Locke’s Theory of Revolution, Essay Example

Introduction

It is one thing for an eminent philosopher to argue that revolution is a correct response to unjust authority, as John Locke does in his Second Treatise of Government.  It is another, however, to translate such a principle into action because, except in cases where the public is as one in a unified sense that revolution is necessary, innumerable circumstances may be present which defy the inherent simplicity of the belief.  On one level, Locke’s elegant logic reinforces valid resistance, as it influenced the American conviction to deny British authority and rebel from that established rule.  On another, what is unjust may often be a matter of perception, not fact, and the rebellion of an individual may well oppose the interests of the majority.  Furthermore, there remains the critical component of what form revolution may take, as Locke does not directly advocate violence.  On the contrary, violent rebellion is removed from his concept of revolution.  These elements known, then, it becomes clear that certain “revolutionary” acts, such as the McVeigh bombing in Oklahoma City, grossly transcend Locke’s principles.  Locke’s Theory of Revolution is in fact corrupted when its basic tenets are expanded to justify debatable ambitions within a discontented few, or a rebellious individual.

Discussion

To fully understand why Locke’s Theory is actually inapplicable to militia movements or the lone acts of individuals resisting through violence a government perceived by them as unjust, it is necessary to comprehend the foundation of the ideology.  For Locke, the most crucial element in the establishment of any government or political authority is a force seemingly external to that authority: the consent of the individual.  In the state of nature, all are equal and this then translates to consent as the sole, legitimate means by which the inherent inequality of government may be correct (Locke 52).  Put another way, any form of rule is intrinsically a violation of the natural order, for this type of entity does not exist in nature.  When government arises, then, and in forms ranging from the monarchy to the republican state, it may only be valid when the people conform to it, or directly accept it.  Interestingly, Locke describes a mandate of popular rule as fundamental to any authority whatsoever; it is the popular consent that empowers the government always, and no government may justly exist without it.  The corollary is that it is the lack of consent which demands revolution or overthrow, when the people believe that their government no longer serves their interests.

All of this is both compelling and attractive, as it also offers an undeniable logic.  It is then only reasonable that the people of a nation perceiving that some form of injustice is being practiced would, as a population or majority, turn to Locke’s Theory as a perfectly ethical grounds for revolution, as occurred in the Revolutionary War.  That most evident example of Locke’s philosophy, however, also serves to underscore serious issues in how the thinking may be corrupted for individual ends, or to justify the demands of a select and aggrieved few.  To begin with, and is well known, there was intense conflict in the United States regarding the drastic measure of revolution, just as forces in England desperately urged compromise with the colonies to avoid such a schism. It seems likely that this conflict on America’s part, moreover, was not entirely generated by a distaste for the idea of overthrowing British rule; that is to say, colonials unhappy with English authority probably held to the more pragmatic view that, as revolution is an inherently traumatic process, finding a means to cooperate and compromise is preferable.  This then indicates how popular consent is not necessarily a matter of extremes, as in being completely given or completely withheld.  The nature of any government, in fact, is complex, and it is reasonable to assume that in most there are elements both favorable to, and disliked by, the people. More to the point, it illustrates how very drastic revolution is, if it is ethically conducted at all, because the rule must then be overwhelmingly offensive to the people.

Following this line of reasoning then reveals the importance of consent, or the lack thereof, as being a truly popular element in terms of population size and majority feeling.  The logic here is in fact as strong as Locke’s, as it must be reiterated that government is, as en extension of the people, proportionate to it.  Governmental complexity occurs when societies are large, just as it is usually such complexity that is perceived as generating injustice.  If there are historical instances of small populations overthrowing rule composed of one or a few individuals, they are certainly rare, and revolution itself connotes significant size and impact.  It is inevitable that in any society there will be those unhappy with, or even greatly angered by, perceived tyranny or injustice.  When such perceptions are valid, the society may take on the belief and make efforts to redress the wrongs; when they are invalid, they represent a very real threat to the people themselves, for they are in effect isolated views seeking to exploit a principle that must be more universally applied.  This is by no means to suggest that the discontent of the few should be ignored or neglected.

Nonetheless, when the leap is made wherein the few determine what must be a majority consensus, revolution is not the result. It is in fact terrorism, simply because the needs of the majority, as well as its crucial consent, are not considered.  In plain terms, the consent of the people must be the consent of most of the people, as is the case with discontent. The situation of Tim McVeigh perfectly illustrates the irrationality of the individual or few taking on the mantle of revolutionary.  In a very real sense, McVeigh’s grievances against the U.S. government were legitimate, or at least arguably valid.  The Waco Siege he so fiercely objected to was transparently a case of excess governmental force in play, and with fatal – and likely unjust – results.  McVeigh was and is not alone in believing that the government had become irretrievably tyrannical, and the view is held by many not involved in militia movements.  Moreover, he was within his rights to vehemently protest this and other perceived transgressions. The bombing of the federal building, however, was in no sense a valid, revolutionary response, as is true of any such isolated case of extreme violence committed by an individual or small assembly, because it was a covert action conducted without the support of the people in general.  It may be true that injustice typically needs to be pointed out to people before it is recognized as such, but this is a far cry from taking action so severe, hundreds of lives are lost. In this act of terrorism, McVeigh did not defy the U.S. government any more than he defied the will of the majority of the people, and it must be restated that the nature of revolution demands popular consent, just as governmental authority requires it.

Another important element goes to distancing the actions of individuals like McVeigh and militia movements from Locke’s Theory: violence.  Very simply, Locke in no way affirms that revolution is inherently violent or reliant upon brutal overthrow. Even in discussing the extreme example of a tyrannical king, Locke cautions that such injustice must be confined to resistance, and the people’s right to defend themselves from it; on no account may the severity of a cruel government be permitted to excuse revenge, which implies revolution so violent, the oppressors are destroyed (118).  It is reasonable to suppose that Locke understands how revolution must often take physical forms, as it is unlikely that a tyrannical regime will willingly step down.  When significant nations are involved, in fact, warfare is the most probable form revolution will take, given the extremes of authority and public resistance to it entailed.  Nonetheless, this is not equivalent to an advocation of violence, and militia movements most frequently rely on such to demonstrate their purported revolutionary zeal.

Expanding on how Locke’s Theory contradicts militia movements and the like also allows for an interesting perception regarding that propensity for violence.  Individuals like McVeigh typically assert that only such extremes are effective in countering tyranny, for the tyranny is so embedded in the society, no other means of defying it is possible save the “revolutionary” violence.  The argument is inherently specious, however, and on more than one level.  The “revolution” that involves the death of parties not complicit in the perceived tyranny is, first and foremost, as ethically unsound as may be imagined, and certainly at least as brutal as any regime desired to be overthrown.  Then, there exists the pivotal point of popular consent, which the violence of extremists completely ignores.  In plain terms, to insist that the people are misled by their government and ignorant of its actual, tyrannical policies does not actually address consent.  That is, even if the extremist is convinced that great wrongs are perpetrated without public awareness, the consent remains in place until the people choose to withdraw it.  It is an uncomfortable reality, certainly, but there still may be no justification for revolutionary violence based on the idea that the people would support it if the truth were known to them.  Consent, in simple terms, remains the determining factor, no matter the perceived integrity of it.

Conclusion

In his Theory of Revolution, John Locke provides a compelling and simple rationale: only the consent of the people may validate authority of rule, and of any kind, just as the lack of consent then justifies revolution.  This profound and deceptively simple reasoning has been called into play historically, most notably in the American Revolutionary War.  At the same time, that quality of simplicity is easily inverted or corrupted, and isolated individuals like Tim McVeigh deems themselves revolutionaries when they are in fact terrorists.  The true definition derives from their inevitable employment of covert and extreme violence, and equally so from their neglect of a core principle of Locke’s valid revolution, in that the public as a whole or majority must be the agent defying the unjust government.  The lack of consent from the few, in plain terms, may not be permitted to eclipse the consent of the many, no matter how that majority is viewed as misled or ignorant.  Consequently, John Locke’s Theory of Revolution is in fact grossly corrupted when its basic tenets are expanded to justify debatable agendas within a discontented few, or a rebellious individual.

Works Cited

Locke, J.  Second Treatise of Government. Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing, 1980.  Print.