Expanding the Shield: The Many Elements of Deterrence, Essay Example

Matthew Kroenig’s and Barry Pavel’s article, “How To Deter Terrorism,” is a thoughtful response to how the work of the authors’ on this subject has been interpreted by both the government and by critics. More exactly, it is an attempt to reinforce and clarify thinking that has been adapted to suit governmental policies, and to educate the reader into the often ignored nuances of how deterrence may more effectively work to protect a nation. The authors begin by noting the trajectory of deterrence policy as it existed from the Cold War era and carried over into post-9/11 society. They carefully deconstruct the Cold War model in order to reveal how adaptive deterrence policy must be when actual terrorism, and not full-scale war, is the concern. They emphasize here, as occurs throughout the article, that deterrence can never be more than one element in a broader strategy. This historical perspective on the concept of deterrence, then, indicates the requirement. In plain terms, deterrence is called into play when one party, suspecting or fearing hostile intentions from another, seeks to thwart the possible fulfillment of those attentions. This may be done through various forms of deterrence, but a basic requirement is that the initial party have both an interest to protect and the means to make known its own efforts to protect: “An actor can shape the adversary’s perception of the costs or benefits of a particular course of action” (Kroenig, Pavel 22). Consequently, means and intent are requirements for deterrence.

Kroening and Pavel then go on to break down the various types of deterrence possible, even as they insist on its being recognized as only a partial response to terrorism. Here, retaliation is shown to be both a consistently relied-upon form, and in nations other than the U.S. The formula is simple: as terrorists come to understand that a severe reaction will meet their attacks, they will be deterred from engaging in new ones, as other terrorists will receive the same message. While discussing Indirect Response, Tactical Denial, and Strategic Denial strategies, the authors indirectly cite why deterring terrorism is so complicated and daunting a challenge. Tactical Denial, for instance, in which terrorism is denied by technical means the opportunity to be conducted, is a rationale that still cannot account for terrorist motivation itself. This applies as well to Retaliation and Strategic Denial (wherein the benefit to the terrorist is removed) because terrorists are inherently “irrational.” We do not believe they can be deterred because their agendas are often outside the scope of reason or understandable objective, and deterrence demands some form of comprehension and acceptance. A suicide bomber, for example, is unlikely to be deterred because achieving the goal of the terrorism is the point.

In discussing how deterrence differs from defense, the authors support their lengthy discussion on President Bush’s deterrence strategies. More exactly, they view the emphasis on Homeland Security as a defensive measure to be inadequate. Kroenig and Pavel do cite instances wherein defense, in Tactical Denial forms of increased security, has thwarted known terrorist plans, but they emphasize that deterrence is best applied when it looks beyond immediate circumstances. They seem to feel the U.S. is ignoring opportunities in not expanding the dimensions of terrorism, even as they acknowledge the importance of defensive measures: “The United States should, therefore, do more to work with friends and allies to put laws on the books…to punish terror activity” (26). Under Bush, Homeland Security was developed as a poised and powerful counter to terrorism, in which active deterrence sometimes took the form of combat strikes into perceived enemy territory. Such “preventive war,” however, is still only an immediate measure, and the authors hold that wider policy promoting real deterrence, and not “proactive defense,” will be more effective. They state: “The objective of homeland

security should not be to fend off an endless number and methods of terrorist attacks” (29), implying that this was the Bush agenda.

Lastly, regarding the morality of anti-terrorist policies, Kroenig and Pavel ultimately distance themselves from such concerns. Not only do they coolly assess the Israeli practice of retaliation by the bombing of the homes of terrorists’ families (27), they overtly claim that it is dangerous to focus on issues of morality when a dangerous enemy is at hand. The argument is sound, if only because the nature of terrorism ethical concerns. At the same time, there is no discussion here of Homeland Security or U.S. deterrence as violating the rights of U.S. citizens through privacy intrusions, and this is a moral question not easily resolved. While deterrence is moral for the society, the unfortunate reality remains that it may be exercised in ways defying morality within the society it seeks to protect.

Works Cited

Kroenig, M., & Pavel, B. “How To Deter Terrorism.” The Washington Quarterly 35. 2 (2012 ): 21-36. Web. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/0163660X.2012.665339