Can We Know When to Trust Our Emotions? Essay Example

According to some of the most common discourses about the concept of knowledge, it appears that the latter is incompatible with emotion. Knowledge is viewed as something objective and whose truth is entirely independent of subjective belief, whereas emotion is precisely a sign of this contrasting subjectivity. In other words, this suggests an account of knowledge according to which the term is defined in terms of a certain account of rationality, while emotions are the irrational, spontaneous beliefs and actions of a given individual. However, perhaps such a dichotomy is ultimately too simple and thus represents a false dichotomy. For example, in the history of knowledge and of great discoveries, can we not identify certain happenings which were guided or at least engendered by an apparently “emotional” motive, such as inspiration or even a hunch? In this regard, knowledge and emotion can be seen as not separated by a boundless gulf of rationality on the one hand and irrationality on the other hand, but two practices of the human being that may at times work seamlessly together. Yet this is not to suggest that emotions cannot ultimately hinder knowledge, when we consider the latter in terms of realist and objective terms. In other words, emotion can only be trusted in the pursuit of knowledge to the extent that emotions compliment this pursuit as opposed to transgressing it: when one pursues knowledge, it can be said that one pursues truth, such that it becomes crucial to understand when emotion may potentially distort the very truth that is being sought.

This nature of seeking a proper balance, whereby emotion ultimately serves knowledge, is therefore based on an account of emotion that acknowledges emotion’s difference from knowledge. In other words, emotion may serve as a tool that assists the pursuit of knowledge, but as with any tool, it must be employed at proper times. Such an essentially pragmatist account of the relation between knowledge and emotion therefore acknowledges the value of emotion, while nevertheless placing it in a hierarchical relationship with knowledge, whereby the latter is the most crucial element. The need to establish such hierarchy is the result of some of our common understandings of emotions, described by Ronald de Sousa as follows: “Emotions are reputed to be arational or irrational.”[1] This account of emotions, as de Sousa also notes, nevertheless indicates “complex relations to rationality.”[2] In other words, the definition of emotions in terms of rationality and irrationality is already examining emotions according to a particular account of knowledge, wherein knowledge is conceived as the opposite: rationality. Hence, in this sense, we can only define knowledge and emotions in terms of their relationship to each other. By understanding emotion as irrational, we therefore can also begin to clarify what knowledge as rationality truly entails. Hence, while this relation is ultimately negative, it nonetheless possesses some explanatory potential in terms of what knowledge itself is.

Accordingly, because of this relation, one can understand that there is some type of exchange between knowledge and emotion when we attempt to define these terms, although the relation does take a certain negative form, in which the terms are mere opposites. This negative relation, however, is clearly premised upon an account of knowledge that ties it to rationality. This understanding of knowledge as rationality can be equated to a notion of so-called “propositional knowledge,” whereby the sole knowledge is that “derived from empirical evidence and subjected to stringent and robust tests as valid knowledge.”[3] When considering the relationship of knowledge and emotions these terms, which are ultimately related to the methods of the natural sciences, it would appear that emotion is entirely banished from the pursuit of knowledge. However, even this is not entirely the case: one may consider the various intuitions or hunches that will lead a scientist to pursue a particular line of inquiry, such as the feeling that a particular scientific test may be appropriate in light of the particular question. Of course, emotion in this case is only limited to a starting point: emotion is the origin of the path, but it cannot dominate this path, for this would be a betrayal of knowledge in this scientific and propositional sense.

From another perspective, if one considers forms of knowledge different than propositional knowledge, such as personal knowledge, the relationship at first glance becomes even more intertwined. As Anderson defines such personal knowledge, it entails “the kind of knowledge that is inseparable from the knower’s identity, biography, and emotional experiences.”[4] Accordingly, in terms of personal knowledge, emotion itself is construed as one of the key themes of such a type of knowledge. But arguably, the same balance in regards to knowledge and emotion is still at play in this example, because if someone wants to have a valid account of their personal knowledge, they must be able to divorce emotions from their analysis. For example, personal knowledge about someone’s biography and the emotions that the individual felt must be examined objectively if this personal knowledge is to have any meaning. In other words, if one reflects on their personal self, if one is overly emotional in this analysis, they will not gain any further knowledge of themselves, but rather merely perpetuate an entirely emotive account of the experience in question. Hence, even in cases of personal knowledge it appears that not only must a proper balance be struck between knowledge and emotion, but that once again a certain hierarchy of values conferred to knowledge and emotion must be established.

A historical example of such a balance or hierarchy can be found in the work of the polymath Michael Polanyi. Polanyi’s own experiences as a scientist informed his view that there was a deeply personal and emotive aspect of the scientific method. As Miles notes, “During Polanyi’s research in physical chemistry in the period 1913-1920, in one of his projects he proposed a theory concerning the absorption of gases by a solid non-volatile adsorbent. Many experiments seemed to disprove this theory….Polanyi persisted with further evidence at a later meeting but his theory was rejected. Only after 1930, from the work of others, was Polanyi’s theory vindicated, and it is still in use today.”[5] In the case of Polanyi, therefore, emotion played a decisive role. In the face of overwhelming (apparently) propositional evidence, alongside the rejection of his peers, Polanyi nevertheless persisted in his viewpoint, eventually proving justified. Polanyi himself noted that this pursuit of knowledge was heavily based on emotion, such that he identified specific positive emotions that aid in the sciences, such as “the ability to stick to a theory, with supporting evidence, despite contrary evidence advanced by the scientific community, which may challenge it.”[6] Hence, an almost hubristic commitment to one’s research against the majority of consensus opinion and apparently propositional evidence can ultimately aid in the uncovering of truth. However, even Polanyi, despite the importance he conferred to emotion in relation to knowledge, still employs a hierarchy: in the above quotation, persistence as an emotional aid in the pursuit of knowledge is only valid, insofar as there also remains such “supporting evidence.” Polanyi understood emotion, with its largely subjective character, as the true source of scientific knowledge, since the latter arises through “personal, subjective, individual vision, experimental commitment and dialogue with the scientific community.”[7] (Miles, 101) However, as Polanyi himself would certainly agree, personal and subjective vision is not interchangeable with experimental evidence and dialogue: the truth one is seeking out in such knowledge is an objective truth. Accordingly, personal subjective vision always encounters a limit in terms of what it may purport, a limit that takes the form of the contrasting objective reality that will ultimately justify such claims, despite any subjective and emotionally charged commitment to their believed truth.

What becomes crucial, therefore, is to understand that the relationship that subsists between emotion and knowledge is not entirely egalitarian, especially when we consider knowledge in terms of the aim of acquiring knowledge that is valid on an objective level. Certainly, emotion in its various forms, such as spontaneous inspiration and, as in the above case of Polanyi, an almost stubborn pride, can eventually bear the fruit of objective knowledge. Yet the latter is only legitimate when we define knowledge as precisely such realist and objective truth, independent of the whims of the subject, whims of the subject which are in the end homologous with our common accounts of emotion. Emotion plays a role in the pursuit of knowledge; however, it plays a very distinct role in this pursuit, and the prevention of the overstepping of its boundaries is crucial to avoid the sacrifice of veracity in this pursuit of knowledge itself.

Works Cited

Anderson, Elizabeth. “Feminist Epistemology: An Interpretation and a Defense.” In: Yuri Balashov and Alex Rosenberg (eds.) Philosophy of Science: Contemporary Readings. London: Routledge, 2002. 459-488.

Basford, Lynn and Slevin, Oliver. Theory and Practice of Nursing: An Integrated Approach to Caring Practice. Cheltenham, UK: Nelson Thomas, 2001.

De Sousa, Roland. The Rationality of Emotion. Cambridge, MA: Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1987.

Miles, Grahame. Science and Religious Experience: Are They Similar Forms of Knowledge? Eastbourne, UK: Sussex Academic Press, 2007.

[1] Roland de Sousa. The Rationality of Emotion, pg. 1.

[2]  de Sousa, op. cit., pg. 1.

[3] Lynn Basford and Oliver Slevin. Theory and Practice of Nursing: An Integrated

Approach to Caring Practice. pg. 155.

[4] Elizabeth Anderson. “Feminist Epistemology: An Interpretation and a Defense.” pg. 466.

[5] Grahame Miles, Science and Religious Experience: Are They Similar Forms of Knowledge?, pg. 100.

[6] Miles, op. cit., pg. 101.

[7] Miles, op. cit., pg. 101.