False Memory in Child Abuse, Term Paper Example

One of the most impactful debates with law and the sciences has been the question of repressed memories of abuse. Some argue that such evidence is accurate and should be admissible as evidence. Others argue such so-called recovered memories should not be admissible because clinicians tend to make positive suggestion to clients and human memory is known to be inaccurate and susceptible to artificiality. This dichotomy is investigated here.

In the 1980s, the presence of two uniformly dreadful trends came to pass. Authentic childhood sexual abuse (CSA) became increasingly evident, but a lot of victims were not thought to be telling the truth (Ornstein, Ceci, & Loftus, 1998). Still, many scientists believe there is not enough data to confirm false memory syndrome (FMS) (Gold, Hughes, & Hohnecker, 1994). A disconnected but aching quandary is the understanding that not guilty citizens have been blamed of offenses wrecking their lives and those of their relatives (Ornstein, Ceci, & Loftus, 1998). A consideration of these two kinds of devastating occurrences necessitates a concern for the function of recall (Ornstein, Ceci, & Loftus, 1998). Of particular significance are questions related to the degree to which belated information of harrowing occurrences are taken to be correct and realistic likenesses of actuality and the level to which recollection is flexible and can become fuzzy in due course (Ornstein, Ceci, & Loftus, 1998). Occurrences involving ill-treatment can be arranged scalar from independently validated memories to those where no memory exists at all let alone validation (Ornstein, Ceci, & Loftus, 1998). In the middle, there are cases which share characteristics of each (Ornstein, Ceci, & Loftus, 1998). Researchers have studied cases where a person has no recollection of a distressful experience whether or not it occurred, engages in treatment, and come out with detailed recall (Ornstein, Ceci, & Loftus, 1998).

Over 6oo undergraduate students were surveyed to examine their thinking and knowledge about repressed memories. Some believed in repressed memories. Others thought clinicians sometimes produce FMS. Some thought at least some repressed memory evidence should be admissible in court (Golding, Sanchez, & Sego, 1996). Women had larger tendency to give credence to the idea than men (Golding, Sanchez, & Sego, 1996). Scientists claim certain cases rely upon a presupposition where psychiatric symptoms are caused by repressed memories (Ornstein, Ceci, & Loftus, 1998). If the memory can be revealed, the symptoms somehow go away (Ornstein, Ceci, & Loftus, 1998).

Nevertheless, delayed recall has been such a widely accepted characteristic of traumatic incidents that it is echoed in the conditions posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD) in the DSM IVr (fourth edition; American Psychiatric Association, 1994): “inability to recall an important aspect of the trauma” (p. 428). Many therapists believe it is the cause of “recurrent and intrusive distressing recollections of the event” (p. 428). As such, many currently steer clear of aggressively supporting remembrance of CSA unless sufficient protection and strength have been established (Gold, 1997). Otherwise, recovery of traumatic memories can circumvent built-in safety mechanisms that keep these matters out of consciousness causing flashbacks and additional types of invasive and psychologically overpowering recall (Gold, 1997). Then, performances tend to significantly worsen instead of improving (Gold, 1997). Even though therapists are avoiding the retrieval of such memories toward increased security and self-management skill set, the question should be answered through rigorous scientific processes (Gold, 1997). Few researchers have actively engaged testing the bases of each side of the debate sufficiently to answer the question (Gold, 1997). It represents some of the core issues to the psychological endeavor itself (Gold, 1997).

Too much reliance on traumatic memory retrieval early on in the development of psychotherapy had become a major problem because there was not enough scientific data to help clinicians understand the iatrogenic effects (Gold, 1997). Many clinical experts believe these pitfalls could have been avoided had there been more cooperation between scientists and clinicians and less animosity with respect to such treatments (Gold, 1997). Scientists tended to see clinicians as unscientific, and clinicians tended to see scientists as overly analystical (Gold, 1997). In the end it was society and CSA survivors who suffered (Gold, 1997). In order to rectify this trend, both clinical and research psychologists have teamed up in order to address the issue headlong (Gold, 1997). Although we have yet to see the final results of such a resolution, some changes have occurred in recent years (Gold, 1997). A middle way is emerging whereby, neither is repressed memory denied nor is FMS (Gold, 1997).

Researchers have also studied cases in which a person has incomplete recollections of previous trauma (Ornstein, Ceci, & Loftus, 1998). Here, an incomplete remembrance can develop into complex distortions over time (Ornstein, Ceci, & Loftus, 1998). Even where the incomplete recollection is true, alterations can still happen (Ornstein, Ceci, & Loftus, 1998). Some therapists are troubled by mistaken beliefs about how the human memory system functions (Ornstein, Ceci, & Loftus, 1998). While, others employ in potentially unsafe techniques based upon such mistaken beliefs confound memory retrieval with positive suggestion (Ornstein, Ceci, & Loftus, 1998). Prominent understandings about the function human memory center on sequences within recall method (Ornstein, Ceci, & Loftus, 1998). It is believed that a developmental point of view is imperative for taking into account issues of adults trying to recall stuff from remote times (Ornstein, Ceci, & Loftus, 1998). The levels to which false information may corrupt recall performance and the delineation between realism and daydreaming have been scrutinized (Ornstein, Ceci, & Loftus, 1998).

Nevertheless, each case is different. Researchers dispute that a assortment of mental features are positioned within the system professional recommendations to courts to evaluate the reliability of victims’ claims of sexual abuse when there is a major postponement in exposure of the facts (Alison, Kebbell, & Lewis, 2006). As such, they evaluate the victims’ claims of they come to recall repressed memories, how the assertion of ill-treatment initiated in a curative situation, and the intricacies about oversimplifying observed data (Alison, Kebbell, & Lewis, 2006). These problems can be more simply evaded if authorities preserve a case-by-case mindset (Alison, Kebbell, & Lewis, 2006). The debate about bogus and exposed recall hinge on the courts’ reasoning about acceptability of such testimony, and professional witnesses ought to cautiously portray findings from research as well as victim recall (Alison, Kebbell, & Lewis, 2006).

A somber investigation of the debate has been attacked based on traditional logic (Spiegel, 1997). The classical method of question and answer has been applied to the case with some success (Spiegel, 1997). For example, it has become logically accept that the complaints of either side against the other must also be applied to the complainant (Spiegel, 1997). Questions of inordinate diagnoses and coercion have been applied to both scenarios (Spiegel, 1997). When CSA survivors with reports of repressed memories begin to recant their claims of abuse, clinicians though it might be because of family pressure for example (Spiegel, 1997). They contended that if FMS can be detected for non-existent events of CSA then they could also be detected for FMS of CSA non-abuse (Spiegel, 1997). The question of dissociation with respect to trauma has been well documented (Spiegel, 1997). Also, the length of time between the event and recall (trauma or not) has been demonstrated to reduce the quality of memories and decrease their reliability (Spiegel, 1997). So, it is not just a matter of remembering trauma per say, the human memory functions in a specific way that is not meant to be fool proof. It is more likely to take recent, relevant information and interpolate it into less recent knowledge to acquire a sort of synthetic understanding of the world – a necessarily inaccurate understanding.

That being said, it is important to note that science itself is a function of the human mind and not foolproof wither. So, for either side of the argument to become too dogmatic about any assertion without clear statistical evidence is fool hearty. The human mind itself is one of the least understood phenomenons in reality and to presume that one no matter how knowledge d or experienced has all of the answers is simply impossible.

It seems false memories can be created, however. False memory formation was observed in individuals who report having recovered recollections of traumatic experiences doubtful such as being kidnapped by extra-terrestrials (Clancy, McNally, Schacter, Lenzenweger, & Pitman, 2002). Researches investigated false memory of three groups:

1. Those having reported recovered recollections of being kidnapped by extra-terrestrials
2. Those who believe they were kidnapped by extra-terrestrials but have no recall of it
3. Those who refute having been kidnapped by extra-terrestrials (Clancy, McNally, Schacter, Lenzenweger, & Pitman, 2002).

Those in the first two groups were more likely to have FMS, but they did not differ in other significant recall measures (Clancy, McNally, Schacter, Lenzenweger, & Pitman, 2002). High hypnotic suggestibility, depression, and schizotypic scores were significant predictors for FMS (Clancy, McNally, Schacter, Lenzenweger, & Pitman, 2002).

There are legal implications to both so-called repressed and false memories. Mental health professionals acting as expert witnesses are expected to testify about the prevalence of sexual abuse, and also about the veracity of memory. In cases concerning grown survivors CSA, the evidence is typically about repressed and FMS (Rotzien, 2002). Many professionals have noted concerns about the lack of definitive data to support either syndrome. Juror awareness and knowledge of repressed and FMS, their attitudes about CSA and memory recovery, and gender, result in effects for repressed memory knowledge, experience and gender (Rotzien, 2002). Again gender differences about beliefs CSA and FMA were found (Rotzien, 2002).

These facts weigh in on the legal controversy at hand. Should recovered memories of CSA be admissible as evidence in court (Gordon, 1998)? Especially if the information is spoken by expert clinical witnesses, the professional opinion of the testimony may play an undo part in the trial, and the accused may be denied the fairness guaranteed them (Gordon, 1998). In essence, it would become somewhat of a publicity war before the bench because, at this stage in the game, there are no clear ct answers and scant methods for determining the existent or non-existence of an FMS memory or the quality or validity of a recovered repressed memory (Gordon, 1998). Much of the responsibility for this dilemma rest with the judiciary itself (Gordon, 1998). They are the ones that administer rules of evidence in the court room (Gordon, 1998).

This duty, however, may be augmented with material knowledge of the debate itself and as more and more facts about repressed memories, means of retrieval and FMS are known, and the better they will be able to perform this duty (Brainerd, Reyna, Wright, & Mojardin, 2003). For example, researchers have posited a possible explanation for the both phenomenon (Brainerd, Reyna, Wright, & Mojardin, 2003). They have come to understand that memory may be false in the fine details but true overall (Brainerd, Reyna, Wright, & Mojardin, 2003). Let us say, that a CSA survivor recovers a traumatic memory the details of which include a blue painted room. Well, just because the room may have actually been green does not necessarily mean that the rest of the memory as wholesale false also. The basis of what they have found is then two fold. The length of time to retrieval impacts the quality of the memory and details of memories during trauma may be distorted even though the overall memory of an event may be true (Brainerd, Reyna, Wright, & Mojardin, 2003). This is part and parcel to the natural defenses of the mind. It rejects ideas that are too distressful to face, and it tends to forget unimportant information (Brainerd, Reyna, Wright, & Mojardin, 2003).

Clinicians and scientist are finding ways to tease out fallacies in human memory. Recent case law and mass media events confirm recovered and FMS can occur (Palm & Gibson, 1998). Although recovery of repressed memories can be accurate in certain instances, some skeptics do not believe uncorroborated memories should be sufficient evidence in criminal cases based alone on the relevance of false memorization (Spiegel, 1997). As it turns out, memories are not very reliable after all. Stressors typically impact the way memories are encoded especially in children (Howe, Cicchetti, & Toth, 2006). The result of trauma and neurological development on fundamental recall procedures have been investigated (Howe, Cicchetti, & Toth, 2006). Some evidence suggests that mistreated children’s fundamental memory processes are not dependably dissimilar from those of other kids. (Howe, Cicchetti, & Toth, 2006). The effects of abuse related symptoms such as dissociation and despair on essential memory processes and false recollections as well as positive suggestion predicate an obvious requirement for continued study (Howe, Cicchetti, & Toth, 2006).

The social impact of the debate can hardly be overstated. People’s live have been shattered by false testimonies as they have been from CSA. It boils down to an acceptable application of knowledge by scientists, clinicians, law enforcement, and the judiciary – including jurors. One would hope that the overall process that is currently in play to resolve these issues makes enough headway in the coming years to bring some certainty to such a sensitive and misunderstood subject. The rights of the abused and the rights of the accused and public safety are all at stake.

References

Alison, L., Kebbell, M., & Lewis, P. (2006). Considerations for experts in assessing the credibility of recovered memories of child sexual abuse: The importance of maintaining a case-specific focus. Psychology, Public Policy, and Law, 12(4), 419-441.

Brainerd, C. J., Reyna, V. F., Wright, R., & Mojardin, A. H. (2003). Recollection rejection: False-memory editing in children and adults. Psychological Review, 110(4), 762-784.

Clancy, S. A., McNally, R. J., Schacter, D. L., Lenzenweger, M. F., & Pitman, R. K. (2002). Memory distortion in people reporting abduction by extra-terrestrials. Journal of Abnormal Psychology, 111(3), 455-461.

Gold, S. N. (1997). False memory syndrome: A false dichotomy between science and practice. American Psychologist, 52(9), 988-989.

Golding, J. M., Sanchez, R. P., & Sego, S. A. (1996). Do you believe in repressed memories? Professional Psychology: Research and Practice, 27(5), 429-437.

Gordon, J. D. (1998). Admissibility of repressed memory evidence by therapists in sexual abuse cases. Psychology, Public Policy, and Law, 4(4), 1198-1225.

Howe, M. L., Cicchetti, D., & Toth, S. L. (2006). Childrens basic memory processes, stress, and maltreatment. Development and Psychopathology, 18(3), 759-69.

Ornstein, P. A., Ceci, S. J., & Loftus, E. F. (1998). Adult recollections of childhood abuse: Cognitive and developmental perspectives. Psychology, Public Policy, and Law, 4(4), 1025-1051.

Palm, K. M., & Gibson, P. (1998). Recovered memories of childhood sexual abuse: Clinicians practices and beliefs. Professional Psychology: Research and Practice, 29(3), 257-261.

Rotzien, A. L., PhD. (2002). Factors influencing juror verdict in a case involving repressed memories of abuse. Current Psychology, 21(3), 220-239.

Spiegel, A. (1997). Memories: True and false. American Psychologist, 52(9), 995-996.