Germany’s and Japan’s State of Democracy, Essay Example

Introduction

In the wake of losing WWII, German’s Basic Law (Grundgesetz) and Japan’s Constitution were both designed to provide democratic stability. Yet, in retrospect, both countries’ have lacked a central element crucial to all healthy democracies: competitive opposing parties. Germany’s CDU/CSU and Japan’s LDP have enjoyed varying levels of electoral domination in their lower houses ) since each party’s establishment in the mid-twentieth century. However, in the last decade, this domination has eroded with the increasing vote share of opposition parties in Germany and a period of DPJ dominance in Japan.

In this paper, I worked on the following research question: Comparatively, what is the nature of the Germany’s CDU/CSU and Japan’s LDP electoral dominance? What does this indicate about Germany’s and Japan’s state of democracy?

Method

For this analysis, I focused on the lower houses due to their similarities and political weight. I first checked the electoral trends for Germany and Japan. Both countries’ main parties, the CDU/CSU and the LDP respectively, had historically enjoyed electoral dominance in the lower houses. However, both parties have been increasingly challenged over the last decade. To understand this, I broke down the parties’ electoral success into three categories: electoral institutions, party leadership, and opposition parties.

By focusing first on electoral institutions, I intended to gain insight into the effect of structural elements in shaping electoral opportunity and strategy. It was important to understand whether the system was inherently non-conducive to party competition and, if not, why a single party had dominated for so long.

I then sought to understand the degree to which effective party leadership had led to electoral dominance. This would hopefully illuminate how responsive each party was to their constituents, a vital marker of a healthy democracy. It would also provide background into what strategies are conducive to electoral success. If those strategies are not party specific, oppositional parties could then co-opt the same strategies for their own.

Lastly, I wanted to focus on opposition parties. I wanted to understand a) why there weren’t more successful challengers, b) in what circumstances did challengers succeed and c) what the future chances were for the alternation of parties.

Background

For much of the Federal Republic of Germany’s existence, the CDU/CSU has enjoyed electoral dominance. As evidence, the CDU/CSU has been a part of the leading coalition for 13 out of the 19 Bundestags and has held the chancellorship for 48 out of the 68 years.^[1] Furthermore, even when they were not in the leading coalition, the CDU/CSU still received the most vote share of any party in the Bundestag. Similarly, the LDP has led 19 of the 21 Sh?giins, which in turn have nominated and approved many a Prime Minister from within their own party.^[2]

While neither country came from a strong democratic tradition, it could be argued that Germany had the preconditions for democracy as early as the 19th century.^[3] Although Imperial Germany was characterized as a soft autocracy, German voters then were already politicly active, well-informed and “increasingly assertive” in their policy preferences (as was actively reflected in their vote choice).[4] Were it not for war breaking out in 1914, there is the chance that Imperial Germany, due to budgeting issues, would have been forced to either overturn or endorse the increasing democratic tendencies of its people.[5] Indeed, some argue the war was used as an intentional distraction of the people from their trending democratic tendencies.

In comparison, Japan was shocked out of a Given Germany’s preconditions, it is arguable that Germany would practice democracy more readably/accurately than Japan

Analysis:

Electoral Institutions

Germany

When writing the Grundgesetz, Germans were haunted by memories of a weak Weimar democracy and the rise of the extremist National Socialist German Worker’s Party (NSDAP) in concert with Adolf Hitler. In consideration of this, Germans focused on creating a system whereby the same events could not reoccur. Opposed to mass politicization, extremist parties and anti-democratic movements, West Germany valued stability, consensus and a militant democracy.^[6] It was these values that shaped the electoral system under the Grundgesetz.

Notoriously complicated, the electoral system for the Bundestag is mixed member proportional–notably the first to exist.^[7] Every four years, elections are held in which each voter has two choices (a practice that started in 1953).[8] The first choice is for a candidate, which is chosen from within a single member district (SMD). Their second choice operates within a proportional representation (PR) system, as voters chose a party. These votes are then pooled nationally to determine the representation of each party in the Bundestag. PR votes do not go to a specific candidate, rather, the party creates a closed list from which they let in members to the Bundestag.

What makes the German’s approach to PR interesting, is that to gain seats through PR, a party must receive either three seats via SMD or 5% of the PR vote.^[9] This was done to ensure smaller extreme parties could not gain an edge into mainstream politics through parliament, as was the case with the NSDAP in the Weimar Republic. To ensure that a) each party’s representation in the Bundestag is proportionate to their received votes in the PR and b) each party’s directly elected candidates have a seat, the Bundestag then has overhang seats, also known as balance seats.^[10] This leads to a fluctuating number of total seats in the Bundestag. While the 5% block in the PR presents a challenge to newer parties, there has still been a proliferation of newer parties such as the AfD and the Greens.

By pooling the PR and allowing it to decide seat distribution in the Bundestag, Germany eliminates distortions of party preference. Additionally, by having two vote options, voters are able to strategically split their ballot to indicate coalition preferences.[11] Since it is difficult for smaller parties to win in the SMD, voters can try to optimize their vote choice by voting for their larger party preference in the SMD and their smaller party preference in the PR.[12]

Japan

Similar to Germany, Japan’s lower house electoral system mixes both direct and indirect voting systems. In 1994, Japan transitioned from a single-non-transferable vote (SNVT) system to a mixed system of proportional representation (PR) from an open list and single-member districts (SMD). This shift caused the LDP to pander more to rural voters, whose votes carried the most weight due to the malapportionment of voting blocks. This malapportionment allowed the LDP to maintain power with much greater ease, as many of the opponent parties early-on did not have roots in these communities or candidates they could field.^[13] While the LDP always counted on the rural countryside for its support, new parties were still on the rise and even dominating urban theatres. For this reason, the LDP’s attention to the countryside became of increased importance in maintaining political staying power.^[14]

Accordingly, the LDP was quick to pump into the countryside one trillion dollars in the form of eight fiscal packets focusing on public works projects and protections.^[15] This proved important since the LDP was losing power and the rural areas remained a central constituency. PARC, a government policy research council, reflects the LDP’s intense focus on rural areas through its labor distribution. Despite its low growth potential, the Agriculture sector had the largest PARC division with 209 members. This was followed by construction, which had the second largest group with 132 members.^[16] Meanwhile, science and technology, the sector with the greatest growth potential, had the smallest PARC division with only 29 members. ^[17]

The evolution of the electoral system had many ups and downs for the LDP. In the initial electoral system, it was necessary for the LDP to ensure not too many of its candidates ran in the same district. Otherwise the vote would be too divided and none of their candidates would be elected. With the switch over to the new system, this was not as much an issue and the LDP was able to run more people on a less divided platform, which effectively led to less intra-party struggle.^[18]

While the PR vote selects for 200 of the Sh?giin’s members, the other 300 seats are sourced through the SMDs.[19] Traditionally, PR helps smaller, newer parties gain influence over established ones. However, due to the unlikely coalition between the LDP and Koimeto, the PR system has worked to stabilize LDP dominance for the last two decades.[20] The Koimeto and LDP coordinate their electoral efforts by asking all of their constituents to vote LDP in the SMD and Koimeto for the PR. The Koimeto arose through the Soka Gakkai Buddhist Movement and has a reliable turnout of 8 million voters, which typically accounts for 12% of the total vote share.[21] This means that the LDP has a constant 12% cushion in the SMDs, which provides them a major advantage that is hard for opposition parties to overcome. This advantage is then compounded by nationally low voting rates. This is reflected below whereby the LDP/Koimeto coalition does better when there is less turnout.

Comparison

The Bundestag and Sh?giin are very similar. Both of these lower houses were constructed as the most influential section of their legislative branches and were given the responsibility of choosing and approving the Chancellor (Germany) or Prime Minister (Japan). Additionally, both have a mixed voting system that combines direct and indirect voting methods. Although both countries mix SMDs and PRs in Japans original system was conducive to LDP domination, when they changed the system that should’ve opened the way to more parties, it was too late, the triangle was formed and LDP had too strong a hold on vital constituent groups Germany has always had a system that is more conducive to the proliferation of parties, despite the 5%, this has made it easier for current parties to enter the system and effect real change experience difficult.

Germay by require chancellor to be chosen in such a way, it has enabled greater compromise between parties and therefore better representaiton among people

• Writing by someone else on a a website: By producing highly proportional outcomes, the electoral system makes manufactured majorities, where one party wins an absolute majority of the parliamentary seats on a minority of the popular votes, very unlikely. In fact, over the last five decades in Germany, manufactured majorities have never occurred. Majority governments have usually been coalition governments, and any change of government has resulted from changes in the configuration of the coalition. German coalition governments are usually stable and regarded as legitimate by the electorate, and, because of a coalition’s built-in incentives to co-operate, many Germans prefer a coalition government to a single-party government. The main checking function is fulfilled by an opposition, which is fairly represented. It is important to note that the relationship between government and opposition in German politics is more consensual and co-operative than conflictual or hostile. This, however, is a result of history and political culture rather than of the electoral system per se.

Japan

The LDP formed in 1955 through the merging of the Liberal Party and the Japan Democratic Party. Almost continuously since then, through the tumultuous 1990’s and beyond, the leadership LDP has maintained its political dominance by pragmatically evolving its political stances to fit the times. For example, after forming in 1955, LDP party leadership initially planned to strip Article 9 from Japan’s constitution, promote medium to small business and further the economic relations between it and the United States.^[22] Upon realizing such a position was politically ruinous, however, leadership re-branded the LDP as the champion of economic growth in order to maintain the party.^[23] A similar shift occurred in the 1970s in the context of a large number of industrial pollution related scandals.^[24] Despite public outcry, it seemed the public’s calls for help would, once again, be ignored due to the government’s prioritization of industry. However, in response to the intensity of public dissent, the LDP re-directed itself once more, this time as the champion of environmental responsibility. In short: a complete reversal.^[25]

The 1990s saw this trend continue. The leadership, which had concentrated much of its political focus to rural areas (to pander to the local constituencies with public works projects and subsidies), started to liberalize and remove some of the support and protections of rural citizens in favor of loosening the load on urban citizens.^[26] An example of how this was carried out is the easing-up on the large-scale retail store law, allowing larger chain stores to move into more rural areas without approval by the local businesses’ representation.^[27] This was a departure from the LDP’s previous practices, but they continued to provide a sizable amount of support to the rural areas to help prevent the creation of floating voters.^[28]

Another trend of the LDP leadership is its continuous gathering of support through the use of transactional tit for tat politics, embodied in business connections and pork barrel politics. This type of politics has been instrumental in sustaining the LDP’s election funds and was started by Kishi, who laundered large unreported funds from business organizations, a rumored M-fund from the United States and untold more to support the party. A great example of the power of transactional politics is the rise of “the commoner’s Prime Minister,” Tanaka.^[29] It was his support of local groups, a small railroad in particular, lead to the creation of his beginning core constituency group in his hometown.^[30] This process of transactional raising of funds was continued and became, when done in excess, a very large detractor from the LDP. After Fukuda quit Tanaka’s cabinet, he ran in the national parliamentary election of 1974 exclaiming, “The trend of money-based politics is too strong.”^[31] The LDP finally lost power for a turn when publicly condemned for collusion with Mitsubishi under Tanaka, and the LDP lost political dominance to a 9-power coalition in 1993.^[32]

Opponent Parties

Germany

CDU/CSU has relatively enjoyed political dominance in Germany for many years, despite ever serving in opposition. Consequently, most of the other parties such as SDP, AfD, The Greens, and FDP have served as opposition parties. The latest of the Parties AfD, performed well electorally in 2013 elections within months of establishment.[33] According to Berbuir, Lewandowsky and Siri (2014) AfD is one of the most successful parties since 1950s.[34] The rapid success was on account that the founding members were well connected through expansive personal networks. Besides, AfD was opportunistic of the migration crisis as it was committed to nativism. The party has sought after protecting the nation from immigration for political interest.[35] Notably, the slogan ‘we are the people’ in its simplicity signified their fight against multiculturalism to conserve Germany.[36] The challenge facing AfD and other opponents is the dominant party CDU/CSU which rules through traditional political thinking that empowers the ‘state’. It undermines the value of societal forces which is the core of AfD and other small parties.

On the other hand is SDP, a party that has enjoyed major involvement in the coalition government. As mentioned above society forces is one of the most significant issues in Opposition. As such, SDP has believed in the need for social justice and equitable wealth distribution.[37] However, SDP has not had the real taste of power in full. The coalition partner CDU/CSU has exploited the favourable economic and political circumstances maintain a strong dominant position than SDP. Moreover, CDU/CSU is more legitimate in governance rendering the many years it has had in power unlike SDP. SDP has failed to focus on one specific cause successfully limiting the rise to power in senior positions of governance.[38] For instance, the Greens have succeeded in remaining focused on a cause of national interest, climate change.[39] Consequently, the Greens party has won voter’s trust.

The Green party is slowly gaining strength in Germany. The momentum has increasingly grown since inception with a record membership of ninety thousand.[40] On macro-level explanation is the increasing integration of the environmental issues in the public domain. Besides, in a new guise the old materialistic politics seem to lose value. The current priority is green politics which is appealing to most young people.[41] In essence, this accounts for a huge population of the middle income earners. Conversely, the issues addressed by the Green Party are not proportionate in addressing the most basic aspects of national interest that attracts more voters.[42] The environmental issues have a materialistic aspect in a broader sense. Thus, the green party’s perception is risky in the modern politics for lacking a socio-economic balance. It is not to mean that the Green party are outsiders. In fact, the central considerations represent a significant portion of the economy that is not well addressed by the ruling party. Therefore, it seems the Green party will remain in playing a vital role of opposition to balance governance. On the other hand, for them to rise in ultimate power a reconsideration of their political issues is paramount.

Japan

The LDP is the dominant party in Japan that was formed in 1955.[43] It has continuously held the reign in the government since inception apart from 2009 and a 10 month period during 1993-1994 electoral reform.[44] LDP managed to retain its position owing to pursuing goals that are fundamental in the political interest. For instance in the year 1998-1999, LDP utilized most of its resources in developing rural areas and offering financial assistance to projects in the public domain.[45] Consequently, it garnered overwhelming support in most districts. Such action oriented policies and projects make it difficult for other parties to challenge LDP’s position. Besides, LDP also maneuverer politically in 1967 when it offered so many construction contracts where most politicians gained access to money.[46] The result was winning majority of seats from the business people who acquired contracts. The opponent parties such as JSP and Sakigake were too small and did not have the financial muscle to lure the public.[47] However, they maintained they role in keeping LDP sane. Occasionally passed votes of no confidence in the 1990s when bribery had become the order of the day in LDP. Finally LDP transformed again.

But there also remained a large malproportionment in the voter’s block in favor of rural areas and this allowed the LDP to maintain power with much greater ease, as many of the opponent parties did not have roots in these communities or candidates they could field.^[48] Parties such as the DPJ only had enough candidates to run and in 62 out of 100 rural blocks, making it much harder for them to threaten LDP authority.^[49] This meant the LDP always had 10 more seats and could easily form a slim majority with 70% of the rural vote.^[50] Even when opposition parties had power, they were still too divided to effect change, as reflected in their inability pass more than a very small number of their numerous proposals. Only 40% of proposals passed in a regular diet session and the amount of cabinet submitted proposals fell to historic lows, and were even passed at worse rates (66%) than under the LDP (100-70% depending). ^[51] It was not long until the LDP returned to political dominance.

Comparison

Japan has thrived for more than fifty years in the hands of a single party LDP since the opponents failed to take appropriate action in cultivating ties with voters through actions.[52] LDP had established strong ties with voters and ensured economic growth. In contrast, CDU the dominant party in Germany thrived for a long period but it was loosely structured as a result of going in to power too soon before forming a strong organised party. Nonetheless, when CDU lost power in the 1960s, it had time to for political and organizational development.[53] It learned to make political adjustments and compromises for its own good.

Further, Japan politics are grounded on responding to the concerns of citizens unlike in Germany where the Leading party plays substantial roles for accountability and healthy politics. For instance in 1998, LDP protected the domestic economy and as result local industries blossomed and employment levels increased.[54] Contrary to Japan politics, the opponent parties in Germany craft policies to win the public. However, most of the policies are sound. For instance AfD is very adamant on restricting immigration, and this appeals to most Germans who no longer feel safe with the influx of refugees and Islam.

Conclusion

The LDP was largely able to maintain its political dominance given the party leadership, an electoral system that remained in their favor, which the LDP capitalized on, and a lack of true opposition. While the LDP changed their positioning to suit the times, there is continuity in the constancy of this change (when necessitated) to better the LDP’s electoral chances. With a transition in electoral system, the LDP’s strategy of campaigning also transitioned to reflect the system, but their winning factors remained the same: tit for tat catering to supporters, a malproportioned rural voting block and less established/proven opposition parties. Overall, the LDP has successfully been able to continuously leverage and maneuver its party to better chances while self-correcting along the way.

Each of these factors might be altered with time, and a two-party system might arise. Just as the LDP lost power before, it will most likely do so again allowing for rural malproportionment to be eventually fixed. That or the LDP might find itself in a position where it is advantageous to change it. As for the LDP’s catering to support by utilizing governmental powers, there is little chance of this form of politics disappearance. It remains difficult for the LDP opposition groups to receive more votes, as voters do not see them as capable of delivering their promises given the LDP’s dominance. If in the past, when this democracy was shaped once again, there had been laws in-place to prevent such a happening it might have helped prevent this. But the normalization of this type of politics implies that only strong public resentment (as before under Tanaka) could reverse this type of practice. Opposition parties have the benefit of social media and many new, pervasive methods to spread their message. As the older section of the current voter block passes, so does a large dependable group of LDP voters. If the opposition parties continue to try and harness these changes, surely they will be able to bolster their position, build their constituency and pose a greater challenge to the LDP. In order to deal with these possible sources of change, the LDP will need to continue to evolve accordingly as the factors of its current electoral dominance are tested or whittle away.

References

Berbuir, Nicole, Marcel Lewandowsky, and Jasmin Siri. 2014. “The Afd And Its Sympathisers: Finally A Right-Wing Populist Movement In Germany?”. German Politics 24 (2): 154-178. doi:10.1080/09644008.2014.982546.

Bittner, Jochen. 2019. “Opinion | The Greens Are Germany’S Leading Political Party. Wait, What?”. Nytimes.Com. https://www.nytimes.com/2019/06/19/opinion/greens-party-germany.html.

Carter, Neil. The politics of the environment: Ideas, activism, policy. Cambridge University Press, 2018.

Cooper, Luke, and Titus Molkenbur. 2019. “The Afd Is Gaining Strength In Germany. A Reformed EU Can Stop It | Titus Molkenbur And Luke Cooper”. The Guardian. https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2019/sep/03/afd-germany-reformed-eu-immigration-parties-europe.

Jefferson Chase. “What You Need to Know about Angela Merkel’s CDU | DW | 24.09.2017.” DW.COM, September 24, 2017. https://www.dw.com/en/what-you-need-to-know-about-angela-merkels-cdu/a-39150360.

Krauss, Ellis S., and Robert Pekkanen. The rise and fall of Japan’s LDP: political party organizations as historical institutions. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 2010.

Kortmann, Matthias, and Christian Stecker. “Party competition and immigration and integration policies: a comparative analysis.” Comparative European Politics 17, no. 1 (2019): 72-91.

“Kushida and Lipscy – 1 The Rise and Fall of the Democratic Party of Jap.Pdf.” Accessed December 20, 2019. https://web.stanford.edu/~plipscy/kushidalipscydpjintro.pdf.

Kushida, Kenji E, and Phillip Y Lipscy. “1 The Rise and Fall of the Democratic Party of Japan.” Shorenstein APARC/Brookings Institution Press, 2013, 40.

Pekkanen, Robert, ed. Critical Readings on the Liberal Democratic Party in Japan. Critical Readings. Leiden?; Boston: Brill, 2018.

Ramseyer, J. Mark, and Frances McCall Rosenbluth. Japan’s Political Marketplace: With a New Preface. 2. print., 1. Harvard Univ. Press paperback ed. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Univ. Press, 1997.

REED, STEVEN R., ETHAN SCHEINER, and MICHAEL F. THIES. “The End of LDP Dominance and the Rise of Party-Oriented Politics in Japan.” The Journal of Japanese Studies 38, no. 2 (2012): 353–76.

Samuels, Richard J, and Cornell University Press. Machiavelli’s Children: Leaders and Their Legacies in Italy and Japan. Ithaca; London: Cornell University Press, 2007.

Scheiner, Ethan. Democracy without Competition in Japan: Opposition Failure in a One-Party Dominant State. Cambridge?; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006.

Schlesinger, Jacob M. Shadow Shoguns: The Rise and Fall of Japan’s Postwar Political Machine. Stanford, Calif: Stanford University Press, 1999.

^[1] Jefferson Chase, “What You Need to Know about Angela Merkel’s CDU | DW | 24.09.2017,” DW.COM, September 24, 2017, https://www.dw.com/en/what-you-need-to-know-about-angela-merkels-cdu/a-39150360.

^[2] Stevan R. Reed, Ethan Scheiner, and Michael F. Thies, “The End of LDP Dominance and the Rise of Party-Oriented Politics in Japan,” The Journal of Japanese Studies 38, no. 2 (2012): 353–76.

^[3] Berman

[4] 455

[5] 450

^[6] https://www.aicgs.org/2019/05/the-past-shapes-the-future-the-german-constitution-at-70/

^[7] https://aceproject.org/main/english/es/esy_de.htm

[8] https://aceproject.org/main/english/es/esy_de.htm

^[9] http://www.electionguide.org/countries/id/82/

^[10]https://www.cnbc.com/2017/09/15/german-elections-explained-chancellor-bundestag-voting-parties-and-merkel.html

[11] https://aceproject.org/main/english/es/esy_de.htm

[12] https://aceproject.org/main/english/es/esy_de.htm

^[13] Ethan Scheiner, “Democracy Without Competition in Japan: Opposition Failure in a One-Party Dominant State,” p. 181.

^[14] Ibid.

^[15] Ethan Scheiner, “Democracy Without Competition in Japan: Opposition Failure in a One-Party Dominant State,” p. 161.

^[16] Mark Ramseyer and Frances Rosenbluth, “Japan’s Political Marketplace,” p. 32-33.

^[17] Ibid.

^[18] Mark Ramseyer and Frances Rosenbluth, “Japan’s Political Marketplace,” p. 17-34.

[19] http://afe.easia.columbia.edu/special/japan_1900_elections.htm

[20] https://www.ft.com/content/feed704c-b31e-11e7-a398-73d59db9e399

[21] Ibid

^[22] Richard Samuels, “Machiavelli’s Children: Leaders and Their Legacies in Italy and Japan,” p. 229.

^[23] Steven Reed and Kay Shimizu, “Avoiding a Two-Party System: The Liberal Democratic Party versus Duverger’s Law,” p. 30.

^[24] James Schlesinger, “Shadow Shoguns: The Rise and Fall of Japan’s Postwar Political Machine,” p. 61.

^[25] Steven Reed and Kay Shimizu, “Avoiding a Two-Party System: The Liberal Democratic Party versus Duverger’s Law,” p. 30.

^[26] Ethan Scheiner, “Democracy Without Competition in Japan: Opposition Failure in a One-Party Dominant State,” p. 161.

^[27] Ibid.

^[28] Ibid.

^[29] James Schlesinger, “Shadow Shoguns: The Rise and Fall of Japan’s Postwar Political Machine,” p. 66.

^[30] Ibid, p. 70.

^[31] Ibid, p. 65.

^[32] Kenji Kushida and Phillip Lipscy. “The Rise and Fall of the Democratic Party of Japan,” p. 7.

[33] Berbuir, Nicole, Marcel Lewandowsky, and Jasmin Siri. 2014. “The Afd And Its Sympathisers: Finally A Right-Wing Populist Movement In Germany?”.German Politics 24 (2): 154-178.

[34] Ibid, 3.

[35] Kortmann, Matthias, and Christian Stecker. “Party competition and immigration and integration policies: a comparative analysis.” Comparative European Politics 17, no. 1 (2019): 72-91

[36] Cooper, Luke, and Titus Molkenbur. 2019. “The Afd Is Gaining Strength In Germany. A Reformed EU Can Stop It | Titus Molkenbur And Luke Cooper”. The Guardian. https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2019/sep/03/afd-germany-reformed-eu-immigration-parties-europe.

[37] Poli, Eleonora. 2019. “Germany’S SDP And The Sleeping Beauty Syndrome”. Aspenia Online. https://aspeniaonline.it/germanys-sdp-and-the-sleeping-beauty-syndrome/

[38] Ibid.

[39]Bittner, Jochen. 2019. “Opinion | The Greens Are Germany’S Leading Political Party. Wait, What?”. Nytimes.Com. https://www.nytimes.com/2019/06/19/opinion/greens-party-germany.html.

[40]Carter, Neil. The politics of the environment: Ideas, activism, policy. Cambridge University Press, 2018.

[41] Carter, Neil. The politics of the environment: Ideas, activism, policy. 42

[42] Bittner, Jochen. 2019. “Opinion | The Greens Are Germany’S Leading Political Party. Wait, What?”. Nytimes.Com. https://www.nytimes.com/2019/06/19/opinion/greens-party-germany.html.

[43] Krauss, Ellis S., and Robert Pekkanen. The rise and fall of Japan’s LDP: political party organizations as historical institutions. Ithaca, N.Y.:( Cornell University Press, 2010.)

[44] Ibid,4.

[45] Kabashima, Ikuo, and Gill Steel. Changing politics in Japan. (Cornell University Press, 2012.)

[46] Ibid, 6.

[47] Reed, Steven R., Ethan Scheiner, and Michael F. Thies. 2012. “The End Of LDP Dominance And The Rise Of Party-Oriented Politics In Japan”. The Journal Of Japanese Studies 38 (2): 353-376. doi:10.1353/jjs.2012.0037.

^[48] Ethan Scheiner, “Democracy Without Competition in Japan: Opposition Failure in a One-Party Dominant State,” p. 181.

^[49] Ibid.

^[50] Ibid.

^[51] Mark Ramseyer and Frances Rosenbluth, “Japan’s Political Marketplace,” p. 20.

[52] Krauss, Ellis S., and Robert Pekkanen. The rise and fall of Japan’s LDP: political party organizations as historical institutions. Ithaca, N.Y.:( Cornell University Press, 2010.)

[53]Berbuir, Nicole, Marcel Lewandowsky, and Jasmin Siri. “The Afd And Its Sympathisers: Finally A Right-Wing Populist Movement In Germany?”. (2014) 158.

[54] Krauss, Ellis S., and Robert Pekkanen. The rise and fall of Japan’s LDP: political party organizations as historical institutions. Ithaca. 29