DoD Energy Risks and Challenges, Essay Example

Defense Science Board Report on DoD Energy Risks and Challenges        

In a 2006 memorandum from the Undersecretary of Defense to the Defense Science Board, the DSB was directed to form a task force on DoD energy strategy. The overarching purposes of this task force would be to assess how the DoD uses energy and to identify ways in which energy use -and its associated costs- could be reduced. Among the issues raised in the memorandum were the risks and costs of maintaining fuel supplies in combat operations; artificially low prices of aviation fuel and other forms of energy utilized by the DoD; the low adoption rate of new and alternatives fuel and energy technologies; and the systemic and organizational road blocks that slowed initiatives and processes related to making improvements in these and other areas. The 2008 report from the Defense Science Board on DoD energy strategies (subtitled “More Fight- Less Fuel”) identified a number of key ways in which the DSB asserted that DoD can and must reduce fuel use and associated costs. While the report is wide-ranging, the bulk of its findings and recommendations generally fall under one of the issues and areas of concern raised in the 2006 memory. In short, the report concluded that the DoD uses too much fuel while largely ignoring opportunities to minimize this use (and mitigate the risks and costs associated with then-current rates of consumption).  To the extent that the findings in the report met with resistance from the DOD and individual branches of the armed forces, the systemic and organizational hurdles their implementation faced (and continue to face) are similarly identified in the 2006 memorandum and the 2008 report. This demonstrates that the problems and the solutions, while challenging, are largely understood. It is nothing more and nothing less than institutional inertia that stands in the way of the DoD getting “more fight” for “less fuel.”

The DSB was tasked with examining a number of issues that fit into “four broad areas” (DSB, 2008, p.9). These included identifying ways to reduce the use of fuel in deployed forces while assessing how such reductions will impact operations; consider how alternative and renewable energy might supplant conventional energy sources for deployed forces; determine how institutional barriers slow the transition of more effective energy policies; and to indentify the larger (read: non-military) benefits to the U.S of developing and adopting new energy technologies. In the report, the DSB Task Force determined that the DoD “faces two primary energy challenges” (DSB, 2008, p. 3): first is the impact that the demand for fuel in deployed areas brings with it a significant number of risks and costs, both of which are growing; second is the dependence of domestic and international military installations (e.g.,  military bases, research facilities on “fragile and vulnerable commercial power grid(s)” (DSB, 2008, p. 3), leaving them vulnerable to the repercussions of terrorist attacks, natural disasters, and other circumstances which might lead to long-term disruption of those power grids.

While a thorough summary of the DSB report is beyond the scope of this discussion, there are several key issues covered in the report that are clearly of significant concern to the DoD. Moreover, the issues raised in the report are hardly surprising; similar assessments and concerns have been discussed and expressed in a variety of other forums, both within and outside the purview of the DoD or the federal government. A 2012 report issued by the Congressional Research Service (CRS) entitled “Department of Defense Energy Initiatives: Background and Issues for Congress” addresses a number of strategies that have been implemented by the DoD related to energy; among them are some that are direct antecedents to the DSB report; others either predate the DSB report or cover additional issues (though given the comprehensive nature of the DSB report, most energy-related issues relevant to the DoD or individual branches of the armed forces are at least touched on, some more extensively than others). A pair of reports in 2007 and 2009 report from the Brookings Institute (a Washington D.C.-based think tank) also addressed several of the same overarching issues and challenges the DoD faces in terms of short- and long-term energy usage.

In one of several memoranda included in the DSB report is the phrase “the tyranny of the tanker.” This term is used to describe the dependence of deployed forces –especially those engaged in combat- on maintaining a steady supply of fuel and other energy resources, and the costs and challenges associated with that dependence.  According to the report, one of the systemic problems associated with the way DoD manages energy-related issues is a lack of “strategy, policies, metrics, information, and governance structure necessary to properly manage energy risks” (DSB, 2008, p. 4). As an example of this informational void, the report cites the need for DoD to “use the fully burdened cost of fuel (FBCF)” by ending policies and practices which overlook the real costs of fuel, including transportation and field support costs (p. 5); a 2001 DSB task force determined the necessity of including FBCF figures in decision-making processes, a recommendation that the 2008 report notes has not been implemented. Similar findings were made by the Brookings reports, though the 2012 CRS report asserts that initiatives related to FBCF and to Key Performance Parameters (KPP) have been implemented in the years following the 2008 DSB report (CRS, 2012, n.p.).

The issue of dependence on power grids by military installations is given significant consideration the DSB report; similar issues are address in the Brookings reports and the CRS report (Lengyel, 2007; Warner & Singer, 2009). The CRS report notes that several domestic military installations have begun deploying solar powered systems to augment their energy needs, though such efforts have made only a minor dent in the overall energy requirements (and dependence on vulnerable infrastructure) of these installations (CRS, 2012, n.p.). This continues to present an area of significant vulnerability for military installations, and will remain one of the DoD’s notable challenges for the foreseeable future.

What the 2012 CRS report makes clear is that despite initiatives related to FBCF, KPP, alternative energy, and other issues of concern, few of the recommendations proffered by the 2008 DSB report have been implemented to any significant degree. The DoD continues to remain beholden to the burdens of supplying energy to deployed forces in ways that leave those forces and the supply chains vulnerable, unwieldy, and extraordinarily costly. There is little question that the recommendations of the DSB report are sound, nor is there much doubt that the risks posed by ignoring them are potentially disastrous. What seems clear is that opposition to these recommendations is not necessarily overt, but is instead the result of institutional barriers and the glacial pace of effecting change in an organization as diverse diffuse, and massive as the DoD.

Fracking: Environmental and Security Risks

The process of hydraulic fracturing –commonly referred to as “fracking” involves the use of liquids forced under pressure into subterranean deposits of natural gas and other fossil fuels. As the liquid –typically a mixture of water, sand, and solvents and other chemicals- is forced into well cores, it produces minute fractures in rock formations which allow the natural gas or other substances to seep into the well core where it can be extracted. The use of fracking techniques allows natural gas, shale gas, and other deposits to be extracted to a greater degree than conventional techniques, thereby making many wells more productive over their lifespans. Fracking was first introduced as a technique for extracting the remaining natural gas or other desired materials from a well as it was nearing depletion, though in recent years fracking has been used more widely as a first order means for extracting fossil fuels from deposits that might otherwise be considered inaccessible.  Opponents of fracking claim that the technique carries significant environmental risks, including the risk of contamination to groundwater supplies by the ingredients in fracking fluid to the possibility of earthquakes and other problems as underground mineral formations and rock beds are destabilized by excessive fracturing. Beyond the potential for direct environmental risks associated with fracking, some opponents (and even supporters) of fracking assert that the fracking process and the associated infrastructure may open the door to broader risks, including issues related to security and infrastructure vulnerability. None of these potential risks associated with fracking exist in a vacuum; they are inextricably linked and intertwined.  In order to assess any specific risk associated with fracking it is necessary to place it in the larger context of energy use and the overarching vulnerabilities of the entire U.S. energy sector.

With these considerations in mind, however, it is appropriate to first address some of the potential environmental risks associated with fracking. The process of fracking releases gases such as methane into the atmosphere which act as pollutants, while the fluids used in fracking have been shown to contaminate groundwater supplies. Industry spokespersons insist that the risk of groundwater contamination is low and that when fracking is done under appropriate conditions the risk is all but eliminated (bp.com, n.d.).  Also of concern for opponents of fracking is the sheer volume of water used in the process; fracking often requires the transportation of millions of gallons of water from a source to the site of a well, which not only helps deplete the original source but also contributes to pollution through the emissions of trucks and other transport vehicles (Ostrander, 2013, para. #1).

In the state of North Dakota fracking is being used to extract petroleum deposits from underground rock formations; this use of fracking also releases natural gas as a byproduct of the process. Because the wells and fracking infrastructure at these sites is focused on oil extraction, the natural gas released in the process is considered waste, as there is no means of collecting it (Ostrander, 2013). In these sites the natural gas waste is simply burned off, thereby contributing to the problem of CO2 in the atmosphere (Ostrander, 2013, para. #1). The problem of seismic activity has also been cause for alarm among anti-fracking groups and individuals, as measurable earthquakes have been triggered by fracking (Dangers of Fracking, 2014, n.p.). These and other environmental hazards will likely continue to be of significant concern as the use of fracking grows in the years to come.

Beyond the dangers that fracking may pose to the environment, the potential risks associated with the process must also be considered in the larger context of U.S. energy security. Fracking techniques that can extract natural gas, oil, or other fossil fuels from deposits that would otherwise be untapped or unreachable can ostensibly help to mitigate some of the concerns the U.S. faces related to energy.  The economic fallout of “oil shock” –a sharp rise in the price of oil- has been among the leading drivers of efforts to tap into domestic energy supplies (Faeth, 2012, para. #5). Proponents of fracking assert that it is necessary to harvest as much natural gas and oil as possible from domestic sources, a position which, while seemingly reasonable, overlooks several factors. Regardless of how much oil and gas is produced by fracking, such fuels are funneled into an international corporate system that makes them available on the open market, thereby undermining the notion that an increase in domestic fracking leads directly to an increase in domestic energy supplies (Faeth, 2012, para. #7). At best, the oil and gas derived from fracking merely serves a system that is, according to opponents, outdated and dangerous.

Much of the infrastructure associated with fracking is a subset of that of the extant energy sector. The U.S. power grid remains heavily dependent on the use of fossil fuels, and also remains vulnerable to risks posed by natural disasters, terrorist attacks on physical infrastructure, cyber-attacks on SCADA systems at power plants, and disruptions in oil and gas supplies from international sources (Pastreich & Feffer, 2014, para. #1). In this light, the growth of and dependence on fracking serves to offset the development of alternative energy sources and technologies that could, in time, help to lessen U.S. dependence on fossil fuels. Opponents of fracking argue that it is poorly regulated and monitored, and that fracking sites and the infrastructure used in the fracking process is vulnerable to the same risks that threaten other components of the U.S. energy sector. Even ostensible supporters of fracking, such as the conservative think tank the Heritage Foundation, warn of the vulnerabilities of the U.S. energy sector posed by physical and cyber attacks (Pastreich and Feffer, 2014, para. #1). At best, fracking may offer a short-term solution to some long-term problems; at worst, it may contribute to delays in transitioning to alternative energy sources and technologies that will arrive too late, if at all.

To the extent that there are security issues related to fracking infrastructure, such issues are not entirely unique to fracking. Instead, one of the overarching risks associated with fracking is that using fuels derived from fracking may serve to postpone the transition to alternative energy sources and new energy technologies that will provide long-term solutions to the problem of energy security. This view is not intended to minimize the seriousness of any issues related to the impact of fracking on the environment, but such issues are, at worst, a subset of the larger problems associated with burning fossil fuels in general. Long-term solutions to both the environmental impact of fossil fuels and the security risks posed by dependence on such fuels will only be found in cleaner, more efficient, and renewable energy sources. In this sense, it is not so much the physical infrastructure of fracking that leaves the U.S. at risk; it is the ideological, political, and economic infrastructure that rewards short-term solutions while leaving long-term solutions (and the price for not finding them) to future generations.

Cybersecurity and the Energy Industry

The issue of cybersecurity was brought into sharp relief with the discovery of the Stuxnet computer worm in 2010. Stuxnet has the capability to attack computer systems used in the automated control of manufacturing facilities, power plants, and other large-scale industrial and utility installations.  As was widely reported, Stuxnet attacked computer systems in the nation of Iran, damaging systems related to that country’s nuclear energy facilities. The threat posed by Stuxnet clearly demonstrates the vulnerability of SCADA and other computer systems used in the U.S. energy sector, and has made the issue of cybersecurity an area of significant concern.  Components of the U.S. energy sector   infrastructure remain vulnerable both to the risks posed by natural disasters, terrorist attacks, and other physical damage and to those posed by hackers attempting to breach the systems that control these components. While the dangers of attacks by Stuxnet-like computer viruses and worms is significant, these dangers must be considered in the broader context of energy-sector infrastructure, and the vulnerabilities that make it possible for such attacks to occur.

In a 2012 report entitled “Cybersecurity: Challenges in Securing the Energy Grid,” the General Accounting Office of the U.S. government detailed some of the existential threats to the U.S. energy sector related to cybersecurity. According to the report, “threats from numerous sources can adversely affect computers, networks, organizations, entire industries, and the Internet itself…these include both intentional and unintentional threats” (GAO, 2012, para. #1). While Stuxnet and similar viruses can be used to specifically attack SCADA systems and other computer systems at specific sites (such as power plants and nuclear facilities), these targeted attacks are just one subset of a much larger group of potential threats. Attacks on unrelated systems can have a domino effect that reaches across networks and other communication systems; attacks on one industry can have an impact on other industries; and “the Internet itself” can have unintended effects on virtually any industry, energy-related or otherwise.

It is the issue of interconnectivity as predicated both on the Internet and on private or proprietary systems and networks which makes cybersecurity such a significant issue in the 21^st century. Components of the overarching power grid remain uniquely vulnerable simply because the potential catastrophic fallout of either a direct or indirect attack would have such far-raging consequences, but the vulnerability of energy-related infrastructure is just one example of a much larger and more systemic problem. The specific, focused threats posed to any given installation are just the beginning of the list of possible cyber-threats the energy sector faces. As the GAO (2012) report notes, there are a number of broader issues that leave the components of the energy infrastructure vulnerable beyond the direct threat of an attack on a specific SCADA or other systems (para. #2).

Among the challenges described by the GAO are “a lack of a coordinated approach to monitor industry compliance with voluntary standards; aspects of the current regulatory environment (which make) it difficult to ensure the cybersecurity of smart grid systems; a focus by utilities on regulatory compliance instead of comprehensive security; a lack of security features consistently built into smart grid systems…(the lack of) effective mechanisms for sharing information on cybersecurity and other issues…(and inadequate) metrics for evaluating cybersecurity” (GAO, 2012, para. #3). What this list shows is that the existential cyber-threats to the energy industry in the U.S. go far beyond those posed by the likes of Stuxnet, and are include inefficient and inadequate means for providing oversight, inter-and intra-organizational communication, and network-wide security.

The use of IT is deeply embedded in virtually every aspect of the energy industry. Beyond just the threats of cyber-attacks on power plants and other infrastructure, cybersecurity issues can be found anywhere that IT is used, from controlling the functions of power plants to handling private customer data (Rueckert, 2012, para. #3). Virtually everyone in the U.S. is linked directly or indirectly to the IT systems used in the energy industry; as such, an individual or group which hacks into a customer database is a legitimate cyber-threat to the energy industry and its customers (Rueckert, 2012, para. #3). The potential for disrupting service for thousands or even millions of people exists anywhere that hackers can target IT systems linked directly or indirectly to the energy industry. Stuxnet was allowed to infiltrate computer systems when authorized user inadvertently introduced it, a situation which highlights the potential for human error to lead to significant problems. Because IT systems are so inextricably linked, while regulatory oversight and security remains woefully inadequate, the entire energy sector remains vulnerable to significant and even catastrophic attack far beyond the confines of any specific component of its infrastructure.

Vulnerability Assessment: Nuclear Power Plant

As previously noted, the underlying existential threat to the U.S. energy industry is rooted in the vast depth and breadth of the myriad IT systems used to control and connect it. The threat of site-specific cyber-attacks on power plants and other installations, while serious, represent just one of a virtually infinite number of ways that components of the energy industry remain vulnerable. Such facilities are also at risk of physical attack or sabotage, damage wrought by natural disasters, or the consequences of attacks on other components of energy-sector infrastructure that reach across computer networks and communication lines to reach multiple targets. A comprehensive vulnerability assessment of a specific facility –such as a nuclear power plant- must consider these and other factors; with that in mind, however, a site-specific assessment can also reveal vulnerabilities that are unique to that facility and others of its kind.

A vulnerability of a nuclear power plant begins with an examination of the physical risks posed to the site and facilities by terrorist attack. In the aftermath of September 11, 2001, new protocols and policies were established at the national level with these risks of terrorist attack in mind. The Energy Policy Act of 2005 prompted the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) to revise its standards and criteria for its “Design Basis Threat” (DBT); the DBT establishes the “maximum severity of potential attacks that a nuclear plant’s security force must be capable of repelling” (Holt & Andrews, 2014, p 1). This DBT serves as the fundamental basis for conducting vulnerability assessment related to a physical attack on a nuclear power plant and for developing and deploying security measures designed to oppose such attacks. In order to assess the efficacy of the DBT for a specific plant, the NRC conducts drills and exercises in the form of mock attacks that attempt to penetrate the physical security barriers, obstacles, and other measures in place. These barriers include those that are intended to keep attackers from breaching the site’s perimeter, and those that are intended to physically protect vital or sensitive areas within the facility.  Such individual areas include the control systems for the plant, the areas where nuclear material and waste is stored, the areas where nuclear reactions take place, and the physical connections among each of these areas and between the facility and the outside world (Holt & Andrews, 2014, p. 1).

One form of physical attack that has been given greater consideration in the aftermath of 9/11 is the potential for aircraft to be deliberately crashed into the facility; accidental crashes are also considered, though the same general principles and security measures apply in either case. New nuclear plants are designed to protect the reactor core in the event of such a crash, though many older facilities remain vulnerable to this type of attack or accident (Holt & Andrews, 2014, p. 1).  According to a report from the Congressional Research Service the NRC rejected proposals to retrofit older plants with steel or concrete barriers designed to protect them from aircraft crashes, determining that extant security measures and systems were adequate to protect the core in most cases (Holt & Andrews, p. 1).

Physical risks to nuclear plants also include natural disasters and events, such as fires, floods, and seismic events. A vulnerability assessment of any nuclear power plant must include making determinations about how well-protected the facility is from these and similar events. In the case of flooding, for example, the water pools used to cool spent uranium rods would be at risk of overflowing and contaminating the surrounding area, including groundwater supplies (IAEA, 2014, p. 10). Nuclear plants must contain redundant systems intended to prevent contaminated water from leaving the facility. The dangers of just such an event were exposed when the Fukushima Nuclear Power Plant in Japan was damaged by an earthquake and subsequent tsunami. While it is impossible to protect against all physical vulnerabilities at U.S. nuclear plants, it is paramount that steps are taken to minimize the physical threats posed to them by terrorists and natural forces.

Along with the threat of physical attacks on nuclear facilities, a complete vulnerability assessment must also include consideration of cybersecurity threats. The nuclear industry in the U.S. is somewhat unique in that many plants still utilize analog control systems that predate modern SCADA systems (Holt & Andrews, p. 1). Such systems remain vulnerable to physical attack, sabotage, and system failure, but are largely immune to Stuxnet-type threats. Newer plants, however, do incorporate SCADA and other computer systems, and even older systems use digital computers for a range of ancillary functions. The computer systems at nuclear power plants must be assessed on a regular basis to ensure that the offer the highest possible protection; a vulnerability assessment of these systems would include mock efforts to infiltrate the systems with computer worms and other forms of malware.

The possibility of physical damage or cyber-attacks on nuclear power plants comprise a significant area of concern during a vulnerability assessment; however, there are other factors to consider, such as the proper function of the plant under normal conditions. Nuclear plants are not just vulnerable to purposeful attack; accidents or other inadvertent events can pose significant risk both to plant personnel and to those outside the plant. Paramount among these issues is the handling and disposal of nuclear material and waste. Nuclear material is transported into and out of nuclear plants, activities which expose it to potential disaster. Nuclear reactor chambers must be assessed regularly to ensure that they are safe and do not allow radiation to escape. Water cooling pools must be assessed to ensure that they are operating correctly and protecting plant personnel and those in the surrounding region from radiation. Every system and process in the plant must be assessed regularly to ensure the safety of all those potentially affected by adverse events.

The final phase of the vulnerability assessment involves the people who work at the plant or who have any reason to enter and exit the facility. Background checks on all personnel must be conducted routinely, and all training and safety protocols must be administered and assessed regularly to ensure compliance. By assessing the physical and systemic vulnerabilities of the plant as well as the potential vulnerabilities related to its human operators and other personnel, it is possible to determine what, if any, vulnerabilities exist at a nuclear power plant.

References

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Ostrander, M. (2013). Is Fracking a Necessary Evil?. Thenation.com. Retrieved 7 August 2014, from http://www.thenation.com/blog/175783/fracking-necessary-evil#

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Warner, J., & Singer, P. (2009). Fueling the “Balance” A Defense Energy Strategy Primer. Foreign Policy Studies: The Brookings Institution.