Hough v. Shakopee Public Schools, Research Paper Example

Fact Statement

Background

The background to the case involves Plaintiffs, Tristan Hough, Trevin Hough, Emily D’Estada and David Cichimow whom are enrolled in special-education programs operated by the Minnesota River Valley Special Education Cooperative (“MRVSEC”).[i]

The Shakopee Public Schools “Shakopee”) is one of six school districts that belong to MRVSEC. The MRVSEC a public cooperative established under Minnesota’s Joint Powers Statute, Minn.Stat. § 123A.15, serves students who require special education. All of these programs are designated as Setting IV programs under federal law. Bahnson Aff. [Docket No. 143]. Setting IV programs are non-residential public schools that exclusively serve disabled students. “The Code of Conduct for MRVSEC’s program provides: “All students may be searched when they enter the building. Students may be asked to turn out their pockets and staff will search bags and clothing.”

The search policy applied to non-disabled students attending Shakopee Public Schools provides:

“The personal possessions of students and/or a student’s person may be searched if and only if school officials have a reasonable suspicion that the search will uncover a violation of law or school rules. The search will be reasonable in its scope and intrusiveness.”[ii]

The Code of Conduct issued to students by MRVSEC since 1998, does not includes searches at the Town Square Transition Center which were an amendment to customary policy, beginning 2001. In the past 10 years since the searches at issue were initiated, there have been no objections by students or parents to the search policy. However, my clients, the plaintiffs, and every student attending a MRVSEC program, have been subjected to daily searches upon arrival to school every day attended. The foregoing complaint outlines constitutional violations to the plaintiffs, and discriminatory actions resultant from the searches. Discovery of multiple plaintiff and witness statements provide adequate evidence that students have had their backpacks and purses searched, and were also required to empty their pockets; removing their shoes and socks, turn down the waistband of their pants, even at times subject to submit to a pat down searches.

Depositions

In respect to the Scope of the Legitimate Expectation of Privacy we argue that in spite of limited expectation toward privacy in a public school environment where the State is responsible for maintaining discipline, health, and safety [Earls, 536 U.S. at 830], that MRVSEC’s argument that the expectation of privacy by students with special needs is “even more limited” than students that are not, is in direct contradiction to the expectations of the plaintiffs and their legal guardians regardless of medical needs or otherwise. In the following deposition we urge the court to consider the extent by which students with disabilities should expect reasonable sacrifice toward a normative standard of care by a public institution intended to serve their special needs. We agree that a student requiring assistance with personal hygiene might require augmented service provision that might compromise privacy, but to what extent is this considered an examination of personal intent or wrongdoing? As determined in prior court decision, medical records of disabled students must be disclosed to a limited number of school officials, but do not at any time implicate the child’s personal right to privacy in a relationship of subjection of bodily integrity.

We also ask the court to reject MRVSEC’s argument that its codes of conduct which inform students that they may be searched diminish the students expectations of privacy, and that students of privacy expectations protected by the fourth amendment are to be considered absolute, and not revocable by arbitrary decision by school staff that the expectations will no longer be honored.

Outline to the deposition: Coleen Trosen, MRVSEC Special Education Coordinator, in her individual capacity and counsel representation of plaintiff submit the following exchange from discovery on the searches at Town Square Programs:

Q: What you’re saying is children were asked to turn things over; is that correct?

A: Yes.

Q: And that was the extent of it? Pockets weren’t turned inside out? Shoes and socks weren’t taken off? Bags weren’t opened and looked into?

A: No. All of those things happened. I think I said bags were looked into, but, you know, every day I don’t think it was the exact search or the exact same person, but shoes were not always taken off. Pockets, kids always sort of just automatically, if they had a coat with 16 pockets on it, we [ . . .] nevertheless retain some legitimate expectation of privacy in their bodies, clothing, and personal possessions.

According to our discovery in the matter, the character of the intrusion was considered only mildly invasive by MRVSEC, in the argument that the searches were merely administrative and predictable: “every student was searched before entering the building.” MRVSEC cites that the intention of the searches was strictly limited to internal, regulatory activity, and was not at any time instigated as an act of entrapment toward complaint to law enforcement. We argue that MRVSEC dramatically underestimated the intrusiveness of those searches. Again inquiries into the searches produced a consistent response to our inquiry:

Q: But it did happen?

A: Oh, yes.

Q: And this happened to all the children that came into the program?

A: Yes.

In Plaintiff, Daniel’s deposition with MRVSEC counsel the following exchange describes the searches from the perspective of the student(s):

Q: Can you describe [the search]?

A: I guess you could say he’d pat you down or whatever and make you turn your pockets inside out. If you were wearing like a sweatshirt or whatever, he? d check your hood, and he’d check the pocket that sits in front. He’d make you take off your shoes or whatever, and you’d pound them on the ground so if there was anything in there, I guess it would fall out or whatever. But yeah, he would pat you down or whatever and search us that way.

Q: The teacher would put hands on you?

A: Yes.

Q: And what would they pat down?

A: Arms and legs. And then they would take your waistline where your pants are, and they would like shake it or whatever.

In reference to consent as required by Second Amendment protections, the record contains no consent for Plaintiff party, David. Record of consent does exist for Daniel and other Plaintiffs, but are conclusively signatory promises to adherence of guidelines and rules during transport. MRVSEC seems to disagree, and claims that the plaintiffs, as special-needs students, have waived all expectation of privacy upon signatory of the form, and by way of consent have acknowledged loss of privacy upon the receipt of the code of conduct that they have agreed to. We argue that there is no adherence to signatory acknowledgement is enforceable due to status of the plaintiffs as disabled minors, and therefore MRVSEC has no legal defense based upon this claim; especially as the consent forms are related exclusively to transport.

Complaint

This is essentially a Fourth Amendment case, but the plaintiffs have filed a “kitchen-sink? complaint, including allegations of Second Amendment violations. The plaintiffs allege that the searches violated the Fourth Amendment, and numerous other provisions to the United States Constitution, the Minnesota Constitution, federal statutes, Minnesota statutes, and the common law. According to the Second Amended Complaint, the claims of Tristan and Trevin Hough are being brought by and through their Guardian and Parents. Like the majority of the students in the MRVSEC, the plaintiffs were enrolled in a program for developmental disabilities, which include assessed behavioral problems.

According to the 42 U.S.C. 12132 Federal Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. 794 (known as 504 the Act), and the Minnesota Human Rights Act (MHRA) [Minn. Stat. 363A.12 subd. 1], the plaintiffs bring tort claims under Minnesota law for intrusion upon seclusion (a type of invasion of privacy). The plaintiffs’ cross-motion for summary judgment and request denial of the Defendant’ motion for a separate trial. We request summary judgment on all claims, and especially the Fourth Amendment claim(s) against MRVSEC. Second, we request summary judgment on claims of Trevin Hough and Daniel Manthey for intrusion upon seclusion.

We contend that the searches by MRVSEC violated the plaintiff’s rights under the Fourteenth Amendment to procedural due process, substantive due process, and equal protection of the laws. The plaintiffs also raise due process claims under the Minnesota Constitution. This is based upon Plaintiff contention that the searches amount to disability discrimination in violation of Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act. The initial complaint also raises claims with respect to plaintiff Tristan Hough for violations of the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, 20 U.S.C. 1400-50. The main complaint is a Second Amended Complaint, filed September 16, 2008 [Docket No. 181].

The Fourth Amendment complaints brought to the suit under 42 U.S.C.1983 indicate violations took place during daily searches at the MRVSEC. This is based upon claims of unconstitutionality by the school under consideration of Supreme Court decision on New Jersey v. T.L.O., that prohibition on unreasonable searches and seizures applies to searches conducted by public school officials [469 U.S. 325, 333, 1985]. The factor of “reasonableness” under the Fourth Amendment is the circumstance by which the complaint is hinged. Although school searches can be based on something less than probable cause – if it is believed that commission of a crime is underway – but by no means should that suspicion be unwarranted according discriminatory belief. The Two Step Rule mentioned in New Jersey v. T.L.O requires that the search was: 1) justified at inception; and 2) that it was reasonable in relation to scope of circumstance to justify the interference in the first place.

Discussion: Case Law

The defendants have violated the plaintiffs according to preceding court decision. With respect to school searches, the New Jersey v. T.L.O. case offers parameters for determining limits to justified interference. Reasonable ground is cited as probable cause for school searches. Evidence that the student has violated or is violating either the law or the rules of the school should be present.[iii] Permissibility of such a search must be defined within a scope that includes adopted measures of policy outlining protocol and objectives of the search. At no time should the search be excessive in intrusion, nor discriminatory in nature regarding the ethnicity, age or sex of the student.

Since the aforementioned decision, the Supreme Court has established that school searches do not always need to be supported by individual suspicion. Instead, suspicion-less searches can be justified by special needs, beyond the normal need for law enforcement [Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 653 1995]. Following that the search policies under the Fourth Amendment, by the Eighth Circuit court which discerned that those suspicion-less searches should be conducted only in cases where the Balancing Test was applied and resulted the three required factors. In the Vernonia School District and Earls cases, outcomes to the three factors were: (1) the scope of the student’s legitimate expectation of privacy; (2) the nature of the intrusion; and (3) the need for, and the effectiveness of, the intrusion in furthering the government interest at stake. Due to the fact that full-scale, suspicion-less searches eliminate virtually all privacy pertaining to personal property, and no evidence in the record of special circumstances in this case justifies this considerable, and universal intrusion, we hold that the search practice that was conducted on the plaintiffs at MRVSEC is unconstitutional; so much so that it reflects practices employed in juvenile detention facilities and has not place in a school setting where the Balancing Test has not been met with conclusive findings. We reject the claim that the plaintiffs had diminished expectation of privacy, and that voluntary searches were not seen as a justified intrusion. It is in the details of precedent that we assert the complaint, and that no reasonable circumstance had been proved for a claim of probable cause by the school, as the universal decision was in its last instance unconstitutional.

Request for Relief

Request for relief is in the form of injunctive and compensatory damages, based on wrongdoing by MRVSEC and negligence in regard to requests by plaintiffs to abstain from un-consented to searches, which included unwanted touching of minors. We respond to MRVSEC’s claim that forfeiture of privacy in special education programs, through waiver of tacit consent is admittance to tortfeasor misconduct, and that at no time were the transport waivers to be considered unmitigated cause for searches of private persons and property. [iv]

Due to the exceptional nature of the claim and the paucity of evidence upon which it is based, we reassert request for summary judgment in favor of the plaintiffs for violations by the defendants, Shakopee public schools (independent school district no. 720); Shakopee board of education; Kathy McKay, Director of Special Education for Shakopee Public Schools, in her individual capacity; Minnesota river valley special education cooperative (joint powers school district no. 993); Lezlie Prettyman Olson, Director, in her individual capacity; Darren Kermes, Director, in his individual capacity; Colleen Trosen, Special Education Coordinator, in her individual capacity; and Barbara Bahnson, Special Education Administrator, in her individual capacity.

[i] Hough v. Shakopee Public Schools (I.S.D. No. 720): US District Court: 1983.

[ii] Ref. Hough v. Shakopee case background (assignment prompt).

[iii] Van Dyke, J. & Sakurai, M. (2009). Checklists for Searches and Seizures in Public Schools, 2009-2010 ed. Deerfield: Clark Boardman Callaghan.

[iv] Dobbs, D. & Hayden, P.T. (2001). Torts and Compensation: Personal Accountability and Social Responsibility for Injury. St. Paul: West Group.

Diamond, J.L. et al., (2000). Understanding Torts: Second Edition. New York: Lexis Nexis.

References

Diamond, J.L. et al., (2000). Understanding Torts: Second Edition. New York: Lexis Nexis.

Dobbs, D. & Hayden, P.T. (2001). Torts and Compensation: Personal Accountability and Social Responsibility for Injury. St. Paul: West Group.

Hough v. Shakopee Public Schools (I.S.D. No. 720): US District Court: 1983.

Van Dyke, J. & Sakurai, M. (2009). Checklists for Searches and Seizures in Public Schools, 2009-2010 ed. Deerfield: Clark Boardman Callaghan.

[1] Hough v. Shakopee Public Schools (I.S.D. No. 720): US District Court: 1983.

[1] Ref. Hough v. Shakopee case background (assignment prompt).

[1] Van Dyke, J. & Sakurai, M. (2009). Checklists for Searches and Seizures in Public Schools, 2009-2010 ed. Deerfield: Clark Boardman Callaghan.

[1] Dobbs, D. & Hayden, P.T. (2001). Torts and Compensation: Personal Accountability and Social Responsibility for Injury. St. Paul: West Group.

Diamond, J.L. et al., (2000). Understanding Torts: Second Edition. New York: Lexis Nexis.