Iran Hostage Crisis, Research Paper Example

Introduction

This hostage crisis was a diplomatic one involving United States and Iran, in which 53 American citizens were held hostage for a period of 444 days (from November 4, 1979 to January 20, 1981). This had followed a group of Islamist students and militants taking over the United States Embassy in a manner to show support of Iranian Revolution[1]. The epitome of the crisis, which is essential in our discussion, came when the negotiations to have the Americans failed, and the American Government through the then President Jimmy Carter decided to have the military rescue the Americans, through an operation dubbed “Operation Eagle Claw”.

The operation was not successful, and ended with a crash of two aircrafts, leaving eight American servicemen and an Iranian civilian dead. The crisis came to an end on January 19, 1981, when the two countries signed the “Algiers Accord” in Algeria, just a day after the swearing in of the new American president (Ronald Reagan) succeeding Jimmy Carter.

The crisis was expressed as an embarrassment of “vengeance and mutual incomprehension” by most Americans as well as the world at large[2]. This can be said to be so because Iran had taken their decision to show Americans of their disapproval with the step they had taken in supporting the Iranian Coup. The holding of the hostages must have been a blow against America, as well as its Iranian influence, its efforts in undermining the Iranian Revolution, as well as its unwavering support of the just overthrown Government of Shah of Iran, by the name Mohammad Reza Pahlavi (pp108)

Even though there were adequate reasons for America to have taken the decision they took, it was not diplomatic for America to do so. The support had gone overboard, in which America had supported the 1953’s Shah Restoration to power in a coup against the Iranian Government that had been democratically elected to power, organized by the CIA at the Embassy of America. The same support was also seen when the Shah was allowed into America for medical treatment.

In America, the taking hostage of the citizens was perceived as an indignation violating the International Law principle, granting immunity from arrests of Diplomats as well as the sovereignty of diplomatic compounds in their embassies. The relations between Iran and America was badly affected by the decision, whereby some American political analysts views the crisis as the major reason as to Jimmy carter’s defeat in the Presidential elections held in November 1980.

In the process, United States lost its glory inn the eyes of the entire world, mainly from the fact that the crisis would have been stopped if America had followed the right diplomatic protocols. As a result, the prestige of the Ayatollah Khomeini was strengthened, and the political power of the ones who were in support of theocracy and conflicted with any normalization of associations with the west. Further, the crisis marked the start of America’s legal action, or economic sanctions against Iran, thus further weakening economic ties between the two countries.

The hostage taking was not successful for Iran, as it lost international support for the war against Iraq and the settlement was almost fully favorable to America because it failed to meet any of Iran’s original demands. On the other hand, the crisis strengthened Iranians who supported the taking of the hostages. Anti Americanism became more severe with Anti American rhetoric becoming more unabated. Some politicians such as Behzad Nabavi and Mohammad Mousavi Khoiniha became stronger, whereas those related or accused of relating with America were removed from the political realm[3]. The contempt of America in the Iranians’ perspectives of democracy still lingers as evidenced when Iran commemorated the hostage event (as done every year in Iran) by demonstrating at the US embassy, as they burned the flag of the United States on the 4^th November 2009[4].

As the president of the United States of America, sworn to the oath of protecting the lives and liberties of the American people, Jimmy had a duty to withhold that pledge when the American citizens were faced with those circumstances[5]. His administration in the other fields had been paralyzed because of the way energies were diverted so greatly. Politically, his stakes had risen with the taking of the hostages. The relationship between the international and domestic political pressures was interactive.

The then secretary of State, by the name of Cyrus Vance had a rough time trying to encourage American allies to cooperate with America by joining them in enforcing economic sanctions against Iran[6]. The allies had refused to cooperate, leaving Jimmy a man who had experienced tremendous losses to national honor, personal popularity as well as worldwide status when the Americans were taken hostage. By the time of the mission to rescue the hostages, Jimmy must have desperate for redressing his losses. If the hostages were to be released, he must have reasonably expected that his lost glory would be restored. As the president in such a status quo, he could not have absorbed the losses related to the hostages having been held captive.

If we were to look at Jimmy through the prospect theory, he must have been a man operating in the domain of losses since he had not renormalized to a status quo, characterized by such a serious loss. His operative response must have been one that refused to identify the hostages’ seizure as an acceptable loss.

There were five fundamental options that Jimmy Carter was to consider in respect to risk assessment[7]:

Doing nothing and waiting for Iran’s internal situations to stabilize, hoping that the crisis would resolve itself over time, an option that was supported by the Secretary of State, Vance. This would have involved inserting political pressure but not offering new initiatives until the point at which the Iranians would have formulated their own systems in to a rational new structure. The good thing about this option was that it would not have antagonized the Iranians anymore, and would prevent the hostages from suffering any more harm. However, this option would have had its domestic political risks, in that the public would have raised their voices for the Government to take action. He would have as well been charged with ineffectiveness blamed of being pushed around by the Ayatollah. Therefore, Jimmy could not take it.

The second option was to break political and economic relations with Iran, in which an embargo would be placed of shipments of military as well as other sales, expelling the Iranian citizens from America etc. Supposing that was to done, it would not have been the appropriate decision, considering the technicalities in the diplomatic protocols. America succeeded in expelling Iranians, including their embassies and students, which was seen by the world as insensitive of human rights. Further more, that would not have done any good to the American hostages, as anything that would be perceived as unfair in the eyes of the Iranians would be used against them to justify harming them[8], thus  forcing Jimmy Carter to think twice about that option.

The third option was to engage the military, in a rescue mission without necessarily involving an outright act of war but instead to work by stealth. This would have minimized casualties, and bring about the release of the hostages directly. The problem would have been with the subtleness and sophistication. However, there was the problem of malfunctioned helicopters (pp 222). There would also have had serious military risks involved with the option, and the possibility of success was not certain. However, if the option became successful, the hostages would be freed and Jimmy would have become a hero besides saving the day.

The fourth option was to interrupt Iranian commerce e.g. to bomb Iranian harbors. Unfortunately, the option would have been politically expensive as it could have constituted something almost similar to the cold war. That would not have been intended for war, but would have had a significantly negative effect on Iran’s capability to import and export goods without having to necessarily set up a blockade (pp 222). This option would never have been successful, as the allies of Iran, would have intervened seeing that business in Iran meant business to them as well. Jimmy Carter, wishing against such an occurrence would not choose to implement that option.

The fifth option was to take a full blown war rage against Iran, something that would have sparked tremendous strife against the Islamic region. That would have jeopardized the conditions of the hostages, thereby leaving the option un-implementable.

Conclusion

Having been faced with the situations that Jimmy Cater was faced with, Jimmy Carter did a great job by committing himself to the safe return of the hostages, and at the same time protected America’s interests and prestige. He confronted the issues with all the necessary thoughtfulness as he could muster, and thus deserves to be highly appreciated for the efforts. That is still seen as he remained in office (not as the president though) after the swearing in of the new President, so that he could continue to argue the case with Iranians to release the remaining hostages.

For Jimmy Carter to have devoted his efforts for the release of the hostages even at the expense of losing his seat as Americans went to the poll, that dedication to the American people is worth a lot of appreciation. This is because he put the lives of his fellow Americans first, before concentrating on getting re-elected to the office. That dedication to office shows how valuable Jimmy Carter was to the Americans, who should remain as one amongst the greatest Americans in history.

Bibliographies

Mackey, Sandra (1998). “The Iranians: Islam, Persia, and the Soul of a Nation”: Plume.

Mackey, Sandra, (1996) “The Iranians: Persia, Islam and the Soul of a Nation”, New York: Dutton, (p.298-300)

Moin, Khomeini, (2000), p.221; “America cannot do a Thing”; Amir Taheri New York Post, 2^nd November, 2004

O’Reilly, Kevin (2007), Decision Making in History of the US; the Cold War & the 1950s, Social Studies, pp. 108-110

[1] Mackey, Sandra (1998). The Iranians: Persia, Islam and the Soul of a Nation. Plume.

[2] O’Reilly, Kevin (2007). Decision Making in US History. The Cold War & the 1950s. Social Studies. pp. 108-110

[3] Mackey, Sandra, The Iranians: Persia, Islam and the Soul of a Nation, New York: Dutton, 1996 (p.298-300)

[4] O’Reilly, Kevin (2007). Decision Making in US History. The Cold War & the 1950s. Social Studies. pp. 108-110

[5] Moin, Khomeini, (2000), p.221; “America Can’t do a Thing” by Amir Taheri New York Post, November 2, 2004

[6] Mackey, Sandra, The Iranians: Persia, Islam and the Soul of a Nation, New York: Dutton, 1996 (p.298)

[7] Moin, Khomeini, (2000), p.221; “America Can’t do a Thing” by Amir Taheri New York Post, November 2, 2004

[8] Moin, Khomeini, (2000), p.221; “America Can’t do a Thing” by Amir Taheri New York Post, November 2, 2004