Hume, Virtue, and the Four Categories, Essay Example

Hume divides the virtues into four categories, based on what makes them virtues. Does this division work? Why or why not?

Hume makes four distinctions between classes of virtue.  These include qualities useful to others, qualities that are useful to the person possessing theme, qualities agreeable to others, and qualities that are agreeable to the person possessing them.  The distinction between these qualities is important to consider in order to come to a conclusion as to how well this division works.  In order to understand these distinctions it is important to first analyze the underlying argument that Hume is making regarding the principles of morality and virtue.  These principles are fundamentally dependent upon the notions of agreeableness and usefulness.  This discussion of morality and utility presents an important distinction within Hume’s moral philosophy.  However, the generality of the conclusions that are drawn seems to indicate a lack of usefulness in regards to the distinctions that are being made.

Virtuous qualities, in Hume’s philosophical arguments, are determined by the underlying usefulness or agreeableness that they have to those people or things that they are associated with.  This presents an important distinction in regards to the way that Hume views the idea of virtue, which is based on the role of moral judgements and the capacity of those in question to make them.  There is, therefore, a need within Hume’s moral philosophy to exemplify these qualities in order to attain a sense of moral judgement.  Moral judgements are, according to Hume, based on “certain sentiments of pleasure or disgust, which arise upon the contemplation and view of particular qualities or characters” (Hume 578).  The relationship to Hume’s divisions is fundamentally based on the notion of these qualities and how they are interpreted.  Whether a quality is met with disgust or pleasure will determine the moral nature of its existence.

The question of whether this division works can be understood through an analysis of his four categories. The approach that Hume takes towards the idea of moral principles presents the need to understand the implications of taking action. Through analyzing the arguments made by Hume, it is evident that there is a need to categorize moral actions into one of these four basic categories in order to understand the implications of his claims.   For this reason, it is important to first look at the way that he makes these distinctions. These points will hopefully present important insights into the role of virtue in Hume’s moral philosophy in regards to these four categories.

The four categories, qualities useful to others, qualities that are useful to the person possessing theme, qualities agreeable to others, and qualities that are agreeable to the person possessing them, present two important distinctions regarding Hume’s understanding of morality.  These are the ideas of agreeableness and usefulness.  These seem to relate to the principles of both morality and utility.  If something is agreeable, then it is ethically sound.  If it is useful, then it exists for a purpose.  In the use of both of these distinctions, it seems that Hume is attempting to account for the discrepancy between the idea of how things ought to be and how they actually are.  Hume has developed a way for accounting for one of the underlying difficulties in establishing an ethical framework.  That is, accounting for this distinction between morality as an ideal and morality as an implementation as the most effective or efficient methodology.  While he is able to account for this discrepancy, his categorization regarding the four moral categories of virtue presents a general framework becomes too general to make any important moral claims.

The main issue with Hume’s distinction between the four categories is the need for specific classifications of all moral decisions or actions.  This division is too general to establish a foundation for understanding morality in any useful way.  In this sense, it seems that Hume “has difficulty accounting for mistakes that sensible people, in general, might make due to lack of  relevant information” (Drive 174).  The moral implications that Hume discusses are determined on the ability of a person to analyze and develop an informed opinion about these decisions or actions before they are taken.  This presents a challenge for those who have to make decisions or actions in a short amount of time, making it difficult to correctly label and categorize these actions into their specific distinctions.  For this reason, it seems that the division that Hume makes regarding the four categories of moral virtues does not work in the most efficient manner.  This is due to the need to establish the utility or moral implications of an action or principle before it is carried out in order to categorize it into its specific role.

The four distinctions that Hume makes regarding virtue, qualities useful to others, qualities that are useful to the person possessing theme, qualities agreeable to others, and qualities that are agreeable to the person possessing them demonstrate an effective way of overcoming the underlying issue between utility and idealism.  Distinctions between these ideas are fundamentally predicated on understanding what Hume means when discussing the ideas of agreeableness and usefulness.  In Hume’s view, morality is fundamentally based in the utility or popularity of an action or principle. The difficulty, however, is in distinguishing these principles when actually acting upon a moral principle.  Through analysis of these distinctions, it seems that these categories present an issue when attempting to classify specific moral actions.  This presents a challenge to the notion that Hume’s theories regarding the four categories of virtue actually work.

The major concern for the distinctions that have been made by Hume is the unclear distinction that is made between what can be considered a ‘complex’ and what can be considered a ‘simple’ form.  While this might, at first, seem to be a simple distinction, at its heart it is actually much more complicated.  He indicates, for example, that the idea of a color can be understood in a simple way.  This, however, becomes more complicated when taking account of the fact that it is difficult to determine if one person’s conception of ‘redness’ can even be considered to be similar to another’s.  This presents an important challenge to the argument that Hume has regarding these distinctions.  In this sense, it becomes more difficult to distinguish various phenomena in regards to their properties when considering the implications of the division of these traits into specific categories.

Furthermore, in Hume’s conception of reality, the mind must first have the impression of an object before that object can be objectively considered.  In this sense, his notion of impressions having priority over the mind presents difficulty in regards to the establishment of a justification for specific criteria.  If the mind is unable to have any form of representation of an object without first perceiving that object, however, it becomes difficult to conceive of how the mind is able to understand color and shade.  For instance, if the mind is able to conceive of a single shade of a single shade, due to having the impression of that color being imprinted by the physical world, it is possible to conceive that they could think of a shade that is slightly different than the one that they were exposed to.  This demonstrates am important counter-example to the arguments that are presented in Hume’s theories.  Furthermore, this challenges his underlying notions regarding his four virtues.  In the same way, it would be possible to conceive of a situation in which the virtuous action that Hume discusses is different than those that are implied by his theories.

Works Cited

Driver, Julia. Pleasure as the Standard of Virtue in Hume’s Moral Philosophy. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly. 85. 2004. 173-194. Print.

Hume, David. A Treatise of Human Nature. Oxford: Clarendon. 1978. 581. Print.