Is Islam a Religion of Peace? Research Paper Example

Jihad and Islamic Law

The term ‘Jihad’, particularly after September11, frightens the Western world with its implications. Popularly understood as ‘holy war’, apologists insist that Jihad has another context. Literally called ‘effort’ 1, Islamic interpretation of the term has ranged from defining it as the ‘effort’ to rid oneself of contaminating influences (namely an act of self-discipline to become more perfect)1 to ‘jihad’ – a militant war to rid the nation from internal and external enemies that oppress it. Here again, Jihad could be understood as either a defensive war poised to fight against its aggressors, or as an offensive war, launched against its enemies who could potentially threaten it.   This essay explores the Koranic and Mohammad’s intent of Jihad by a brief foray of Islamic history, an analysis of Koranic phrases that discuss Jihad, a perusal of Islamic law on Jihad-related issues, and, finally, the Western, particularly American association of Islam with terrorism in the wake of the September 11^th fiasco.

History of Islam

Islam was created by a devout businessman, Mohammed ibn Abdallah, on 17^th Ramadan in 610 CE.  One night, he awoke to “find himself overpowered by a devastating presence, which squeezed him tightly until he heard the first words of a new Arabs’ scripture pouring from his lips” 2.  His wife, Khadja, and her cousin, Waraqa ibn Nawfal encouraged him in his revelations, and in 612 he acquired his first converts, Ali ibn Abi Talib, Abu Bakr, and Uthman ibn Affan.  Mohammed did not think he was founding a new religion 3. His teachings recreated Judaism and Christianity, only placing Ishmael, alleged father of the Arabs as the focus. Mohammed asserted that he was merely bringing the old faith to the Arabs, who had never had a prophet before.

The new scripture was called the quran (recitation) 4, and the new sect would eventually be called Islam (surrender). A Muslim was a man or woman who had made this submission to Allah. The Koran’s teachings were based around regular prayer (salat), charity (zakat), and the fast of Ramadan.  A Muslim community (ummah) was supposed to be compassionate and egalitarian in its distribution of wealth. Islam focused itself on practice rather than on theological diatribe.  Important too was the effort – jihad – to live in the way that God had intended humans to live*.

When Mohammed died in 632, he had conquered either by war or by treaty almost all of the tribes of Arabia, many of whom had converted to Islam. Single-handedly, Muhammad had brought peace to war-torn Arabia, and he lived on in the Muslim faith as the man closest to perfection and the Prophet of God whom every devout Moslem strives to imitate in all known particulars of his life.

The first four caliphs (deputies) who succeeded Mohammed in leading this new ummah were all men who had been among the Prophet’s closest companions and who had played a leading role in the formation of Islam: Abu Bakr, Umar ibn al-Khattab, Uthman ibn Affan, and Ali ibn Abi Talib.  During their reign, expansion of Islam’s empire continued unabated; later Islamic law would give a religious interpretation to this conquest dividing the world into Dar al Islam (the house of Islam), which was in perpetual conflict with Dar al-Harb (the House of the World)*. The last years, however, were marked by a violence that shocked an ummah that was supposed to be one of peace. Uthma, son-in-law of Muhammad, was murdered, and Ali, another son-in-law, was murdered too.

The Empire was taken over by the Ummayads – strong, able, tolerant monarchs – who developed Islam in many ways, and during this time Islam expanded and flourished as a cultural and tolerant religion, foremost in the world in science, archeology, the arts, and philosophy. During this time, too, Islam as qua religion began to solidify 5. Hasan al-Basri openly criticized the monarchy for disobeying (in his opinion) God’s teachings. His school was known as the Qadarites. Another school that arose at that time, called the Mutazilites, also stressed the freedom of the human will, insisted on equality of Moslems, and condemned the luxurious lifestyle of the court, but shied away from political activity on the grounds that only God could be involved.

Debates around the inadequacies of the Umayyad government gave rise to the jurists (faqihs) who attempted to turn the narrative phraseology of the Koran into a tangible and practical code of law that would make Islam a just society according to clear and written tenets.  In order to codify this law, they collected hadith (reports) about the Prophet and his companions to find out how they had acted in given situations so that their conduct could be modeled upon.  Others took their own local traditions as starting points, and tried to trace these traditions back to the early days of the founders.  Abu Hanifah, legal expert of this period, founded a school (madhhab) of jurisprudence which Muslims still follow today.  His teachings were built on by later jurists who founded new madhabs.

The Abbasids (750-935) who succeeded the Ummayads was characterized by a mediation of bloodshed with high culture and fame. Harun al Rashid, possibly one of the most famous of Islamic Caliphs (aside from Sueliman the magnificent) characterized Islamic rule during this period by his absolute monarchy, security, and great cultural renaissance where philosophy, poetry, medicine, the arts, mathematics and astronomy flourished.  Dhimmis (minorities of other religions) participated as equal citizens in this renaissance and Muslim scholars made more scientific discoveries during this  time than in the whole of previously recorded history*, although there was marked discrepancy between the Koranic or Islamic ideal and the way the caliphate kingdom functioned.  The break between the Shiis (those who clung to Ali as legitimate ruler of the nation) and the Sunnis (those who revered Muhammad and all four rashidun) occurred during this period. Mystic Islam  (best as Sufism), or esoteric groups were born during this period as well as Muslim philosophy.

By the 14^th century the shariah was in place and fixed. It could no longer be added to 5. From 1500 –1700, Islam seemed invincible. The Safavid Empire succeeded by the Mogul Empire and then the Ottoman Empire ceaselessly expanded their territory conquering land after land and reaching its apogee under Suleiman the magnificent.  Then, however, the empire having become too large, started to decline and imploded in on itself, and the West took over in 1750.

The West brought with it a modernization and alien culture that confused the Islamic empire who were centuries behind in technological development* and found the Western culture threatening, baffling, and contra to their Koranic morals 6. The European powers colonized one Islamic country after another: Algeria, Aden, Tunisia, Egypt, Sudan, Libya and Morocco.  They invaded other Arab provinces with their protectorates and mandates, and often left conflict wherever they trod. In 1948, the Jewish secular state of Israel was created, further inflaming bitterness and humiliation.  Although some Muslims were in love with the West, and others tried to integrate the Western system (which they respected) with Islamic tradition, Islamic nationalism –learned from European history – started to take root*. Islamic Brotherhood created by Hassan al-Banna (1906-1949) essentially moderate but with some radical branches insisted on a spiritual reformation that would accompany a national development.  Some of the Muslim rulers, such as Atsturk and the Pahlavi monarchs of Iran, introduced European manners in their kingdoms in a coercive manner resulting in a backlash of fundamentalism.  This fundamentalism is not a purely Islamic phenomenon; it exists in Christianity and Judaism too where people, possibly nervous by modernization and uncertainty, selectively use their religious texts to promote a way of life that rejects secularism, treats women and outsiders as inferior, and is often aggressive to both deviants of their own faith and to outsiders of other faiths 7.  According to Armstrong (2000), Islam was actually the last religion to develop a fundamentalist strain, although it has become the most notorious in that direction.  Sayid Qutb (1906-1966), the founder of Islamic fundamentalism 8 told Moslems to model themselves on Mohammed: to separate themselves from mainstream societies, and then to engage in a violent jihad where one must convert aliens to Islamic faith. Tolerance, Qutb formulated, could come only after the political victory and the establishment of a true Muslim state 9.  Fundamentalist movements, such as the Taliban, and fundamentalist-inclined individuals, such as Khomeini and Osama ibn Laden, have all been influenced by Qutb where there is a resurgence of a return to alleged traditional Islam, in some countries more radically than in others. Whilst some reject Western culture utterly, others try to incorporate some of the best aspects of Western civilization in sync with their own tradition, and eschew bigotry as a curse 10. It is not only Muslim bigotry, they point out, that is destructive, but Western bigotry too, for erroneously linking Islamic fundamentalism and violence to the Koran and failing to distinguish between the two when the two may actually be distinct.

Islam in the 20th and 21st century

European colonization and penetration in Islamic countries had mixed results. Whilst many governors, statesmen, activists, thinkers, writers, and educators, particularly in the beginning  ‘bent over backwards’ to secularize themselves and employ western ideas in modernizing their countries, others used those same ideas to defensively and offensively beat their opponents 11.

Those who welcomed Western influence, attended Western universities, mission schools, or Ottoman and Egyptian state academies and learned to think and conduct themselves in a European manner. Some of these changes were positive for the Middle East in that the modernizing influence was salutatory for them enabling them to grow. Modernizing intellectuals and reforming rulers arose who praised the philosophy and ideology of their masters and proposed synthesis of Islamic with Western ideas. Modern knowledge, they claimed, was necessary for advancement.  Iranian intellectuals such as Mulkum Khan and Aqa Khan Kirmani urged Iranians to acquire a Western education and replace the Shariah with a secular legal code.  Sheikh Muhammad Husain Naini  argued that constitutional government, western style  was the next best thing to return of the  Hidden Imam 12; whilst in India Sayid Ahmad Khan claimed that the Koran  was in accord with  Western rationalist science. Some governors went to an extreme in brutally attacking religion in their pursuit of imposing secularism upon the state*. Ataturk, for instance, closed down all madrassahs, suppressed the Sufi orders, and forced citizens to wear Western garb.  Nasser for a while suppressed the Muslim Brotherhood. In Iran, the Pahlavi monarchs, one after the other, shot students who protested against their regime, closed madrassahs, and forbade Iranians to go on the hajj. Moderates, however, believed that Islam and the West could function side-by-side, that Islam need not be given up, and that Western ideas could be incorporated into its fabric for its betterment. One such thinker was the journalist Rashid Rida (1865-1935) who advocated the establishment of  a fully modernized  but fully Islamic state, based on a reformed Shariah.  Another organization that later would become hijacked by terrorists and distorted of its original intentions was the Society of Muslim Brothers founded by the schoolteacher Hasan al-Banna who insisted that Islam must become a total way of life, not confined to one particular private sphere and he, therefore, sought to unify the Islamic nation, raise the standard of living, fight against illiteracy and poverty and liberate Muslims from foreign denominations. His movement spread throughout the Middle East.  The Brothers founded schools, clinics, hospitals, factories, tutorial colleges and clubs; they also trained Muslims in Koranic living and taught them modern labor laws so that they could defend their rights. Others were also inspired by doctrines of political and economic liberalism, which they recognized as the basis of Western power and success and attempted to import those ideas to their own countries. Many of these tentative experiments (such as in Iran and in Turkey (1845)) failed. Ottoman attempts at constitutionalism too did not last long. Most of these attempts failed due to the traditional Islamic power struggle being too entrenched and due to sectarian and internal conflict, bankruptcy, disorder, and corruption 13. Finally, war in 1914 destroyed any further politicizing attempts.

Other modern ideas, however, had a rebound affect in that Middle Easterners discovered European ideas that they could use to their own benefit. Examples included the liberal arguments that individuals had rights and freedoms, and that nations could be overthrown. Frustrated Middle Easterners discovered too the conceptualization of ‘nation’ and ‘race’ – important in that time – to Europeans:  a nation was based on race, language, culture, and shared historical experience, and these values were worth fighting over. Thus was Islamic Nationalism created 14. In the late 19^th century, new movements, fed on these ideas were created: the National Party in Egypt, the new Ottomans succeeded by the Young Turks in the Ottoman Empire, the Arab secret societies in Beirut and Damascus, the Constitutionalists in Persia, and the Young Tunisians.

Unrest in the Middle East was further created by the forming of the secular State of Israel in 1948 dislocating thousands of Palestinians from the homeland, and by British withdrawal from India in 1947, when the Indian subcontinent was partitioned between Hindu India and Muslim Pakistan which to this day is in a conflcitual state with each other.

Unrest was one of the elements that foddered fundamentalism 15. Mawdudi, the founder of the Jamaat-I Islami in Pakistan, argued that Moslems must band together to fight secularism if they wanted their religion and culture to survive. He called for a universal jihad: just as Mohammed had fought the jahiliyayah (the barbarism and ignorance of the pre-Islamic period), so too Muslims must resist the modern jahiliyah of the West 16.  According to Mawdudi, Jihad was the central tenet of Islam 17. Sayid Qutb exceeded Mawdudi in claiming that Muslims were duty bound to overthrow their own ‘heretical’ governments; they had to separate themselves from mainstream society, and engage in violent jihad 18.  As  Armstrong (2000) and Tibi (1988), for instance allege, it was partially due, if not totally, to the Jamaat-I Islami  and to Qutb that Nasser was assassinated, that Khomeini came to power, that Malcolm X founded the nation of Islam (before he became disillusioned and took his followers into Sunni Islam); that the Taliban ruled the way they did, that Osama ibn Laden and his cohorts toppled the Twin Towers; that, in fact, every major, minor and attempted terrorist attack that had been perpetrated in the 20th and 21st centuries came about.  The 21^st century has begun with a disquieting reciprocal relationship between Islam and the West: each perceives the other with prejudice and fear, with the West associating Islam with Jihad and associating the Koran (as in the words of President Bush) with a ‘barbarous faith’.

The definition of Jihad, how Jihad is actually defined. The definition of Jihad as percveived from the Quran. Does the Quran encourage or discourage Jihad with specific verses from the Quran.

There seems to be contradictory meanings regarding Jihad. On the one hand, it is thought to be an internal struggle in order to make oneself the most perfect person, then it seems to be to keep Islam ‘clean’ from external influences; and finally it seems to be a physical struggle against both internal and external enemies. It might be that the Koran itself has contradictory aspects that can be read in ambiguous ways, or that people who call themselves Moslem choose to read the Koran in ways that most suit themselves. Our first place of investigation, therefore, would be the Koran.

The Quran frequently mentions jihad and fighting against the unbelievers, for instance:

“Leave is given to those who fight because they were wronged – surely God is able to help them –  who were expelled from their habitations without right, except that they say ‘Our Lord is God’ 19.

This is traditionally considered to be the first verse dealing with the fighting of the unbelievers*.

Many verses exhort the believers to take part in the battle “with their goods and lives”, promising reward to those who are killed in the jihad, for instance: “If you should die or be slain in the cause of God, God’s forgiveness and His mercy would surely be better than all the riches they amass 20.”  The quran also threatens those who do not fight with severe punishment in the hereafter:

Those that stayed at home were glad that they were left behind by God’s apostle, for they had no wish to fight for the cause of God with their wealth and with their persons. They said to each other: ‘Do not go to war, the heat is fierce.’

Say to them: ‘More fierce is the heat of Hell-fire!’ Would that they understood! 21.

It is ambiguous whether the Koran allows Muslims to fight unbelievers only as a defense against aggression or under all circumstances.

On the one hand, the Koran seems to imply that war may only be started in self-defense: “and fight in the way of God with those who fight with you, but aggress not: God loves not the aggressors.” 22.

On the other hand, those who maintain unconditional fighting against unbelievers  also have phrases that they can point to, for instance:

Then when the sacred months are drawn away, slay the idolaters wherever you find them, and take them, and confine them, and lie in wait for them at every place of ambush.” 23.

And too:

Fight those who believe not in God and the Last Day and do not forbid what God and His Messenger have forbidden – such men as practice not the religion of truth, being of those who have been given the Book – until they pay the tribute out of hand and have been humbled. 24.

Finally, one must remember that Islam is a religion of several sects, some more tolerant than others, and its religion varies according to the culture of the country that it is in, often adopting from and cohering to the patterns of its host-nation. Muslims that live in the States for instance have largely different ways of life than those who live in Liberia, in Africa, in Saudi Arabia, or in Serbia and Europe.

Summarily, as regards warfare, the Quran and Islamic history traditionally holds of a just war  of self-defense to protect  decent values but condemns killing and aggression. It is only comparatively recently that Muslims have been told that  Jihad consists of “killing Americans and their allies – civilians and military” 25. Passages from the Koran that they use to substantiate this consist of the following examples: “and fight the polytheists [mushrikun] together as they fight you together” 26, and fight them until there is no more oppression and religion is for God.” 27. Furthermore: “When the forbidden months are past, then fight and slay the polytheists [mushrikun] where you find them, seize them, beleaguer them, and lie in wait for them in every stratagem of war.” This verse, according to Lumbard (2000), refers to idolatrous Arabs of Muhammad’s time not of other religions for whom a different term is used.  Although Bostom (2005) refutes these apologetics with other contradictory verses from Koran and classical and modern Islamic legislators that seem to clearly condone Jihad against polytheists and practitioners of other religion unless they convert, its seems as though many of these phrases are taken out of context and that modern day Jihadists rely on a term and concept that was understood in a very different way in an earlier time.

It is this ambiguity that resulted in Islamic sects such as famously Sufism which, whilst many Muslims may call it non-Islamic, has drawn many to the Moslem faith. Sufism insists that distinction must be made between the lesser Jihad and the greater Jihad 28 as illustrated by Muhammad himself when he said to his companions, after they had returned from a military campaign in defense of the Median community: “We have returned from the lesser jihad to the greater jihad” 29. The lesser jihad referring to physical battle, whilst the greater jihad referring to combat with one’s carnal passions. It is in this way that some Islamic followers – such as Sufism – interpret Jihad, whilst others, focus on the concept of the lesser jihad – battle with one’s enemies – to neglect of the other.

The rules of Jihad: Is Jihad mandatory or voluntary, who is required to participate, what is the promise to those who fight in Jihad.

Our first recourse to details about these laws would be to the Koran. The Koran possesses verses that deal with technical and practical matters related to the jihad such as exemption from military service 30 (“It shall be no offense for the disabled, the sick, and those lacking the means to stay behind: if they are true to God and to His apostle”); fighting during the holy months 31 (They ask you about the sacred month. Say: “To fight in this month is a grave offense, but to debar others form the path of God, to deny Him, and to expel His worshippers from the Holy Mosque, is far more grave in His sight”); and in the holy territory of Mecca 32 (“do not fight them within the precincts of the Holy Mosque, unless they attack you there”); the fate of prisoners of war 33 (“When you meet the unbelievers in the battlefield strike off their heads and, when you have laid them low, bind your captives firmly. Then grant them their freedom or take a ransom from them, until War shall lay down her burdens”, safe conduct 34 (“If an idolater seeks asylum with you, give him protection so that he may hear the Word of God, and then convey him to safety”), and truce 35 (“if they incline to peace, make peace with them, and put your trust in God”.

There were limits placed upon the early Muslims who carried out jihad against  mushrikun (i.e. people who were given another Writ). Verse 2:190 of the Koran, for instance, speaks of “fight[ing] in the way of God” but also of not transgressing the “limits”. Al-Tabari explains these limits in depth One of these for instance was stipulated by the Ibn Abbas, the cousin of Muhammad, who explained that these ‘limits refers to  the following: “Do not kill women, or children, or the old, or the one who greets  you with peace, or {he] who restrains his hand [from hurting you], and if you do this then you have transgressed.” 36 The Umayyad Caliph, Abd al-Aziz also translates this verse as referring to “… do not fight he who does not fight you, that is to say women, children, and monks.” (ibid.)

Some examples of the hadiths that explain these ‘limits’ and regulate when and how one can perpetrate Jihad are:

When Abu Bakr al-Siddiq [the trusted friend of Muhammad] sent an army to Syria, …[he instructed the commander:] “I instruct you in ten matters: Do not kill women, children, the old, or the inform; do not cut down fruit-bearing trees; do not destroy any town; do not cut the gums of sheep or camels except for the purpose of eating; do not burn date-trees nor submerge them; do not steal from booty and do not be cowardly.” 37

Mutilation was also forbidden:

Umar ibn Abd al-Aziz wrote to one of his administrators: We have learned that whenever the Prophet of God sent out a force, he used to command them, “Fight taking the name of the Lord. You are fighting in the cause of the Lord. Do not commit theft; do not break vows; do not cut ears and noses; do not kill women and children. Communicate this to your enemies.” 38

In fact, the many examples of the early Muslim form of Jihad are consistent in their aim to show that Jihad was aimed as being purely a defensive or preemptive types of  stratagem, not necessarily intended to convert others (Cook, 1997). They can and if wished to should keep their own religion, are protected under Islamic law, and subservient only in terms of paying a poll tax. There are many historical records to this account, for instance:

In the Name of Allah, the compassionate, the merciful. This is what Khalid would grant to the inhabitants of Damascus, if he enters therein: he promises to give them security of their lives, property, and churches. Their city shall not be demolished; neither shall any Moslem be quartered in their house. Thereunto we give to them the pact of Allah and the protection of His Prophet, the caliphs and the “Believers” So long as they pay the poll tax, nothing but good shall befall them 39

More so, if the dhimmis wished they could join the Moslems in battle in attempt to expand their empire. A treaty concluded with the Jarjimah, a Christian people from the town of Jarjumah in 642 CE states that:

Terms were made providing that al-Jarjimanh would act as helpers to the Moslems, and as spies and frontier garrison in Mount al-Lukam. On the other hand it was stipulated that they pay no tax, and that they keep for themselves the booty they take from the enemy in case they fight with the Moslems.” 39.

Another treaty concluded with them at a later period states:

Al-Jarajimah may settle wherever they wish in Syria… neither they nor any of their children or women would be compelled to leave Christianity..” 39

Evidently the laws and implications of the early Jihad were very different to the present connotation. Then jihad was waged in order to extend the Nation’s borders and was national in intent. Non-religionists could join if they wished to, and equally profit from the spoils without having to renounce their religion. Today, the term ‘Jihad’ has become religious if not political in intent with its war seen as localized against non-believers, particularly against Jews and against those abetting the Jews.

Even though jihad, as shown later, is largely incumbent as a collective experience (and if not undertaken, the entire umma is considered as sinning and therefore worthy of punishment), jihad sometimes becomes an individual duty too.  As brought down by the legal specialists, this was the case when the caliph appointed certain persons to participate in a raiding expedition or when someone takes an oath to fight the unbelievers 40. Although some of this, one could argue, was appropriate only to former times, the aspect of taking the oath can be quite applicable to modern times too. And in that case jihad is offensive. But jihad is obligated too – and, arguably, even more so – when Islam is in the defensive situation and poised to defend its territory. Both positions are presented and taught nowadays by Islamic fundamentalists claiming that the West has infringed on its territories in both a physical and moral aspect and therefore they need to wage a war of self-retaliation. Also, as shown later with the September 11 fiasco, this could actually be classified as an offensive war against the infidel.

Sunni and Shiite theories of jihad verge slightly in their ramifications. The Shiites (who believed in Ali as being a  once true imam) hold that a true jihad can be waged only under the rightful imam, theoretically, therefore no lawful jihad can be fought for expansionist reasons, although jihad can always be waged for reasons of defense.  Sometimes the ‘ulama’ are regarded as the representative of the Hidden Imam and consequently several wars between Iran and Russia have been called jihad with that reason in mind 40.

As mentioned later, there seems to be at least two types of Jihad that which is waged against carnal desires, and the other battled against one’s physical enemies. Abou el Fadl (2004) says that the second was really referred to in the quran as qital – feud, and that jihad in its literal sense refers solely to the spiritual conflict.

Similarly, although it is popularly known that Muslim jurists divided the world into two abodes (dar al-Islam and dar al-harb), it is hardly known that later jurists divided the world into at least three if not many more abodes.  Most jurists writing after the tenth century posited a third abode that they called dar al-sulh or al-‘ahd, i.e. one where non-Muslims were friendly and non-belligerent to the Islamic nation. In that case, it was prohibited to fight them, and that if anyone would do so, that group must be punished and forced to compensate. After the twelfth century, Jurists split the world into increasingly more abodes: the real or true abode, some jurists argued, was wherever true justice existed and where Moslems could practice their religion undisturbed (dar al-‘adl). In that sense, the USA even though not an Islamic state could be considered as such since it extended liberty to Muslims and encouraged the to practice their religion. In this sense, it would be prohibited to aggress against Americans.  Other jurists distinguished between an abode of formal Islam and an abode of true Islam, A territory governed by unjust Muslim rulers, would be an abode of formal Islam, whereas one where Islam was practiced correctly would be considered the abode of true Islam. Some jurists, primarily Sufi scholars, theorized that the only abode where true Islam was to be found was in the heart.  In other words, Muslim jurists were not always in accord about the context and object of Jihad. According to most of them, the act of disbelief or the failure to believe (kufr) was not a sufficient cause for war because by itself, it did not justify the termination of life 41.

Muhammad’s understanding of Jihad: Did Mohammad justify it in the name of Islam; and individuals such as Iran’s Ayotalloh Khomaini.

Mohammed’s understanding of the term jihad throughout seems to be in a commendable context using the verbal noun of the verb jihada as some sort of struggle, to strive, to exert oneself; an endeavor towards a praiseworthy aim.  In the religious context, it may be a struggle against one evil inclinations or for the sake of bettering the umma (the moral betterment of Islamic society). In the books on Islamic law, the word means armed struggle against the unbelievers also, says Peters (1996), a common meaning in the Koran. There is the smaller jihad or the larger jihad, both are equivalent to the English concept of ‘crusade’. If used in a religious context, the adjective ‘Islamic’ or ‘holy’ is added to it (such as ‘asl-jihad al-Islami or al-jihad al-muqaddas).

Jihad goes back to the wars that Mohammed fought, their description in the Koran, and their embellishment in later hadiths.  It can be argued, as Armstrong (2000) for instance does, that the concept of wars then was very different to that of now, and self-defense particularly of an embattled and expanding nation necessitated this kind of jihad; they were not out to convert others. Their aim was simply to safeguard and expand their territory.  War between tribes was lawful, particularly if it was to defend against aggression, and the wars fought in Mohammed’s time had certain rules attached to them that he himself incorporated in the Koran, and about which some of the hadiths later describe.  Chivalry forbade warriors to kill non-combatants like children, women, and the elderly, and the doctrine of jihad which was fixed later in the closing half of the second century incorporated it as part of its doctrine.

These first comprehensive treatises on the laws of jihad were written by al-Awzai (d. 774) and Muhammad al-Shaybani (d.804), who had compiled the debates and discussions on the subject  that had been accumulating since the Prophet’s death 42.  It is possible, too, that the doctrine of jihad was influenced by the surrounding countries and era in which the laws were codified.  For instance, many of them were formulated during the era of the Byzantine Empire, where the idea of religious war and related notions were popular and common*.

The doctrine of jihad as understood by Mohammad and the first caliphs and by those who replicated it in his name as brought down in the hadiths was the existence of one single Islamic state ruling the entire umma.  It was the duty of the umma to expand the territory of its state in order to bring as many people under its rule as possible. There is ambiguity as to whether or not the peoples should be allowed to remain dhimmis (i.e. minority faiths) or be compelled to convert.

On the one hand, the quran insists that “there shall be no coercion in matters of faith,”1 and commands Muslims to  respect the beliefs of Jews and Christians, whom the Quran calls  all al-kitah, literally  “people of an earlier revelation”:

Do not argue with the followers of the earlier revelation otherwise than in a most kindly manner – unless it be such of them as are bent on evil-doing – and say: “we believe in that which has been bestowed on high upon us, as well as  that which has been bestowed upon you; for our God and your God is one and the same, and it is unto Him that we [all] surrender ourselves.”2

Until the middle of the eighth century, conversion was even not encouraged.  Early Muslims simply assumed that Islam was a religion for the descendents of Ishmael, just as Judaism was for the sons of Isaac, and Arab tribesmen had always extended protection to clients of other faiths.  In fact, once Jews, Christian and Zoroastrians  had become dhimmis (protected subjects) of the new Moslem Empire, they  had to be treated with respect, or Arab tribesmen would avenge an injury done to them.

On the other hand, the quran does say that war against unbelievers may not be mounted without first giving them opportunity to convert:

Whenever the Prophet appointed a commander to an army or an expedition, he would say: “(…) When you meet your heathen enemies, summon them to three things. Accept whatsoever they agree to and refrain then from fighting them. Summon them to become Muslims. If they agree, accept their conversion, In that case summon them to move from their territory to the Abode of the Emigrants [i.e., Medina]. If they refuse that, let them know that then they are like the Muslim Bedouins and that they share only in the booty when they fight together  with the [other] Muslims. If they refuse conversion, then ask them to pay poll tax. If they agree, accept their submission. But if they refuse, then ask God for assistance and fight them. (…)” (ibid.).

In other words, what you have is the option of conversion or death.

In another place, this time in the Koran itself, Muhammad also says, “Fight them (i.e. the infidels) until there is no persecution (or: seduction) and the religion is God’s (entirely)” 45  which seems to imply the objective to extirpate unbelief and make the whole world under Islam – or is this speaking to atheists? Either way, this seems to grant absolute legitimacy to assertions such as those formulated by Qutb who affirm Koranic permission for their crusade.

The Jihad that is conducted to expand the empire is a collective duty which is fulfilled if a sufficient number of people participate in a unit. If this is not the case, the whole umma is sinning and deserves to be killed. Taking this literally, fundamentalist Islam – or terrorism perpetrated in the name of the Islamic religion – then does seem to have a cause  for Islam promises that keeping the Law would  result in a flourishing nation. The fact that  Middle East  seems to be suffering and  is poorer, constantly embroiled in wars and famine and underdeveloped when compared to the West  must be attributed, so many of them claim, to their deficiency in abiding to Koranic regulations. Accordingly, the Koran’s injunction of  required jihad and the fact that it is not being fulfilled would  – according to that Koranic phrase – explain the empire’s present miserable state. Indeed, as many fundamentalists assert: Islam’s heyday was procured due to their waging jihad against non-observers and expanding their Empire. Revival of those glorious days would necessitate that they do the same now.

Expansionist jihad, however, presupposes the presence of a legitimate caliph to organize the struggle and this is where individuals such as Khomeini and Osama ibn Laden step in.  Even after the conquests have come to an end, the caliph – so the legal specialists laid down – still has to raid enemy territory at least once a year in order to keep the idea of jihad alive 46.

Fundamentalists like Khomeini, however, who murdered their own Muslim colleagues had a problem, since the Koran and Islamic law prohibits fighting against and certainly killing a colleague of their faith.  This is certainly so in the case of calling an armed revolt against a Muslim ruler, when Islamic law allows revolt only in rare occasions (Peter, 1996). One of these is when a ruler is an apostate and since an apostate deserves capital punishment, fighting against him is allowed. Fundamentalists, therefore, (Khomeini included) have styled secularists such as the Pahlavi family of Iran   heretics (kafir) in order to justify their struggle against them.  Qutb and Abul-Alaal Mawdudi are responsible for formulating these opinions.  This was the argument too that was presented by the Jihad organization in their pamphlet entitled the “Absent Duty” (cited in Peters, 1996) that stated their reasoning for assassinating Sadat of Egypt. Since the government had refused to introduce the Shariah and was obviously inclined to Western law, and since, as according to two fatwas issued by a fundamentalist author Ibn Tamiyya (1263-1328) who argued that people who apply their own law instead of the Sharia are unbelievers, Sadat was consequently an unbeliever and could be assassinated.  Similar arguments have been given today by similarly disposed fundamentalists: rulers of their own governments who do not apply sharia laws (according to their own understanding of what the sharia entails) are considered heretics; therefore, according to their reading of the Koran, they deserve to be assassinated 47. And, indeed, it is worthy to do so.

America’s response to Jihad and Islam, Jihad portrayed in Western media, Radical Muslim movements such as Al Queda; whether Sept. 11 attacks was an example of terror in the name is Islam; building the Mosque near ground zero.

The 20^th and 21st centuries are not the first time when jihad was vigorously espoused  for purification of Islam. The 18^th and 19^th centuries saw similar revivals too where  adherents tried to establish a purely Islamic society doing this by way of jihad.  As some would argue then against the colonizer and use the same argument today against the Western penetration, relying on Koran 2:195 they would maintain “.. and cast not yourself by your own hands into destruction” 48.

On the other hand, clauses in the legal jurisdiction and apologetics maintain that  Muslims can cooperate with non-believers as long as nonbelievers do not aggressively seek to harm them.  One such argument came from Sayyid Ahmad Khan (1817-1898) who asserted that jihad was obligatory for the Muslims only in the case of “positive oppression or obstruction in the exercise of their faith.. . impairing the foundation of some of the pillars of Islam 49. Muhammad Abduh (1848-1905) and Muhammad Rashid Rida (1865-1935) likewise asserted that jihad is allowed only as defensive warfare.  That, however, left the way open for jihad against colonial oppression, and similarly leaves the way open for jihad today against American expansionism and western interference – and certainly against Israel’s occupation of Palestinian property.  Recently, jihad has been presented as a form of Muslim international law and equated with the concept of Grotius’ bellum justum* (Brown, 1999).

In order to understand the concept of the Jihad better, one has to understand something of the Shariah.  The Shariah is a living tradition. Moslems seek to have something to guide them in this life of uncertainty, and so they attempt to go as far back to Mohammad and the early caliphs and his first followers as possible.  These chains of transmission and laws were over the years formulated into the shariah (Islamic Law). The fact was, however, that as the shariah was formulated and as commentators and thinkers interpreted it and applied its teachings, this was often done according to the spirit of the time, the individual, and the environment.  Thus for instance, the commentators who lived during the early caliphate kingdom when particularly brutal Jihads were occurring in order to expand and defend the kingdom approached the Koranic text with these battles in mind. Thus today there is a crisis of legitimacy in Muslim thought due to the many contradictory arguments on each side of the controversy 50.

Dr. Nader Pourhassan (2002) was raised to be a fanatical supporter of Islam, but after being married to an American Christian woman spent seven years immersed in the Koran  and the resalahs (rules for daily living) as taught by the Muslim clerics critiquing his conditioning.

His conclusion regarding September 11 was that many of the hijackers were unaware of the consequences of their act – it was the pilots solely who   knew precisely what they were going to do, aside from which  he compared suicide bombers to  the baby born of a mother addicted to drugs: the child inevitably too becomes an addict. “Her mother injects her with heroin to stop her cries, and the child becomes unable to avoid being addicted” (115). Muslim society, he said is injected with distorted teachings of Islam, such as Jihad that  paints a cushioned picture of  suffering in the present Islamic Empire, and guarantees the Empire more suffering unless they wage a Jihad. Socialization and ingrained respect for their teachers makes many citizens, even though adults, into the drug-addict’s baby.  An example of this kind of indoctrination is the opinion transmitted from many religious leaders about women for instance when “one of the most respected Shiite religious leaders stated in his book that women are a type of animal – they aren’t even human and that God decided to give them human faces so that men would not be too disgusted to talk to them, and would be able to bring themselves to mate with them” (p.12). This is the kind of indoctrination that many fundamentalist Moslems receive from their leaders that drive them to commit acts such as that of September 11.

Whilst Moslems have been shaped by their own inherited ideologies, Kalin (in Brown, 1999) argues that modern Euro-American perceptions too have been shaped by inherited religious, philosophical, and ideological factors that have shaped presentations of Islam not only in the media but also in academia.  There are two militating views of Islam in the US: the confrontationist and the acconmadationist.  Whilst the former calls for an all-out confrontation and clash between the two civilizations, the latter views Islam as a sister civilization of the West and an intricate component of a tradition which is not only Judeo-Christian as classically seen but also Judeo-Christian-Islamic. This clash was exemplified by the recent conflict over the building of a Mosque near Ground Zero. Whilst President Obama seconded the motion on the grounds that Muslims have the choice to build their house of worship wherever they wish (Miller, 2010) *about six out of ten New Yorkers opposed the idea on political and ideological grounds. The problem here was that Islam was being confounded with terrorism (or with Islamicism, as some call fundamentalism).  The West, according to Voll (1982)51, has its own transmission of ideas of Islam that frighten it and compel it to see the religion as backwards and intolerant. Islam, meanwhile, sees the West as oppositional and bigoted. The result is a ceaseless fear and feud between the two. Whether or not Jihad does have toots in the Koran is ambivalent, but the West apparently seems to see Islam as a religion, and all Muslims as a whole in a more categorized and general way than they should see them52. Not all are terrorists; many espouse salaam.

Conclusion

It may be that the Koran contains verses that could be read in varying ways and that it has been modernism that has inspired the Jihad as popularly understood by modern world, Islamic and western alike. Just as Esposito (1999; 1995) remarks, Jihad is a concept that, like many religious terms not only in Islam but in other religions too, has varied among the ages and been shaped by its surrounding environment 51. Intended in one place to slaughter the enemy ‘within’ (and still taken in that sense by Sufism), Jihad later, as Islam was compelled to defend itself and extend its Empire became known as a war necessary to wage against offenders aggressors. Recently, fundamentalists extended that meaning as such that implied to their own people who replaced shariah law with secularism and against the West who threatened the Moslem tradition with secularists learning 52. As Norman (1960) and Smith (1957), for instance, show not everyone accepts these views. Many Islamic apologists and commentators show (and have since time immemorial) shown how Islam and the West can co-exist in fraternity each reciprocally contributing to the other without Islam necessarily needing to surrender its teachings* They also demonstrate how the Koran has been selectively distorted by fundamentalist hijackers, and how the strength of socialization and traditional Islamic respect for teachers results in a transmission of Jihad that is fundamentally warped* . It is not only the Middle East that is biased by socialization; the West has their form too. Going to the source of these teachings possibly needs erosion of this socialization – needed in order for each to destruct its own particular construction of prejudice and construct a world where militant Jihad –as is understood by some – does not exist.

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1 David, 1997

1 David, 1997

2 Armstrong, 2000, p.4

3 * Armstrong, 2000; Hourani, 1991; 1986.

4 Since early Muslims, being illiterate as was Muhammad, gathered to hear it being recited. (See also Lewis, 1950)

* Armstrong, 2000; Lapidus, 1998

* Armstrong, 2000

5 Abou eld Fadl, 1994; 1999; 2004

* * Armstrong, 2000

5 Abou eld Fadl, 1994; 2004; Cook, 1997

* Said, 1978; Tibi, 1988

6 Armstrong, 2000, 1991; Ahmed, 1999; Norman, 1960; Said, 1978; Tibi, 1988.

* Said, 1978

7 Armstrong, 2000; Lawrence, 2007

8 Chouweiri, 1999

9 Qutb, 1977

10 Hourani, 1986; 1991

11 Ahmed, 1992

12 So-called Twelver Shiis believe that  the 11^th Imam died in 874 and left behind a young son who went into hiding. It was said that that this 12^th Imam would return one day to inaugurate an era of justice, but only after a long time had passed.

* Lapidus, 1998

13 Huntington, 1996

14 Ruthven, 1987

15 Armstrong, 1991; Lawrence, 2007

16 Mawdudi, 1967, 1976

17 Mawdudi, 1967

18 Qutb, 1977

19 22:39

* Iqbal, 1989

20 3:157-158

21 9:81-82

22 2:190

23 9:5

24 9:29

25 Lumbard, 2000

26 9:36

27 2:193

28 Arberry, 1950; Kelsay, 2007

29 Tibi, 1988; Lambard, 2004, p.3

30 9:91, 48:17

31 2:217

32 2:191

33 47:4

34 9:6

35 8:61

36 Al-Tabari, vol. 14., p.84

37 Peters, 1996, p.54

38 Abou eld Fadl, 1999, p.136

39 Lumbard, 2004, p.18

39 ibid. Lumbard, 2004, p.19

39 ibid.

40 Abou eld Fadl, 2004; Abou eld Fadl, 1999

40 Peters, 1996

41 Abou eld Fadl, 2004; Abou eld Fadl, 1994

42 Gabrieli, 1950; Iqbal, 1989; Stewart, 1988.

* Iqbal, 1989

43Quran, 2:256

44 Quran 29:46

45 2:193; 8:39

46 Peters, 1996

47 Kelsay, 2007

48 Norman, 1960

49 Abou Rl-Fadl, p163

50 Brown, 1999

* Miller, S. (Aug., 14, 2010) “Obama supports building of mosque near ground zero,”  ABC News. Political Punch. blogs.abcnews.com/politicalpunch/2010/08/obama-supports

51 Voll, 1982

51 Esposito, 1999, 1995; Halliday, 1996; Voll, 1982; Wensinck, 1932

52 Tibi, 1988

* Norman, 1967; Smith 1957

* Esposito, 1995