Embryonic Stem Cell Research, Research Paper Example

Prospectus

Since major discoveries were made in the 1990s in regard to the potentials of stem cells in treating disease and injury, so too has there been a corollary force of opposition to the research.  Some of this opposition is fueled by deeply held religious convictions, but most arises from a seemingly innate tendency in people to revere human life to such an extent that even the most primal stirrings of it are perceived as inviolable.  The embryo, many averse to the research feel, is not actually a human life, yet these same opponents so strongly associate the potential of it to become one that they mistake trajectory for result.  Science, it is felt, has no business tampering with what produces human life, and grossly oversteps its ethical prerogatives in destroying embryos, as it must, to retrieve stem cells.

That there is an inherent wariness when medical science veers into matters touching upon humanity is not only understandable, but admirable.  It is important that science never lose sight of its boundaries as determined by cultural consent, just as medical science is obliged to adhere to its credo of never willingly doing harm.  That credo, however, applies to human life, and the embryo is not human life.  Then, and crucially, it is established that stem cell research is likely to relieve innumerably diseases and conditions creating suffering.  To that end, the research must go on, and the following will demonstrate this view through an analysis of the basic points to stem cell opposition.  Sources to be used include Andrew Siegel’s 2008 article, “Ethics of Stem Cell Research,” which provides interesting information on the issue of voluntarily destroyed stem cells;   The Human Embryonic Stem Cell Debate: Science,           Ethics, and Public Policy, a 2001 work that offers enormous information regarding both the facts and ethical issues surrounding the subject; and Embryo: A Defense of Human Life, by Robert George and Christopher Tollefsen.  This latter volume, through a truly striking and scholarly approach, offers the best possible platform upon which to argue for the correctness of stem cell research.  Ultimately, the following will assert and substantiate that embryonic stem cell research must continue, and in a way that fully considers its ethical implications as it proceeds, because only so expansive a course may ensure that the greatest good is accomplished for humanity itself.

Introduction

It is an interesting process, in that advances in medical science tend to exponentially create dilemmas removed from science itself.  Famously, research in genetics has created an ongoing controversy with regard to deep-seated beliefs about the origins of human life, and debate continues to rage over perceived violations of faith-based ideologies holding to divine responsibility.  No less impactfully, medical science today is in the grip of conflict, as the potentials of stem cell research clash with opposition viewing the work as a desecration of human life and dignity.  On one level, irrefutable evidence supports enormous benefits to be obtained through utilizing stem cells retrieved from human embryos. On anther, the very source of the materials generates serious outrage, and from quarters not necessarily motivated by religious concerns.  The reality is that this research goes to the basic definitions of human life itself, which translates to fiercely held beliefs regarding what defines the value of that life.

No matter the eventual outcome of the controversy, if in fact any resolution is foreseeable, it is likely that strong objections to such research will remain in place.  Human life at its most elementary level invariably prompts powerful opinions, just as identifying when such life actually commences remains a critical issue in abortion arguments.  This then presents an unprecedented and extraordinary dilemma; science, obligated to work for humanity’s benefit, must somehow accommodate implacable resistance to these efforts, when stem cells are the source of the benefits.  As will be seen, opposition to embryonic stem cell research is by no means easily set aside, nor essentially without merit.  Nonetheless, the advances rendered possible by this work are simply too immense to be sacrificed to it.  Embryonic stem cell research must continue, and in a way that consistently and carefully considers its ethical implications as it proceeds, for only so comprehensive a course may ensure that the greatest good is accomplished for humanity itself.

Background

Not unexpectedly, the science behind what is known today as embryonic stem cell research (ESCR) is both complex and largely based on medical advances dating to science’s first awareness of the human cell itself.   It was, in fact, through the study of abnormalities, set in motion by the knowledge that all life is inherently cellular, that first introduced the stem cell as a concept.  In the late 19^th century, it was discovered that massive physical malformations contained varieties of cells actually adapting to the abnormal processes, and the first embryonic stem cells noted were of a carcinogenic nature.  By the 1950s, bone marrow was being introduced into irradiated mice and it was seen that the stem cell population in these subjects was regenerated.  The cells themselves, however, remained largely inexplicable, as efforts then went to isolating a type of stem cell with more universal properties; to the end, mouse embryos were explored (Svendsen, Ebert  vii).  The science carried on, clearly intrigued by the possibility of identifying a type of cell which could potentially be utilized to repair damaged or diseased cell tissue in humans.

It would be 1998 and the groundbreaking work of Dr. James Thomson that would initiate what, today, is the ESCR controversy.  A year earlier, Dr. Ian Wilmut had proven that adult cells from mammals held all the genetic information necessary to “reconstruct” the entire being, and a sheep was cloned from the cells taken from gland tissue.  Thomson’s impact was to work with human embryo stem cells, if not in a way intended to clone; essentially, his breakthrough lay in the identifying of them.  The debate immediately commenced, as to the ethics involved in any scientific utilization of the human embryo.  Dramatically, Thomson’s work would take a turn going to address the very issues he prompted, as in 2007 he, along with a Dr. Yamanaka in Japan, discovered that adult human cells could be induced to revert to an embryonic state.  These are the pluripotent cells, potentially retrievable from any human and not reliant on embryos (Svendsen, Ebert  viii).  While these cells have been seized upon as the deal answer to the ethical dilemma of ESCR, there are issues regarding their true efficacy.  More to the point, this work, while indicating vast potential, by no means eliminates the existing controversy.  A variety of obstacles exist, even as new types of stem cells are tested as to their abilities to produce desired growth.  Some, for example, are subject to immune system reactions, and are rejected as organ transplants may be.  Others remain limited by virtue of being Hematopoietic, in that they can only generate new cells of the same type, as in skin or blood.  Only the embryonic stem cell is free from such restrictions (Holland, Lebacqz, & Zoloth  5), even as ongoing research seeks alternatives.   The embryo is as rich a field for stem cells as has ever been identified, as these cells are essentially generated specifically to differentiate, or take on specific functions: “The fertilized egg has unbounded stemness” (Kelly 10).   The impetus to do so is created by the inescapable fact that, as opponents to ESCR so loudly proclaim, the extraction of the cells translates to the destruction of the human embryo.

The Primary Issue

As may be evident, the issues emanating from ESCR tend to center on a single and critical aspect.  It is one, moreover, that has certainly been present in other controversies, such as legalized abortion: namely, at one point may it be said that human life begins to exist as such?  That this is the crux of the dilemma relies, and appropriately so, on the universal acceptance of human life as inviolable, if not sacred.  To deliberately harm a life is considered an unconscionable action; consequently, it is also believed widely that no course, even that which may provide vital help to others, can justify such an action.  In the views of many, ambitions to aid humanity that involve the destruction of human life are intrinsically specious, if not blatantly immoral.

Moreover, the ESCR debate is far more complex than may be assumed.  More exactly, it is first necessary, in addressing the question posed, to investigate a common perception.  It is believed by many that those strenuously opposed to ESCR act due to religious convictions, and perceive the human embryo as invested with a soul by a divine will or presence.  This is by no means the chief reality, although it may be reasonably assumed that deeply religious people harbor such feelings.  The issue itself actually transcends religion, as even large segments of the scientific community have concerns regarding the destruction of embryos.  Then, opponents of ESCR are vocal, and justly so, in decrying claims that their objections are based on religious feeling.  Such a stance appears to them a matter of political expediency, and a means of dismissing valid issues as prompted by faith-based fervor (George, Tollefsen 20).  The objection is not without validity; many proponents of ESCR eagerly portray opponents in such a discriminatory and unjust light: “Religious conservatives see their (stem cells) destruction as nothing more than a high-tech form of cannibalism”  (Bellomo 1).  To do justice to the true matters at stake, then, it is essential to set aside religious points of view, simply because what is believed to substantiate the human being as such typically exists outside of spiritual, religious, or metaphysical realms of thought.

To revert to the question of when life actually begins, which has crucial bearing on the ethics of utilizing embryonic cells, an interesting element arises, and one distanced from any scientific, or even spiritual, point of view.  It is that of potential.  As has been evident from the lengthy and heated abortion controversies, people tend to associate human life with the possibility of human life, as existing in the most primal forms in which we are able to identify it.  More exactly, many opponents to ESCR do not claim that the embryo destruction is the taking of a life; rather, they view it as an unspeakable crime because it is the intended halting of a life that is to be.  This is not, again, a perception that relies on a religious foundation, in that the destruction violates the will of God; instead, it arises from the relatively pragmatic likelihood that the embryo may well be permitted to become a human being.  It is important that this association of expectancy as translating to human life be comprehended, for it has great meaning within the arguments most sensibly opposed to ESCR.  As will be seen, these arguments are not without foundation, and often rely on intricate knowledge of reproductive systems.  Nonetheless, as will also be revealed, they consistently seek to infuse dimensions of actuality within parameters that must, regrettably or otherwise, be seen as potentials.

No more powerful argument regarding the immorality of ESCR, in terms of the biological processes named above, may be presented than that of George and Tollefsen in their Embryo: A Defense of Human Life.  The authors go to great, and uniformly scholarly, pains to differentiate their stance from that of faith-based, or even socially relevant, concerns.  Impressively, they document what may be called the “journey of life” in a highly pragmatic fashion, and emphatically do not attribute to the sperm or the eggs any stature as inherently affirming that a life is in place.  The authors carefully delineate the initial processes of conception, identifying the specific function, and even “being,” of each cell going to the activity.  The sperm, for example, is not “alive” in their viewpoint, even though it moves and exists as alive within the female body for a short time (George, Tollefsen  37-38).  More precisely, the sperm and the egg are parts of the larger organisms of male and female, and George and Tollefsen are exacting in not endowing them with any larger function.  They even, and seemingly nonchalantly, concede how these cells dissolve when they meet and proceed to create the embryo, which enhances their credibility as dispassionate opponents of ESCR.  Nonetheless, they adamantly conclude that this same, organic behavior produces a trajectory that has a defining moment; when there is a union between sperm and oocyte, the maturing of human development is present.  The authors then affirm that most embryologists concur in that this is the fixed moment when the trajectory of human life is set into definitive motion (George, Tollefsen  39).  Simply, the zygote formed by the union of the sperm and the egg is a different entity, and one clearly created only by means of that union.  It exists where nothing before it existed, and consequently represents an irrefutable course of human creation as occurring.

The argument is certainly compelling, and not easily refuted.  To do so, in fact, would be to contradict all we actually know regarding the pathways of conception.  What demands investigation here, however, is that aspect of potential seized upon by George and Tollefsen, yet not fully acknowledged by them.  More exactly: it is one thing to present an incontrovertible evidence of a trajectory in place, and another to affirm that the trajectory and the thing it may be likely to become are one and the same.  As noted, this is the critical matter fueling all ESCR debate, yet it is often overlooked precisely because the association between trajectory and final development is so strong.  No one may reasonably aver that a healthy embryo will not, unless contrary conditions present themselves, grow into a fetus, and subsequently develop into a full human being.  Both sides of the ESCR debate, ironically, tend to join forces in this assessment:

“An embryo has potential in the sense of having an “active disposition” and “intrinsic power” to develop into a mature human being” (Siegel).  What is pivotal here is that interpretation of the “potential,” and it is interesting to note how it is shaped by the subjective phrases quoted above.  It is certainly impressive to cite an “active disposition” as existing within an embryo, yet the term itself intrinsically suggests a conscious will in play, either as within the embryo or as an external force.  More bluntly, “disposition” translates to inclination, and it seems irresponsible to accord a living process so expansive a capability.  Similarly, “intrinsic power” creates even further unease.  In pragmatic terms, the expression may just as easily be applied to as primitive – and notoriously unevolving – a form of life as a lichen.  It too has an “intrinsic power” to remain alive, and to slowly grow.  There is, plainly, no inescapable moral obligation to view a living process as endowed with the qualities we attach to human life, and this must include those human processes that go to creating human life.  Put another way: if we are ethically obligated to attach esteem to human life, we are similarly obligated to comprehend the distinctions between organic processes and that life itself, and not rely on association and expectation to guarantee that state of being.

It must be noted that none of this is to suggest that human reproductive processes are without meaning until a fetus is in a certain stage of development.  Clearly, how a person’s life commences is of immeasurable import.  At the same time, the tendency to invest the embryo, the cell which may or may not move forward into the innumerable phases of further growth into a human being, with attributes based upon what we foresee as occurring is as irresponsible as ignoring the value of the process behind it itself.  If it is disagreeable to many, the reality remains that the embryo is a nucleus, and not a fetus or a human being.  Moreover, as it essentially belongs to the body in which it is created, other issues come into play determining its value, and which generate controversies all their own.

Relative Worth and Other Issues

No discussion of ESCR may be conducted without at least a cursory awareness of the benefits of the research.  The issue of the embryo as a human life remains distinct from such benefits, as it is unreasonable to suppose that any could validate the work if it does indeed demand the willful taking of life.  As, however, it has been proposed here that only associative perception creates the concept of the embryo as a human life, it is all the more essential to understand how critical ESCR is.   This is an understanding not easily conveyed, simply because of the nature of the processes themselves.  As all life is cellular, the implications for stem cells to address disease and injury are virtually limitless.  Blood-forming stem cells may fully restore the hematopoietic systems of cancer patients; atherosclerosis, which takes the lives of hundreds of thousands annually, could be reversed with blood vessel-forming cells; severe wounds and burns may be healed by skin cells; and the millions suffering from rheumatoid arthritis and osteoarthritis could be treated with chondrocytes, or stem cells adapted to create new cartilage (Holland, Lebacqz, & Zoloth  10).  In no uncertain terms, the cell is the building block of all life; when new cells are applied to replace damaged ones, it follows that whatever harms life or creates disease may be addressed or eliminated.  The ethics involved in the use of embryos notwithstanding, it remains established that the stem cell presents opportunities for enhancing human life as no other medical advancement has.

This potential wealth of benefits serves to illustrate even more dramatically the insistence of opposition, and in regard to the creation of embryos specifically for generating stem cells.  Not unexpectedly, this has raised objections reflecting the concerns of opponents generally, in that an unacceptable disregard for the sanctity of human life is in play.  Government panels and commissions delving into the issues of ESCR since the 1990s uniformly reach conclusions that afford embryos, both artificially and naturally created, an intermediate moral status. On one level, these reports assert that none of the qualities associated with human life, such as sentience, is present in the embryo, so it may not be viewed as a life.  On another, that specter of potentiality weighs in, and it is established that some levels of fundamental “respect” must be applied to embryo research (Holland, Lebacqz, & Zoloth 41).  President Obama’s decision to fund stem cell research notwithstanding, the government itself is in an unenviable position, always, in this arena.  It is obligated to act for the public interest in a manner removed from ideological, religious, or philosophical concerns, yet the society it governs is largely composed of just those elements.  What has become apparent, then, is that these concerns are so intense, even the laboratory creation of embryos in order to cull stem cells offends many sensibilities.  Again, it is felt that such efforts express a horrifying disregard for the sanctity of human life, and that science is somehow seeking to dictate matters of creation itself.

Such strenuous opposition demands that a more pragmatic mode of address be made, if the immense worth of ESCR is to be maintained.  More exactly, and despite the protestations of stem cell opponents, certain realities blatantly contradict objections to the work.  For example, as many modern couples seek assistance in having children, the interesting fact exists that untold numbers of embryos are developed through in vitro fertility procedures and are discarded (Svendsen, Ebert 147).  These choices to discard, made by the parties involved, are typically made to protect privacy rights and the “ownership” of the embryos by the partners, or women.  The veto here seems perfectly rational; if the law allows that a woman has the rights to her reproductive processes, she is completely entitled to make such a decision.  What is more interesting, however, and certainly relevant to the subject, is the reasoning behind these decisions.  They are not, as a rule, random:  “Patients who elect that their embryos be discarded also do not merely foresee the embryos’ destruction; their election of that option manifests their intention that the embryos be destroyed” (Siegel).  This would seem to indicate that cultural or societal forces are strongly at play, discouraging the possibility that a “part” of a person’s being may be taken over by another, and used to create a life removed from that of the embryo’s owner.  The concept is understandable, yet it also begs the question of a further choice, were stem cell research not as stigmatized as it remains.  More exactly, it seems eminently reasonable to assume that those individuals choosing to discard embryos would prefer they be used to save lives or further immensely important medical research.  Ultimately, there can be no single answer to the question of whether destroying an embryo is justified if that destruction leads the way to life-saving discoveries.  Such an answer must be predicated on the value system of each individual weighing the matter, as these are ethical considerations beyond parameters of definitive conclusions.  What is crucial here, however, and what vastly goes to supporting ESCR, is that embryos are being deliberately destroyed anyway, and all the time.  Given what is known about what stem cells may accomplish for humanity, this single factor reflects a lapse at least as great as any moral qualms about the identifying of when human life begins.

Conclusion

Perhaps the greatest irony in the entire ESCR debate lies in the fact that no proper good from stem cell research may accrue without a consistent regard for the ethical concerns objecting to it.  As has been discussed, these concerns appear to be based upon an association or expectation of human life as inevitable, rather than as any firm belief in the embryo as being one.  Then, the mere fact that millions of potentially valuable embryos are destroyed at the behest of their owners powerfully weakens any moral opposition, if these embryos are indeed viewed as a form of life.  At the same time, and importantly, these very arguments serve to reinforce the responsibility of science to question its course, particularly in areas so touching upon how humanity is perceived.  It is to be hoped that ESCR will continue to gain governmental support, and that opposition will fully comprehend the value of it.  That there have been significant controversies regarding its ethics, too, should serve to sway feeling away from an understandable, if inappropriate, view of what precisely an embryo is.  It is not human life, but a form of life that may develop into the human, and the very real issues plaguing humanity today must take precedence over speculation as to the possibility of a “soul,” or a truly human status, as existing within an embryo.  In no uncertain terms, embryonic stem cell research must continue, and in a manner that consistently and carefully considers its ethical implications as it proceeds, for only so comprehensive a course can ensure that the greatest good is accomplished for humanity itself.

Works Cited

Bellomo, M.  The Stem Cell Divide: The Facts, the Fiction, and the Fear Driving the Greatest Scientific, Political, and Religious Debate of Our Time.  New York: American Management Association, 2006.  Print.

George, R. P., & Tollefsen, C. Embryo: A Defense of Human Life.  New York: Random House,  2008.  Print.

Holland, S., Lebacqz, K., & Zoloth, L. The Human Embryonic Stem Cell Debate: Science, Ethics, and Public Policy.  Cambridge: MIT Press, 2001.  Print.

Kelly, E. B.  Stem Cells. Westport: Greenwood Publishing Group, 2007.  Print.

Siegel, A.  “Ethics of Stem Cell Research.” The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2008 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (Ed.).  Web.  Retrieved from <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2008/entries/stem-cells/>

Svendsen, C. N., & Ebert, A. D.  Encyclopedia of Stem Cell Research, Vol. II.   Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications, 2008.  Print.