Existentialism or Ancient Philosophy, Research Paper Example

The philosophy of Stoicism placed a great deal of emphasis on self-control and the cultivation of virtue in order to attain happiness. The Stoics recognized that one could not hope to control everything that transpired; all that one could hope to govern was one’s self. In the face of the vicissitudes and uncertainties of life, the Stoics held that the mastery of the self was the key to realizing satisfaction and contentment, no matter one’s circumstances.

Stoicism was founded around 300 BCE by Zeno of Citium, in Cyprus, who as a young man traveled to Athens and became a pupil of the Cynic philosopher Crates (Sellars 4). The Cynic philosophy opposed nature and human society, arguing that one should embrace the former and reject the latter (4). For the Cynic, what mattered was securing the basic essentials of life, i.e. “food, water, basic shelter and clothing”, and disregard the “arbitrary” conventions, customs and mores of one’s own particular culture (4-5). Cynic ideas exerted a deep philosophical impact on Zeno’s philosophy: in his Republic, Zeno argued for “the abolition of the law courts, currency, marriage and traditional education” (5). Zeno became a very popular and well-respected teacher, and his pupils were known as ‘Stoics’ after the Painted Stoa, or porch, where he taught (5).

A more profound Cynic influence can be seen in the Stoic opposition to the philosophy of hedonism, the very philosophy to which Stoicism emerged as a response: hedonism advocates the pursuit of pleasure and the avoidance of pain as the highest gain and greatest good (Soccio 182). For the hedonist, pleasure is good, and its pursuit is “our birthright” (183). For the Stoic, however, what matters is not the pursuit of pleasure, but rather the pursuit of self-control (Soccio 181). Self-control is attained through self-discipline, which consists of learning to detach oneself from all externalities: everything that happens to one or around one (181). Self-control and self-control alone can produce true happiness, because only the truly self-disciplined person can be happy in any situation, and under any circumstances (181).

As Soccio so aptly summarizes it, “Everything is a matter of attitude” (181). Because one cannot control everything that happens to one, it therefore follows that one can only ever hope to control one’s self—and that if one instead pursues something else, one will ultimately and inevitably encounter unhappiness (181). However, the early Stoics were not united on a key point of Stoic philosophy: the question of whether some externalities, or “’indifferents’” as the Stoics called them, were better than others (Sellars 6). Aristo of Chios, a pupil of Zeno’s, argued that they were not: specifically, that one ought not to prefer wealth over poverty (6). Aristo ultimately lost the argument, as other Stoic thinkers espoused the idea that indeed, some “indifferents” were preferable to others (6).

Chrysippus of Soli was the third to head the Stoa, from ca. 232-205 BCE (Sellars 7). An enormously influential and important Stoic, Chrysippus left his mark on the philosophy as a whole (7). As Strange explains, Stoicism as developed by Chrysippus—Chrysippean Stoicism—held that the human mind, or soul, was “wholly rational” in character (32). Specifically, reason or logos constitutes either the entirety of the soul, or at least its “h?gemonikon or ‘leading part’” (32). Pure reason, then, is essentially the governing principle of the soul: irrationality comes about in the course of dianoia, or thought/the mind (32). Irrationality disturbs dianoia, which in turn distorts the ability of dianoia to be rational (38). All emotions and all desires are simply “judgments or beliefs”; passions and emotions are unnatural, and they should be extirpated (32).

But it was more nuanced than that, for the Stoics did not hold that one should extirpate every desire or wish (boul?sis): rather, they defined a truly desirable boul?sis as being a “reasonable desire or pursuit”, a eulogos orexis (33). And for the Stoic, a reasonable desire was defined in terms of a desire that in fact is directed towards some real good, and not merely an apparent good (33-34). There is a contrast here with epithumia, or lust, which the Stoics defined in terms of “bad or irrational desire”, i.e. a desire that aims for something which is not good, but seems to be (34). Thus, a boul?sis, a wish that is in fact a eulogos orexis or ‘good, reasonable desire’, was one of the eupatheiai, the “’rational affections’” in Stoic philosophy (Strange 34). The wise person was one who cultivated the eupatheiai, the rational affections, in place of the path?, the “normal passions” (34). The Stoics held that these “normal passions” were undesirable indeed, “diseased conditions of the vicious soul,” in Strange’s words (34).

But Stoic ethics also emphasized voluntariness or responsibility as a key for ascertaining whether an individual’s desire or action was praise- or blameworthy: if an individual gave sunkatathesis, or consent, to an axi?ma, or proposition, then and only then could the individual be said to have made a choice (34). This distinction is very important in Stoic philosophy, because whether we give assent/sunkatathesis is the primary thing that is actually eph’?min or “’up to us’” (34). Thus, Stoic conceptions of rationality and responsibility were inextricably and indelibly linked to Stoic conceptions of the soul, consisting principally of logos, and the mind, dianoia, which together made up the pneuma, the very essence of the self—what might be defined as ‘spirit’ (38). And importantly, the Stoics held that the pneuma was itself a part of something much greater: nothing less than the “active element in the universe,” which for the Stoics meant Zeus (38).

In later times, Stoicism enjoyed great popularity with the Romans as well as the Greeks. The three main figures associated with this later Roman Stoicism are the philosopher Epictetus (ca. 55-135 CE), Lucius Annaeus Seneca, a Roman senator known for his prolific writing, and the Emperor Marcus Aurelius, who ruled from 161-180 CE (Morgan 428). Epictetus’ background is especially noteworthy, in that he was a slave and had no control over what happened to him—indeed, had no control over his own body (Sellars 190). As Sellars explains, this seems to have influenced his Stoicism considerably: Epictetus learned that “the only absolute control… [he] had was over his own reactions to what happened” (190-191). Fittingly, he developed a characteristically Stoic motto: Anechou kai apechou, “bear and forbear” (191). In one instance, his master Epaphroditus—ironically, also a former slave—cruelly tortured Epictetus, severely breaking his leg (191). Epictetus first warned his master that his leg was likely to break, and, when it did, reportedly said “’See, it’s just as I told you’” (191). In a later adage, he characterized the experience in a most extraordinary fashion, saying “’I was never more free than when I was on the rack’” (191). Fortunately, Epictetus was finally freed, at some point after the death of Emperor Nero in 68 CE, and went on to become a very influential teacher (191).

Although Epictetus wrote nothing himself, one of his pupils, the historian Arrian, transcribed some of his lectures into the Discourses (Magill 127, Morgan 428). As Magill explain, Epictetus held that in order to achieve the good life, one had to master three stages: firstly, one had to master one’s own desires; secondly, one had to learn how to perform one’s duties, and thirdly, one had to learn how to think correctly “concerning one’s self and the world” (127). The mastery of one’s own desires came first, because Epictetus held that achieving a tranquil mind was the chief end of philosophy (127). For Epictetus, all disturbances or perturbations came about due to a disparity or discrepancy between “our wills and the external world” (127). This, of course, is characteristically Stoic, and so is Epictetus’ diagnosis of the problem: it is rarely the case that our desires will coincide with the circumstances obtaining in the external world all around us (127-128). There is far too much that we cannot control, Epictetus recognized from personal experience. It therefore follows that attempting to approach life by trying to fulfill one’s desires in the external world will only lead to sorrow, envy, and strife (128). For Epictetus, the preferred course of action, the key to the good life, was therefore to change the only thing that one could control: one’s reactions to external circumstances (128).

Secondly, Epictetus enjoined the importance of duty. Epictetus saw the individual as a part of the whole: a part of a community, a society, a country, and the world itself (Magill 128). Epictetus characterized a human being as “’a citizen of the world’”: unlike the unthinking animals, a human being could reason, comprehend the gods, and understand their part in the greater whole (128). As such, we each have duties to others, and we should not abuse each other—and Epictetus, from personal experience, singled out the abuse of slaves by their owners as a case in point (128). A person should also venerate the gods, believing in their existence and recognizing their wisdom (129). Thirdly and finally, Epictetus believed in the importance of learning to think correctly, i.e. logically (129). Learning rationality was important in order to learn how to control one’s own desires, and in order to discover the duties one owes to the gods and to others (129). One should learn to recognize fallacies, in order to avoid them and to correct others (129). Finally, one should use logic to cultivate morality, by “testing whether particular things are good” (129).

Stoic philosophy was concerned with the pursuit of the good life, defined in terms of a state of self-mastery, such that one could be content under every circumstance. Rather than pursuing one’s own pleasures or simply seeking to return to nature, the Stoics held that one should discipline one’s self towards the pursuit of goals that would result in real goods. By cultivating rationality and self-mastery, the Stoic endeavored to replace passion, emotion and desire with a certain equanimity towards all that life might bring.

Works Cited

Magill, Frank N., ed. Masterpieces of World Philosophy. New York: HarperCollins Publishers, 1990 Print.

Morgan, Michael L., ed. Classics of Moral and Political Theory. 5^th ed. Indianapolis, IN: Hackett Publishing Company, 2011. Print.

Sellars, John. Stoicism. Berkeley and Los Angeles, CA: University of California Press, 2006. Print.

Soccio, Douglas J. Archetypes of Wisdom: An Introduction to Philosophy. 7^th ed. Belmont, CA: Wadsworth. Print.

Strange, Steven K. “The Stoics on the Voluntariness of the Passions.” Stoicism: Traditions and Transformations. Ed. Steven K. Strange and Jack Zupko. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2004. 32-51. Print.