Cycles of Conflict: What Generates War, Essay Example

An interesting duality seems to be in place when the causes of war are examined. On one level, there is an extensive and analytical focus on pragmatic considerations and the many interactions between nations that generate conflict on this scale. War viewed by this approach is invariably a result of national agendas unable to reach peaceful accommodation, no matter the nature of those agendas. Historically, religious differences have been seen as sufficiently great to actually demand that war be waged, just as territorial ambitions for commercial gain have frequently been an impetus. At the same time, and when a more philosophical or ideological approach is taken, it is reasonable to argue that all practical or definitive reasons are essentially constructs developed by nations for the purpose of going to war. More exactly, and as history also amply demonstrates, there seems to be a “visceral” incentive in humanity itself that values extreme conflict. This in itself is likely territorial or acquisitive, but it is nonetheless an incentive that transcends circumstances. In regard to what causes war, then, there is room for debate. While the actual events and rationales of each occasion for it may be identified, there remains the inevitable reality that war is so a consistent expression of national behavior, it is caused by an intrinsic demand in the populations of nations to wage it.

In terms of practical causes, Snyder and Diesing are foremost authorities on what may be termed cause through specificity. Snyder in particular, and admirably, addresses conflict in ways almost mathematical, detailing equations of power balances and strategies which, upset or inadequate, trigger war. Regarding alliances alone, Snyder comprehends and seeks to identify the roles of multiple variables. As he himself notes, these variables are essentially incalculable. For instance, regarding the relatively basic question of why some nations ally with others, considerations include: the multipolar systems in play in the individual nations; the differences in military capabilities; the interests, both conflicting and in common, between potential allies; and the domestic compositions of the nations concerned, including ethnic and ideological influences (Snyder 129). All of this is of course valid, as is every facet of Snyder’s and Diesing’s analysis of war causality in general. In plain terms, nations are complex and organic entities acting out of a vast arrays of impulses and ambitions; a clearer understanding of these elements, then, seems helpful.

Nonetheless, the sheer complexity of the pragmatically-based approach renders such study inherently self-defeating. When, it may be argued, so many factors are exponentially related to causes of war, analysis becomes relatively meaningless. Then, and as the Snyder and Diesing school acknowledges, a powerful influence resides in those shifting qualities of societal and national composition. Nations are never inert, and the tides of cultural, governmental, and commercial forces within them must create “new” agendas within them all the time, which in turn must drastically affect how they perceive their neighbors. Beyond this, there is the element of what actually does not significantly alter: human ambitions to expand and dominate. If nations have in fact endured lacking these ambitions, they are few and far between. Consequently, it seems more useful to note causes of war from this basic foundation of human behavior, so prominently in evidence in international conflicts throughout history.

To that end, perhaps no theorist comes nearer to supporting war causes as deriving from visceral, national impulses than does Lebow. He does not dismiss pragmatic realities, but he more importantly traces their developments back to essential motivations also identifiable in nations and histories of conflict. Lebow’s underlying motive for war – appetite, spirit, reason, and fear – in fact nicely address both the practical and the more universal causal agents. With regard to spirit, for example, Lebow sensibly connects the relationship between individual senses of self-esteem, vital to the wider concept of societal spirit, to an aggressive nationalism (67). More to the point, he comprehends that self-esteem is measurable chiefly in a comparative way; the people feel themselves to be of value because others do not seem to reflect that same degree of worth. Going to war causation, then, this is a path easy to follow. If a society is in any way doubtful of its esteem, this can be remedied by literally proving itself of greater value than another, and war is expedient in accomplishing this. It is self-enhancement for a nation through conquest. When the other incentives noted by Lebow are taken into account, a valid, if generalized, reason for war appears that is more valid than any assessment of complex variables.

In simple terms, humanity, and not nations as such, seems to generate war because collectives of humanity invariably display the desires which can only be satisfied through conquest, which translates to war. Cycles going to warfare breaking out are represented in each instance by sets of practical considerations and conflicting aims, certainly. Nonetheless, they are uniformly linked by a foundation of human behavior consistently in place, and the practical causes are then merely the individual mechanisms enabling the more primal tides of behavior.

Works Cited

Lebow, N. Why Nations Fight: Past and Future Motives for War. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010. Print.

Snyder, G. H. Alliance Politics. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2007. Print.