Introduction to Human Rights Law, Essay Example
1: The distinction between negative rights and positive rights is deeply grounded in the philosophical tradition. Negative rights are defined by the negative duties that they impose on other people in order to “protect freedoms of various kinds” (Velasquez, 2011, p. 564). An example given by Velasquez is “the right of free association”, which “imposes on others the duty not to prevent people from associating with whom they please” (p. 564). In the philosophical tradition, John Stuart Mill emphasized negative rights as “’freedoms-from’ …in [his work] On Liberty” (p. 564). The father of consequentialist ethics, Mill argued “that the end of all human action and first principle of morality is the greatest happiness principle, also known as the principle of utility” (Paola, Walker, & Nixon, 2010, pp. 26-27).
From Mill a defense of negative rights is very natural: negative rights, such as freedom of association, of speech and the press, and to one’s own property are important for happiness. Getting in the way of those rights is therefore wrong, inasmuch as it deprives people of important sources of happiness. Long before Mill, the concept of negative rights is found in Hobbes, who “defined it as ‘the absence of opposition’” (Hobbes, 261, qtd. in Halper, 2003, p. 14). Locke conceived of negative rights “in terms of natural rights” (Locke, Two Treatises, ctd. in Halper, 2003, p. 14). In fact, natural rights were very much the basis of Locke’s political thinking: in his own words, he held that “men being… by nature all free, equal, and independent, no one can be put out of this estate and subjected to the political power of another without his own consent” (Two Treatises, bk. II, ch. VIII, p. 187).
Positive rights, on the other hand, go beyond negative rights in that their advocates “tend to view liberty as entailing conduct directed at a morally good goal” (Halper, 2003, p. 14). In other words, positive rights promote codes of conduct: directives for how someone should act (p. 15). The Enlightenment philosopher Rousseau, a positive rights advocate, “considered liberty to be submission to the general will”, a key part of his idea of the “social contract” (Rousseau, “Social Contract,” ctd. in Halper, p. 15). The philosopher Immanuel Kant wrote of positive and negative moral duties, both of which made up his “categorical imperative,” the “general imperative that reason imposes on all of us” (Devettere, 2009, p. 59). Positive rights, then, are “an ‘exercise’” that necessitates effort from individuals and society, notably the state (Halper, 2003, p. 15). U.S. President Franklin Roosevelt was for both positive and negative rights: his “famous Four Freedoms [included] not only freedom of expression and of worship (negative rights), but also freedom from want and from fear (positive rights)” (Israel, ctd. in Halper, p. 15). Karl Marx, on the other hand, advocated positive rights but disdained negative rights (p. 15). In their Manifesto of the Communist Party, Marx and Engels argued that, instead of a negative right, “modern bourgeois private property is the final and most complete expression of the system of producing and appropriating products” (2004, sec. II, p. 297). From this, Marx and Engels concluded that capital “is a social power”, and that the capitalists’ use of it deprived the proletarians of the enjoyment of their own positive rights (p. 297).
The UN’s Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), signed in 1948, was “the first part of the so-called international bill of rights” (Baderin & Ssenyonjo, 2010, p. 7). The UDHR covers both negative and positive rights: examples of the former include “right to life, liberty and security of person (Art. 3);” “prohibition of torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment (Art. 5);” and non-discrimination (p. 8). Examples of positive rights delineated in the UDHR include “right to social security (Art. 22);” and “right to a standard of living adequate for health and well-being… (Art. 25)” (p. 8).
In other words, the UDHR is concerned both with civil and political rights, and social, cultural, and economic rights. The UDHR emphasizes the protection of all persons from discrimination, the abuse of the government, and other abuses of their negative rights, and promotes standards of social and economic well-being for all, affirming positive rights (Baderin & Ssenyonjo, 2010, pp. 8, 11). These are two different kinds of rights, with very different modalities of implementation: civil and political rights are concerned with prohibiting the government frominterfering with the rights of persons to safety, security, non-discrimination, expression, justice, etc. Governments must secure these rights in the laws and ensure that they are maintained; however, the focus is on preventing something that would curtail the enjoyment of said rights by the citizens. Social, cultural and economic rights, such as social security and the right to an adequate standard of living, are positive rights that governments must be proactive to implement (p. 11).
Since the UDHR, the UN Commission on Human Rights has produced “two binding covenants… the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR)” (Baderin & Ssenyonjo, 2010, p. 11).Article 2(1) of the ICESCR stipulates the obligations of signatory states to seek to implement economic, social and cultural rights “individually and through international assistance and co-operation, especially economic and technical… with a view to achieving progressively the full realization of the rights recognized” (Ssenyonjo, 2010, p. 55). Cooperation, assistance and effort, then, are needed to implement ESC rights. Moreover, signatories of the ICESCR are obligated to “monitor the actual situation with respect to each of the rights on a regular basis” in order to ascertain “the extent to which the various rights are, or are not, being enjoyed” (p. 73).
The ICCPR differs in its implementation, because it established the Human Rights Council (HRC), “an independent expert body… to oversee its implementation” (Joseph, 2010, p. 92). The ICCPR also obliges nations that signed it “to immediately respect and ensure to all the enjoyment of the rights therein,” unlike the ICESCR with its call for ‘progressive’ realization (p. 92). Finally, another key difference, albeit one not resulting from the treaties themselves, is that of advocacy: NGOs “such as Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch, have historically focused on civil and political rights” (p. 91). By contrast, NGOs working in “the economic, social and cultural rights arena tended to be organizations that facilitated service delivery to disadvantaged groups, such as charitable organizations” (p. 91).
2: Non-state actors, such as non-governmental organizations (NGOs), have become important participants in international human rights legal processes. As Wiessner (2004) explained, NGOs have an increasingly important role to play in “the act of application, by courts or other bodies,” e.g. “from the admission of NGO complaints in various intergovernmental human rights systems to the acceptance of NGO amicus briefs in WTO dispute settlement process” (p. 97). The reason for this is very simple, and it is the reason that NGOs exist in the first place: as Wiessner explained, “NGOs are best understood as associations of people who organize themselves to achieve a particular political end” (p. 98). This single sentence is the key to understanding why NGOs exist, and why they function as they do. Again in Wiessner’s words, NGOs “articulate, and combine to a pointed political force, the needs and aspirations of individual human beings with respect to a discrete policy issue” (p. 98). NGOs, then, are (at least at their best) highly-focused organizations driven to seek political and/or legal recognition for their policy issue, their founding and driving principle (p. 98).
From this, the role of NGOs in international human rights legal processes is very profound indeed: human rights NGOs are seeking recognition for their particular human rights policy issues under international law (Wiessner, 2004, p. 98). A crucial point that was raised by Wiessner is that in a very important sense, NGOs are typically not democratic, inasmuch as they are “typically founded precisely in order to counter the will of the majority” (p. 97). Consequently, while “the majority may accept NGOs as voices in the cacophony of (international and domestic) society… they may be legitimately excluded from decision-making for the community at large” (p. 97). However, Wiessner’s argument is that NGOs derive their legitimacy from “authenticity of… mission” rather than “strength of… numbers” (p. 98). The cardinal value of all such NGOs is thus “access to all values by all” (p. 98). From this it follows that a crucial, indeed indispensable, role of NGOs is to protect minorities and other disenfranchised groups from the specter of the ‘tyranny of the majority’ or other powerful groups in any given society (p. 98).
From this idea of equality and justice for all, the role of NGOs as observers, advisors and watchdogs is very logical (Hobe, 2004, p. 103). As observers, NGOs “advise the organs of international organisations,” and NGOs “that act as advocates of the public interest of the international community” have even supplied their expertise to “some of the major universal conferences of the United Nations” (p. 103). The participation of NGOs in “the field of international protection of human rights” is so important that it has been codified into the law of the selfsame field (p. 103). According to Hobe, NGOs “possess… standing before international human rights courts and before other human rights monitoring bodies, inter alia under the protocol additional to the UN Covenant on Civil and Political Rights” (p. 103).
As monitors and watchdogs of human rights, NGOs have a very important role to play in reporting human rights abuses (Hobe, 2004, p. 103). In this capacity, they have developed a great standing as experts, which is “increasingly made use of by international tribunals, such as the Tribunal on Former Yugoslavia… by inviting relevant NGOs as amici curiae” (p. 103). If authenticity is important to NGOs as the basis of their legitimacy, their expertise has also given them a valuable place at the table of international human rights law. Indeed, as experts NGOs are able to assume the duties of states in key policy arenas: specifically, they “supplement and sometimes even substitute the implementation of public tasks incumbent on State parties to the respective conventions” (p. 103).
In light of NGOs’ profound contributions to policy, it is indeed questionable whether “one can still regard them as entities without any legal subjectivity under international law” (Hobe, 2004, p. 103). Hobe argued for an important distinction on this matter: to the degree that NGOs “are acting particularly within the legal framework of an organ of an international governmental organisation… they are incorporated in the exercise of public authority” (p. 103). Accordingly, both Hobe and Wiessner argued that transparency and accountability are of paramount importance for NGOs: in order to maintain their credibility as true voicesfor their particular policy issues, they must ensure financial transparency and accountability (Hobe, 2004, pp. 104-105; Wiessner, 2004, pp. 99-101). The responsibilities and trust placed in NGOs are considerable, and waste, misuse, or financial fraudendanger NGOs’ missions and their credibility (Wiessner, p. 99).
As non-state actors, NGOs have a decided advantage in that they can advocate for a particular policy issue in a grassroots manner: NGOs are not tied to a specific state, and they are not elected officials. As such, they benefit from their non-state status in the arena of international human rights law: they are credible international advocates and monitors, expert witnesses and advisors on important policy issues in human rights legislation. As Kooijmans (2004) explained, the non-state status of NGOs has also given them an important role in inter-state disputes, such as a case “initiated by Congo-Brazzaville against France,” which “started with a complaint filed with a French prosecutor by a number of human rights organizations, NGOs therefore” (p. 22). The complaint “contained accusations of crimes against humanity and of torture allegedly committed in the Congo against Congolese nationals by a number of high Congolese officials,” notably “the President of the Republic and the Minister of the Interior” (p. 22). Congo-Brazzaville’s response was to bring charges against France for violating “the immunity of its Head of State” and for violating “the principle that a State may not exercise its authority on the territory of another State by unilaterally attributing to itself universal jurisdiction in criminal matters” (pp. 22-23). As Kooijmans observed, this case and others demonstrate the global values that increasingly confront the International Court of Justice, “global values which are invoked by non-State actors like humanitarian organizations” (p. 23).
Clearly, NGOs have become powerful international actors, and some of the strongest voices for human rights in international human rights legal proceedings. While they are ultimately dependent upon the power of state actors to achieve their aims, as champions, experts, and advisors they have gained very real power and recognition. The role of these non-State actors is truly a very important one for advancing the concepts of justice and equality for all.
3: The use of force in order to halt or prevent human rights violations, so-called humanitarian interventions, is nothing if not controversial. On the one hand is the position that humanitarian intervention is justified if it is moral, regardless of whether or not it is legal under international law, i.e. authorized by the UN Security Council (Pattison, 2010, p. 43). Pattison, however, observed that in Kosovo, “NATO undertook action… that was, according to most international lawyers and commentators, illegal because it lacked the requisite Security Council authorization” (p. 44). Although NATO’s action was illegal by the standards of international law embodied in the UN Security Council, according to Pattison it “was, to a certain extent, successful at preventing rights violations on the scale of the Bosnian war and did receive notable support in the international community” (p. 44). Thus we confront the possibility that a humanitarian intervention may be, in the words of the Independent International Commission on Kosovo, “’legitimate, but not legal, given existing international law’ (2000, qtd. in Pattison, 2010, p. 44).
At issue, then, is whether the positive results of a successful humanitarian intervention outweigh any concerns of legality in international law, particularly with regard to state sovereignty. Given the “lack of effective action in response to the human rights violations in Darfur, DR Congo, northern Uganda, and elsewhere,” we must ask with Pattison the question “If an illegal but effective intervener were to intervene in one of these states, should we support it?” (p. 44). Clearly, the questions of legality and effectiveness are quite separate, so which should be taken as the standard for determining whether an intervention is legitimate and justified? That which is legal is not always moral, and that which is moral is not always legal: hence, for Pattison, the distinction is that between “lex lata—the law as it is” and “lex ferata—the law as it ought to be” (p. 45).
During the Cold War, however, the debate on humanitarian intervention was very different, inasmuch as, according to Roth (2003), in essence there was no debate: the standard was one of non-intervention (p. 238). The Cold War rivalry between the U.S. and the USSR created an atmosphere wherein “transgression of non-intervention norms was viewed simultaneously as East-West escalation and [global] Northern encroachment upon the [global] South… and was in no event perceived as motivated by noble purposes” (p. 238). Thus, any humanitarian intervention would not only exacerbate superpower tensions and invite “counter-intervention, it could [also] be expected to exacerbate rather than ameliorate internal conflicts” (p. 238). Moreover, internal armed conflicts, including and especially those of the type that might warrant humanitarian intervention, were perceived “as a legitimate way for questions of public order to be worked out within States” (pp. 238-239). However, this did not represent “a repudiation of the moralistic principle of popular sovereignty, but rather an application of that very principle in the absence of shared assumptions”: in essence, the idea was that it fell to actors within every state to determine the character of that state (p. 239).
It is not difficult to argue against the ideas delineated above: one need only consider the legacy of post-Cold War violence in Bosnia, Rwanda, Kosovo, and Darfur. Can any state which perpetrates such horrors be said to have legitimacy? Ought it to continue to hold its rights of sovereignty? Mullerson (2000) observed that these conflicts are similar “only to an extent” with “certain conflicts that took place during the Cold War” (p. 293). Far more importantly, in their genocidal intensity “they are repeating, in some important aspects, conflicts that were endemic in Western Europe hundreds of years ago” (p. 293). The most important area of similarity is that these conflicts are, in essence, attempts at nation-building by means of homogenization and, as Mullerson observed, “historically, homogenization (almost never complete of course) was achieved through practices that nowadays may be defined as ethnic or religious cleansing” (p. 295). In the longer run, such homogenization “facilitated state-building and progress towards democracy and human rights,” for the simple reason that “it is easier to carry out democratic reforms in a more homogenous society than in a less homogenous one” (p. 295).
In light of this, one argument is easy to make, however unpleasant to modern liberal sensibilities of pluralism it may be: namely, that concerned parties, other state governments, should refrain from humanitarian intervention and allow the conflict in question to run its course. It may even be argued that intervention will only make the conflict still worse. One contemporary example that readily suggests itself is the case of Iraq: although the country was not undergoing such an internal conflict prior to the 2003 U.S.-led intervention, that very intervention created the circumstances that precipitated just such a conflict. Specifically, by removing the dictator Saddam Hussein, the U.S. undercut the privileged position of Sunni Arabs in that country. The woeful story is familiar to anyone who followed the news over the years of the U.S. occupation: the Shi’a Arab majority asserted themselves, leading to a conflict with the Sunni Arabs.
To be sure, Iraq is not a perfect example: the conflict was brought about by outside intervention, an intervention that upset a pre-existing pattern of inequality. Moreover, the conflict was overwhelmingly carried out by rival militias, whereas the conflicts in Rwanda and Darfur pitted state governments and their militias against minority groups, their victims. Nonetheless, the point remains: in some situations, there are limits to the ability of an intervener to be successful in a humanitarian intervention.
A clear standard for establishing grounds for a humanitarian intervention is that of atrocity against a persecuted group or other disadvantaged party. The Turku Declaration “provides, inter alia, that attacks against persons not taking part in acts of violence shall be prohibited in all circumstances” (Mullerson, 2000, p. 342). Other provisos include a prohibition on the use of “weapons or other material or methods prohibited in international armed conflict;” a prohibition on “acts or threats of violence the primary purpose or foreseeable effect of which is to spread terror among the population” as well as prohibitions against internal displacement for non-safety reasons, and against arbitrary executions (p. 342). These are good standards for establishing when a humanitarian intervention might well be justified to secure a clearly-defined and very clear aim, namely the prevention of attacks and other atrocitiescommitted against non-combatants or another group that has been forced to defend itself—here one thinks of Bosnia, the situation in the southern Sudanuntil recent years (sans a humanitarian intervention, of course, though the case for one was very strong indeed).
Again, a contemporary case is easy: Libya. Beyond question, the recent NATO intervention in March of this yearsaved the Libyan rebels from certain defeat by the forces of Muammar Gaddafi. The NATO intervention was multi-lateral rather than unilateral, and it refrained from sending in ground troops, choosing rather to establish a no-fly zone. The goal was simple: to prevent Gaddafi’s forces from continuing to attack civilians. The Libyan rebels regrouped, and gradually began to take back the territory that they had lost to Gaddafi. To be sure, the stated aim of the intervention was not changing the government, but from a human rights perspective it was still a fortunate consequence, given the reports of Gaddafi’s atrocities in attempting to suppress the rebellion, as well as his lengthy record of sponsoring terrorism. As the Libyan rebels have now taken Tripoli and effectively ended Gaddafi’s regime, the intervention appears to have been very successful. Of course, only time will tell whether or not the rebels will be able to construct a stable Libya, one that ensures respect for human rights.
Humanitarian interventions should never be undertaken lightly. It is no easy thing for a foreign power—whether a neighbor or a distant country—to intervene in an internal conflict within another state. However, the question of whether a humanitarian intervention is legal under international law is entirely separate from whether or not it is legitimate, as the case of Kosovo makes very clear. In conclusion, where a humanitarian intervention can reasonably be expected to make a tangible difference with regards to stopping a pattern of attacks and atrocity against noncombatants or some other persecuted group, there is a good moral case for an intervener to step in. Any would-be intervener must attempt to carefully weigh the prospective benefits of an intervention, the good that it might accomplish in preserving and protecting human life and well-being, against the possibility that it might lead to a further exacerbation of the conflict and increased instability.
4: 2006 was a good year for the U.S. in the UN in a number of important ways: according to the U.S . Secretary of State (2006), “with active lobbying and global demarches on the part of the United States and its allies, four significant country-specific resolutions passed, some defeating associated procedural no-action motions in the process” (p. 86). The first resolution, sponsored by Canada, concerned “the human rights situation in Iran,” and this passed “in a vote of 70(U.S.)-48-55” (p. 86). Resolutions on the DPRK and Burma also passed quite handily, and “the U.S.-sponsored resolution on Belarus was adopted” (p. 86). The United States was also “able to join consensus on Denmark’s resolution against torture and on the resolution on the protection of migrants, after successfully resisting language proposed by Mexico that challenged U.S. border protection measures” (p. 86). In sum, in 2006 the U.S. was a leading and successful voice in the UN Third Committee’s resolutions on human rights.
Also in 2006, the UN Human Rights Committee (UNHRC) received the U.S.’s “second and third periodic combined report, which was seven years overdue” (UNHRC, 2006, p. 57). The report expressed regret “that the State party [the U.S.] has not integrated into its report information on the implementation of the Covenant with respect to individuals under its jurisdiction and outside its territory” (p. 57). This complaintcontinued with the Committee expressing regret “that the State party, invoking grounds of non-applicability of the Covenant or intelligence operations, refused to address certain serious allegations of violations of the rights protected under the Covenant” (p. 57).
However, on the positive side, the Committee praised the United States for “the Supreme Court’s decision in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld (2006) establishing the applicability of common article 3 of the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949,” for the reason that this “reflects fundamental rights guaranteed by the Covenant in any armed conflict” (p. 57). Further praise was directed toward the U.S. Supreme Court for its decision in Roper v. Simmons (2005), “which held that the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments forbid imposition of the death penalty on offenders who were under the age of 18 when their crimes were committed” (p. 57). Another Supreme Court decision regarding the death penalty that also drew Committee praise was Atkins vs. Virginia (2002), “which held that executions of mentally retarded criminals are cruel and unusual punishments” (p. 57).
2006, then, was a mixed year for the United States: successful resolutions against notorious human rights offenders and praise for Supreme Court decisions on the one hand, balanced by UN concerns about reports of mistreatment of POWs and the detainees at Gitmo in Guantanamo Bay on the other. 2010, however, marked the first universal periodic review of the U.S.’s human rights record. That document, the United States Country Review (USCR), (2011), revealed a number of serious areas in which the U.S. has been remiss. Firstly, the document notes that although the U.S. “is one of the richest nations in the world… it also has one of the highest poverty rates among developed nations” (p. 283). This clear defense of positive rights is a bold challenge to much of U.S. thinking about human rights, which has emphasized civil and political rights (negative rights), and given much less emphasis to economic and social rights.
Secondly, the USCR (2011) takes the government of the United States to task on its “mixed human rights record” in startling language, charging that while the U.S. government “promotes democracy and equality abroad, many of its own citizens face discrimination and/or persecution at home” (p. 283). The Bush administration’s “illegal wiretapping of domestic telephone conversations and e-mail transmissions” drew criticism, as did the Patriot Act for “infringing on civil and privacy rights of law-abiding citizens” (p. 283). Other serious abuses of human rights noted include “the suspension on habeus corpus, the interminable detainment of those deemed to be ‘enemy combatants,’ and the government’s right to determine who might fall into that obscure category” (p. 283). A particularly disturbing set of allegations concerned possible “U.S. complicity in secret prisons or ‘black sites,’ in which prisoners are taken to other countries and tortured” (p. 283). In this vein, “the Bush administration’s failure to take a strong stand against torture and to uphold the Geneva Conventions has been the source of great consternation” (pp. 283-284).
The 505 detainees at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, drew especial mention, as did “other detainees… housed in facilities in Iraq and Afghanistan” all without charges and in violation of “international and U.S. domestic law” (USCR, 2011, p. 284). But police abuse “and the use of excessive force” were also described as “common in the U.S.”, and the overcrowded prison system, rife with abuse, also drew concern (p. 284). The woefully-inadequate and mishandled response to Hurricane Katrina was another area of concern (p. 284). Hate crimes against migrant workers and on the basis of sexual orientation were also noted (p. 284).Overall, the first-ever universal periodic review of the United States’ human rights record revealed a shameful laundry-list of abuses, ranging from social problems to terrible violations of the most important principles of not only international law but U.S. domestic law. The United States must renew its commitment to human rights and social justice for all those under its laws.
Baderin, M. A., & Ssenyonjo, M. (2010). Development of international human rights law before and after the UDHR. In M. A. Baderin & M. Ssenyonjo (Eds.), International human rights law: Six decades after the UDHR and beyond (pp. 3-30). Burlington, VT: Ashgate Publishing Company.
Devettere, R. J. (2009). Practical decision making in health care ethics: Cases and concepts (3rd ed.). Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press.
Halper, T. (2003). Positive rights in a republic of talk: A survey and a critique. Norwell, MA: Kluwer Academic Publishers.
Hobe, S. (2004). Legitimacy, recognition, democratic control, transparency and accountability of non-governmental organisations. In W. B. Heere (Ed.), Proceedings of 2003 Hague Joint Conference—From government to governance: The growing impact of non-state actors on the international and European legal system (pp. 101-108). New York: Cambridge University Press.
Joseph, S. (2010). Civil and political rights. In M. A. Baderin & M. Ssenyonjo (Eds.), International human rights law: Six decades after the UDHR and beyond (pp. 89-106). Burlington, VT: Ashgate Publishing Company.
Kooijmans, P. H. (2004). The role of non-state actors and international dispute settlement. In W. Heere (Ed.), Proceedings of 2003 Hague Joint Conference—From government to governance: The growing impact of non-state actors on the international and European legal system (pp. 21-30). New York: Cambridge University Press.
Marx, K., & Engels, F. (2004). From Manifesto of the Communist Party. In J. T. Wren, D. A. Hicks, & T. L. Price (Eds.), Traditional classics on leadership (pp. 288-303).Northampton, MA: Edward Elgar Publishing, Inc.
Mullerson, R. A. (2000). Ordering anarchy: International law in international society. Cambridge, MA: Kluwer Law International.
Paola, F. A., Walker, R., & Nixon, L. L. (2010). Medical ethics and humanities. Sudbury, MA: Jones and Bartlett Publishers.
Pattison, J. (2010). Humanitarian intervention and the responsibility to protect: Who should intervene? New York: Oxford University Press.
Roth, B. (2004). Bending the law, breaking it, or developing it? In M. Byers & G. Nolte (Eds.), United States hegemony and the foundations of international law (pp. 233-251). New York: Cambridge University Press.
Secretary of State. (2006). United States participation in the United Nations. Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office.
Ssenyonjo, M. (2010). Economic, social and cultural rights. In M. A. Baderin & M. Ssenyonjo (Eds.), International human rights law: Six decades after the UDHR and beyond (pp. 49-88). Burlington, VT: Ashgate Publishing Company.
UN Human Rights Committee. (2006). Report of the Human Rights Committee: Vol. I. New York: United Nations Publications.
United States Country Review. (2011). Human rights. United States Country Review, pp. 283-286 Retrieved from http://web.ebscohost.com/
Velasquez, M. (2011). Philosophy: A text with readings (11th ed.). Boston, MA: Wadsworth.
Wiessner, S. (2004). Legitimacy and accountability of NGOs: A policy-oriented perspective. In W. B. Heere (Ed.), Proceedings of 2003 Hague Joint Conference—From government to governance: The growing impact of non-state actors on the international and European legal system (pp. 95-101). New York: Cambridge University Press.
Time is precious
don’t waste it!