Legitimacy at the Input Stage of Policy Making, Essay Example

Does engagement with interest groups allow the EU institutions to gain more legitimacy at the input stage of policy making?

The European Union operates through a variety of different methods, with different patterns of institutional practice, which change over time. These have evolved organically, and continue to evolve in reaction to both internal and external influences, both procedural and functional (Eising, and Lehringer 184). In this essay we begin by looking at the European Union (EU), how it operates, its decision-making and policy making process. Then we identify the interest organizations operating at the EU level, and the relationship between these interests groups and the EU. Also we look at lobbying directed at EU decision makers, the role and goals of interest groups in EU policy and decision outcomes. Finally, we determine if and how interest groups impact policy-making in the EU.

Decision-making process in the European Union

Political institutions such as the EU form a political opportunity structure that influences the formation and behaviour of interest groups. The EU’s institutional setting, which is its dynamic political agenda, complexity, multilevel character, and reliance on consensus, shapes the interest group system and interest mediation within the EU. European institutions increasingly regulate interest group behaviour even though there are still significant variations among and within institutions in the handling of interest representation.

Decision-making in the European Union is complex. This complexity derives from the vertical and horizontal separation of powers  (Warleigh, and Drachenberg 204).There are five classifications of strategycreation that stylethe judgement of the European Union; policy management; allotment method; the method of Community; strong transgovernmentalism; supervisory model of the EU(Wallace 98).

The Community method began as a two-way separation of powers between the Commission and the Council, and with unanimous voting required in the Council. This method adapted to introduce qualified majority voting, what has become a powerful legislative role for the European Parliament (Warleigh, and Drachenberg 209).

The leading agenda setter where the Commission has the right of inventiveness is in the normal legislative process. In the open technique, organization takes place in parts that fall in the ability of the affiliate states such as education, employment, and social protection among others.  The open technique was an EU negotiation which permitted EU participation in strategy areas over which affiliate states did not want to lose regulation. This is a fairly new policy device, therefore, challenging to measure.

The policy-making process depicted as a policy cycle. The policy cycle originates with an issue on the political agenda raised as an issue of concern. This follows a decision to address the issue, and proposals for action formulated. Finally decide on what sequence of action to pursue, and take up a policy decision. The policy must then be implemented. “The main actors in the policy process of liberal democracies are politicians, bureaucrats, and interest groups” (Hix, and Hoyland 200). Interest groups seek to promote policies and to influence politicians’ and bureaucrats’ decisions and often play a role in implementing policy.

Interest organizations operating at the EU level

There is a huge number and diverse interest societiesfunctioning at the EU level. Not only interest organizations but also nationwide associations, think tanks, specialized consultancies, law firms, and organizations representing local, regional, and municipal authorities are active in representing the respective interests (Kluver 120).Interest societies in the EU are associations of nationwide interest groups, direct membership of other organizations (like firms), or a blend of these two elements. Nationwide groups include individuals, firms, or non-profit organizations. Business interest societies make up the largest share of interest societies in the EU. They are quick to respond to European incorporation. Non-business interest groups include those pursued by religious, social, human rights, consumer, and environmental assemblies. They typically gain recognition under the umbrella level of non-governmental organizations or civil society organizations.

Interest societies utilize a lot ofresources to observing EU progresses since it is difficult to predict the growth of the EU’s political outline. Initially these groups consisted mostly of economic groups, but this has increased especially since the formation of European interest groups which attracted competing interests from more groups established. Though the EU gives interest groups several points of entree, it also awards interest groups avital say in the European policy process. This is because of its disposition towards consensual decision-making.

The EU has important effects on interest organizations. They not only form an opportunity structure within which interest groups can pursue their interests, but they also set up committees and bodies to consult regularly with groups. They delegate policy making and implementation powers to such committees and bodies. They support a variety of interest groups by providing finance, organizational help, and privileged access (Warleigh, and Drachenberg 201). They can pursue their own policy preferences in alliances with groups that are supportive of their case. As Olson outlined, interest organizations also benefit those citizens who are not members of an interest group. For example, if an interest group succeeds in shaping the policy making in their favour, each one profits of their achievement, and not just the group members.

Lobbying at EU decision makers

Lobbying directed at EU decision makers increased extensively since the beginning of the single market program in the 1980’s. The number of interest groups seeking to influence the EU policy process has increased dramatically. There has been a major alteration in lobbying resources by large firms away from the national level actors such as the Commission. Firms tend to use public affairs consultants to provide specialist information and monitoring services as a supplement to, rather than a substitute for, direct approaches to the EU institution. Business interests and the owners of capital have powerful represented in the EU policy process. Regulation at the European level provides a strong incentive for firms to spend valuable resources to ensure that policy outcomes do not harm their interests. Individual firms use multiple channels and diversify their public affairs expenditure, making their lobbying strategies more sophisticated (Young 54).

Interest groups lobby the political process in the EU. This is mainly done by individual firms, national and European associations that represent business interests. However, due to the new EU policy competences, public interests, social movements and national government bodies are fighting back.

EU institutions respond differently to lobbying activities and interest groups’ preferences.  In lobbying, the institution depends on its relative role in the EU policy-making process. However, the EU commits to ensuring the contribution of interest groups in the policy procedure as a principle of good governance. However, in 2001 the “Transparency register” had been installed to overlook the lobbying activities in both the European Parliament and the Commission. This register was set up because corrupt and illegal consultation over policymaking processes was taking place. From that point on, all lobbyists who decided to register, as it was not compulsory, were required to announce their clients and their salary. Transparency was highlighted and the EU raised its profile.

The Institutions of the European Union don’tmake policy in a vacuum, and links that they have with civil society take many different formulas. Interest societies have main significant roles to play in linking European-level organizations with the nations of the European Union, in addition to mediating between them. Frequently they socialize their members into democratic politics, to give voice to citizens between elections, to participate in constructing a general will out of the concerns of groups and serve as ‘schools for democracy’. No distinctinterest society delights in a strong monopoly of depiction in any one strategy area.

Copiato

Interest groups in the European Union are not a consistent unitary actor. Differences among EU and nationwide groups and between business and non-business interests have implications for the EU policy method. There is an imbalance in interest depictionamid business and non-business assemblies. To address this, the Parliament and the Commission promote the establishment of spread out interest groups. They offer them financial support and enhance their standing in the policy process (Kluver 28).

The EU institutions dynamicallyendorse the formation of European-level groups. They make available funds for weak diffuse interests and back those involved in implementing European policy.

The goal of interests groups is to achieve policy outcomes close to their interests. While the goal for the EU governmental actor is to increase power and influence in the EU decision making process. Structure of opportunities in the EU change; hence require the strategies of actors to evolve to conform to each structure that varies in each policy sector. Once there are incentives to mobilize at the European level, the rules of the game of EU policy making provide plenty of opportunities for private or public interests to influence EU policies.

At a domestic level, interest groups have to focus their efforts on the pre-legislative stage of policy-making. At the EU level, interest groups are able to influence the direction of policy at any point in the legislative process, from pre-legislative preparation through amendment during legislative adoption, to post-adoption implementation and judicial adjudication (Copenhagen Business School 10). The primary motivation to supply interest-group access to the policy making process by the Commission and the European Parliament are for these actors to increase their influence in the EU legislative process.

Interest group’s impact in the European Union policy-making

Looking at individual interest group characteristics alone, neglects the fact that decision-makers challenged with a number of interest groups, concurrently attempt to impact political decisions. Interest groups that offer a lot of citizen backing and market control do not spontaneously have a high chance to influence policy design. They have to come up with a lobbying coalition with other influential interest groups. These groups must offer a lot of citizen support and market power to the European Commission comparative to opposite lobbying coalition. Hence, same interest group can have a significant chance to impact policy-making on one subject, whereas its chances are low on another issue. This depends on the collective characteristics of its issue-specific lobbying coalitions.

Further research needs to take into consideration the issue-specific alignment of interest groups into lobbying coalitions when examining the impact of interest group force on policy-making. EU institutions have diverse tasks in the legislative process. They need information from interest groups to be able to perform their tasks successfully to create suitable legislation. Moreover, interest groups’ contribution in this legislative process connects to help grow input and output legitimacy and decrease the democratic discrepancy gap.

Different kinds of interest groups, national associations, European associations, and individual firms can cater differently to the requirements of these institutions. This determines their best points of admission during the legislative procedure, and how successful they might be influencing this process (Hix, and Hoyland 180). Each interest group and lobbying case differs. The theory may not relate to all cases.

Characteristics that determine the capability of interest groups to exercise influence include; the setting up of policy-relevant material to European institutions; the amount of citizens embodied by interest groups; and the degree of economic power.

Case Study: The Erika Case

Built in 1975, the Erika was the last tanker contracted by the Total-Fina-Elf company. In 1999, the tanker sank off the coast of France leading to a huge environmental calamity. It is estimated that the amount of oil that was spilt was between 7,000 and 10,000 tons (Eising, and Lehringer 184).

The Erika case lobbies planned legislation to intensify maritime safety rising from the accident of the tanker Erika. This case acts with the Oil Companies International Maritime Forum (OCIMF).

OCIMF’s lobbying aimed at proposing quick phasing out of single hull tankers and creating a European reimbursement fund which complements a similar existing American fund. The former proposal may lead to potential scarcity of ships for hire, while the latter will increase costs to the oil industry. However there is conflict between the influencers of the policies and these are the private actors, public actors, and interest groups that focus on political intentions of decision makers. The degree of conflict amongst OCIMF and involved decision makers was high.

OCIMF interests represented political queries. In the first proposal, the industry is likely to face a financial predicament if the phasing out of the single hull tankers by 2015 was a success.  This is because it will be impossible for the industry to increase double hull tankers that would phase out the single hull tankers and at the same time sustain the oil transportation.

The second proposal focused on the planned Fund for the Compensation of the Oil Pollution Damage in European Waters COPE. The European Commission targeted at raising the amount of resources in the fund and also to create a European fund. The oil industry called for liability of ship owners too where they contributed to a share of the fund (Wallace 98).

In the end, the European’s Commission legislation to raise the accountability of ship owners was revised in favour of OCIMF’s arguments. The creation of a European fund was put to an end. However, the international existing fund was increased. The decision to eliminate single hull tankers was left to the decision of the International Maritime Organization (IMO). This resulted to an international regulation, which was implemented at the European level in the Erika I package. The OCIMF acted as influential corporate interest group.

Conclusion

EU associations concentrate on representing their interests rather than providing services to their members. European interest groups are more visible at the EU level than national associations, and they have become important intermediaries between their national members and the EU institutions (Eising, and Lehringer 203). However, national associations are more vocal when EU policies have transposed into domestic law or implemented by the national public administration.

There is a perceived risk that the EU institutions use the diffuse interest groups for window dressing in social policy. That interest organizations become highly dependent on the EU institutions thus influencing the organizations’ political positions and activities. While they are still important contributors to EU policy making, they are increasingly also regarded as representatives of civil society in the EU. However, there is a potential bias built into the system of EU interest representation. Majority groups represent business interest as opposing to diffuse social interests.

Social partners have extensive rights, such as the right to formulate and/or implement European policies themselves. They are co-legislators in EU social policy.

Business interest organizations still outnumber non-business interests to a significant extent. In representation, there is a clear bias in favour of business interests (Copenhagen Business School 21).

In conclusion, there is fairly optimistic depiction of interest group participation in European policy-making. The optimistic effect of citizen support and economic power indicates that interest group contribution also enhances the input legitimacy of the EU.