Legal Impact of Workman, Research Paper Example

Introduction

Workers Compensation is the primary mechanism for providing medical and living expenses to people who have been injured on the job, and as such is expected to play a vital role for all Americans whose health insurance policies do not cover work related injuries or illnesses, but the organization reputation for ruling on safety related cases has not always impact favorable on these employees (Sered,Fernandopulle, 2005)

An understanding of the mechanism at work in Workers Compensation is essential to effectively evaluate how and why the outcome of their legal cases impacts on injured employees the way they do.

Employers according to Sered and Fernandopulle (2005), pay a certain amount into an insurance pool, so that workers injured on the job can apply from it to receive medical benefits and financial compensation for the days they were not able to work.

The downside of this arrangement is that the workers receiving such benefits and financial compensation, has to forfeit their rights to sue the company, regardless of the fact that what they might receive from Workers Compensation may be grossly inadequate to meet their personal and other needs.(Sered and Fernandopulle, 2005).

Workers Compensation is therefore like a middle man in the legal arrangement, whereby it protects the companies from possible paying out millions of dollars for lawsuit, and at the same time provide financing for the workers until successful resolution are arrived at.

A spin off from the institutionalized role by Workers Compensation is the fact that it is an unpopular entity among the medical community, in terms of making timely payment work services rendered to injured employees, and according to Sered and Fernandopulle (2005), it has become common as they assess the impact of the organizations safety rulings across the state, is that they delay accepting and paying workers claims.

This action allows workers to accumulate medical and other bills far in excess of what they will eventually be paid, and forces them to accept lump sum paymentsto alleviate their desperate situations.

However, once the lump sum payments are accepted the cases closed, and these workers cannot extract anymore benefits, and has to meet all unmet financial obligations by themselves.

The relationship between the lawyers for Workman’s Compensation is also an issue that has negative repercussions towards the welfare of injured employees, as Conilogue, the bureau chief of the Department of Benefits and Administration at the Idaho Industrial Commission, reports. Physicians, he says, do not want to work with Workman’s Compensation patients, because they do not get paid for the time spent doing the paper work and it takes a long time to give a legal deposition certifying the injuries or illness. (Sered, Fernandopulle, 2005).

There are cases according to Conilogue, where because of the delaying tactics of the Workman Compensation lawyers, doctors are charging as much as $2500 per hour to do depositions, which they know are beyond the capability of patients to pay, and often resulted in extended delays for their cases to be processed, while their personal bills accumulate (Sered, Fernandopulle, 2005).

Should this be a microcosm of the entire institution’s behavior across the country, then the impact on employees suffering from injuries as a result of safety rulings may be devastating?

However, analyses of the impact on cases that have been ruled on, will determine whether the conclusions were valid or not.

Changes in Permanent Disability Benefits

In Benson v Workman’s Compensation Review Board et al., 170 Cal. 4th 1535, 2009, The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, ruled that separate rating for industrial injuries that become permanent and stationary at the time, according to The Ison Law Group (2008).

The case arose as a result of Diane Benson working as a file clerk for Permanente Medical Group, and having to stand on her feet for almost the entire day, doing repetitive tasks that entails neck and upper extremity movements, and as a result suffered an injury to her neck in 2003, while reaching for a bin containing file cards (Ison Law Group, 2008).

She reported for work the following day, but suffered more excruciating pain than the previous day and had to be taken to the doctor, where she was diagnosed with neck stain and placed on light duties.

One month later Miss Benson was placed on disability, after which she underwent a three level fusion of the spine and never returned to the job (The Ison Law Group, 2008).

Facing financial hardship, Miss Benson put in her claims for Workman’s Compensation, and was medically examined after two years by the agreed an agreed medical examiner(AME), that diagnosed that she had suffered neck strain and cumulative trauma injuries, and apportioned a 62% disability rating, which means that she will be entitled to a combined payment of $185 for 362.25 weeks or $67,016.25.]

The Workers Compensation Judges awarded the package based on the recommendations on the AME, but Permanente Medical Group successfully submitted a petition to the Workman’s Compensation Appeals Board for a review, citing that the law as modified by Senate Bill No. 899 of 2004, required Miss Bensons disability to be rated separately (The Ison Law Group, 2008).

The Board issued an en banc opinion in ruling that Benson should have been rated separately based on the fact that the Wilkinson Doctrine, which California Supreme Court interpreted as meaning that workers should awards based on combined disability, was no longer relevant (The Ison Law Group, 2008).

The impact of this on Miss Bentley financial status is that rather than receiving the original $67, 016.00, she was awarded only $49, 210.00, due to the application of the non-linear benefit schedule in which the number of weeks to be paid reduces with the severity of the injury. (The Ison Law Group, 2008).

The Supreme Court of Californiaupheld the ruling, according to Gordon, Eddlestein, Krespact et al (2010), which will set a precedent for all future Workman’s Compensation safety ruling on the apartment of disabilities, but left an exception in place, buy stating that in some cases injured workers will still be able to secure permanent disability monetary rewards (Gordon, E Eddlestein, Krespact et al, 2010).

Admission of Supplemental and Decision Reversal

The case of State of Wyoming, et al v Wyoming Workers Safety and Compensation Division 2011WY 61 S10 9156, came about, because on January 19, 2001, Mr. Carson of Metrocities Mortgage LLC, was involved in an accident in the Snake River Canyon, between Alpine and Jackson Wyoming, that sent him into a coma for one month, and took the life of one of a passenger (Justia LLC, 2010)

During the time of his coma, his wife submitted a Wyoming Report of his injury to the Workman’s Safety and Compensation Division, indicating that he had experienced a work related injury as a result of the accident, while being employee by Metrocities Mortgage LLC (Justia LLC., 2011).

The submission was denied as it was deemed that Mr. Carson did not meet the definition of injury under Wyoming Workers Compensation Act, because no proof was provided to show that that injury arose out of and in the course of his employment with Metrocities (Justia LLC, 2011)

Mr. Carson’s employerMetrocities Mortgage LLC objected to the final ruling, and requested a contested case before the OAU, but was unaware that during the hospitalization of Mr. Carson, the spouse of the deceased passenger had filed a wrongful death action in the federal district court (Justia LLC., 2011).

The action alleged that Metrocities was vicariously liable for Mr. Carson’s negligence, due to the fact that Mr. Carson was acting within the scope of his employment when the accident happened, and caused Metrocities Mortgage LLC to withdraw its previous objection to the ruling (Justia LLC, 2011).

OAU later denied the request to reverse the decision to deny Mr. Carson benefits, based on the fact that the testimony of a witness; a Mr. Gunderson was judged to have lacked credibility. However, Mr. Carson appealed on the basis of his lack of memory due to the coma, and the availability of a new witness testimony as supplemental.

The courts after consideration, reversed its decision to reopen the case for the claim for benefits, and remanded the district court with instructions to remand the OAU to consider the supplemental record (Justia LLC, 2011)

Mr. Carson was therefore given a second respite before the courts to claim and receive the benefits that was accrued to him, when he was injured on the job.

Exclusive Remedy Defensefor General Contractors, Definition of Contractors, and Workers Compensation benefits for employees of subcontractors

In the Entergy Gulf States Inc. v Summers, 282 SW 3D 433-Tex: Supreme Court 2009 rehearing, the judgment handed down by Justices George Christian et al, first began argument on October 16, 2008, and was denied on April 3, 2009. the court objective was to decide in the Workman’s compensation related case, whether a premises owner that was contracted for the performance of work on its premises, and had provided workers compensation insurance to the contractors employees, pursuant to the contract, is entitled to the benefit of exclusive remedy defense, generally afforded only to employees, by the Texas Workers Compensation Act (Google Scholar, 2011).

Statutory Employment Status is normally conferred on general contractors, who qualify by providing workers compensation insurance for subcontractors employees, according to the terms of Act, according to Google Scholar (2011), but made no provision for the premises owners that act as their own general contractors, with regards to employment status, and the exclusive remedy defense (Google Scholar, 2011).

The defense argued that the exclusive remedy defense for qualifying general contractors is likewise available to premises owners that meets the Act’s definition of general contractors, and has contractually provided workers compensation insurance for the lower level subcontractor’s employees (Google Scholar, 2011).

They inferred that Entergy Gulf States met this definition and qualifies under the Act, by providing workers compensation insurance coverage under written agreement with International Maintenance Corporation (IMC), and conclude that the company was entitled to the exclusive remedy against the negligence brought about by the IMC employee John Summers (Google Scholar, 2011).

Judgment was rendered for Entergy Gulf States, but the circumstances that led to the case came about when Entergy entered into contractual arrangement with IMC to assist in the performance of specific maintenance, repairs, and other technical services at its 436*436 various facilities. Under the contract, Entergy Gulf States was to provide at its own cost, workers compensation insurance for IMVC employees through an Owner Provided Program (OPOP), in exchange for a lower contract price (Google Scholar, 2011).

John Summers, an employee of IMC was injured while working at Entergy Sabine Station Plant, and applied and receive benefits under the Workers Compensation insurance policy purchased by Entergy.

However, he subsequently sued Entergy Gulf States for negligence, and Entergy then moved for summers’ judgment on the grounds that it was a statutory employee immune from common–law torts (Google Scholar, 2011).

The court agreed and granted judgment on Entergy’s behalf, but Summers appealed, and had the judgment reversed. Entergy Gulf States was subsequently granted a petition for review, to examine whether section 406 121(1) of the Workers Compensation Act excludes a premises owner from serving as its own general contractor for the purpose of qualifying for immunity as a statutory employer of contracted employees (Google Scholar, 2011).

The specifics of the Act, according to Google Scholar (2011), declares that a general contractor can qualify for immunity from common law tort, it that contactor first signs an agreement with a subcontractor to provide workers compensation insurance coverage to the subcontractor and his employees.

The general contractor as a result of the agreement becomes a statutory employer of the subcontractor and his employees, for the purpose of Workman’s Compensation Laws, and is entitled to immunity from common tort actions brought against it from the employees of the subcontractor, and exclusive remedy against work related injuries and workers compensation benefits (Google Scholar, 2011).

In making his case, Summers argued that Entergy had failed to establish as a matter of fact that the company and himself executed a written agreement under which it would provide Workman’s Compensation coverage, and that the contract for maintenance, construction,, and general services was between IMC and another Entergy company, namely Entergy Services Inc. as opposed to Entergy Gulf States (Google Scholar, 2011).

Entergy Gulf States countered summers’ major arguments, by providing legal documents to show that it had satisfied that written agreement under the statute, and the Workman’s Compensation coverage was secured with IMC by Entergy and not Entergy Services.

The judges in deciding that Entergy qualifies as a statutory employer and was entitled to exclusive remedy, outlined the indisputable fact that Summers had sought and obtained benefits for his injury from Entergy OPOP, which was the reason why the company secure the insurance coverage, and the only remaining inquiry was whether Entergy qualifies as general contractor or not (Google Scholar, 2011).

They concluded that indeed Entergy Gulf States had qualified, and that was the reason why they were denying the claim from Summers.

General Comments

It seem the court had not considered the old law, the inherent evil, the remedy, and the practical motivation for changes in the legislative amendment of the statutes that could be substantive, in arriving at their decision against Summers (Google Scholar, 2011).

Had they done so they would have been able to conclude that the third party was qualified for benefits relating to the exclusiveindemnity? Despite the details provided in the submission, the law remained unchanged, and future injured workers facing a similar case can expect the same result, which implies that general contractors will always be protected from being sued by the employees of their subcontractors, as long as they qualify as contractors, and have written workman’s compensation insurance coverage contractsin place.

John Summers may have failed in his bid to sue Entergy Gulf States, because of the inflexibility of Supreme Court judges, who when faced with the challenge of making a new decision, after having blurred the inconsistency between its initial decision and that made in the Superior Snubbing case.

Justice Hetch sums it up, according to Google Scholar (2011), when he says that has never been clear when a person is considered the statutory employee of a subcontractor or his employee, and therefore rather that bringing clarity to the issue for future incapacitated workers who will fall under the workman’s compensation axe, they left it Stare Decisis.

Petition for Review – Texas Labor Code 417.004

The Energy Service Company of Bowie Inc. (Petitioner) v. Superior Snubbing Service Inc. (Respondent) No. 05-0202, which was argued on December 1, 2005, came about when Daryll Faulk was injured while working for Superior Snubbing Services Inc., which carried workers compensation insurance and was a subscriber, according to Justia LLC (2011),

He did not sue Superior Snubbing Services Inc. but later, while working at a well with the employees of Mitchell Energy Corporation, Energy Service of Bowie, and others, he sued them instead, according to Justia LLC (2010).

Energy and Superior were contractors for Mitchell but executed no agreement between each other, but did so individually with Mitchell where provisions for indemnity were included.

Energy settled the suit with Faulk but sued Superior for indemnity, saying the contract Superior Snubbing Services had with Mitchell was to ensure they (Superior Snubbing Services, Inc.) protect, defend, indemnify, and hold the employees of Mitchell, agents, partners, invitees,, representatives and contractors harmless from and against all claims, demands, causes of actions, suits or other litigations of every kind, and character from injury to its employees, partners, agents, …which may be incident to and arising out of within the scope of, or in connection with the work to be completed (Justia LLC, 2010).

Superior in response denied that it owed indemnity to Energy in part, or on the basis of Texas Labor code section 417.004, and Entergy had not executed an indemnity agreement with it.

According to Justia LLC, Section 417.004 stipulate that if actions for damages are broughtby an injured employee, a legal beneficiary, or an insurance carrier against a third party liable to pay damage for the injury or deathunder this chapter that resulted in judgment against the third party or a settlement by the third party, the employer is not liable to the third party for reimbursement or damages based on the judgment or settlement, unless the employer executed before the injury or death occurred, a written agreement with the third party, to assume liability (Justia LLC, 2011).

Interpretation of Section 417.004 in layman’s term means the subscribing employers have the freedom to contract outwards their statutory immunity from liability, is protected from economic pressure, can engage in broad indemnity contracting away their immunity as to third parties with whom the employers did not have contractual agreements (Justia, LLC, 2011).

The effect of this interpretation means persons who are not signatories to and or have no direct agreement, are included when subscribers signs indemnity agreements, and this place them into the pre-1989 amendments, where they have no control over whom they may be called upon indemnify; due to the owner or other contractual parties with whom the employers executed the agreements, remain able to contract with anythird party contractor desired (JustiaLLC, 2011).

Energy contended according to Justice Johnson, that if the statute is applied only to direct parties, then the agreement will derogate the Texas Oilfield Indemnity Act (TOIA), and brings confusion and disruptions into the oil and gas industry (Justia LLC, 2011).

Additionally, Justice Johnson continues the main reason for the passage of TOIA was to protect certain contractors who will not be able to effectively protect themselves from being economically pressured into executing broad indemnity contracts in order to get oilfield work (Justia LLC, 2011).

The thrust of TOIA, the legal luminary conceded, is to make certain oilfield indemnification agreements void and unenforceable, to limit the enforceability of other agreements, and to prevent the enforceability of broad oilfield indemnity agreements, according to Justia LLC (2011).

This Act according to Justice Johnson,  only allowed the enforcement of certain specific types of indemnity agreements that are not subjected to its provisions, by excluding them from general operational languages and not specifically addressing the anti-indemnity provisions of workers compensation provisions, but negating them ( Justia LLC, 2011).

Section 127.006 represents the closest TOIA comes to addressing the workman’s compensation anti-indemnity provision, because it stipulate that  TOIA is not intended to affect the validity of an insurance contract or a benefit conferred by the workers compensation statute, Justice  Johnson clarifies (Justia LLC (2011).

In affirming the judgment of the court of appeal, the Justice expressed the view that the court’s construction did not comport with the literal meaning of the statute, diluted the subscribing employer’s immunity from common-law damages claim of injured employees; which is a key concept underlying the workers compensation statutes,  and does not match with one of the main reasons for the revision of the workers compensation, which is the reducing of cost to the subscribing employers (Justia LLC, 2011).

Entergy Service Company of Bowie, Inc. therefore, failed in its bid to reverse the ruling and recover damages from Superior Snubbing Services, Inc, despite settling with Daryll Faulk, who it seems was well advised in suing the former, who did not have the freedom to contract outwards its statutory immunity from liability, be protected from economic pressure, and to engage in broad indemnity contracting away its immunity to third parties with whom it did not have contractual agreements.

The case then is instructive to future workers engaging in working relationships of this nature, who may be inclined after being injured, to sue their immediate employers and not those who are legally responsible for providing the workers compensation coverage and benefits.

In Ryan v. Workman Compensation Appeal Board Community Health Services Community Health Services, argued before Flaherty, J.C, Zappala, Cappe, Castille, Nigro, Newman, J.J. et al between April 28 1997 and February26, 1998, the court addressed two issues, the first of which was whether a claimant who was involved in a work related accident and later suffered  psychological injury which was allegedly triggered by learning that she is being sued  by the driver of the other vehicle involved in the accident, should have her claim analyzed  under psychical/mental or mental/mental burden of proof for the purposes of determining eligibility to receive  a reinstatement of workers compensation benefits (Findlaw, 2011).

Secondly, if such a claim should be analyzed under the physical mental burden of proof, what standard of should be applied in the physical/mental case (Findlaw, 2011).

The Supreme Court judges ruled that because the claimant psychological injury should have been applied under the mental/mental burden of proof, and since the same claimant failed to submit evidence that abnormal working condition caused her psychological injury, they were reversing the order of the commonwealth court, and reinstating the claimant’s workers compensation benefits (Findlaw, 2011).

The case came up as a result of Mary Ryan a nurse employed to Community Health Services, being involved in a work related automobile accident, in which she suffered a fracture to her right patella, a bruised arm, and a chest injury (Findlaw, 2011).

She became a recipient of the Workman’s Compensation benefits as a result of the work related accident with a weekly payment of $419 pursuant to a Notice of Compensation Payable, executed on May 1, 1990.

The Notice of Compensation made reference only to   Ryan’s physical injuries, and on April 30, 1990, she returned to work in the same pre injury position as a visiting nurse.

Ryan received her final compensation benefit on May 4, 1990, but in the summer of 1991, began experiencing depression , when she learnt that the driver of the other vehicle involved in the accident had filed suit against her as a result of suffering from severe head injuries (Findlaw, 2011)).

Ryan sought psychological treatment after complaining of suffering form nightmares about the work related accident, and suffered two mishaps on February 3, and March 1 of 1992, when she was caught drinking on the job and had t take a leave of absence, and was hospitalized for 13 days for an overdose of anti-depressant pills, respectively (Findlaw, 2011).

On October 23, 1992, Ryan filed, (a) a petition to amend her Notice of Compensation Payable, so that it could reflect she had also suffered work related mental disability as a result of the injury of February1990, and (b), a petition seeking reinstatement of her Workman’s Compensation benefits as of February 23, 1992, he day she took leave of absence (Findlaw, 2011).

Unfortunately, according to Findlaw, (2010), both Ryan’s petitions were denied on November 12, 1992, and the case assigned to a Workman’s Compensation judge.

The Claimant returned to work on February 2, 1993, in the same position, and filed a penalty petition because the appellants had contested the two petitions, and refused to reinstate her workers compensation benefits (Findlaw, 2011).

At the hearing Ryan testified about her work related accident and the mental injuries suffered as a result, and brought in two experts medical doctors to reinforce her medical condition. The first of the two medical experts reported that she had disthymic disorder, suffered from alcohol abuse, and personality disorder, while the second told the court that Ryan became upset when she learn that she was being sued, and experienced post traumatic disorder (Findlaw, 2011).

The Appellant also presented a medical expert who had examined Ryan to testify, and he told the court that she had a history of alcohol abuse, was alcohol dependent andthat he saw no evidence of any psychiatric disability that connects with the claimant work related accident (Findlaw, 2011).

Medical Experts testifying on behalf of the petitioner were found credible by the Workman Compensation Judge, while that of the Appellant were rejected, as the claimants request to amend the Notice of Compensation Payable to reflect that the  claimant  sustained psychological injury in the nature of depression from the February 27, 1990 work related automobile accident (Findlaw, 2011).

In addition, the WCJ mentioned (a) that the claimant had suffered another depression during the period she was off the job, and (b), that he had rejected the penalty petitions  because the contest submission by the appellant were deemed reasonable according to Findlaw (2011).

The judgment of the WCJ according to Findlaw (2011), was appealed by Community Health Services and the decision reversed, only for the scenario to be repeated to make the claimant having judgment, when the case was sent to the Supreme Court to review the record and findings of the WCJ, regarding the work related accident being triggered by the claimants psychological problems.

The Supreme Court found no evidence tom substantiate the claim, and opined that the Commonwealth Court and the WCJ erred as a matter of law in concluding that the evidence presented demonstrated the existence of physical/mental injury, for the purpose of reinstatement of workers compensation benefits ( Findlaw, 2011).

Further to the previous remark, the Supreme Court Judges emphatically rejected the concept of one learning of the filing of a lawsuit being used as the reason for the mental injury received, and advised that it was a psychological stimulus that affected claimant on learning that she was being sued as a result of the accident, and not a physical stimulus (Findlaw, 2011).

The claimant injury the Supreme Justices opined should have been classified as mental/ for the purpose of determining the eligibility for Notice of Compensation benefits Payable reinstatement. The evidence was then examined by the justices using the new classification and led them to conclude that the claimant failed to prove that her psychological injury was the product of her work related accident, based on the ruling on a similar case Hepp v Workman’s Compensation Review Board (BP

Oil Company) 67 Pa Commw. 330 447A.2d 337 (1982) Acute psychiatric episode occurring in employee’s home following receipt of notice of discharge for fighting at work, was not a work related disability) and several others (Findlaw, 2011).

Critically, the Supreme Court justices warned that in terms of determining compensability, judges must be vigilant in distinguishing those cases which may seem to be mental injuries brought on by mental stimuli, but are actually mental injuries caused by physical traumas (Findlaw, 2011).

The case was a challenging one base on the number of reversal of decisions, and the using of the wrong premise to initially reinstate the claimant’s workman’s compensation benefits, but this may be due to the expert medical evidence the petitioner brought to the court. The claimant was unable to present evidence that showed that her psychological injuries were as a result of the work related automobile accident, and as a result lost the petition.

The judges in the name of justice and fairness informed both parties that the claim should have been analyzed, and used the recommended classification to make their final decision, thereby educating the lawyers on both sides, and set a standard for future cases.

Finally, the petitioners financial situation may have been the driving force behind the case, and not good logics, because she had at least three opportunities to convincingly make a case before the judges, but was unable to provide the evidence required to get her workman’s  compensation benefits reinstated.

The final case, is the case No.96-102  Catherine E. Saterlee (Petitioner and Appellant) v Lumberman’s Mutual Casualty Company (Respondent and Insurer for Buttrey Food and Drug -Employer) which was submitted in brief on September 12, 1996, and decided on December10, 1996, and came about as a result of Catherine E. Saterlee filing a petition in the Workman’s Compensation Court for the State of Montana, after she was allegedly totally disabled during the course of her employment at Buttrey Food and Drug’s Anaconda  store location, and the company insurer Lumberman Mutual Casualty Company terminating her disability benefits Montana Department of Labor and Industry, 1996).

Saterlee in her appeal questioned whether the findings of the Workers Compensation Court was supported by substantially credible evidence, and if they did not err when they decided that Saterlee request for an award of attorney fee and the imposition of 20% penalty in addition to her disability benefits (Montana Department of Labor and Industry, 1996).

The petitioner had worked with Buttrey Food and Drugs  for fifteen years, before she developed the work related degenerative arthritis in her cervical spine, but experienced no symptoms or disability from the condition. Saterlee job stacking shelves, dusting and cleaning floors, and checking out customer were accomplished without any physical limitations (Montana Department of Labor and Industry, 1996).

The record showed that Saterlee had lost her son in an automobile accident in May 1990, and as a result she missed several months of work suffering for severe depression, which was later diagnosed as post traumatic stress disorder. The petitioner however, returned to work after the episode without any further loss of time until the injury now before the court occurred (Montana Department of Labor and Industry, 1996).

The injury occurred on July 25, 1992, when Saterlee was waiting on a customer and bent over to reposition a 45pound bag of dog food, so that she could read the label. She experienced a puling sensation in her left should, followed by pain which travelled from her neck down to her left arm. Saterlee was later able to testify credibly before the Workers Compensation Court, about the pain she has experience from that time and ever since (Montana Department of Labor and Industry, 1996).

The Petitioner tried to return to work on two consecutive days, but could no longer perform those same duties, and was assigned different task while undergoing several medical examinations and treatment by several physicians, who diagnosed her as having (a) left trapezius strain, (b) neck strain, (c) degenerative disc disease, and (d), degenerative arthritis of the cervical spine (Montana Department of Labor and Industry, 1996).

Treatment and therapy for her cervical and shoulder pain, according to the Montana Department of Labor and Industry (1996), were unsuccessful, as her condition worsened with constant pain that caused her to become unable to fulfill her household chores.

Lumbermen’s Mutual Casualty Company terminated Saterlee disability benefits when a report from the medical doctor Alvin J. Harris were received, with the doctor forecasting that the soft injury the patient suffered should heal in six months, and any continuing disability, would be from some other pre-existing spinal disease.

Saterlee dilemma continued when multiple family bereavements and terminal diagnosis caused her condition to worsen, and for her to be diagnosed with major depression and post traumatic stress disorder according to the Montana Department of Labor and Industry (1996).

The Social Security Administration found Saterlee vocally disabled when she applied for benefits in December, 1993, and attributed this to both back pain and severe emotional trauma (Montana Department of Labor and Industry, 1996).

This did not prevent Lumbermen’s exposition in court, because they inferred that based on the medical report they received, the petitioner had recovered from any soft tissue injury, and the pain she was experiencing was from a pre-existing injury. They also pointed out that Saterlee being disabled from gainful employment through physical impairment was not the driving force behind the case, but the external emotional disorder which developed subsequent to her work related injuries; and as such it is not responsible for any disability from the disorder (Montana Department of Labor and Industry, 1996).

Saterlee initially and at the appeal, repeatedly stresses that she was free from pain prior to the injury, but was unable to function due to pain since the injury, and the evidence does not support any other findings, other than she is totally disabled due to a work related injury.

The Workman’s Compensation Court did not fully accept the testimony of both parties and made its 11 findings know in a report. The first and ten were critical to the outcome of Saterlee case. In the first findings, the petitioner was found to be a credible witness, and in the second they stated that Saterlee at the time of the trial did not cope with the pain and returned to work Montana Department of Labor and Industry, 1996).

They went further to say that they were not persuaded that absent the psychological trauma associated with the death of  her daughter and other relatives, the pain would preclude her from physically performing the either of the medically approved jobs, and therefore had valid medical and psychological reasons for her inability to cope with the pain, and these reasons were attributable to subsequent unrelated events and not her industrial injury (Montana Department of Labor and Industry, 1996).

In response to issue No.1, the court ruled that it will uphold the Workman’s Compensation Court’s fin, if they are supported by credible evidence according to Wunderlich v. Lumbermen’s Mutual Casualty Company (1975), 892 P 2d 563, 566.

The court chose to reverse part of the Workman’s Compensation Court’s judgment, which denied disability benefits to the petitioner, because there was substantial evidence upon which the court found that the insurer did not act unreasonable, when it terminated the benefits (Montana Department of Labor and Industry, 1996).

However, they opined, it was unreasonable for the insurer to use the medical correspondence of Alvin J. Harris MD in February as the basis of the decision.

Finally they denied Saterlee request for attorney fees and 20% penalty points, and remanded the case to the Workman’s Compensation Court for judgment based on the opinions given (Montana Department of Labor and Industry. 1996).

Conclusions

The petitioner had mixed results at the end of the case, in terms of having her Workman’s Compensation benefits restored, and the claims for psychological injuries denied. Establishing connections between work-related injuries and psychological injuries seems a difficult proposition not only for Saterlee, but Ryan, and Carson as well.

The medical community seems motivated by money in these cases, and the burden of proof is always on the part of the petitioner in situations where the sciences are inexact, and the occurrence of external events, are often disassociated from work-related injuries.

Petitioners are also at a disadvantage to secure the services of high quality lawyers and medical expertise in proving their cases, especially due to the fact that many not even are working during the time their cases are being tried.

The apportionment laws seems to benefit employers rather than employees, as in the case of Benson where the permanent disability benefits are divided between different causes within the same individual, and caused  significant reductions in payments.

Excellent legal counsel is a major prerequisite in dealing with safety issues in Workman’s Compensation cases, as the Summers case had  shown, in that the General Contractor and not the sub-contractor was the entity who had no exclusive remedy protection against the employees of the subcontractor, is the one to be sued for work related injuries.

The difficulty of the employees with the Workman’s Compensation Board and its team of expertsmay be summed up by borrowing part of Ethan of Massachusetts quote; do not get injured on the job and have emotional problems otherwise, because the case may be lost in terms of disability and other benefits, before it has even been tried.

Reference

Sered, S.S., Fernandopulle, R.., (2005). Uninsured In America University of California Press, Berkley CA p.86-106 Print

The Ison Law Group (2008). Benson v Workers Compensation Appeal Board (2009) www.theisonlawgroup.com/news104.html , 07/15/11 Web

Gordon, Eddlestein, Krespact, et al (2010). California Supreme Court Upholds Workers Compensation Apportionment Ruling But Allows for Important Exception www.geklaw.com/news-082009.htm, 07/15/11 Web

Justia LLC (2011). State of Wyoming, et al v Wyoming Workers Safety and Compensation Division 2011WY 61 S10 9156, www.justia.com/cases/wyoming/supreme-court/2011/461956.html, 07/15/11 Web

Google Scholar (2011). Entergy Gulf States Inc. v Summers, 282 SW 3D433-Tex: Supreme Court 2009 www.google.com/scholar_case?case=10000415595350368978&hl…, 07/16/11 Web

Justia LLC (2011) Energy Service Company of Bowie Inc. (Petitioner) v. Superior Snubbing Service Inc. (Respondent) No. 05-0202  www.justiallc.com/cases/texas/supreme-court/2007/2000/010.html, 07/17/11 Web

Findlaw, (2011). Ryan v. Workman Compensation Appeal Board Community Health Services Community Health services,   www.findlaw.com/pa-supreme-court/1456495.html , 07/17/11 Web

Montana Department of Labor Industry (1996). No.96-102  Catherine E. Saterlee (Petitioner and Appellant) v Lumberman’s Mutual Casualty Company (Respondent and Insurer for Buttrey Food and Drug -Employer) www.dli.mt.gov/cases/96-102.htm , 07/19/11 Web