Katrina Hurricane vs the Tva’s Kingston Ash Spill, Essay Example

Any specialist in crises and disaster management would argue that there are no two identical disasters or crises. In each case, the totality of circumstances, characteristics of development and cause-effect relationship are different and often n unique to a particular case. However, various occurrences can be characterised in similarities of missteps or violations that led to a certain disaster. In this regard, engineering ethical issues are of particular importance, since they reflect conditionality of disaster occurrence and consequent development. The necessity of studying these issues is aimed at the realisation of the level of organisational monitoring of these issues and also the development of ways of their avoidance in the future projects. The aim of this paper is to compare and contrast engineering ethics issues in the case of Hurricane Katrina and TVA’s Kingston ash spill. Furthermore, controls in place within my organisation aimed to avoid such ethical lapses are outlined.

Although the two disasters are different in scale and nature of their development, in terms of engineering ethical issues of dealing with each case they have various similarities. First of all, in both cases the occurrence of these disasters was not envisioned by preliminary safety assessment. In the case of Kingston, although the seeps took place and were fixed, they were not envisioned in the preliminary assessment of potential crises, and they were not addressed systematically. In other words, “the “fixes” put in place to remedy these seeps were limited to patching the specific leaks” (Ide et al., 4). Thus, since the preliminary plan did not envision any systematic actions and their necessity, they were not conducted.

In the case of Katrina, just as Kingston the preliminary assessments were characterised by unanticipated failure modes and faulty assumptions. In this regard, the example of levee breaches along the 17^th Street Canal is the most prominent one: “the formation of gaps behind the floodwalls with hydrostatic pressures acting along the full depth was unforeseen and not accounted for in the original designs of the I-wall systems” (Newberry 541). In terms of faulty assumptions, it is considered that underseepage would not be problematic during short-term rises of the canal water level.

The problem was that just as Kingston evaluated seeps in terms of the outdated estimates and did not take into account changes in the surrounding environment and physical characteristics of the design against them, so did engineers in the case of Katrina (Poel and Royakkers 57). In other words, in both cases, the factor of time and consequent appearance of the new factors influencing the original design were not analysed and accounted for. While the initial design simply could not foresee all of the new factors, the interim monitoring and assessment of potential hazards could prevent Kingston spill entirely and could limit the scale of Katrina destructions (Harris et al. 79).

Another crucial similarity between the two cases is the lack of communication and cooperation between various units. While in the case of Kingston, these were units within a single organisational network, in the case of Katrina these were various units within local, state and federal levels. For Kingston, the argument for the responsibility over the byproducts ponds was between the Fossil Engineering Division and the Coal Combustion Byproduct Division, with none of them actually being responsible for it or taking any actions to monitor the situation (Ide et al., 2).  In the case of Katrina, from the perspective of the original design the problem was in terms of interface, and development of independent compounds of the entire system of levees, canals and buildings separately rather than as unity. This further resulted in different authorities and responsible bodies for various activities and properties. Consequently, the clash of interests took place and timely coordination of actions became virtually impossible:

“At the time of Katrina, there was an unresolved dispute between the agencies. A frontage wall needed to be built to shield the pump building from the canal, so that the floodwalls could be finished to their intended height. Since such a frontage wall would intersect the interests of both the SWBNO and the OLD, the question of who had responsibility to fund and construct it was a contested issue” (Newberry 556).

Thus, in both cases, irrespective of the presence of various stakeholders and units who could actually conduct required works, the lack of initial division of responsibilities in the situation of the potential disaster undermined efficiency of all participants and increased the ruinous results of disasters in both cases.

In both cases, the dysfunction of disaster management was the lack of its prevention plans and initial risk assessment plans. Although it can be argued that both natural and technogenic disasters are hard to predict, the initial risk assessment of the project design and its continuous monitoring of each stage with consequent modifications can prevent numerous faults that become evident during the disasters (Poel and Royakkers 66). For instance, the case of Katrina,   assessment of the water level change from the initial one caused by the new factors and sea-level increase would demonstrate the inability to levee to withstand the additional pressure according to the new water level calculations (Poel and Royakkers 67). In the case of   Kingston, “after the completion of the “starter” dikes for a new byproduct retention pond, TVA did not perform routine inspections to ensure that the pond was constructed pursuant to the engineered specifications” (Ide et al., 3). Consequently, in both cases no modification and up-to-date risk assessment was conducted.

Irrespective of mentioned above similarities, the two case studies do have certain differences. In the case of Kingston, one of the problems was the lack of standardisation, appropriate training and metrics: although there were training manuals of how to handle ash, their practical implementation was never explained and trained to the personnel. The workers on the site also lacked required materials and tools for handling the situation (Harris et al. 84). On the other hand, in the case of Katrina, the resolution of the disaster problems was carried out by governmental organisations on various levels. Although, as it was mentioned above, they had certain arguments regarding authorities and responsibilities, in terms of skills, training and  material preparedness, responsible units were more efficient and ready for the disaster management in the case of Katrina rather than Kingston  (Poel and Royakkers 61).

Another distinctive difference between the two cases is that Kingston disaster took place in the private sector, while Katrina disaster was mainly a responsibility of the authorities. In this regard, the difference is essential particularly in such matters as the availability of resources and financial issues of the disaster management (Harris et al. 76). In the case of Kingston, the lack of crises management funds had direct impact on what personnel could actually do with the existing situation, while in the case of Katrina, various financial options were available, and various levels of authorities were involved in it. Consequently, the timeliness of disaster management was better in the case of Katrina rather than Kingston (Poel and Royakkers 54).

One more difference between the two cases was that Kingston spill was more conditioned by negligence and the lack of timely risk assessment and monitoring, while Katrina disaster was also complicated by the historical context and lock-in decision of the previous engineers. In this regard, due to the different level of technologies development, social and safety requirements, the contemporary engineers have to deal with the consequences of decisions of the previous generations which was well-demonstrated in the case of Katrina. In other words, historical heritage has to be taken into account in engineering designs:

“historical contingencies concerning the adoption of certain practices and standards have significant consequences for future engineers, at times effectively locking them in to certain courses, even when the rationales for those courses may no longer be relevant” (Newberry 562).

Regarding the organisation I am currently working with, it deals with Maritime offshore industry. In order to avoid the outlined above issues, our organisation pays particular attention to up-to-date monitoring of safety and consistency of technology and personnel performance. In this regard, except for annual systematic risk assessments and technological performance evaluation, monthly monitoring and technical checks are conducted. In terms of the future potential disaster management, all members of staff are going through training and disaster management programmes conducted every six months.

Moreover, the company collaborates with the local authorities and research institutes regarding the exploration of the marina and environmental changes that might cause an unpredicted impact on the existing constructions and equipment functionality. We are constantly working on the updating risk-management manuals and improvement of workers skills and knowledge regarding disaster management. In other words, just as there are no limits for perfection; so, there are no limits to security and risk assessment. It is an on-going process and if paid due attention it might contribute to the prevention of the ruinous implications of the disasters examined above.

Works Cited

Harris, C., Pritchard, M. and Rabins M. Engineering Ethics: Concepts and Cases. Boston, MA: Cengage. 2013. Print.

Ide, W.R., Blanco, J., and Long, M. “A Report to the Board of Directors of the Tennessee Valley Authority Regarding Kingston Factual Findings” 21 July 2009. Web. 12 June 2015.

Newberry, B. “Katrina: macro-Ethical Issues for Engineers” Science and Engineering Ethics, 16.3(2010): 535-71. Web. 12 June 2015.

Poel, I. and Royakkers, L. Ethics, Technology and Engineering: An introduction. Hoboken, NJ: Wiley-Blackwell. 2011. Print.