Perspective of Interagency Cooperation, Term Paper Example

Abstract

Interagency cooperation has been promoted by the U.S.  Government proactively since the events of 9/11 which introduced a new type of threat for Homeland Security. The threat was unexpected, and as Krawchuk (2005, p. 1) states: “The United States is unused to the experience of terrorism on its own shores”. This indicates that a new approach for combating terrorism needed to be introduced, and a new trend emerged in Homeland Security: the model of information sharing and collaboration. The below paper will not only review the initiatives related to interagency cooperation, detailed in the 9/11 report for the Senate, published in 2011, but also will attempt to evaluate the effectiveness of the newly introduced programs. The main finding of the below paper is that collaboration and information sharing among agencies increased the United States’ capabilities to identify, eliminate, and prevent terrorist threats targeting the Global West, and in particular the United States.

Introduction

Since the terrorist attacks of  9/11, the need for more collaboration among agencies (homeland and international) has been realized by the U.S. Government. The Status Report (Budinger & Smith, 2011, p. 2) states that “Since 9/11, there has been a shift in federal and state government culture towards this type of information sharing and collaboration model, and some segments of the government have made progress implementing information sharing policies. Government sources report that this approach, in turn, has been very successful”. At the same time, the United States’ Homeland Security has been criticized several times since the attacks, and the above mentioned “successful” outcomes of collaborative covert operations have been questioned by both politicians and journalists.

Gertz (2011) states that the CIA is taking over several affairs from military, as the U.S. is currently trying to avoid taking unnecessary risks. The training of secret military forces abroad is still in the hand of covert agencies, and this reduces the operation’s success, according to the author. Collaboration, on the other hand, can be beneficial when locating terrorists, and identifying threats to national or international security. The main achievement of the collaborative covert operations, mentioned by Gertz (2011) is certainly the killing of Osama Bin Laden. Without interagency cooperation, it is clear that the operation would not have been successful.

In order to successfully combat terrorism, according to Cerami & Boggs (2007), the policies and procedures of several agencies need to be aligned. This is defined as one of the main challenges of interagency cooperation. A recent research symposium, titled “The Interagency Process in Support and Stability Operations: The Integration and Alignment of Military and Civilian Roles and Missions” (2007) has concluded that there are too many military personnel who state that peacekeeping missions taken on by the United States have resulted in little or no success in countries where terrorist threats aiming at the Global West originate from. The main focus of investigation within the current essay will be on improving collaboration among agencies by aligning procedures, correctly allocating information and tasks, and focusing on a shared mission: the protection of stability and security at home and in countries where U.S. forces and covert operations are present.

Problem Statement

While several government initiatives have been proposed since the shocking events of 9/11 to improve the effectiveness of covert operations through information sharing and collaboration, the results have been questioned by both politicians and political scientists. Krawchuk (2005)  states that there is currently an overwhelming task that different agencies (The Department of Defense (DoD), Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), Department of State (DoS), Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) in the United States face. The agencies need to clearly define their own responsibilities, deal with the overlapping operations and gaps in strategic approaches. Aligning the operations of the above large and complex agencies is a task that cannot be completed in a two-to-three years, and it is likely that a strategic approach to collaboration needs to be applied. Cerami & Boggs (2007) ask the question clearly related to the effectiveness of interagency collaboration: “If the interagency process is in such obvious need for adjustment and so vital to current efforts, why is it so difficult to instigate the necessary reforms?” (Cerami & Boggs, 2007, p. 1). Through the below literature review, the author of the current essay would like to reveal the main challenges in front of policymakers, agency leaders, and the U.S. government, and will attempt to find effective methods to overcome the hindering effects of multiple responsibilities and policies.

Literature Review

The Status Report (Budinger & Smith, 2011) identified some challenges related to homeland security and terrorist threats related to transport, immigration, and screening of individuals. The report states that the government needs to operate in a new way after 9/11. Proposing a program for robust sharing of information and intelligence across the agencies, the recommendations of the status report include the creation of a network for collaboration and safe transmission of data. While there are several risks associated with sharing information across agencies, the potential benefits – according to the authors – are greater.

The main reason why 9/11 happened, according to Budinger & Smith (2011) is because the U.S. Government failed to adapt to the “networked world”. As the authors state: “The U.S. government might have prevented the 9/11 attacks if the Federal Bureau of Investigation (“FBI”), the Central Intelligence Agency (“CIA”), and state and local law enforcement had connected what they each knew about the hijackers and acted upon it” (Budinger & Smith, 2011, p. 2). The main issue back in 2001 was the “wall” between intelligence and law enforcement, which prevented collaboration. The CIA was not likely to share information with the FBI and vice versa, therefore, the collaboration stalled, and the agencies failed to prevent the terrorist attack. From the report reviewed above, it is evident that the U.S. government does not want to fail to “connect the dots” any more.

The virtual reorganization of the government and its law enforcement / intelligence agencies was necessary, because the agencies realized how serious the threat was. The shift started in 2001 from a “need to know” culture towards a “need to share” approach. Based on the recommendations of the Markle Task Force (Baird & Barksdale, 2006) highlighted the possible solutions: creating a trusted information sharing environment, and increasing trust, as well as government accountability.

The 9/11 Commission Report (2004) states that counterterrorism in the United States has existed for many decades before 9/11. However, the experience in the 1980-s suggested to decisionmakers that the only part of the government that should be involved in counterterrorism and the fight against military conflict in the Eastern world (in particular Israel and Palestine) should be military forces. This line of thought existed for many years, and while intelligence agencies worked on one level of international affairs, they had nothing to do with military action. No real collaboration existed. One example is brought up by the report, related to the Gulf War, When the Iraqi agents warned America that the then former president, George W. Bush was under threat, the government decided to fire missiles and hit back on the ground, instead of using a collaborative approach.

The main weaknesses of America’s counterterrorist program are clearly highlighted by the authors of the 9/11 Commission Report (2004). These are:

Structural barriers within the U.S. government and administration that hinder collaboration among agencies. There is –  according to the report  – a lack of joint mission, therefore, there is no real integration within “joint” operations.

The lack of shared values, standards, and common grounds among agencies that make information easy to share, disclose, and utilize in joint operations. The report recommends that agencies create a common set of standards in order to make collaboration easier.

The management of intelligence agencies and communities is divided. Different tasks and responsibilities are now assigned to various federal agencies, and the CIA lost its influence on several affairs. As the authors put it: the Central Intelligence Agency is no longer “Central”.

Agencies are also criticized for their weak capacity for organizing and allocating resources in a timely manner, and reacting to threats and dangerous situations.

Further, according to the report, there are now too many jobs assigned to various government departments. As an example, the DCI is responsible for running the CIA, briefing the President on international affairs, and manage collaboration at the same time.

Finally, the report states that agencies are too complex and secret. Back in 2004. when the report was written, there were 15 intelligence agencies in the United States, all having their own set of rules and confidentiality regulations.

After reviewing the 2004 situation, it is important to check what changed in the years following 9/11, and the release of the 9/11 Commission Report. The Rand Corporation (Davis et al., 2010) created an overview report on the long term effects of the terrorist attacks on the collaboration among agencies, homeland security, and counterterrorism. The research was sponsored by the National Institute of Justice, U.S. Department of Justice, and highlighted some important steps that homeland security agencies took in order to improve the effectiveness of counterterrorist and safety initiatives. The main research questions focused on the development of law enforcement strategies, what type of challenges arose while implementing changes, and how does information-sharing, technological advancement support the coordination of homeland security activities. Finally, the authors (Davis et al., 2010, p. 410) asked the question: “What are the current benefits associated with this long-term focus on CT and HS? What analytic framework can be used to assess the potential costs?”

One of the main trends analyzed by the authors related to reforms after 9/11 is the creation and development of fusion centers and hubs (networks) for information sharing. According to the authors, the U.S. government became motivated to utilize existing technology in order to facilitate networking and the sharing of intelligence. This approach was not only fast and effective, but also cheaper than creating new infrastructure that is compatible with all agencies’ systems and information technology.

Reorganization of agencies is also mentioned by the authors (Davis et al., 2010), as an advancement that facilitates improved effectiveness and leverage. Through reorganization of agencies, the government managed to reduce the number of overlapping responsibilities, and could spend its resources on advancing the analytic capabilities needed to determine threats and identify trends during military or political conflicts. However, the most important advancement, according to the report, was, that the government did not only allow and facilitate information exchange, but also formalized it. This way, information sharing is no longer dependent on individual contacts and network, but it is available for people who need it. As a result, information became centralized, and relationships among agencies became managed on a professional level.

By encouraging the adaptation of regional approach, the response and readiness capabilities of agencies grew, and counterterrorism and homeland security started a long term, regional collaboration using centralized intelligence available for interested parties. This, indeed, resulted in a higher level of competence across the intelligence community.

With regards to training and facilitating initiatives, several changes are identified by the report written nine years after the terrorist attack (Davis et al., 2010). Prior to 9/11, the intelligence community did not focus on counterterrorism, however, immediately after the events, a shift was clearly visible. As the authors (Davis et al., p. 60) confirm: “Whereas before the 9/11 terrorist attacks LEA intelligence activities were focused on gangs, organized crime, drug trafficking, and other related areas, after 9/11 LEAs began to focus on terrorism-related intelligence in addition to criminal intelligence”. The terrorist attacks also triggered the creation of units with a single focus on counterterrorism and homeland security. Federal funding was made available for the creation of fusion centers, and multi-juristictional centers were created. Specialized response units were also brought to life, as a result of increased awareness about homeland security threats.

While several challenges occurred after the introduction of reforms focused on merging homeland security and counterterorist activities within the United States, it is also important to note that – according to several authors (Krawchuk, 2005; Budinger & Smith, 2011) the changes brought forwards several benefits, such as improved efficiency, increased analytical and technological capabilities, reduced personnel cost, and overall higher competency across organizations.

While it is important to review the changes introduced by the U.S. Federal Government in response to the events that shook the intelligence community as well as the American public, it I also crucial to analyze the impact of the changes introduced. Budinger & Smith (2011) created a comprehensive status report for the Senate Committee on Homeland Security & Governmental Affairs. The authors state that the success of the reforms focused on collaboration proved that “Washington can work”, and “the result of these reforms is that people within government are starting to work across agency lines in new and more powerful ways to understand the meaning of fragments of information and use that analysis to make better decisions” (Budinger & Smith, 2011, p. 3).  Therefore, the reorganization of the intelligence community within the United States did not only increase the capacity of government agencies, and improved the collaboration among various offices, but consequently it increased the capabilities of each agency and advisory body to make informed decisions related to homeland security and counterterrorism. In the operation that focused on finding and killing Osama Bin Laden, for example, several agencies worked together, such as the CIA, the NSA, the Director of National Intelligence, and the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (Budinger & Smith, 2011). The  leader of the interagency team was the CIA, however, the results would not have been achieved without the fusion of intelligence operations. Similarly, in 2009, a plot to bomb the New York underground Metro system was prevented as a result of close collaboration among agencies. The above examples show that efforts focusing on collaboration to identify threats and prevent terrorist attacks pay off. While the authors (Budinger & Smith, 2011) admit that success has been achieved through collaboration, the report also lists several shortcomings and development areas for the government to consider. The main points made by the status report are listed below.

While progress has been made, the intelligence community should not forget that the threats have not disappeared, and agencies need to keep their guards up. New threats and channels of communication appeared, such as internet-based messages targeting “lone wolves” to join terrorist groups. Intelligent agencies need to focus on identifying new sources of threats in order to protect the nation.

There is a need for developing a shared vision across agencies in order to overcome “bureaucratic resistance”. On the other hand, controlling the flow of information to protect the interest of the United States and international community fighting against terrorism is important. Some shortcomings are clearly visible in the information sharing approach applied by the coordinators of interagency operations from the recent WikiLeaks scandals.

The U.S. Government should focus on developing individual and organizational capabilities, updating knowledge of staff, and providing training for personnel to overcome the terrorism-related challenges of the future.

Themes and Initiatives Identified

The above literature review and analysis of reforms after the events of 9/11 have shown that the government of the United States has started focusing on sharing information and collaborating on the state, regional, and federal level. While studies reviewed above have stated that the efforts have been mainly successful, it is important to note here that there are personnel-related consequences of the reorganization of the intelligence community. One of the main issues identified related to the reorganization of agencies was the security of information sharing. By increasing collaboration, the agencies also elevated the risks of exposing sensitive information, therefore, focus should be placed on preventing further WikiLeaks events.

Budinger & Smith (2011) states that at the same time as increasing information sharing capabilities and technology, security measures and protection systems have to be developed simultaneously in order to protect information. While allowing the public to find out about activities might be unpleasant for the government, terrorists accessing the same information would increase the threat of attacks.

Information sharing was found to be a toll that made the entire homeland security department and community more efficient (Budinger & Smith), therefore, it should be further encouraged. As it has been previously mentioned by several authors, the main reason why 9/11 happened was because government agencies focused on a “need to know” approach, instead of a “need to share” one (Budinger & Smith, 2011). However, changing the priorities and aligning missions calls for the creation of a shared vision across agencies. Without working towards the same objectives, having the same priorities and goals, the agencies’ collaboration will be hindered. Therefore, creating a cross-agency shared vision is necessary for improving collaboration and networking.

Davis et al. (2010) stated that training of homeland security personnel across agencies and standardizing compliance requirements can be burdensome, and calls for a strategic approach. The authors also state that counterterrorism and homeland security training in the United States is carried out on a “campaign” basis, after major events, instead of maintaining continuity and focusing on updating employees’ knowledge about new threats and methods used by terrorists. Continuous improvement should be in the focus of training and reorganization programs, in order to allow the joint operations of homeland security and counterterrorism become more effective. Horizontal collaboration among agencies was found to be the main reason for the United States’ increased capabilities to identify and eliminate terrorist threats.

Cerami (2007) stated that in order to improve the overall effectiveness of counterterrorism and homeland security operations, it is important that the United States aligns interagency processes focusing on long term plans and policies. This thought also confirms that the United States should become more “proactive” and less “reactive” fighting terrorism at home and abroad. Managing and monitoring agencies’ performance and creating an evaluation framework to measure the effectiveness of collaboration is needed, according to the study. Improvements in the leadership also need to be created, in order to communicate a shared vision more effectively.

Similarly, the findings of Krawchuk’s (2005) study suggest that there is a need for a flexible and adaptable interagency approach, in order to make policies and strategies more comprehensive. The author suggests that the agencies create a “network-centric warfare”, focusing on spotting and understanding the political and social context of counterinsurgency operations. The suggested multidisciplinary approac/h to counterterrorism and homeland security includes the elimination of military and insurgent freedom movements, creating a secure environment for operations, and – most importantly – developing interagency capacities with several facets, such as media, law enforcement, civil affairs, and diplomatic approaches.

Conclusion

The above study has revealed that the events related to 9/11 created a wake-up-call within the United States intelligence community to increase collaboration and effectiveness of agencies. Three main trends have been identified based on the research. First of all: the lack of collaboration created a hindering effect on the effective operation of intelligence agencies. Second, that the focus of intelligence agencies after 9/11 shifted from law enforcement and organized crime towards counterterrorism and homeland security. Third, that the collaboration initiatives introduced by the government of the Untied States have increased both effectiveness and organizational capabilities.

The main challenges identified regarding the integration of operations and collaboration were related to the lack of shared vision, principles, practices, and systems. Several additional security threats originated from collaboration, such as WikiLeaks, which could have been avoided if there was a long-term, strategic approach focusing on data security, training of personnel, and the identification of future threats and challenges.

The main challenge the intelligence community is likely to face in the future is that terrorist groups are becoming more advanced in techniques, and agencies need to closely  monitor new sources of threats in order to develop strategies to eliminate them, just like the use of social media to recruit members for terrorist groups.

The main finding of the above research is that in today’s America, networking has the capability to increase the overall effectiveness of homeland security and counterterrorism, and there is a need for a multidisciplinary approach towards collecting and analyzing intelligence.

References

Baird, Z., & Barksdale, J. (2006). Implementing a trusted information sharing environment—using immutable audit logs to increase security, trust and accountability. Markle Foundation.

Boggs, J. W., & Cerami, J. R. (2007). The Interagency and Counterinsurgency Warfare: Aligning and Integrating Military and Civilian Roles in Stability, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction Operations.US Army War College

Budinger, Z. B., & Smith, J. H. (2011). Ten Years After 9/11: A Status Report on Information   Sharing.Statements before the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs.

Davis, L., Pollard, M., & Ward, K. (2010). Long-Term Effects of Law Enforcement’s Post-9/11 Focus on Counterterrorism and Homeland Security. RAND Corporation.

Gertz, B. (2011) Military, CIA shun 9/11 panel on covert operations. The Washington Times. September 8, 2011

Krawchuk, F. T. (2005). Combating Terrorism: A Joint Interagency Approach. Institute of Land Warfare, Association of the United States Army.

National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, & United States of America. (2004). The 9/11 Commission Report.