Luck Egalitarianism, Essay Example

One of the overarching questions for philosophers is the matter of what constitutes “justice.” Simply attempting to define or quantify the concept of justice in the most ephemeral terms can be challenging (or impossible), and this task only gets more difficult when it is considered in the context of real-world systems of government and social structures. For justice to have any real meaning, it must be viewed through the lens of the society in which it is being assessed. Justice exists at the intersection of the ethical, moral, legal, political, and cultural standards of a given society, and what constitutes justice in one society may not be seen similarly in another (Lamont & Favor, 1996, n.p.). In contemporary considerations of justice, political philosophers have posited the concept of “luck egalitarianism,” a framework in which those members of society who are worse off than others are subject to a redistribution of resources or the alteration of social conditions such that their circumstances can be made more fair and equitable in relation to those members of society who are more well off. Within this larger framework of luck egalitarianism are a number of subsets or branches, each of which holds different views on why and how resources or conditions should be redistributed or altered, though the basic premise that society should meet the needs of the less fortunate through some system of redistribution remains the same. Upon cursory examination luck egalitarianism has a certain immediacy that makes it appealing or even attractive, though a more thorough exploration of this philosophical construct reveals it to be flawed not just to the point of impracticality, but to the point of complete impossibility.

While the term “luck egalitarianism” has taken hold as an appellation for a number of notable philosophers, it is worth noting that the term was actually coined by Elizabeth Anderson, herself a staunch opponent of this philosophical construct and a critic of philosophers such as Ronald Dworkin (who rejects the label while largely embracing the political philosophy), John  Rawls (whose work underpins some of the key tenets of luck egalitarianism), and Richard Arneson (who, unlike Dworkin, embraces and defends both the label and the philosophy of luck egalitarianism).  It was Rawls who first proposed a political philosophy that fell somewhere between utilitarianism and what he called “intuitionism” (Kymlicka 2002, p.54) and it was his positions that spurred the work of subsequent luck egalitarians.  While each of these philosophers –among others- offers strong arguments in favor of their various positions, it is Anderson’s dissection of luck egalitarianism that reveals it to be an unworkable political philosophy.

In its simplest sense, luck egalitarianism holds that those who “suffer from simple bad luck” (Arneson 2004, p.1) should not have to face unfair conditions solely because of their undeserved or unearned misfortune. While even a supporter of luck egalitarianism like Arneson acknowledges the diversity of positions and viewpoints that all fall under the umbrella of the luck egalitarianism umbrella, Arneson counters critics like Anderson by arguing that her complaints about the philosophical framework are largely overblown or inaccurate (Arneson 2004). As Arneson describes it, there are two “substantially independent components” (2004, p.2) of luck egalitarianisms. One such component holds that society ought to be constructed such that all members have the same conditions available to them; the second component holds that individuals should act to maximize moral value to all members of society.

Luck egalitarians argue that the resources of society should be distributed fairly and equally, even though this means that some members of society will rightly have to relinquish some resources (or access to resources) so that those who do not have such resources will now have them. Among the underlying premises of such views on redistribution is that a distinctions must be made between the conditions that are earned and those that are unearned. Unearned conditions, for example, might include being born into poverty or wealth, or being born (or later afflicted) with a disability or being born with natural athletic or intellectual advantages (Arneson, 1999, p.225). Earned resources, by contrast, are those that are acquired or gained after the playing field has been leveled. For example, if all members of a society are granted equal resources, some will take advantage of those resources, while others will squander them. Luck egalitarians acknowledge this, though they assert that equal access to resources through redistribution will still improve conditions for those who are hampered by misfortune through no fault of their own (Lippert-Rasmussen, 2005, n.p.).

When considering such redistribution in the context of maximizing the moral benefits thereof, a distinction is drawn between those who are badly off in life because of unearned circumstances and those who are badly off because they squandered whatever good fortune they were granted through unearned means. According to Arneson (2004), such a framework takes into consideration the issue of individual responsibility, and makes it necessary to weigh the impact of individual choices on the ways in which resources will be redistributed or allocated. Arneson describes this as “the control principle,” asserting that “one is not (properly held) responsible for what lies beyond one’s power to control” (2004, p.3). Such distinctions about the ways in which assessments are made about who is and is not responsible for their own circumstances, and questions of  how resources are allocated according to the moral weight of redistribution begin to reveal the complexities inherent in even the least thorough exposition of luck egalitarianism.

In her essay “What is the Point of Equality, “Anderson (1999) largely eviscerates the philosophical framework of luck egalitarianism by revealing both its practical and conceptual shortcomings. Like Arneson, Anderson too notes that the umbrella term “luck egalitarianism” holds beneath it a variety of viewpoints and conceptual models; unlike Arneson, Anderson posits that these oft-contradictory positions and viewpoints eat away at the underpinnings of the entire philosophy of luck egalitarianism.  Anderson (1999) also breaks down the larger framework of luck egalitarianism into smaller pieces; in her view luck egalitarians fall into one of two subsets: the welfare egalitarians and the resource egalitarians. In the first subset are those who assert that social conditions ought to be constructed such that all members of society have equal access to the same liberties and rights, in essence redistributing legal and social conditions in order to achieve equality; in the latter are those who specifically argue in favor of redistributing tangible resources by taking unearned resources from those who have them and giving them to those who, through no fault of their own, do not. In either instance, it is difficult or impossible to achieve such conditions in any practical manner, according to Anderson.

Where Arneson sees the issue of redistribution as one that is rightly complex but wholly necessary (1990, p.158), Anderson’s arguments reveal, if only indirectly, that the practical complexities cannot simply be ignored. It may be possible to alter social or legal conditions, for example, to provide greater equality to members of society who would otherwise not have it, but true equality –in the framework posited by the luck egalitarians- cannot be reached in such a manner. A redistribution of actual resources is even more unwieldy, as it raises questions not just about who should be given resources, but from whom they should be taken. Where Arneson weighs questions about morality and individual responsibility when considering how resources should be redistributed, Anderson hones in on the core problem: that making determinations about who should have to relinquish resources is entirely unworkable in a real, functioning society.

Take as a whole, the arguments for and against luck egalitarianism make it clear that questions about equality and justice are not easily answered. The luck egalitarians raise good points when asserting that those who are suffering through no fault of their own cannot be seen as the beneficiaries of justice in a social or political sense. If society could, at least conceptually, alleviate or lessen that suffering through the provision of resources, it is understandable why some would wish to see such a thing be made to happen. To the degree that social conditions can be altered such that those who suffer from a dearth of access to some resources, it is entirely reasonable to make such alterations. Changing laws to allow same-sex marriage, for example, offers benefits to same-sex couples without taking anything away from those who have no way to benefit from such changes. The moment that the redistribution of tangible resources is raised, however, the circumstances are entirely different. It may be a philosophically-supportable position to say that those who have more than others should be made to relinquish some (or even all) of what they have, but in real-world circumstances this is simply not viable. It may be attractive and appealing to consider the idea that resources should be spread evenly among all members of society, but the practical realities of the human condition render such a system of justice unworkable.

References

Anderson, E. (1999). What Is the Point of Equality?*. Ethics, 109(2), pp.287–337.

Arneson, R. (1999). Egalitarianism and responsibility. The Journal of ethics, 3(3), pp.225–247.

Arneson, R. (1990). Liberalism, distributive subjectivism, and equal opportunity for welfare. Philosophy \& public affairs, pp.158–194.

Arneson, R. (2004). Luck egalitarianism interpreted and defended. Philosophical Topics, 32(1), p.1.

Kymlicka, W. (2002). Contemporary political philosophy. 2nd ed. Oxford [England]: Clarendon Press.

Lamont, J. and Favor, C. (1996). Distributive Justice. [online] Plato.stanford.edu. Available at: http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/justice-distributive/ [Accessed 15 Sep. 2014].

Lippert-Rasmussen, K. (2005). Justice and Bad Luck. [online] Plato.stanford.edu. Available at: http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/justice-bad-luck/ [Accessed 15 Sep. 2014].