John Stuart Mill and Parameters of Harm, Essay Example

An examination of John Stuart Mill’s political philosophy reveals what may be termed a “human” indulgence, if not weakness.  Mill is so consistently concerned with liberty that he evinces a kind of anxiety regarding the limits of state authority, seemingly fearful of any potential of the state to impose upon or restrict individual freedoms.  The concern is certainly warranted; not only is human history replete with examples of even liberal governments eventually exceeding their authority and infringing on personal freedoms, there is as well the inescapable reality that social elements often influence governments in ways attaching morality to laws, which in turn enables the state to curtail liberties.  This being the reality, Mill then offers his principle of harm, which holds that harm only extending beyond the self may be reasonably addressed by the state. This is in fact Mill’s Principle of Liberty, in that no limitation of liberty may ever be sanctioned unless doing so prevents harm to others.[1]  Among other things, the concept is embraced by Libertarian thinkers, just as it so emphatically represents a tenacious insistence on the preservation, if not sanctity, of personal freedoms.  It is essentially an ideology maintaining the state as non-interfering except in extreme circumstances, affirming individual accountability as the core determinant of individual choice.

In theory, Mill’s harm principle is immensely compelling.  It is attractive by virtue of its simplicity; when individual actions do not adversely affect others through actual harm, it is unconscionable that the actions be penalized or restricted.  That Mill comprehends the issue of offensiveness is also admirable, in that perceptions of action as inappropriate or morally questionable may also not be allowed to violate personal freedoms.  Regrettably, both societies and the individuals who compose them are inherently complex entities, and the exponential processes occurring as individuals create and maintain societies are, in a word, inestimable.  As the following will explore, this alone creates significant difficulties in any real application of Mill’s principle. Societies and individuals are inevitably and inextricably linked, which typically blurs distinctions of the correctness of societal -and consequently state – response.  This in turn enables and/or reflects the critical element of harm defined as such.  While there are certainly instances wherein Mill’s principle is valid, particularly when the society expresses through state authority an unethical oppression of freedoms due only to moral perceptions, it is necessary to comprehend that liberty itself is by no means necessarily the foundation of a liberal state.  That is to say, as societies are structured in terms of ethical conformity, it is usual that their governments incorporate ideas of behaviors, appropriate and otherwise, into their policies. There is as well the element of determining the limits of harm aside from more abstract interpretations. All of this combines to weaken Mill’s principle, and reinforce that the parameters of harm itself are not so neatly in keeping with his ideological position.

No analysis or criticism of Mill’s principle, of course, may be conducted without there first being a full understanding of his meaning, and his specific identification of harm itself.  To his credit, Mill does not present harm as the sole factor of his principle and leave the term to be interpreted at will.  He makes interesting and important distinctions which, if not precisely defining it, add boundaries to it.  For example, for Mill the aspect of privacy is by no means a license for individual action that harms others, as in abusive households.  The abuser is creating harm and therefore waives the freedom to act even within the most private of arenas.  Then, Mill does not suggest that the incorrectness of society interfering directly with liberties is synonymous with society’s unconcern; if there are issues unacceptable to the society, it does not violate the harm principle when it expresses dissatisfaction.[2] Furthermore, Mill very much recognizes that there are inherent gradations in determining harm, particularly in terms of anticipating harmful consequences.  There are innumerable and inevitable occasion in the society in which harm is likely as prompted by other actions, and this obligates the society to consider when that potential harm in fact warrants interference. For all his emphasis on individual liberties, Mill is something of a pragmatist; he comprehends that, in any society, people invariably harm, or come near to harming, one another in countless ways.[3] Certainly, he understands and acknowledges that harm is a mutable subject, apart from even societal and individual conceptions of it.

At the same time, there remains the reality that Mill fails to define beyond these exceptional, and somewhat broad, terms.  For example, Mill addresses the issue of harm as generated by inaction, as when a failure to respond to a dangerous situation places others at risk.  He fully supports such cases as warranting societal interference.  Nonetheless, Mill remains oddly ambiguous regarding this matter of harm-prevention as opposed to harmful conduct.  Some critics applaud Mill’s emphasis on harm-prevention as enlightened and a true justification of the harm principle itself; society works to ensures its good when it maintains limits on likely harm, if in fact this is not its primary function.  Others, however, view this prevention model as too broad, simply because it then relies on a kind of interference antithetical to Mill’s main principle.  More exactly, preventing harm is typically done when individuals make active efforts to help one another, and this then renders the aspect of interference questionable.[4]  Put another way, when it is permissible for the society to take what may be called a proactive approach, the parameters regarding potential of harm expand immeasurably, as assessing these potentials necessarily involves both interpretation and some form of active interference, if only in terms of monitoring and/or assisting others.

Then, and unfortunately, Mill never goes to any real definition of harm itself, which inevitably confounds his critics and even his admirers.  It is of course reasonable to assume that Mill discusses harm as that which literally injures, kills, or causes pain to another.  This is the tacit thrust of his argument, and the extremity of the conditions is in place to affirm how unjust it is for the state to intervene under any other circumstances.  Mill himself affirms that the well-being of others, in either physical or moral terms, is insufficient to warrant societal interference when no literal harm is done.  This, however, only amplifies the dilemma innate to the harm principle, as Mill also supports harm-prevention; how, it must be asked, is the the society not permitted to act when it believes that its well-being is challenged, which goes to a form of harm?  In plain terms, the inescapable flaw in Mill is that he does not present a comprehensive concept of his primary element: harm.  If he believes, as his ideology indicates, that there is such a thing as moral well-being, then he must accept that there is as well the possibility of moral harm being committed.  Mill holds to harm as literal and/or physical, it may then be argued, because only such a definition allows him to exercise the harm principle “ethically.”

In fact, it is arguable that Mill’s harm principle is in fact based on an acceptance of moral reality, in that it is immoral for society to interfere in constricting liberties when literal harm is not imminent.  Somewhat ironically, then, Mill counters his own principle because it exists to uphold a moral truth while not actually admitting to a vulnerability, or potential to be harmed, in individuals who may be morally harmed by the principle itself.  This may be assessed through examining the issue of pornography.  Liberal thinkers who typically espouse Mill oppose the censorship of pornography because the material is objectionable only to some on moral grounds, and does not actually harm anyone.  Feminists and others hold strongly contrasting views; they assert that most pornography debases women, which is a distinct form of social harm.  If, in fact, defenders of pornography put forth the claim that is usually exists to give “harmless” pleasure to men, the opposition is enabled to counter that this generates the greater harm of reinforcing a culture in which the suppression and objectification of women is acceptable, which is consequently greatly harmful to the entire female population.[5]  All of this, moreover, does not address the underlying elements of the production of pornography as literally harmful to those creating it, as when women and children are coerced through desperation to engage in it.

What this single issue of pornography then presents is a challenge to Mill’s harm principle, and one reflecting multiple aspects of the innate dilemma within it.  To begin with, harm is consistently and inevitably subject to interpretation, a reality which by no means lessens the potentials of real harm as so interpreted.  On the literal question alone, there is ample room here to refute Mill’s insistence on harm as being direct and physical, as he strongly implies through the absence of any other definition.  Pornography is an immense industry in which women, children and men as well are often physically degraded and physically abused, processes enabled frequently by the desperation or outright victimization of the participants.  It is further supported by research that pornography, rather than serving as a “harmless” outlet for male fantasy, promotes criminality. A common theme in pornography is the rape of women, and evidence suggests that this in turn generates sexual aggression in men evincing actual abuse.[6] This also does not even address the criminal exploitation of children, which must be taken into consideration if pornography as a whole is to be assessed as harmless.

Then, and critically, there is the issue of moral harm as permeating the society in the form of pornography, and the acceptance of pornography.  This moral component reflects the view that the material, so inherently degrading to women, promotes in the society the inescapably harmful ideology that women exist for such purposes.  It is ordinary for pornography to be defended as essentially a choice, either in terms of participation or consumption, but this ignores the immense and irrefutable impact on the culture.  This is in fact a case wherein a moral wrong has direct and profound influence on literal reality, as in the noted association between pornography and female victimization in life.  The quintessentially Mills view here would be that, as no direct harm emanates from anyone’s enjoying of pornography, the society may not justly interfere.  However, parameters of harm are not, as observed elsewhere, so neatly in place, simply because the “harmless” enjoyment is generated by a harm-producing industry, just as it also is only one facet of an influence noted as harmful to women and children in the society as it functions.  One need not be a proponent of censorship to then conclude, not only that pornography is harmful, but that the subject also powerfully illustrates the limitations in the harm principle. Simply., Mill does not extend the parameters of harm to encompass its very real presence as apart from direct harm. He likely would classify pornography as certainly offensive but, as it is not commonly associated with active harm, he would object to societal interference.

Not unexpectedly, the moral and sexual issue of prostitution also poses a very real challenge to the harm principle.  As with pornography, the usual, liberal outlook is to perceive this as a matter of choice, both of prostitute and client, and one condemned because it offends moral sensibilities, rather than creates any actual harm.  To some extent, this is valid, yet it neglects to take into account – again, as with pornography – the inevitable, ancillary, and very real manifestations of harm within the profession.  If the common thinking is that prostitution is a free choice made by women, vast evidence reveals this as essentially untrue; it is at best questionable how much choice is involved when women are coerced into prostitution due to poverty, drug addiction, or other extreme circumstances.  Then, it is equally established that, as the prostitute relies on the pimp for her safety, her victimization is complete.  Instead of a choice made reflecting a non-conformity with moral codes, prostitution is in fact a form of bondage for most women engaged in it.[7]  Then, all of this is apart from the actual violence women suffer at the hands of pimps and clients, and the harmful degradation and tangible effects of engaging in illegal activity.

This latter component demands further examination, for it may be argued that the harm generated by prostitution is then directly a refutation of Mill.  That is, the society interferes in a manner creating harm for the women, and due it its inappropriate conviction that morality entitles the response.  Consequently, the harmful repercussions of prostitution do not challenge the harm principle, certainly in their legal form.  It may be further argued that the other harmful aspects, such as abuse, are additional realities in place due to society’s unjust determination of prostitution as wrong; were this not in place, then women could not be so victimized by those taking advantage of the underground and illicit arena of the profession.  Mill’s harm principle is then vindicated because it is interference itself, and long ingrained within the society, that actually enables the harm. Moral offense is permitted to translate into interventions which, in the realm of prostitution, create a variety of harms.

Such an argument, however, neglects the vital element of the innate complexity of the society, which in turn goes to parameters of harm as reliant upon interactions inherent to that complexity.  The harm principle is correct only when there are narrow boundaries defining harm itself, as noted, and such boundaries cannot exist in any multifaceted society.  The law itself struggles consistently to separate intent from harm, and offers an inestimable range of response gradations based upon this single element.  For example, a serious charge is depraved indifference, when an individual fails to act in a way deemed both responsible and necessary to prevent harm to another.  There is the murder charge, for instance, perfectly conforming to Mill and demanding that harm be addressed; there are as well innumerable cases where negligence, passion, motive, and other aspects of a crime call into question degree of guilt.[8]  This translates to the society’s consistent need to ascertain how human motive functions when harm occurs, which then profoundly underscores the difficulty and complexity of the efforts.  “Harm,” simply, is virtually unbounded in definition, because it is inextricably linked to both the perceived causal agents and, importantly, the society’s actual ideas of its degree as created by those agents.

In conclusion, it is not so much unreasonable to view Mill’s harm principle as permissive, as it is inaccurate or inapplicable to even the most liberal society.  Permissiveness would in fact go to an ideological agenda absent in Mill; he seeks only to safeguard liberties, rather than promote unbridled behaviors.  Nonetheless, his utter failure to comprehend the vast variety of factors intrinsically going to how society perceives harm renders the principle ultimately invalid.

Morality alone creates dilemmas here because morality guides the society in its ideas of what is right, which then evolve into conceptions of harm when the right is defied.  Then, even questionable moral issues frequently generate harms apart from the nature of the activity, as with prostitution.  Consequently, Mill’s harm principle is essentially inadequate in addressing the issue of personal liberties within any society of any complexity at all.

Bibliography

Donner, Wendy. The Liberal Self: John Stuart Mill’s Moral and Political Philosophy. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1991.

Dworkin, Gerald.  Mill’s On Liberty: Critical Essays.  Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 1997.

Gray, John.  Mill on Liberty: A Defence, 2^nd Ed.  New York: Routledge, 2013.

Hess, Robert E., and Swift, Carolyn F.   Sexual Assault and Abuse: Sociocultural Context of Prevention. New York: Routldge, 2013.

Mill, John Stuart. The Basic Writings of John Stuart Mill: On Liberty, The Subjection of Women and Utilitarianism.  New York: Random House, 2010.

Nemeth, Charles P. Criminal Law, 2^nd Ed.  Boca Raton: CRC Press, 2011.

Wykes, Maggie, and Welsh, Kirsty. Violence, Gender, and Justice.  Thousand Oaks: SAGE, 2008.

[1] John Gray, Mill on Liberty: A Defence, 2^nd Ed. (New York: Routledge, 2013), 3.

[2] John Stuart Mill,  The Basic Writings of John Stuart Mill: On Liberty, The Subjection of Women and Utilitarianism (New York: Random House, 2010), 312.

[3] Mill, The Basic Writings, 312.

[4] Wendy Donner, The Liberal Self: John Stuart Mill’s Moral and Political Philosophy (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1991), 196.

[5] Gerald Dworkin, Mill’s On Liberty: Critical Essays (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 1997), 31-32.

[6] Robert E. Hess, Carlolyn F. Swift, Sexual Assault and Abuse: Sociocultural Context of Prevention (New York: Routldge, 2013), 79.

[7] Maggie Wykes and Kirsty Welsh, Violence, Gender, and Justice.  Thousand Oaks: SAGE, 2008), 140.

[8]   Charles P. Nemeth, Criminal Law, 2^nd Ed (Boca Raton: CRC Press, 2011), 137.