Active Shooters, Dissertation – Literature Example

Blair and Martaindale (2013), assess the United States active shooter events from 2000 to 2010: Training and Equipment Implications. The authors note that between 2000 and 2010, 84 active shooter events (ASEs) transpired.  The report also notes that the frequency of these events appeared to increase over time. The authors further note that “business locations were the most frequently attacked (37%), followed by schools (34%), and public (outdoor) venues (17%). The median number of people killed during ASEs is 2. The median number shot is 4. The most commonly used weapon was a pistol (60%), followed by rifles (27%), and shotguns (10%). Attackers carried multiple weapons in 41% of the attacks. Body armor was worn in 4% of cases” (Blair & Martaindale, 2013, p.2). The authors go on to further note that in 2% of the cases, improvised explosive devices (IEDs) were used and there were shooter who setup barricades in an attempt to keep police officers out. They noted that in 49 % of cases, the killing ended before the police arrived and 56% case required police to use force to stop the violence.

Dorn and Stately (2012) evaluate the significance of teaching students and staff how to mitigate the risks of active shooters. The authors identify some of the core causes of danger as the lack of lockable doors in many classrooms, or even space allocation that led to victims trapped and cornered by active shooters. They attribute the ability of staff and student interference during active student incidents as an essential tool to reducing casualties. They base this position on incidents like in the Kip Kinkel shooting where a student was able to subdue the shooter in Thurston Oregon. The authors note that Kinkel was subdued while reloading and he had a second as well as 600 rounds of ammunition (Dorn & Satterly, 2012, p6).  The authors find that “overemphasizing any one type of threat in training and drills can be a dangerous practice for schools. A review of’ research in the field of crisis decision making reveals that affording people with a relatively broad base of knowledge for a variety of’ types of crisis situations can help them better respond to almost any situation they may face” (Dorn and Stately, 2012, p8). The report identifies involving staff and students in safety precautions for active student incidents as one of the most overlooked avenues for enhancing safety, but one of the most essential for 360 degree precaution rendering.

Ergenbright and Hubbard (2012), assesses 14 case studies This thesis contains 14 case studies that examine lethal Active Shooter incidents that occurred in U.S. IHEs, as well as the Oslo and Utoya Island Active Shooter event that occurred in Norway. Data analysis on each of these incidents revealed facility composition as a critical vulnerability common to all of these incidents. Accordingly, the recommendations included in this thesis suggest a practical implementation of facility upgrades capable of mitigating the deadly effects of Active Shooters. The authors point out that Active Shooter incidents in universities, colleges and other institutions of Higher Education inside the United States on average last a duration of 12.5 minutes. The problem the study uncovers is that “the average response time of campus and local law enforcement to these incidents is 18 minutes” (Ergenbright & Hubbard, 2012, p.1). In the majority of Active Shooter incidents affecting U.S. IHEs, the emergency response time greatly exceeds the incident duration and affords law enforcement authorities no opportunity to interdict the shooter or prevent further casualties.

Jamieson and Griffith (2010), identify first responder training as an essential method to mitigating active shooter violence. The authors note that, “beyond the need for first responder police training that has been underscored by recent high-profile events” (Jamieson & Griffith, 2010, p58).Similar to Ergenbright and Hubbard’s argument about the significance time plays in reducing the impact of active shooters, especially in regards to the possibility of adverting casualties, Jamieson and Griffith also emphasize the value time plays in active shooter cases. The authors note that, “active shooters can inflict significant harm during the time that elapses between the arrival of patrol and intervention by the tactical unit. This became painfully obvious in the Columbine High School tragedy in Littleton, Colorado, in April of 1999” (Jamieson & Griffith, 2010, p58).

A case assesses that Deputy Neil Gardner arrived at the scene of the shooting at 11:24 A.M.  This was one minute after receiving the call from dispatch. He received fire from one of the shooters on his arrival immediately. The report further notes that “deputy Gardner returned fire with a .45 caliber service weapon at a distance of 60 yards, and when the shooter retreated to the school, Gardner called for assistance and began assisting fleeing students to safety. In the next six minutes, five more officers arrived, and as they tried to establish perimeter containment, they received reports of as many as eight shooters, rooftop snipers, and suspects fleeing amid the escaping students, bombs, fire, and hostages” (Jamieson & Griffith, 2010, p58). Some of the victims who escape were injured and they required medical assistance which also played a part in law enforcement response protocols. Shooting continued inside the school. By 11:44 A.M the containment perimeter was secured, and by 11:52 A.M a SWAT team was assembled, and ran an organized a counter assault. All of this demonstrates the fact that response rates are significantly slow and need to be improved in order for law enforcement agencies to have a viable shot at reducing the impact of these shootings. The initial shooting starts at 11:24 and the case shows that while the officer was able to get on the scene within a minute of being contacted, it took dispatch twenty minutes to get the information to the deputy.

Justice (2013), in his study on whether or not U.S. law enforcement is ready for a Mumbai style shooting notes that between 2007 and 2012 that there were an estimated 25 mass shooting, seven of which occurred in 2012. Justice recognizes Mumbai as a prime model of what can occur in the U.S. The author notes that, “the November 26, 2008, attack on Mumbai is a transparent example of how determined terrorists, trained to die fighting, can bring a large metropolitan city to its knees. It is entirely probable that Mumbai-type attacks could occur in the United States. Since the local law enforcement respond to attacks in progress, any active shooter event would be handled by the local jurisdiction” (Justice, 2013, p.5). Justice further notes that this knowledge has led law enforcement agencies in the U.S. to better prepare for Mumbai type attacks. The study finds that a key way for active shooter incidents to be reduced is to enhance the communications and technology tools used to interact or engage nearby attack regions early on.  This is a common finding across many of the studies, specifically concepts that will assist

Lankford (2013), assess the fundamental difference between mass shooters who die verses those who actually survive their attacks. The study shows that only 4% of murders commit suicide. Lankford that this data shows that the majority of mass shooters prioritize their survival and even plan for it. The author notes that “like other murderers, mass shooters who attack in public places, at work, or at school have demonstrated a willingness to violate social, religious, and legal norms by taking the lives of others. And like terrorists, they often perform their attacks on a “public stage before an audience” against victims who are largely strangers, “chosen for their symbolic significance or targeted at random”” (Lankford, 2013, p2).  Lankford does note that at first glance the data stating suicide in active shooter cases are minimal actually appears to be false, noting cursory data shows that “approximately 38% of mass shooters commit suicide by their own hand, and as many as 10% successfully orchestrate “suicide by cop”. As defined by Lindsay and Lester (2004), “suicide by cop” refers to suspects’ intentional provocation of police by “threatening the police officers or civilians in the area with a weapon, most commonly a gun” … Lankford goes on to point out how suicide by cop is the natural transition of and lethal method of committing suicide by engaging in fire with the police. Lanford notes that “the would-be suicide knows that police officers are trained in the use of guns (and so in all likelihood will hit their target), are certain to have a gun, and will fire in life-threatening situations” (p. 4). In addition to those those who commit suicide or “suicide by cop,” there is a large percentage of attackers who survive were clinically suicidal as well. The report notes that these were failed attempts due to the fact that they failed in their attempts to die or decided in the final moments against the decision (Lankford, 2013, p2).

Martinez (2012), evaluates police response to critical incidents in American institutions.  The study points out that law enforcement agencies, in response to increasing mass shooting incidents, have attempted to revise their tactics and protocols. The study finds what many previous studies have concluded that time is a critical factor in reducing the impact of mass shootings. Martinez notes that “police officials have determined that officers’ response time is detrimental to the safety of our nation’s schools, and with this new officer training program, their officers will minimize the number of casualties during a critical incident in academic institutions” (Martinez, 2012, p.69). The study concludes that the greatest threat to academic institutions is one singular assailant with assault weapons.

In sum, the core consensus of all the studies is that law enforcement agencies need to devote more resources to first responders units and reducing response times.   There can also be a correlation made between the reduction in active shooter casualty rates and training students and staff.

Reference

Blair, J. P., & Martaindale, M. H. (2013). United States Active Shooter Events from 2000 to 2010: Training and Equipment Implications.

Dorn, M. S., & Satterly Jr, S. (2012). Fight, Flight or Lockdown-?Teaching Students and Staff to Attack Active Shooters could Result in Decreased Casualties or Needless Deaths.

Ergenbright, C. E., & Hubbard, S. K. (2012). Defeating the Active Shooter: Applying Facility Upgrades in Order to Mitigate the Effects of Active Shooters in High Occupancy Facilities. Naval Postgraduate School Monterey Ca.

Jamieson, J. D., & Griffith, S. (2010). Problem Solving for First Responders.Police Problem Solving, 57.

Justice, J. M. (2013). Active shooters: is law enforcement ready for a Mumbai style attack? (Doctoral dissertation, Monterey, California: Naval Postgraduate School).

Lankford, A. (2013). Mass Shooters in the USA, 1966–2010: Differences Between Attackers Who Live and Die. Justice Quarterly, (ahead-of-print), 1-20.

Martínez, L. E. (2012). The Police Response to Critical Incidents in Academic Institutions. Journal of Police Crisis Negotiations, 12(1), 69-77.

Parfitt, R. (2012). A New Campus Police Agency: A Florida Experience.Campus Law Enforcement Journal, 42(5).