Friedrich Nietzsche’s Claim Regarding Morality, Essay Example

Introduction

Philosophers invite controversy by the very nature of their roles.  To propose rationales for existence itself, and no matter the careful construction and justification, is to make an emphatic claim regarding the most fundamental issues known to humanity, and consequently oppose equally strong beliefs.  This notwithstanding, Friedrich Nietzsche may be said to more actively inspire antagonism than other great thinkers.  Relentlessly pragmatic and fiercely drawn to primal concepts of instinct, as well as gradations of innate superiority of certain races and types of people, he generally despises the core of most philosophy: morality, or the pursuit of morality as the ultimate virtue.  It is not for Nietzsche a reality, but rather a construct needed by masses of men to validate the herd existence for which most are fit.  His reasoning is compelling but, as will be explored, Nietzsche fails.  His arguments cannot succeed because, ironically, he is as implacably confident and as driven by personal agendas as those whom he dismisses.  Equally importantly, he is utterly unwilling to accept an idea of morality as being, in fact, an instinct itself.  Ultimately, Nietzsche’s consistent emphasis on morality as unsubstantial and in place to satisfy “human hers” does not derive from clear thinking, but rather from a contempt that is both personal and hostile, and consequently highly suspect.

Discussion

To begin with, refuting Nietzsche’s ideas of morality as invalid and humanity as herd-driven requires a recognition of the processes by which he views humanity in its entirety.  It is here, at this elementary level, that his thinking is first exposed as weak.  Nietzsche essentially is enabled to cast humanity into herds because he conveniently breaks it up into categories of animals, and of radically varied qualities.  Nietzsche’s very specific racial and national profiles are, in a word, striking, and not by any means because they defy modern notions of race and nationalism as not so defining people.  What renders his views here so extraordinary is his absolute conviction in the rightness of his categorizing entire populations so specifically.  Nietzsche does allow for variations within cultures, as in his multifaceted view of Germans; they are both strong and diffused, and he regrets their neglect of the music of language.  At the same time, he is uncompromisingly hateful toward the English.  Referring to Carlyle as a “muddle-head” who neared the truth of his own people, Nietzsche discounts the English as essentially incapable of great thought, a reality he feels accounts for their fierce holding to Christianity (150).  Lacking any real strength or intellect, this is a race for Nietzsche that is superficially dependent upon hollow morality, and one also prone to alcoholism.

These convictions in place, then, it is easy to follow Nietzsche’s reasoning and deduce that people are essentially herd animals.  When an entire population is defined as having specific traits, it is denied anything like human potential to surpass these identities, and this is as true of the nations he exalts as it is of those he despises.  For example, the Jews for Nietzsche are an extraordinarily strong race, capable of a greatness no other European culture may achieve.  What is specious here, however, is that he denies them to opportunity to fail, or be anything other than great and, as will be noted, it must also be wondered how such innate quality could be so steadily suppressed by the non-great.  In plain terms, Nietzsche insists on painting in broad strokes, but humanity resides most importantly in variations of itself.  The philosopher neglects this critical element, as he also may be accused of being arbitrary in his judgments.

Nietzsche will attribute certain strengths to races he otherwise thinks little of, but it is critical to note that he gives the English no such credit.  Astonishingly, he casts aside Shakespeare, largely acknowledged as the most true and profound poet, as an object of fun, one who would draw laughter from the classic Greeks (115).  This is beyond bold; it in fact denigrates genius for the sake of affirming a national or racial mediocrity, and the overt effort is too specious to be valid.  In other words, Nietzsche is enabled to cast humans into herds because he himself establishes them as herd animals.  The English cling to morality because they must, and they must because he sets crucial – and narrow – boundaries around them. When it as acknowledged that, actual racial or nationalistic traits notwithstanding, human beings transcend these aspects of identity consistently, his argument erodes completely.

All this said, it is not unreasonable to assert that there are ranges of quality within humanity, if one can set aside Nietzsche’s insistence on absolute racial parameters.  Some people are essentially stronger in character and intellect than others, certainly.  What weakens Nietzsche here, however, is his failure to account for the suppression of the strong, which he believes is a consequence of the “human herds.”  Simply, his thinking defies its own logic.  A firm believer in specific and consistent evidences of human superiority, he champions it as great in all ways, and inherently deserving of recognition as such, and more: “Few are made for independence.  It is a privilege of the strong” (28).  It must then be asked: why is this blatant greatness not then leading the herds who are, by Nietzsche’s own reasoning, eager to be led by a force greater than themselves?  Why, if the herds are attracted to an idea of virtue as right to guide and bind them, would they not reflexively exalt and follow the truly great?  His reality of the herd as suppressing the superior, in fact, seems to indicate a superiority in the herd itself.

Moving onto how morality is a construct of the masses, it is important to note Nietzsche’s disdain for a great deal of philosophy itself, or what the world defines it to be.  This is important in comprehending his rationale dismissive of morality, for he does not value – or trust – any philosophical claim based on aspirations to morality, or morality at its core.  The philosopher, like other members of the “herd,” is presenting as a drive for knowledge what is in fact a drive to uphold an idea of virtue, and one that exists primarily because it justifies the philosopher’s intent.  With rare exceptions, the philosopher works only from memoir and inverts what should be philosophical processes; namely, they construct ostensible ideologies of reason to support the morality already in place, rather than apply genuine knowledge to define or create morality.  The impression is strongly made that Nietzsche mistrusts philosophers to define or exalt morality because he feels they are abandoning knowledge to satisfy personal agendas.

Then, Nietzsche neatly divides morality into two forms, even as he admits that both may coexist within the same man.  “Master-morality” enables distinctions of virtue far different than those held to by lower orders, in that the powerful are privileged to decide the virtues from no position of subjugation, which in turn generates morality in which power itself is the key determinant. For example, “evil” is synonymous with weakness to such people because they attach vice to those lacking power. They essentially view the world only through privileged eyes, and this creates, rather than conforms to, the morality they observe.  Conversely, there is “slave-morality,” which is, “the morality of utility” (163).  This is for Nietzsche, in fact, the essence of Christianity; as multitudes have been deprived of standing or power, they have created and held fast to a faith that accommodates the desires and needs of the weak.  They shape and cling to morality that gives comfort to the weak and points to rewards beyond the mortal sphere of existence, not because this is devout belief, but because the belief is dictated by their need.  Consequently, Christianity is for Nietzsche an elaborate and invalid construction, and one no more “moral” than the ideas held by the ruling classes.  Each “herd,” as it were, is able only to believe what suits their roles.

All of this is profoundly cynical, but that alone should not be allowed to dispute Nietzsche’s philosophy in these regards.  There is in fact an excellent logic to this thinking, certainly when the comforts of Christianity are considered.  The faith is very much based on ultimate justice for the miserable, which would seem to correspond well to Nietzsche’s view that this population is so desperate for comfort, it manufactures the necessary morality. Then, it is not unreasonable to assert that those with power will have vastly different perceptions of life and thus shape for themselves a morality in keeping with them. The problem nonetheless lies in Nietzsche’s absolutism. His thinking in terms of morality would in fact be significant if he were willing to admit to it as a general state of being, or morality as a whole influenced by the master and slave roles.  This he will not do, simply because to do so would be to allow for some authenticity in morality itself, and this would utterly defy his philosophy based on exposing it.

This uncompromising stance is flawed, then, because there is vast evidence of all types of people joining in recognizing certain goods as inviolable, and certain wrongs as irredeemable.  This in fact transcends faith differences, and it is extraordinary that Nietzsche chooses to ignore this historic reality and instead rely on a cynicism far less easy to uphold.  He claims: “He who has seen deeply into the world knows what wisdom there is in the fact that men are superficial” (84).  What he does not claim, and crucially, is that not all men are superficial, or that men are not always superficial; if they were, as Nietzsche affirms, one must wonder how his superior races ever achieved their superiority, which quality is intrinsically not superficial.  This goes to another weakness in his reasoning.  Nietzsche values instinct highly and sees it is a characteristic of superior people.  Given that instinct itself encompasses many drives, it is perfectly rational to hold that morality is among these; that, simply, people have an instinctive need to recognize good and evil as distinct forces.  Consequently, Nietzsche’s unrelenting dismissal of morality is greatly flawed by his absolutist views, just as his “herding” of humanity lacks substance by his insistence on unalterable types of sameness in people.

Conclusion

That Nietzsche possesses great powers of analytical thought cannot be disputed.  His mind is keen and even his most extreme views reflect a certain purity of reason, if of a ruthless nature. That extremity, however, actually works against him as a philosopher because he consistently is driven to categorize humans and human needs in uncompromising ways, when humanity invariably defies such unrelenting categorization. What emerges then is a thinker as motivated by personal agenda as the moral philosophers he derides. In the final analysis, Nietzsche’s consistent emphasis on morality as nothing more than a construct, and one in place to satisfy his “human herds,” does not derive from insight, but rather from a contempt that is both personal and hostile, and consequently highly suspect.

Works Cited

Nietzsche, F.  Beyond Good and Evil.  Trans. Hollingdale, R. J. New York: Penguin Classics, 2003.  Print.