Global Governance, Research Paper Example

The emergence of the concept of “global governance” in the academic literature can be viewed as symptomatic of a theoretical attempt within political science to rigorously posit the abstract notion of globalization, anticipating the latter’s development, while simultaneously imbuing such a globalization with a consistent political model or theory. What is immediately problematic, however, is that such globalization is construed as amorphous from the perspective of political scientists’ attempting to advance a notion of global governance. Exemplary of this viewpoint is James N. Rosenau’s (2006, p. 121) account of global governance: “to anticipate the prospects for global governance in the decades ahead is to discern powerful tensions, profound contradictions, and perplexing paradoxes, It is to search for order in disorder, for coherence in contradiction and for continuity in change.” What Rosenau describes as a tension and general ambiguity refers to the apparently chaotic nature of the increasing globalization of the world, chaotic insofar as this globalization is not accompanied by the simultaneous emergence of a global political system that can essentially govern such a perceived heterogeneity.  In other words, global governance entails an intervention, which adheres to the notion that the phenomenon of globalization is not to be merely reduced to an economic dimension, such as the opening of free trade, or a technological dimension, in which communication becomes prevalent. Globalization in such sectors is to be accompanied by a concomitant political globalization, one that is summarized in the very notion of global governance. Accordingly, there is a tendency in the academic literature to construe global governance as a political response to the phenomenon of globalization itself: global governance appears as an attempt to re-claim the terrain that appears to be rendered heterogeneous by various prima facie autonomous agents such as the economy and technology.

However, what is simultaneously crucial to the theorisation of global governance is its apparent opposition to the notion of global government. Accordingly, global governance can be immediately defined in terms of a negative relation, that is, in terms of what global governance is not: global government. This is a pertinent distinction within the academic literature, one which essentially denotes the concession within political science of what Rosenau referred to as the perceived chaos of globalization: global governance seeks to manage such globalization in a manner that is consistent with globalization’s apparent inherent heterogeneity. In short, global governance infers the possibility of a regulative, coordinative multilateral engagement with global political issues, as opposed to the centralized unilaterality that is implied in the syntagm global government.

Such an opposition between the two concepts may be recognized in terms of a shift in political theory away from the traditional emphasis on Nation-State models.

Such models, although supportive of institutions that resemble concepts of global governance, such as the United Nations, are coming to be perceived as insufficient apparatuses to deal with the dynamism of globalization. Wilkinson (2006, p. 1) observes that, “serious doubts have been raised about the efficacy of existing intergovernmental machineries for protecting human rights and promoting international peace and security.” Such failures are made evident in “the massacre of a million people in Rwanda in 1994” and “the tragedies that unfolded in Somalia and the former Yugoslavia.” (Wilkinson, 2006, p. 1) Accordingly, these intergovernmental institutions, according to a clear track record of failures, are increasingly viewed as ineffective. The connection that Wilkinson intimates is that such inadequacies are the result of the continued pertinence of such Nation-States within international relations, as opposed to a global governance which would ipso facto minimize the importance of Nation-States.

Accordingly, a key conceptual factor in the trend towards global governance is the certain undesirability or archaicness that is ascribed to the notion of a centralization of political power, a centralization that is consistent with the notion of global government. Cerny (2004, p. 80) writes that, “until the last few years, the long-term development of the “modern” world order has been characterized by a process of centralization and hierarchisation of power”. The mechanisms of centralization and hierarchisation are exemplified in the notion that “power came to be increasingly concentrated in a shrinking number of strong states, at the apex of a hierarchical pyramid.” (Cerny, 2004, p. 81) Accordingly, global government suggests a clear delineation of political power, for example, one that can be said was present in the polarity of political power present in the Cold War. Yet it is precisely the end of the Cold War that suggests the antiquated nature of such a conception.  Cerny (2004, p. 81) argues that with the end of the Cold War and the rise of globalization “the underlying structural trend today is one of diffusion and decentralization of power.” In essence, the Nation-State model experiences this decrease in the centralization of power, according to the more heterogeneous and non-linear movement of globalization. Consequently, whereas global government is a concept that is linked to the Nation-State model, global governance is a concept that is linked to the “diffusion” consistent with globalization.

With this point in mind, we can suggest that the difference between global governance and global government can be extrapolated according to two primary axes: first, what may be termed a topological axis, and second, what may be termed an ideological axis. What is crucial to this delineation, however, is that these axes are not mutually exclusive. Rather, as we shall suggest, they relate to precisely what Cerny identifies as the shift in the conception of political power that occurred with the end of the Cold War and the subsequent rise of globalization.

The topological axis construes the differentiation between global governance and global government according to what is essentially viewed as the possibilities of “centralization” or “unilateralism” contra “decentralization” or “multilateralism.” In her book A New World Order, Anne-Marie Slaughter (2004, p. 10) argues for the latter, suggesting that, “a world order based on government networks, working alongside and even in place of more traditional international institutions, holds great potential.” As Thakur and Van Langenhove (2008, p. 22) describe Slaughter’s position, “most people fear the idea of a centralized, all-powerful world government. The solution lies in strengthening existing networks and developing new ones that could create a genuine global rule of law without centralized global institutions.” This what may be termed topological mystification of the difference between global government and global governance thus differentiates the two concepts according to the notion of a lucid location of centralized power against the essential radical malleability of networks, or in Cerny’s terms, decentralized or diffuse power. What is crucial to note, however, is that this apparent topological shift in the location of power primarily recalls a difference in form, as opposed to a difference in content. That is, the very possibility of such “a strengthening of networks” and the fostering of multilateral cooperation relies on a shared ideological, political legal and economic content: in essence, for the network to properly function, what is required is a grounding political decision that both establishes the co-ordinates of the network and informs the very relationality of the network, thus allowing it to function as network. Accordingly, the notion of a global government system differs only in terms of form: as opposed to a diffuse heterogeneity of networks, there is a lucid governmental vector of power, which emanates from a centralized authority. From this perspective, in the shift from the thought of global government towards that of global governance, this location of power essentially dissipates and de-centralizes itself, but nevertheless relies on a common world-view for the very possibility of its existence.

While the topological axis suggests a difference in form between global governance and global government, the ideological axis conceives of an absolute isomorphy between global governance and global government according to an ideological content. For example, if the network of global governance functions according to an ideology of neo-liberal capitalism, this ideology is consistent across all points of the network for the network itself to function. That is to say, global governance, despite its apparent de-centralization, must nevertheless rely on a consensus of political content. For example, a centralized global government, in symmetry to global governance, could possess this same neo-liberal capitalist ideology or content, with only the formal difference that is the topological or formal re-distribution of this identical content.

Of course, the argument against our above differentiation between global governance and global government could approach the formal difference between decentralization and centralization through the notion that the network of global governance is inherently dynamic, and is therefore more susceptible to ideological change. That is, insofar as global governance is multilateral as opposed to unilateral, such a multilateralism necessarily implies a dialogue between actors within the network, such as nation-states, corporations, etc., and therefore, possibilities remain extant for different ideological contents to emerge within such a system. What is problematic about this rebuttal, however, is that it once again thinks according to the “topological mystification” and the primarily formal distinction that lies at the heart of the difference between global governance and global government. It is precisely within the horizon of global governance that power become obfuscated, as the latter possesses both an assimilatory and disorienting effect, in which the possibility for political resistance and opposition to global governance remains obscure according to the lack of a clear centralization of political power. In contrast, in terms of global government, the topology of power and ideology is explicit: as there is no dispute as to where such political power is seated, there is no ambiguity in terms of clear lines of political demarcation, and arguably such a model is more susceptible to change, because of the simplicity of its topology.

Accordingly, one may summarize the difference between global governance and global government in terms of a formal shift in political thinking, a formal shift, however, that does not necessarily entail a shift in content. Whereas the multilateralism of global governance intends to replace the unilateral centralities of previous political eras such as the Cold War, such multilateralism primarily differentiates itself according to a topological and formal difference in how political power is conceived. In other words, the mechanism of governance itself remains intact: it is merely formally re-postulated in terms of various non-political factors such as the economics of globalization or the growth of planetary technological communication. Such a formal shift, however, does not entail any subsequent shift in a political content or ideology. Rather, ideologies that are more conducive to such multilateral networks, such as capitalism, may be said to seize on this very formal decentralization of power, thus re-inscribing the political domination of capital. This account, nevertheless, does not overlook the significance to political science of such a formal shift between global governance and global government. In essence, such a formal shift denotes the very conditions of possibility for various types of political organizations, while concomitantly eliminating other types that, for example, would rely on a clear centralized structure of power.

Francis Fukuyama’s 1989 text “The End of History?” is notorious for its primary thesis, in which the author suggests that the end of the Cold War conflict is indicative, in a certain Hegelian manner, of the tangible end of history. This claim, as developed from a combination of the empirical observation of the collapse of the Soviet Union and an intuitive speculation, is phrased by Fukuyama as follows: “What we may be witnessing is not just the end of the Cold War, or the passing of a particular period of postwar history, but the end of history as such: that is, the end point of mankind’s ideological evolution and the universalization of Western liberal democracy as the final form of human government.” (1998, p. 109) For Fukuyama, the ideological victory of liberal democracy and capitalism over communism suggests a certain overcoming of dialectical antagonisms between two opposed ideas; moreover, such an overcoming possesses a certain eschatological dimension, insofar as Fukuyama’s “final form of human government” suggests that the United States, as clear representative of such Western liberal democracy, is the ideological conclusion of political thought.

What is pertinent about Fukuyama’s thesis is that it is diametrically opposed to the current notion in the academic literature on global governance that the United States’ role within global politics is in decline: There is thus a downward trajectory experienced by the United States from the end of the Cold War to the first decade of the twenty-first century. For example, Mario Telo (2009, p. 24) posits that “talk surrounding the relative decline of US leadership compared with the post-World War Two is legitimate….The dramatic failures fo the successive plans for a US-centered world order…have dramatically confirmed the US’s relative decline during the first decade of the new century.” The examination of such an apparent decline may thus be framed according to the following question: how did the apparent perception of the ideological victory of the United States at the end of the Cold War, most emphatically marked by Fukuyama’s thesis, change over the subsequent twenty year period to a viewpoint that stresses the decline in the United States’ influence on global governance?

Two interrelated points may be understood as central to this perceived decline. Firstly, we can accept that Fukuyama’s thesis concerning the end of the Cold War is correct to the extent that the victory of the American ideology of liberal democracy and capitalism demarcated the presence of one singular, significant, geopolitical ideology on the planet. However, the second, subsequent point is that it is the very content of the American ideology that may be understood as engendering this decline. That is to say, the liberal democratic capitalist ideology that remains after the Cold War contributed to America’s decline, inasmuch as this ideology is primarily not dependent on the Nation-State model, that is, in terms of any centralization of power in the form of a unilateral government. Rather, such an ideology is complicit with a multilateral form of government, which recalls the very notion of global governance. In other words, the decline of United States’ influence in global governance can be viewed as symptomatic of the essence of global governance itself.

Appropriating Fukuyama’s thesis, in the Cold War environment, the tension of the polarity of ideologies was essentially conducive to a centralization of power. That is to say, because of the very conflict between the Soviet Union and the United States, the respective ideologies became centralized, as communism and socialism were associated with Moscow, whereas liberal democracy and capitalism were associated with Washington. Yet the eventual “victory” of liberal democracy and capitalism did not only demarcate an American victory: as Fukuyama suggests this victory occurred at the cost of the previously American ideology becoming a world ideology. Accordingly, without any opposition to its content, liberal democracy became symmetrical to global governance itself, and the United States no longer designated the archetype of this ideology according to the decentralization of liberal democracy that essentially occurred with the end of the Cold War.

This is not to suggest that such decentralization was a planned strategy of international relations and geopolitics as carried out by the United States. The policy decisions of the U.S. following the Cold War can be interpreted as claiming the ideological victory of liberal democracy as an exclusively American victory, and thus U.S. policy followed a path that continued to centralize this liberal democracy, in the absence of any oppositional ideology. From this perspective, the failed American policy decisions that led to a perceived U.S. decline can be understood as the equivocation of the victory of liberal democracy with an American victory. In other words, as Telo writes (2009, p. 23), “internal and external causes” shifted the “USA away from its past multilateralism and changing the existing mix of force and consent.” Whereas the presence of the Soviet Union forced the United States to partake in multilateralism in order to protect against an expanding Soviet sphere of influence, the collapse of the Soviet Union subsequently marked the end of this very multilateralist policy. Furthermore, the subsequent post-Cold War emphasis on unilateralism in American policy, despite the ideological victory, has not gone unopposed. Regarding the international community’s perception of the United States’ unilateralism, Telo writes (2009, p. 24) that “a concept of power which is increasingly military, material, based on coercion and without bargaining, shared rules, procedures and institutions is no longer acceptable in the eyes of the global and national community.” It is therefore the attempt to appropriate the world dominance of liberal democracy as an American dominance – reflected in the following policy decisions of America – which has been rejected by the world community. Telo’s key term here is the allusion to “a concept of power”: this suggests that what occurred after the Cold War was the advancement of a concept of power consistent with an aggressive unilateralism, in the adherence to a policy approach that evoked a certain American right to the “spoils of war”.

It is the international community’s rejection of American unilateralism that suggests that such policy decisions themselves can be explained in terms of an explicit movement against global governance. Global governance, in its commitment to a multilateralist de-centralized approach, diffuses the “concept of power”, evoking a neoliberal approach consistent with globalization. Nevertheless, this approach was made possible by the very success of the U.S. in the Cold War. In other words, the American ideological victory at the end of the Cold War facilitated the process of globalization: With the economic openness of the capitalist system, the system was conducive to the diminishing importance of Nation-State actors. Accordingly, American hegemony can be viewed as suffering in light of the very particular type of global community it had created: a global community founded on notions such as unplanned economies, decentralizations of power, communication freedoms, etc.,.

Insofar as global governance may be considered to be a political-theoretical intervention into the phenomenon of globalization, it therefore follows that this intervention is precisely opposed to the centralization inherent to unilaterality and the general concept of power that America advanced in the post-Cold War period.

The particular ways in which America has experienced its decline in global governance can thus be understood according to such policy decisions. Two are of particular prominence: economic and military. The economics of capitalism has allowed countries as China to appropriate the capitalist system and the potentiality to utilize its massive labor power to satisfy product demands for Western countries. In this regard, it is precisely capitalism itself that is not complicit with American hegemony, to the extent that this utilization of the free market is oblivious to the hegemony of any particular Nation-State. Rather, particular Nation-States remain bound to free market economic concepts such as supply and demand, alongside the general phenomenon of the “global economy itself. This is not to suggest, however, that the United States’ role in the global economy is insignificant. John Trent (2005, p. 51) observes that, “The US currently has around 4.6 percent of the world’s population but produces what is variously estimated between 22 and 30 percent of the world’s GDP.” In this regard, notions of an American decline are perhaps overstated. Such statistics, however, while emphasizing the continued influence of the U.S., are clearly dissonant with the idea of an American hegemony consistent with the global extent of liberal democracy and capitalism. It is rather the continued support for a globalized economy, while aiming for a unilateral concept of power, which has created a certain ambiguity in American foreign and economic policy. The apparent declining American economic influence is thus symptomatic of the very ambiguity of American policy and its equivocation of unilateralism and multilateralism: the American unilaterality in foreign relations is obscured by the multilateral paradigm of a globalized economy. In essence, American policy has failed to enact a successful neoliberal approach to international relations.

Such an apparent decline is also reflected in the U.S.’s military and foreign policy of the last decade. Particularly, the American decision to begin the war in Iraq – a war largely viewed as a decisive gesture of aggressive unilateralism – can be understood as symptomatic of the American decline in global governance. These decisions are viewed by scholars such as Joseph E. Stiglitz (2008, p. 314) as the most pertinent cause of American decline: “the consequences of economic failures that resulted from deficiencies in global governance pale in comparison to the consequences of deficiencies in the area of ‘security’…American unilateralism has not made the world safer.” Stiglitz’s interpretation of the American war in Iraq as a failure of global governance nonetheless misses a crucial point: such unilateralism can be viewed as a clear rejection of the notion of global governance itself. Whereas the American decision to act according to various UN regulations in order to present a case for the war could be considered as the demonstration of a certain respect for global governance, the emptiness of this gesture and the lack of a resolution justifying the war demonstrated a clear policy decision to reject the existing mechanisms of global governance. The lack of a resolution can be viewed as a decline of America’s influence in the global governance system; at the same time, it signifies a unified ethical stand by the bodies of global governance against what was conceived as an act of aggressive American unilateralism.

Accordingly, the thesis that American influence in global governance is in decline can be explained according to an amalgamation of various policy decisions. The ideological end of the Cold War resulted in a certain conflation regarding the nature of this victory: it was conceived as both a victory for liberal democracy/ capitalism and a victory for America. What is pertinent regarding this conflation is that the liberal democratic ideology and its conduciveness to the phenomenon of global economy meant that the latter did not require the existence of a strong centralized Nation-State. Accordingly, insofar as the emergence of global governance entails a certain trade-off in the centralization of power, it thus follows that the most powerful nation will be perceived in decline as a result of global governance, whereas weaker nations will be seen in terms of ascent. Above all, it is the ambiguity at the heart of the American policy, according to a synthesis of liberal democratic ideology and realist hegemony, which is emblematic of such a perceived decline.

Understanding the World Trade Organization in terms of the theorisation of global governance immediately suggests that the WTO is an archetypical example of the ideology of global governance itself. Insofar as the participation in globalization and the world economy seemingly requires membership in the WTO, the activity of member-states in the organization has demonstrated that “the World Trade Organization is a central site for global governance.” (Shaffer, 2005, p. 130) Accordingly, when considering an examination of the costs and benefits of WTO membership, the immediate benefits appear to be related to the very possibility to partake in the dominant global economic ideology. As Singh (2005, p. 304) observes, “there is a growing consensus that WTO membership constitutes a key step towards integrating developing countries into the global economy and the international trading system.” As the underlying benefit of the WTO is the ability to participate in this international trading system, this benefit can therefore be understood in negative terms as the danger of economic isolation within an increasing globalized economy. Nevertheless, it is the particular economic policy of the WTO that may be posited as costly to member countries and prospective member countries, in terms of the compromise of a national autonomy. The emergence of the WTO as the defining body of global economic theory and practice is not a truly global body: as Shaffer notes, “the WTO…and its predecessor, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT)…are in large part products of US entrepreneurship, persuasion, and pressure, made possible by the United States’ hegemonic position in world politics.” (2005, p. 130) Thus, on the one hand, WTO membership seems to entail the benefit of member states gaining their piece of the global economic pie; on the other hand, such membership necessarily requires a submission to the particular economic hegemony practiced by the United States and the Western world. Accordingly, the WTO, as a form of economic global governance, would suggest a consecration of American and Western geopolitical power: the cost of joining the globalized economy is the adherence to the dominant rules of this economy, as defined by its most important member states.

The WTO as an apparatus of global governance essentially seeks to integrate a globalized economy through the formation of a unified trade policy. According to Singh (2005, p. 303) “one of the key functions of the WTO is to serve as an international forum for trade negotiations.”  The dialogic aspect of the “forum” immediately suggests a prima facie plurality in the voices allowed to form economic policy on a global scale. The possibility for negotiation therefore, remains attractive for potential member states, as it suggests an opportunity for respective states to advance their own economic proposals on a global scale, while also opening their market to other countries in terms of import and exports. Concomitantly, “the organization facilitates the implementation, administration and operation of the various covered agreements” (Singh, 2005, p. 303), such that the formation of trade policy is not the only objective of the WTO: The WTO is to essentially govern this policy, ensuring it remains both consistent and effective.

According to the neoliberal democratic ideology of global governance, it is stressed that members of the WTO are not obligated to the decisions of the Secretariat, but rather that the WTO entails a radically democratic approach to the world economy. Power is claimed, for example, to be diffused throughout the organization, such that “the power of initiative in the context of the Organization rests not with the Secretariat but with Member governments whose representatives constitute and preside over the many councils and committees.” (Singh, 2005, p. 303) According to Singh’s account of the WTO, the organization functions primarily according to a variant of a classical democratic system, in which the free thoughts of its members contribute to the formation of policy. The “power of initiative” referred to by Singh suggests that the possibility of such formation of policy also remains radically decentralized, and that member states are thus allowed a certain degree of autonomy vis-a-vis the actual decision making process of the WTO.

Furthermore, it is stressed that the accession process towards membership is also viewed as beneficiary: “Many of these countries cite the benefits of the WTO accession process itself, which serves as an impetus to spur and consolidate their own internal reform process and accelerate their economic development.” (Singh, 2005, p. 304) Accordingly, the objective to meet the required standards for membership in the WTO forces potential member states to formulate a rigorous economic program that meets the WTO benchmarks. As P.K.M. Tharakan claims (2000, p. 158) this process can have a positive local effect on potential member states, as “the credibility of a reform-minded government may itself be enhanced in the government can ‘tie its hands’ through WTO membership.” Thus, the mere potentiality of realizing accession to WTO membership can be viewed as stabilizing the economic system and the government of a potential member-state. This stabilization rests on a certain assurance that the WTO economic policy is in fact the correct policy, and that the adherence to such a policy promises certain economic benefits.

Yet it is precisely the nature of the economic policy that is practiced by the WTO that recalls the hegemonic aspects of its function as an apparatus of global governance. In the above examples, potential member-states must comply with the regulations of the WTO to become a part of the global economy. Thus, the WTO can be viewed as governing through an implicit manner the policy of even non-member countries according to its setting of benchmarks for membership. As Shaffer observes, “The WTO institutionally constrains domestic political choices over trade and intellectual property matters.” (2005, p. 130) The complicity with WTO regulations is thus coextensive with a lack of autonomy on the domestic level over very particular sectors of the economy. The apparent autonomy of joining or not joining the WTO is essentially an illusory autonomy, as the choice to not join the organization entails the possibility of economic isolation. Accordingly, the notion of a globalized economy finds itself always already defined in terms of the precise policy of the WTO, such that it bears the effect of a certain compromise of economic sovereignty, while also implying that the only possible form of a world economy is the form dictated by the WTO.

Such a concession of economic sovereignty is clear in the WTO’s antagonism with the possibility of Nation-State centrally planned economies. Richard Pomfret remarks (2005, p. 246) that the WTO has had a conflicting relationship with countries that embark on a centrally planned economic approach: “The biggest challenge to becoming a truly global organization lay in incorporating the formerly centrally planned economies.” Insofar as the centrally planned economy represents a deviation from a globally planned economy, the WTO’s attempt to integrate such economies is therefore indicative of the policy decision to suspend the possibility of the centrally planned economy itself. That is to say, to the extent that membership is defined according to the globally governed economy, an immediate conflict surfaces between autonomous nation states and the WTO’s globally mandated economic policy.

In this regard, the precise economic policy of the WTO is crucial, as the organization is not merely an amorphous body of changing economic policies, subject to the aforementioned “power of initiative” that can apparently be seized by any member-state. Rather, an inequality exists among the member states, an inequality reflected in the precise economic policy preferred by the WTO. The WTO is an organization, as Schaffer remarks, “in which the United States, the European Union (EU), and influential constituents within them advance their interests through the WTO.” (2005, p. 130) Such a possibility for the shaping of WTO policy exists because such countries “wield considerable material and ideational resources that provide them with advantages in economic relations in any institutional context.” (Shaffer, 2005, p. 130) According to the precise delineation of the economic policy of the WTO, Shaffer’s point is clearly prescient: the economic policies of the WTO reflect the neoliberal democratic and capitalist ideologies of the United States and the Western countries. In consequence, the apparent democratic essence of the WTO remains compromised, insofar as the dominant member states inevitably inform WTO economic interests. Moreover, as Shaffer suggests, because of the disproportionate distribution of power within the WTO, the WTO essentially functions as an apparatus of global governance that advances American and Western economic policy on a global scale. Shaffer recalls specific examples of the utilization of the WTO to forward particular policy gains: “The United States and EU enhance their leverage in WTO multilateral negotiations through forum-shifting. They play countries off each other through engaging in simultaneous bilateral and regional negotiations, thereby threatening to deny benefits to some countries that they offer to others.” (Shaffer, 2005, p. 130) These explicit examples from Shaffer suggest that the WTO functions as a tool in geopolitical policy. The obvious drawback, therefore, in participation in the WTO is the risk of merely becoming a vassal for Western geopolitical policy, through being forced to comply with an ideology and organization that is above all complicit with Western interests.  In consequence, there is a fundamentally deep ideological suspicion regarding the WTO, to the extent that the organization can be construed as catering to the demands of its most powerful constituent states, which concomitantly renders the less-powerful states subject to this very global centralization of power.

Accordingly, the consideration of the costs and benefits of membership in the WTO may be primarily thought in terms of, on the one hand, the advantages of becoming active in a globalized economy, and on the other hand, the lack of an economic autonomy. The failure to join the WTO is accompanied by a fear of potentially remaining left-behind in the wake of the continued acceleration of globalization. The benefits of membership are thus construed in terms of a binary of inclusion-exclusion, in which the threat of global economic exclusion is particularly catastrophic to weaker Nation-States. In essence, the decision to join the WTO is indicative of the lack of any choice whatsoever: it is necessary, insofar as the global economy as dictated by the WTO remains hegemonic. Whereas the local reforms needed to join the WTO suggest the possibility of a certain stabilization of weaker states, the question remains as to whether sovereignty is being sacrificed for this very stabilization: this potential sacrifice of autonomous economic policy decisions entails participation in a realist power game within international relations. It is the particular economic policy of the WTO and its commitment to a specific economic world-view that seems to suggest that the organization itself remains subject to the ideological perspective of its most dominant member states. It is therefore the singularity of the WTO economic policy that delineates both its benefits and its costs: to participate in a singular economic policy allows entrance into the global economy; this economic policy, however, appears to be slanted according to the disproportionate power within its organization.

Works Cited

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