Aristotle, Kant, and Two Concepts of Ethics, Essay Example

Introduction

Determining a higher level or more accurate definition of ethics has been a challenge for philosophy since the first theories were proposed in Western civilization.  It is typically recognized that good exists, and consequently that what is not good exists, but the disputes and differences of thinking go to critical matters of utility, ambition, and human nature itself.  Ethics is then subject to wildly varying perspectives, and few are as diametrically opposed as the teleological and deontological.  The former, famously proposed by Aristotle, insists that ethical good is demanded by recognizing that the quality of good validates itself as end, and that a thing’s being good is both a desirable state and sufficient to require its presence as good; deontology, conversely, and as represented by Kant, holds that good is less universal and that only the moral will behind behaviors and actions determine the nature of such as good.  In plain terms, for Aristotle good is what occurs, and for Kant it is what prompts the processes and conforms to duty to morality.  Certainly, both perspectives are marked by opportunities for debate, even as an examination of the two reveals that they are not necessarily antithetical philosophies.  In the following, these aspects of Aristotelian and Kantian ethics will be explored, exposing that, rather than a “superior” set of ethics established, what is revealed is what may be termed an ironic and philosophical kinship.

Basics of Theories

With Aristotle, teleology is subject to some complexity, but may be briefly stated as a reliance upon the belief that good validates its own presence, or provides reason enough to be held as the most desirable behavior and state of being.  He very much seeks to establish, even as he recognizes variations in ethics arising from specific human activities such as politics, a foundational ethics.  This is achieved in his concept of aligning two realities: virtue as the embodiment of good, and human states of good as arising from the human recognition of the value of virtue.  It is the “behavior” of the soul going to the best possible end, which translates to inherent worth of the process as eclipsing any other imperative.  Aristotle’s own issues with Plato, in fact, stem from the Aristotelian insistence that some fixed idea of human good must be in place no matter relative concerns or specific activities.  This he establishes in the form of humans as compelled to choose, no matter the circumstance, the course most in keeping with the soul’s commitment to the excellence of virtue.  It is the ultimate human imperative because no force or entity is superior to good, and the rational man has no alternative but to bend his soul in that direction.  Ultimately, then, Aristotelian teleology is based on good as an immutable reality which, by “virtue of being good,” must be unchallenged as justifying its own being and purpose.

In lay terms, teleology translates to good for the sake of good, specific behavior or goal  notwithstanding, because the soul’s adherence to good requires no other rationale.

Deontology as conceived by Kant goes to a different conception of virtue or morality itself.  Kant may be termed more pragmatic in his philosophy, in that the adherence to duty supersedes all, and this in turn emphasizes the will of the human being as directed to making moral choices.  Kant’s deontology is very removed from consequentialism because he observes that results often contradict ambitions; the will to act immorally, for example, may produce a moral result, and this cannot then render the initial will moral.  More to the point, for Kant the will to act for good is the highest categorical imperative.  It equates to what he perceives, in fact, as the only unquestionable good, given the potentials for action to create what is not good.  The imperative resides in the human acceptance of morality as the dictating force, which translates to the need to view others and other things always as both means and ends; the human being must act in a way looking beyond current circumstances and maintain a focus on achieving a morally correct end, no matter the circumstances.  This is the “duty” core of deontology, in that human agency dictates worth, and agency that conforms to the acceptance of moral good: “Certain actions can be right even though not maximizing of good consequences, for the rightness of such actions consists in their instantiating certain norms” (Stanford 2007).  As may be evident, this is in itself not entirely removed from Aristotelian teleology, as both philosophies rely on virtue ethics and a guiding force of moral law. The difference, however, is significant, in that Kant is far more concerned with processes and outcomes – or the role of morality as instrumental in human affairs – whereas Aristotle insists on good as the objective in all things, requiring no other perspective or validation.

Issues and Challenges: Aristotle

Beginning with Aristotelian teleology, one issue immediately becomes evident; namely, the actual determination of good as good, and thus meriting its presence as an end unto itself.  Virtue ethics is long subject to this type of investigation, if only because humanity is so consistently marked by relativity and varying ideas of virtue itself.  Aristotle supplies preconditions for the existence of virtue, as in voluntary and involuntary actions creating or defying it.  These conditions, however, are subject to interpretation as to actual impact, as what is voluntary may be coerced by external circumstances, just as involuntary action may be partially an ambition of the self.  Then, they do not go to explaining virtue as an essence.  It is one thing to esteem virtue as the superlative force or entity requiring the human soul’s attention and commanding its efforts; it is quite another to define virtue itself.  Aristotle does define virtue but, it may be argued, in a way supporting his views by only a sheer reliance upon them as expressing accepted realities.  For example, Aristotle holds that actions which adhere to virtue intrinsically create pleasure or satisfaction in human beings.  This in itself, however, is lacking as any definition because it creates its own rationale based on the idea that real pleasure arises from doing good, and human history is rife with examples to the contrary.  More exactly, it seems that Aristotle is relying on a definition of pleasure as only a morally grounded gratification, and one then most desirable to human beings.  This is valid to an extent, certainly; many experience profound satisfaction in behaving in virtuous ways, and perceive no greater gratification.  Nonetheless, pleasure is a mutable concept, and one both connected to and distanced from virtue.  The tyrant, for example, may experience deep pleasure from controlling a population and simultaneously believe he is acting for the good of that population.  If his view differs from ideas of good within that population, it is nonetheless his conviction of good.

This then brings Aristotle in league with Kant, in that a normative base of morality must be in place.  Put another way, it is philosophically insufficient to claim that good justifies itself without there being a generally accepted concept of good adhered to by the majority.  Moreover, and problematically, Aristotle easily insists on gradations of good he fully expects all to recognize as truths.  With his Socratic emphasis on politics and the state in place, for example, he assigns greater and lesser degrees of good to various activities.  To make a bridle for a horse is good, but it is better that the horse be ridden well, and it is better than this that the horse should be ridden successfully in battle for the sate; all of this promotes the “greatest” good of serving the state well, which in turns helps to secure individual good (Kraut 200).  This is all perfectly logical, but it also relies on an absolute acceptance of the state being successful in war as the ultimate good, and this is certainly subject to moral argument.  In plain terms, it may be held that the riding of the horse is good only when the horse is turned away from battle, because good is never served with the state’s participation in war.  It is then seen that Aristotelian teleology demands norms, as does Kantian deontology.

More to the point, norms of themselves may not be taken as definitive proofs of true virtue or morality, and Aristotle’s teleology is weakened when the enormity of this reality is understood.  How human beings determine good has been subject to vast interpretation over human history, and the sheer subjectivity of this requires attention.  Certain behaviors and conduct are generally and traditionally perceived as good, and in multiple cultures; to help others in distress and demonstrate caring, for example, are as universal in terms of good as humanity has ever demonstrated.  At the same time, whole civilizations have engaged in actions perceived by themselves as good, and certainly as of value to the state, and seen as immoral by others at the time and by later eras.  To cite an extreme example, slavery was long considered moral by many different cultures, and through processes of moral reasoning.  The slave owners held themselves superior beings, and thus entitled to take ownership of other humans considered in need of being owned, and/or of little value otherwise.  Put another way, it is certain that many slave owners, and slave cultures, fully believed that they were adhering to virtue and morality because the perception of the slaves as innately inferior validated the thinking.  Consequently, the teleological basis of good as substantiating itself is at best questionable, unless there is an attachment of norms to the morality.

Then, an issue exists in that the Aristotelian idea of ethics requires that all things in the universe be ordered in a way promoting virtue, or promoting human constructions of virtue.  Aristotle never overtly declares that a conscious design dictates the natures of all things, but he does rely on certain relationships as evidence of the imperative of virtue, or a natural order creating the harmony necessary for virtue to exist.  For example, plants nourish animals, animals and plants nourish humans, and so a chain of good is created; these nourishing elements posses virtue because of their existence as being good for mankind.  At the same time, and in plain terms, this is a decidedly human-based view of those elements which are not served by humans, but rather only serve them.  Put another way, a cohesive good here is in place only when human interests are considered (Yack 101). Here again, then, Aristotle appears to be vulnerable to weaknesses which must undermine his basic teleological philosophy as good ordering all, simply because far too many factors go to morality itself.

If, however, Aristotle may be challenged in regard to his failure to insist on virtue norms, he does provide something of an address to such concerns.  While never overtly declaring the morality relies on human agreement as to good, he insists, as he is philosophically entitled to, that the concept of happiness as achieved through the soul’s adherence to good must be directed to perfect happiness.  The distinction is important, if not critical; he holds that there is a secondary happiness achieved through following virtue not perfect.  Aristotle does not offer exact definitions of these qualified states, but he does present one defining value: perfect virtue is in fact that virtue which is not desirable because it promotes other virtues, but desirable as itself (Kraut 242).  This may then be seen as a means of validating his ultimate teleological reasoning, and ironically by means of employing the “failure” noted earlier.  That is to say, there is a virtue removed from norms because it exists, and the human soul is obligated to seek this out.  Aristotle famously contradicts himself in many ways, veering from a focus on absolute morality to an equally emphatic focus on the relative morality within human affairs.  Without question, he maintains a Socratic concept of the state as demanding service to benefit mankind and promote virtue which, as discussed, is subject to argument.  At the same time, however, Aristotle’s confidence in what may be termed a supreme, or inviolate, good validates his teleology.  If humanity goes astray, it is because the soul is not properly committed to the good, and this is known because human beings may only know perfect happiness when that relationship exists.

Issues in Kantian Deontology

Without question, Kant generates significant criticism, as his deontological emphasis on moral will as the essential force brings into question, inevitably, the actual import of consequences.  This in itself creates further disputes to Kant, and one of these is expressed by Phillipa Foot, who takes issue with Kant’s neglecting of intelligent rationale as an instrument in moral will.  To begin with, Kant relies on a normative morality in order that human beings may understand how their behaviors should be guided.  The difficulty here then is: how can reason be ignored in human affairs, when the deontology itself exists to promote processes going to the betterment of all?  Equally importantly, and as Foot emphasizes and as has been noted in challenging Aristotle, humanity’s trust in moral determinations as such is inherently suspect:

“It is obvious that the normative character of moral judgment does not guarantee its reason-giving force” (Foot 310). Put another way, if Aristotle is guilty of presupposing an existing and inviolate force of virtue, so too does Kant presuppose a degree of reason by no means necessarily in place.  He seems to assume that the construct of moral norms is simultaneously moral and in accordance with rationality, and this is suspect when the guiding philosophy is that human beings be directed only by the will to do what is moral.  This goes to the flaw frequently identified in deontology: “Deontologists need their own, non-consequentialist model of rationality” (Stanford), and Kant does not provide this.

More dramatically, Mill offers an interesting challenge to Kant, and in the form of questioning the underlying emphasis on duty itself as the governing agent.  Mill in fact holds that Kant is a “covert utilitarian,” unwilling to properly attribute the necessary import to consequences.  Mill is highly impatient with Kant’s disregard, or minimizing, of how immoral consequences may arise from moral incentives to act properly.  He takes Kantian thinking to an extreme, claiming that, in Kant, human beings may conduct outrageously immoral actions, but do not only because the results would be unwanted (Sullivan  345).  Put another way, Kant’s deontology is ultimately consequentialist because it assumes desirable ends as dictating the behavior of the moral will.  This, in plain terms, reinforces utilitarianism and consequentalism, the emphasis on deontology notwithstanding, and hence Mill perceives Kant as obfuscating his  philosophy.  The point is not without strength; certainly, the Kantian stress on human agency as guided by morality norms equates to a large extent on intentionality, which in turn goes to results.

To assert that duty and the moral will must be the governing agents in human affairs would seem to implicitly attach importance to what the duty exists to achieve, and how the moral will is directed to attaining consequences.  It is then plain that both consequentialism and utilitarianism offer strong challenges to Kantian deontology.

In essence, any refutation of such challenges lies, not in any overt argument from Kant, but in the actual dimensions of the philosophies in question.  It is in fact arguable that their strength in challenging deontology lies in a form of the weakness they underscore in deontology; namely, a neglect of their own shortcomings.  In plain terms, consequentialists and utilitarians tend to seek to substitute result and utility for morality, an approach as specious as anything attributed to Kant.  Bentham, for example, holds that only principles of pleasure and pain dictate human behavior and may be utilized to attain good for individuals and the state.  Emphasizing legal rights, Bentham’s utilitarian philosophy had no room whatsoever for moral rights or duties, which he considered to be nonsense (Stanford 2001).  Less aggressively, Mill reinforces the importance of duty as going to specific ends, and as good defined when results produce good.  The deontological process of the moral will, or the direction of the human being as to behaving to serve good, is unimportant because, as noted, such directions may not be relied upon to actually produce good.  In these views, then, morality is absent, and this is a greater failing than Kant’s lack of emphasis on consequences: “For consequentialists, there is no realm of moral permissions, no realm of going beyond one’s moral duty (supererogation), no realm of moral indifference. All acts are seemingly either required or forbidden” (Stanford 2007).  If definitions of morality vary, there may still be no reasonable dismissal of it as an inevitable agent in human affairs, and Kant’s sense of moral will is validated.

Conclusion

When all of the above is then considered, what may be inferred is something of a parallel between Aristotelian teleology and Kantian deontology. There are of course striking differences between the philosophies, just as each is subject to various forms of criticism.  Aristotle assumes an innate understanding and acceptance of virtue as a dominant reality, and employs this to insist that good generates its own existence and, by providing humanity with perfect happiness, validates itself. Kant is more inclined to distancing himself from isolating the quality of virtue, and instead holds to it as the force commanding human agency, with normative ideas of morality creating duty to be fulfilled.  Both philosophers then promote the essence of morality as the most prominent instrument in human affairs, as a lack of adherence to it creates human misfortune.  Importantly, and as Kant stresses duty, it is moral duty, so virtue is inextricably within his deontology; similarly, Aristotle’s teleological view of good as commanding the soul and dictating behavior is not, ultimately, all that removed from the deontological concept of duty.  The contrast between the philosophies, when examined, then reveals no “better” ethics or avenue to ethics, as each relies on an intrinsic value of morality.  Processes and emphasis vary, but the core agent remains the same, and it is certainly arguable that Aristotle’s teleology and Kant’s deontology, while different in focus, reflect a philosophical kinship.

Works Cited

Foot, Philippa. “Morality as a system of hypothetical imperatives.” The Philosophical Review (1972): 305-316.

Kraut, Richard.  Aristotle on the Human Good.  Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1991. Print.

Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.  Legal Rights. 2001, Web. 26 Oct. 2014.<http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/legal-rights/>

Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.  Deontological Ethics. 2007, Web. 26 Oct. 2014.<http://stanford.library.usyd.edu.au/entries/ethics-deontological/>

Sullivan, Robert J.  Immanuel Kant’s Moral Theory. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 1989.  Print.

Yack, Bernard.  The Problems of a Political Animal: Community, Justice, and Conflict in Aristotelian Political Thought.  Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1993. Print.