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Hold or Retreat, Research Paper Example

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Hold or Retreat: The Third Reich’s Strategic Imperatives in Operation Citadel

The great swing in the Soviet’s fortunes that allowed them to take the offensive from the summer of 1943 until the end of the war came as they successfully fended off a Wehrmacht offensive and eventually won decisively on the Eastern Front in the Battle of Kursk, the largest tank battle in history. The Red Army began to push west after defeating German forces in a crucial battle at Stalingrad on February 2, 1943. The Wehrmacht was able to mount counterattacks that were able to push the Soviets back, but the Soviets were able to hold on to Kursk, an enormous salient territory that proved to be key to their success. High on the forward momentum regained by capturing Kharkov, the Germans were hoping they could continue the momentum by cutting through the Kursk salient. This would allow the Wehrmacht to quell a Soviet summer offensive while significantly shortening the German lines. Success at Kursk was very much needed by the Third Reich at this point due to the major defeat at Stalingrad and the increasing cost of the war in general.[1] Thus, for the Third Reich, Operation Citadel was fated to be a turning point no matter what the outcome: either they would regain ground and hold against the Soviets, stalling them, or they would be forced into operational retreat.

Preparation for Battle

Nearly four months prior to the actual attack, on March 10, 1943, Field Marshall Erich von Manstein presented Adolf Hitler with the idea of the German forces pinching off the Kursk salient by attacking from the north and south immediately after the spring rasputitsa, a semiannual period when the terrain and unpaved roads are impassable due to mud.[2] Consequently, Hitler introduced Operation Citadel in Operational Order No. 6, issued on April 15^th calling for the attack to take place on May 3^rd. Kurt Zeitzler, the Chief of Staff of the Oberkommando des Heeres, the Supreme High Command of the German Army, insisted the success of the operation depended on the attack taking place immediately after the rasputitsa, so the Soviets would not have time to gather their defenses.[3]After several postponements of the attack date by Hitler, despite his commanders’ pleadings, Operation Citadel moved forward on July 5^th with the Soviet’s ready for combat.

The defeat at Stalingrad had exacted an incredible toll on the Wehrmacht in terms of material, morale, and manpower. Despite earlier successes in Operation Blau and Operation Barbarossa, the future was not bright for the Third Reich. To augment their forces, the Germans had begun to draw on men who had previously not been considered for the draft: men as old as 50 years old as well as younger teens.[4] Plus, the Wehrmacht itself was in danger of a general collapse with Hitler distrusting the officers, including von Manstein, and at odds with the high command.[5]

Despite these misgivings, Hitler grudgingly gave von Manstein the freedom of action he requested, since he recognized that von Manstein was the best commander in the Wehrmacht, and he could ill afford to lose him.[6] Von Manstein concentrated forces with the goal of performing a series of counterstrokes to exploit the Soviet troops, who were spread thin at the time, and to regain control of Kharkov and then Kursk.[7] Spearheaded by the three SS divisions of the II SS Panzer Corps, the Third Battle of Kharkov began on February 19. The offensive was an unqualified success with von Manstein encircling and destroying the main force after cutting off the Soviet spearheads. Belgorod and Kharkov were in German control by March 18^th. This left a Red Army salient around Kursk extending into the German area of control when, at the end of March, operations ceased due to German and Red Army exhaustion and the onset of the spring rasputitsa.[8]

Hitler Remains Firm

Prior to suggesting Operation Citadel to Hitler, after taking Kharkov, von Manstein suggested that the Germans take a defensive strategy on the Eastern Front to avoid the burden an offensive attack would put on the panzer arm of the Wehrmacht. Hitler rejected the plan due to the economic impact holding the Donetz River could have and he believed there could be political ramification of taking the defensive at this stage in the game.[9] As the preparation phase for Operation Citadel wore on, von Manstein began to express serious reservations about the attack and believed that it should be abandoned all together, since the Soviets were amassing their defenses, yet he was not forceful with his misgivings.[10]Hitler would postpone the attacks at least four times, despite his General Staff strongly suggesting he not.[11]

The Third Reich’s fortunes needed to turn once more or else it would mean disaster for Hitler. With the loss at Stalingrad, the Wehrmacht had very little room to maneuver on the Eastern Front. Despite being painfully aware of this, Hitler relied upon his own judgment, taking little advice from those under his command. In fact, Hitler only envisioned a limited strike on the Red Army, hoping to just take out an army group and shorten the German lines in Operation Citadel.[12]

All of the military decisions were made by Hitler at this point. Any military strength that Germany possessed at the start of the Second World War was squandered due to Hitler’s inflexibility. Despite being able to see his enemy’s weakness and exploit them in earlier campaigns, he later would not allow his field commanders any flexibility or the ability to retreat. This ended up being catastrophic for the Third Reich.[13]

Soviet Preparations for Kursk

High off of the Stalingrad victory, the Soviet Bryansk, Western, and Central Fronts were considering an offensive in early March but abandoned this plan when the Central Front was threatened by the Wehrmacht’s Army Group South. After finding out through various spy sources that the Germans were planning an offensive in the Kursk sector, Stalin and many of this senior officers were eager to beat the Germans to the punch with their own offensive immediately following the rasputitsa.[14] But, Deputy Supreme Commander Georgiy Zhukov and a number of key officers suggested any offensive should be preceded by a strategic defensive. Zhukov write in an April 8^th letter to Stalin:

In the first phase, the enemy, collecting their best forces—including 13–15 tank divisions and with the support of a large number of aircraft—will strike Kursk with their Kromskom-Orel grouping from the northeast and their Belgorod-Kharkov grouping from the southeast. I consider it inadvisable for our forces to go over to an offensive in the near future in order to forestall the enemy. It would be better to make the enemy exhaust himself against our defenses, and knock out his tanks and then, bringing up fresh reserves, to go over to the general offensive which would finally finish off his main force.[15]

After consulting with senior officers of the General Staff and front-line commanders, on April 15^th, Stalin agreed that the Germans were likely going to attack Kursk. But, he argued, allowing the Germans to attack would give them the initiative. Zhukov continued to argue to the contrary by stating that the conditions for a major offensive for the Red Army could be created by first drawing the unsuspecting Germans into a trap where their armored power would be destroyed. In the end, Stalin trusted his deputy supreme commander’s judgment.[16] This turned out to be a wise decision.

By the end of April, Soviet Union forces had prepared their fortifications and defenses and continued to do so until the Wehrmacht finally attacked in early July.[17] As mentioned earlier, Hitler’s Operational Order No. 6 originally called for a May 3^rd attack date, which was supported by his commanders and would have caught the Soviets with only a few days of preparation. But, as it was, by delaying the strike for more than two months, Hitler allowed the Red Army to have plenty of time to create a strong defense.

To the south was the Voronezh Front commanded by Nikolai Vatutin, and to the north the Central Front commanded by Konstantin Rokossovsky. Each had three main defensive belts subdivided into several fortification zones. Since the Soviet spy channels had tipped them off that the Germans were going to attack with their tank divisions, they prepared accordingly. With the help of more than 300,000 civilians, an interconnected web of barbed-wire fences, anti-tank ditches, and minefields was created. There were also dug-in armored vehicles, machine gun bunkers, anti-tank obstacles, and entrenchments for infantry. It is estimated that the combat engineers in the Red Army laid out over 400,000 anti-personnel and more than half a million anti-tank mines. And, for ease of movement, 3,000 miles of trenches were dug. Almost all artillery, such as anti-aircraft, howitzers, rockets, and guns were enlisted for defense against tanks.[18] The Soviet forces were going to make the Germans pay for their mistake of delaying their attack.

Maskirovka

To conceal the movement of material and men and to mask the troop dispositions and defensive positions, the Red Army used maskirovka, or deceptive techniques.[19] Some of these techniques included generating false radio traffic, camouflaging gun emplacements, spreading rumors in the German-held areas among the civilian population and the Soviet front line troops, and constructing dummy depots and airfields.Night time was the only time the Red Army would allow the movement of supplies and forces to and from the salient. To blend into the landscape, caches of ammo were concealed carefully. Fires were forbidden, and there were restrictions on radio transmissions. In addition, motor transport around and in command posts, which were kept hidden, was forbidden.[20]

The Soviets did not want the Germans to know that they were expecting them.And, there are numerous indicators that show the maskirovka was effective. During June of 1943, 29 of the 35 major Luftwaffe raids in the Kursk sector were against dummy Soviet airfields.[21] In fact, the Germans vastly underestimated the number of Soviet tanks at 1,500. This left the Third Reich in the dark about the Red Army’s intentions.[22]

The Battle Begins

Though there are conflicting accounts, according to some estimates, the Soviets amassed about 1.9 million men, 5,100 tanks, 25,000 mortars and guns, and 3,200 aircraft. While the German numbers were significantly fewer at 910,000 men, 2,900 tanks, 10,000 mortars and guns, and 2,100 aircraft.[23]

Prior to the main assault, preliminary fighting started on the southern face of the salient on the evening of July 4^th with German infantry attempting to seize high ground for artillery observation posts. Along the first main belt of defense, many Soviet observation and command posts were captured during these attacks. Before midnight, tank divisions had seized the villages of Gertsovka and Butovo.[24] By 02:00 on July 5th, a pre-emptive artillery bombardment was ordered by Zhukov. This strike had less of an effect than he had hoped as the Germans were concentrating on the attack. There was no disruption in the Wehrmacht’s schedule of inflicting substantial losses despite delaying the formations. By 05:00, the Germans had begun their own bombardment.[25] In the south sector, it lasted for 50 minutes, and in the north, it lasted for 80 minutes. Aided by close air support from the Luftwaffe, the ground forces attacked after the barrage.[26]

Hoping to catch the Luftwaffe on the ground, the Red Air Force launched a large raid against German airfields during the early morning. The Soviets experienced significant losses in this failed attempt losing 176 aircraft with the Luftwaffe losing only 26. Early on, along the northern face, control of the skies was evenly contested, but in the south, the Luftwaffe was able to maintain superiority. As the battle wore on, the Luftwaffe’s ability to fly sorties was hampered over the course of the offensive due to the inability to service their aircrafts because of lubricant, spare part, and fuel shortages. Plus, the Red Air Force was able to run amok and gain air superiority because the Luftwaffe forces were needed to support ground attacks and could not be spared for taking out Soviet airfields. The problems were compounded as the Luftwaffe no longer held a technical edge over the new and improved Red Air Force aircrafts.[27]

As nearly all operational reserves were in action, the Soviet leaders were forced to commit some of their strategic reserves as the Germans progressed. Tanks dug into fortified emplacements were reported to have given the Germans a lot of trouble, though the German advance was much faster than the Soviets expected, yet it was slower than the Germans desired. The Army Group South was able to cross the Psel River on July 10^th, and despite the minefields and deep defensive system, there were not any significant losses of German tanks. At this point, with the ability of the eastern flank to provide protection in question, the German tanks advanced on Prokhorovka to the northwest. Their efforts were bolstered by a successful surprise night attack that seized a bridge over the Donetz River. It began to look like the German forces headed by von Manstein were going to make the breakthrough they needed. Their successes led to the pivotal Battle of Prokhorovka on July 12^th, which dealt heavy losses to the Red Army’s fleet of tanks despite being an operational draw.[28] This would be as far as the Germans would get as Hitler would soon interfere.

With the Soviets providing more trouble than reconnaissance missions had suggested they would, Hitler summoned commanders von Manstein and Wolfgang von Kluge to his East Prussian headquarters on July 12^th, one week into the battle.[29] Weighing heavily on his mind was the Western Allies invasion of Sicily that occurred two days earlier. Hitler essentially wanted to end the offensive for Kursk and shift the forces to Italy. Since he was well aware that the Soviets were in the process of turning the tables and mounting an offensive against his sector to the north, von Kluge welcomed this news. Von Manstein, on the other hand, believed his troops were on the verge of breaking through the defenses and subsequently destroying Soviet’s reserves in a mobile battle.[30] Hitler relented to von Manstein’s wishes for once only to remove the reserves he needed, the XXIV Panzer Corps, the following day. By July 16^th, the Wehrmacht was back at their starting line. And, the next day the II SS Panzer Corps were transferred to Italy. The Soviets were soon in full offensive attack mode.[31]

Soviet Offensive

In the south, the main Soviet offensive for 1943, codenamed Operation PolkovodetsRumyantsev, did not commence until August 3^rd. The goal was to cut off the extended southern portion of German Army Group South and degrade the 4^th Panzer Army. Though the Soviets originally wanted to attack as soon as the Wehrmacht ended its offensive, there were delays because they needed time to refit and regroup from the heavy losses sustained to the Voronezh Front during Operation Citadel. The defending forces were thinned and the attention of German reserves were drawn by Soviet diversionary attacks across the Mius and Donetz Rivers two weeks prior to the main offensive. The Soviets made deep and broad penetrations into the Army Group South initiated by the Voronezh and Steppe Fronts. By August 23^rd, the Soviets had liberated Kharkov after suffering heavy losses of armor. While the Soviets refer to it as the Belgorod-Kharkov offensive operation, the Germans call it the Fourth Battle of Kharkov.[32]By any name, it marked the final loss of the region gained by von Manstein in the March German offensive. This was also the spot where von Manstein had wanted to build a defense and allow German forces to recover.

In the north, the Soviet offensive began as soon as the strength of the German forces had been dissipated by the Kursk offensive. In the Orel salient north of Kursk, on July 12^th, the Soviets launched Operation Kutusov against Army Group Center. The Soviet Western Front attacked from the north and the Bryansk Front attacked the eastern face. The Germans were defending with the thinly stretched 2^nd Panzer Army. This prompted the German commanders to cease their own offensive to meet the Soviet offensive. Though both sides experienced significant losses, the Soviets had plenty of reserves to draw on. The Soviets were able to take the strategic initiative because of this offensive and where able to retain the advantage for the rest of the war.[33]

At the height of tactical battle, Hitler’s decision to call off the operation was criticized by the German generals. Many historians and other German officers backed up this criticism. In their argument opposing Operation Citadel in the first place, German generals Heinz Guderian and von Manstein argued that the troops should be deployed to Western Europe where they accurately predicted the Western Allies would undertake an operation. When his reserves and Luftwaffe support was removed as he led Army Group South, von Manstein believed the decisive point of the battle had been reached. He no longer had the striking power he needed.[34]But, with his underestimation of the strength of the Soviet reserves due to the maskirovka, there is debate about whether von Manstein’s assessment was accurate.

A few months earlier, von Manstein had lead the successful Third Battle of Kharkov when Hitler allowed him freedom of action. The commanders at the Battle of Kursk were not allowed to fight the battle they wanted. The German forces were neither committed nor concentrated due to Hitler’s unwillingness to accept the risks involved in continuing the operation after the many delays. With the freedom of action of Hitler’s commanders so constrained by his micromanagement, the Battle of Kursk turned into a battle of attrition against an enemy with many more resources. The German forces had little chance of winning and were not prepared.[35]

A Decisive Soviet Victory with Long Term Ramifications

German General Heinz Guderian sums up the aftermath of the defeat this way:

With the failure of Zitadelle we have suffered a decisive defeat. The armored formations, reformed and re-equipped with so much effort, had lost heavily in both men and equipment and would now be unemployable for a long time to come. It was problematical whether they could be rehabilitated in time to defend the Eastern Front. Needless to say the Soviets, exploited their victory to the full. There were to be no more periods of quiet on the Eastern Front. From now on, the enemy was in undisputed possession of the initiative.[36]

Battle of Kursk was a decisive success for the Soviets. Before achieving a breakthrough, a major German offensive had been stopped for the first time. Key to the success was the Soviet’s ability to surprise the Germans with their significant Red Army operation reserves. This was despite the Germans making use of armor that was more technologically advanced than ever before. Few had foreseen this outcome. Operations on the Eastern Front changed after that point. The Red Army had still lost considerable material and men while holding back the Germans, but there was still a large pool of manpower and significant industrial potential for the Soviet Union to draw from. The Germans, on the other hand, did not have these resources to draw on.

Hitler blamed the loss on his General Staff, even though he was the one who determined the plan of attack, timing, and location of the fighting. Hitler’s attention to the political aspects of the war decreased as his interference into German military matters increased.[37] This stood in stark contrast to the leadership of Stalin, who left important command decisions to his commanding generals. He began to trust his commanders’ judgment more and more as their decisions led to battlefield success in the Kursk campaign. During the course of the war, the Red Army was able to gain more action freedom due to Stalin stepping back from operational planning.

Perhaps most damaging of all to the Third Reich was the loss of manpower. The already strained German forces lost 203,000 men in the Battle of Kursk.[38] This left them few men to spare to protect Italy from the recent Allied invasion. And, they were woefully unprepared for the eventually storming of Normandy. The Battle of Kursk would be the turning point that left the Third Reich reeling.

In the end, Stalin’s style of leadership trumped Hitler’s increasingly paranoid grip on his commanders in what would turn out to be the turning point of the campaign on the Eastern Front. The Third Reich was forced into an operational retreat and was never able to regain any of the progress they had previously made. From that point forward, the Soviets had the strategic initiative on the Eastern Front for the remainder of the war. With another costly defeat to add to the Stalingrad loss and with few resources and little chance of reinforcements, Germany had little remaining hope for future success in World War II. As Winston Churchill put it: “Stalingrad was the end of the beginning, but the Battle of Kursk was the beginning of the end.”[39]

References

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Barbier, Kathryn. Kursk 1943: The greatest tank battle ever fought. St. Paul, MN: MBI Publishing Company, 2002.

Beevor, Antony, and Attar, Rob. “The World in Flames”. BBC History Magazine 13 (6), June 2012.

Bergström, Christer. Kursk — The Air Battle: July 1943. Hersham: Chervron/Ian Allen, 2007.

Chaney, Otto P. Zhukov (rev. ed.). Norman, OK: University of Oklahoma Press, 1996.

Clark, Lloyd. Kursk: The Greatest Battle: Eastern Front 1943. London: Headline Publishing Group, 2012.

Davies, Norman. No simple victory: World War II in Europe, 1939-1945. New York: Penguin Books, 2008.

Eberle, Henrik, and Matthias Uhl, eds. (2005). The Hitler book: The secret dossier prepared for Stalin from the interrogations of Hitler’s personal aides. Translated by Giles MacDonogh. New York: Perseus Books.

Erickson, John. Stalin’s war with Germany: The road to Berlin.1983. ReprintNew Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1999.

Fey, Will. Armor battles of the Waffen-SS, 1943-45. Mechanicsburg, PA: Stackpole Books, 2003.

Fraser, David. Alanbrooke. London: Bloomsbury Publishing, 2011.

Frieser, Karl-Heinz. Das Deutsche Reich und der ZweiteWeltkrieg. München: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt München, 2007.

Fritz, Stephen. Ostkrieg: Hitler’s war of extermination in the east. Lexington, KY: The University Press of Kentucky, 2011.

Glantz, David M., and Orenstein, Harold S. The Battle for Kursk 1943: The Soviet General Staff Study. London; Portland, OR: Frank Cass, 1999.

Glantz, David M., and House, Jonathan M. The Battle of Kursk. Lawrence, Kansas: University Press of Kansas, 2004.

Hart, Liddell, and Henry, Basil. The German Generals Talk. New York: Morrow, 1948.

Healy, Mark. Zitadelle: The German Offensive Against the Kursk Salient 4-17 July 1943. Stroud: History Press, 2010.

Lemay, Benoit. Erich von Manstein: Hitler’s master strategist. Havertown, PA: CASEMATE, 2010.

Luttwak, Edwin. Strategy: The logic of war and peace (2^nd ed.). Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2001.

Manstein, Erich von.Lost Victories. München: Monch, 1983.

Muller, Rolf-Dieter, and Gerd R. Ueberschar. Hitler’s war in the East, 1941-1945: A critical assessment. 3^rd ed.). New York: Berghahn Books, 2009.

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Ripley, Tim. The Waffen-SS at war: Hitler’s praetorians, 1925-1945. St. Paul, MN: Zenith Press, 2004.

Roberts, Geoffrey. Stalin’s general: The life of Georgy Zhukov. New York: Random House, 2012.

Showalter, Dennis E. Armor and blood: The Battle of Kursk: The turning point of World War II. New York: Random House, 2013.

Stone, David. Hitler’s army: The men, machines, and organization: 1939-1945. St. Paul, MN: MBI Publishing Company, 2009.

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[1] Kathryn Barbier, Kursk 1943: The greatest tank battle ever fought (St. Paul, MN: MBI Publishing Company, 2002); John Erickson, Stalin’s war with Germany: The road to Berlin (1983; repr., New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1999); David Fraser, Alanbrooke(London: Bloomsbury Publishing, 2011); Stephen Fritz, Ostkrieg: Hitler’s war of extermination in the east (Lexington, KY: The University Press of Kentucky, 2011); Steven H. Newton, ed., Kursk: The German view (Cambridge, MA: Perseus Books Group, 2002); Tim Ripley, The Waffen-SS at war: Hitler’s praetorians, 1925-1945 (St. Paul, MN: Zenith Press, 2004).

[2]Lloyd Clark, Kursk: The Greatest Battle: Eastern Front 1943 (London: Headline Publishing Group, 2012).

[3] Ibid.

[4] Fritz, Ostkrieg; Newton, Kursk; Ripley, The Waffen-SS at war; Dennis E. Showalter, Armor and blood: The Battle of Kursk: The turning point of World War II (New York: Random House, 2013).

[5] Mark Healy, Zitadelle: The German Offensive Against the Kursk Salient 4-17 July 1943 (Stroud: History Press, 2010).

[6] Ibid.

[7] Clark, Kursk.

[8] Ibid.

[9] Erich von Manstein, Lost Victories (München: Monch, 1983).

[10] Clark, Kursk.

[11] David M. Glantz and Jonathan M. House, The Battle of Kursk (Lawrence, Kansas: University Press of Kansas, 2004).

[12] Fritz, Ostkrieg.

[13] Antony Beevor and Rob Attar, “The World in Flames” (BBC History Magazine13 (6), June 2012).

[14] Glantz and House, The Battle of Kursk.

[15] Clark, Kursk, 189.

[16] Ibid.