Confronting Putin’s Russia, Essay Example

President Putin Vladimir of Russia made a decision on how to end post-Cold War eras in Europe by annex Crimea. There had been unpredicted disputes and co-operations between Russia and the West since the years of late Gorbachev-Reagan. In this situation, the underlying sense of Russia has been joining the international order gradually. The new era is definedby territorial occupation, nationalistic resurgence, and ideological clashes. This era is similar to tragic periods of confrontations in Europe during the 20th century. In the coming decades, there are important understandings anddifferences, which will be used for the successful foreign policy of America. Nobody seeks any of these confrontations. Because Russia did not win the cold war fully, a new era crept on it. Russian power diminished, Soviet Union disappeared, and communism faded.

When the soviet order collapsed, it did not lead to a smooth transition to markets and democracy inside Russia. In addition, there was no smooth integration by Russia into the west. This enabled some Russians to have morale in pushingforward on the agenda of revolution changes[1]. Positive results were produced because of the revolutionary changes. TheRussian society was richer than ever before, the Soviet empire collapsed peacefully, there was democratic functioning of the institutions, and the rights of individuals were protected. With the introduction of democracy, there was imperial lossand economic depression, which generated a backlash of counterrevolutionary. This was aiming at the resentment of theterms, which ended Cold War and the old order. Those who proposed this perspective were not in the majority. Thecoming to power of Mr. Putin who was the advocate of this ideology was inevitable.

Mr. Putin changed his own thought as it was relying in between the realistic needs of Russia to move forward andreminiscence of the old rule. Russia picked up its internal transformation in 2008 when Mr. Putin selected Dmitri Medvedev who was leaning on the West as his successor. Russia was isolated for a time in 2008 when it invaded Georgia. Russia regained momentum in its integration into the existing global order after some time. It was the first years in government that cooperation on mutual benefit issues between presidents Obama and president Medvedev were realized. The mutual benefits included; Russian membership in World trade organization, new start treaty, new supply routes to soldiers in Afghanistan, and new sanctions against Iran[2]. The results of the reset led to advancement in several vitalnational interests of America. The American post-Cold War policy of integration and engagement appeared to be workingagain. This is because it was practiced by Republican and Democratic administrations.

This momentum slowed and later stopped in the year 2012 when Mr. Putin became the president. This time when Mr. Putin returned, thousands of Russians were in streets protesting against unaccountable government and falsified elections. Mr. Putin was praised because he restored the state by growing its economy. Mr. Putin did not give a clear response to theRussians who wanted more services from him by proposing him for the third term. Young, wealthy, and educated protesters in Moscow annoyed Mr. Putin. This is because they failed to recognize and appreciate him for his efforts to make them rich. Mr. Putin instituted restrictions and pivoted backward on independent behavior suggestive of the sovietdays. He arrested demonstrators, attacked the independent media, and demanded the wealthy to bring their riches backhome. In addition to autocracy, Mr. Putin demanded United States to strengthen his legitimacy as its enemy. His propagandists rolled out American clips on immoral practices, imperialism, and alleged plans to overthrow Putin’s government.

The ideological struggle between democracy and autocracy returned to Europe as compared to the last century. This battledid not disappear fully because democratic institutions did not fully take root in Russia. Democratic societies need to embrace and recognize the normative and intellectual struggle against this system as proposed by Mr. Putin’s rule of autocracy[3]. This was the same vigor used to summon in Europe against any anti-democratic governments. This wasbefore Kremlin had both the capacity and intention to undermine states and governments using instruments like media, money, military, energy, and secret police. Certain policy steps were recommended using these similarities. Mostimportantly, Ukraine must succeed as a market economy, a democracy, and a state. The highest on his reform list must be diversification and energy efficiency, as well as corruption and military reforms. Other states that were exposed in theregion as Georgia and Moldova needed urgent bolstering.

In addition, in the 20th century those states in the side of the government were protected and assured. NATO had movedin quickly, but the efforts were sustained by putting in hardware that is more military and more integration and training of forces[4]. New efforts were also made to reduce the dependence of NATO countries on Russian energy. The currentregime should be isolated as it was before. During the cold war and World War II, United States and other allies decidedto cooperate with Mr. Putin. This is because they had no option as the vital interests had overlapped. This was not to pullRussia backwards into accepting international values and norms, but it should be well understood as strictly transactional. It cannot be determined or said how long the current autocratic government will endure in Russia.

Bibliography

Balzer, Harley. “The Putin thesis and Russian energy policy.” Post-Soviet Affairs 21, no. 3 (2005): 210-225.

Shevtsova, Lilia. Putin’s Russia. Carnegie Endowment, 2010.

[1] Balzer, Harley. “The Putin thesis and Russian energy policy.” Post-Soviet Affairs 21, no. 3 (2005), p.215.

[2] Shevtsova, Lilia. Putin’s Russia. Carnegie Endowment, 2010, p.129.

[3] Balzer, Harley. “The Putin thesis and Russian energy policy.” Post-Soviet Affairs 21, no. 3 (2005): 220.

[4] Shevtsova, Lilia. Putin’s Russia. Carnegie Endowment, 2010, p.87.