Multiculturalism: Identity, Diversity, and Immigration Policy, Essay Example

When it comes to immigration, in Canada as in the United States, and indeed in the United Kingdom and Europe, the subject appears to be a debate pitting the critics of multiculturalism against its defenders—or at least its provisional defenders. Here, a caution against hasty and untrue generalizations: the battle lines of this debate are frequently not drawn between narrow-minded peopleon the one hand and inclusive peopleon the other. The debate is often a much more complex one, although it is certainly true that it also attracts dogmatic peopleand rabble-rousers. In essence, the debate is between those who criticize multiculturalism and argue for the importance of some kind of national and/or cultural identity, and those who argue that the multicultural ideal does not pose a threat to an orderly, law-abiding, successful society.

Critics of multiculturalism come in different stripes, and it is essential to point out that although they share critical views of the concept, they are not necessarily adherents of a shared alternative vision. By way of example, Marine Le Pen and the Front National Party are critics of multiculturalism identified with the far right in France (Engelhart). Le Pen herself has significantly “mainstreamed” the Front National, going to great lengths to extricate the party from her father’s anti-Semitism and neo-Nazism. She has branded herself a committed patriot, and champions economic protectionism, but not isolationism, reducing immigration rather than eliminating it, and opposition to Islam in the name of combating what she calls “’the Islamization of French society’” (Engelhart 3).

In essence, Le Pen and her Front National, like other far-right parties in Europe, have found a way to champion nationalism without the racism that has usually accompanied it. This “new nationalism” is, in some ways, a lesson in irony and paradox: not only is it not anti-Semitic, in some cases it is very friendly to the Jewish people, thus Geert Wilders’s very public endorsements of all things Israeli and Jewish (Engelhart). Of course, like Le Pen and other European far-right figures, Wilders is also extremely anti-Islamic.

The key thing to observe is that the goalposts of nationalism have shifted in two important respects: the identity to be defended, and the question of whom it is to be defended from. Europe’s new far-right parties are still nationalists, but the national identity has become increasingly separated from the racial identity. For these individuals, the nation needs to be protected and defended, but the “nation” need not consist solely of those with whom it has been traditionally identified. In other words, one does not necessarily have to “look English” to be a partisan of the English Defense League, or “look French” in order to be a member of the Front National. While many of these groups have strongly racist roots, they have abandonedthe racial component of the identity they are defending. Of course, this has also improved their relations with Europe’s Jews.

What Europe’s far right nationalist parties are all fervently united against is Islam. Opposition to Islam may manifest in calls to reduce or eliminate immigration, or at least Muslim immigration, and has led to a great many debates on the subject of women’s headscarves and of course the burqa (Engelhart). Concerns about halal meat and the construction of new mosques are other frequent concerns. The common thread here is that Islam is invoked as a religion that poses a menace, even an existential threat, to Europe as these groups know it. Concerns about Islam and Islamization drive these groups, animate them, and essentially provide them with much of their reason for being.

Again, however, it would be a mistake to portray such far-right groups as the only significant challengers to multiculturalism. A far more sophisticated challenge is that mounted by Neil Bissoondath in Selling Illusions: The Cult of Multiculturalism in Canada. Bissoondath’s thesis is that multiculturalism has failed because it enshrines cultural differences and insists they be tolerated. This emphasis on identity, on cultural distinctiveness, leads to a kind of fetishization of the differences between people groups, Bissoondath says, and this in turn undermines the idea that all Canadians can and should aspire toward a common, national Canadian identity. It is multiculturalism as policy, Bissoondath says, that has led to the ghettoization of “multicultural” Canada, with various immigrant groups often setting up their own separate ethnic zones rather than assimilating themselves to the national population and becoming part of it.

Here again, a caution: Bissoondath goes to considerable lengths to not only condemn racism, but to actually offer thoughtful reflection on the ignorant and prejudicial mentality of which racism consists. The trouble with multiculturalism, Bissoondath says, is that it is inadequate for overcoming racism: it does not offer sufficiently substantive, meaningful options for people to order their dealings with others by. He also cautions against what might be called opportunistic whining and complaining: “We must beware the self-appointed activists who seem to pop up in the media at every given opportunity, spouting the rhetoric of retribution, mining distress for personal, political and professional gain” (190). The common denominator here is an exaggerated “respect” for characteristics of the group, which can in turn be linked to a history of oppressions suffered and wrongs endured.

Instead of the approach offered by multiculturalism, which he describes in terms of “tolerance,” Bissoondath suggests an approach based on “acceptance” (191). Tolerance, in essence, is a shallow position, one of noninterference. Tolerance is not motivated by any real concern or care for others, only an idle-minded recognition that they are perfectly fine to carry on as is. On the other hand, acceptance requires looking beyond superficial differences, such as skin color, hair, physiognomy, even culture and religion, to see the common humanity that all people share (191).

Bissoondath then discusses these principles in the context of Canada. He observes that Quebec City, and for that matter Toronto, have more successfully accommodated themselves to diversity than has Montreal. “Montreal, for so long the centre of Quebec’s struggle to preserve its French character, holds greedily to its sense of self, to the joie de vivre that sometimes feels forced, manufactured” (195). Bissoondath’s point is that Quebec is not a monolith, and neither is any other national or ethnic group. In the context of rising multiculturalism in the 1960s, Quebec’s defining Frenchness was strengthened even as English Canada’s identity was weakened. The practical result has been that Quebecers generally defend higher standards when it comes to integrating others into their society (Bissoondath 198). Becoming part of Quebec’s society means fulfilling certain expectations with respect to language, culture, and outlook that one simply does not encounter in other provinces.

What Bissoondath is advocating is not full-scale assimilation of newcomers, with no room left over for individual or cultural expression that deviates from the mainstream. Nor is he advocating for purism of any kind. Rather, he is exploring identity, and searching for a golden mean between the specter of racism and other forms of bigotry on the one hand, and the multiculturalist approach on the other. Individuals are his reference point, not groups, and he argues that one can learn about, commemorate, and participate in one’s heritage without promoting ghettoization, the self-sealing-off of entire ethnic and religious enclaves from the mainstream. “Emphasizing the ‘I’ and de-emphasizing the ‘we’ may be the only way to avoid the development of cultural chauvinism, the idea that ‘we’ are superior to ‘them,’ and the chasms that result” (Bissoondath 213). This, then, is Bissoondath’s vision: a deeply pluralistic Canada, a society in which every individual has the freedom to draw upon their heritage, but is also encouraged to hold a shared sense of identity as a Canadian citizen, an identity which in turn serves to encourage participation in constructing Canada’s present and future.

Bissoondath has some important things in common with Samuel Huntington, who, in a now-famous 1993 Foreign Affairs article, articulated the thesis that the post-Cold War world was moving away from the age of ideological conflict and back toward a traditional pattern of conflict on the basis of fault-lines between ethnic, religious, and civilizational groupings. A civilization, Huntington says, is the highest level of cultural grouping and cultural identity people have that sets them apart from other people. Civilizations can, like lower-order cultural groupings—tribes, ethnic groups, nations, religions—be born, grow, divide, merge, and die. The point is that one can identify meaningfully with a civilization, and the identities of different civilizations have a profound tendency to come into conflict. Huntington suggests seven or eight main civilizations: “Western, Confucian, Japanese, Islamic, Hindu, Slavic-Orthodox, Latin American and possibly African” (25). These major cultural, and in some cases also religious, groupings have seen some of the most violent and protracted conflicts in world history.

One reason for this, Huntington says, has to do with the fact that civilizations propose profoundly different answers to the most basic questions of human existence and social life (25). But even this is not enough to explain why civilizations clash, because differences in and of themselves do not have to lead to antagonism and conflict. Huntington argues that in addition to differences, civilizations clash because the increasing interconnectedness of the world means that people from different civilizations are coming into contact with each other more and more, meaning more opportunities for friction and tensions (25-26).

Economic modernization and social change also contribute, because they separate people from local identities, leaving broader civilizational identities as natural fallbacks, thus strengthening the importance of these higher-order identities. These processes, Huntington says, also undermine the nation-state as a source of identity (26). Religion is often what comes to the fore, thus the growth of fundamentalist movements in the world’s major religious traditions (26). At the same time, Western power is generating opposition, with leaders of non-Western countries and communities seeking a return to their own, often precolonial, roots. Differences of religion and/or ethno-cultural identity also tend to be not terribly mutable, Huntington argues, and these differences can therefore provide a lasting basis for conflict. Finally, Huntington points to economic regionalism, notably the European Community (now European Union), the North American Free Trade Area, and other integrations. The significance of economic regionalism is that it promotes integration between peoples who are already quite similar in certain ways that matter (27). These differences contribute to the classic “us” versus “them” mentality that pervades all human tribalism (27-29).

Must differences of identity inevitably draw people into conflict, or at least strongly tend to separate them into enclaves? Kymlicka’s answers are very different from Huntington’s or Bissoondath’s. For Kymlicka, the multicultural project appears to be succeeding—and he points to evidence to bolster his position. Kymlicka argues that if Bissoondath was correct, and multiculturalism was undermining integration of immigrants into Canadian society, one would expect rates of naturalization to have dropped in the decades since the adoption of multiculturalism as the official policy of Canada (18). The fact that they have not dropped, and in fact have increased, Kymlicka says, is good evidence that multiculturalism is working. Even more to the point, those immigrants that are naturalizing the most are the “multicultural” ones, i.e. the ones from essentially anywhere but the United States or the United Kingdom.

The relevance of this metric lies in the fact that is no longer necessary for an individual to become a Canadian citizen if they wish to work in Canada, nor is it necessary for them to do so in order to gain access to social benefits. In essence, the main reason to become a citizen is identification: one becomes a Canadian citizen not because it is necessary to fully participate in most aspects of Canadian society, but rather because one genuinely wishes to formalize one’s identification with the country (Kymlicka 18).

Political participation is another metric Kymlicka examines. Immigrants should participate in Canadian politics to a lesser degree if multiculturalism has not worked, and yet, no evidence indicates such a decline. By 1971 many ethnic groups were underrepresented in Parliament, but at the time of Kymlicka’s writing (1998) they had nearly caught up. Perhaps even more of interest, these groups do not participate in politics by forming ethnic-based parties (Kymlicka 18). Instead, they participate in the same pan-Canadian political parties other Canadians do. They also have a high demand for English and French classes, another piece of evidence that does not fit with the idea that immigrants have less interest in becoming a part of mainstream Canadian society thanks to multiculturalism (Kymlicka 19). Similarly, intermarriage rates have increased, with members of various groups tending more and more to marry outside of their group. Within Canadian society, too, there is greater acceptance for mixed marriages (20).

Barber points out that both identity-based conflicts and cosmopolitanism are at work in the world, each carrying out their respective projects, and sometimes at the same time. This is counter-intuitive, and requires some explanation. In many ways the two offer very different visions of the future. Identity-based conflicts offer a grim world of squabbles between groups with different identities, one in which a range of different ethnic, national, and religious “tribes” are pitted against each other. This is the “jihad” scenario: blood-letting in the name of God and/or nation, the division of humanity into armed camps.

On the other hand, there is the “McWorld” scenario: consumerism, globalization, and cosmopolitanism. McWorld is consumerist homogeneity: the Golden Arches in major metropolises from Boston to Beijing to Buenos Aires. McWorld promises to erase differences, glossing over what makes Boston distinct from Beijing, and both cities distinct from Buenos Aires. Integration and uniformity are the bywords of this wondrous brave new world, and the endpoint is a kind of “progress” defined in terms of prosperity and a shared consumer culture (Barber 4-5). This notion of progress is sometimes articulated in more or less utopian terms, with technology and consumerism as the forces that will save humanity and all civilization by homogenizing it and causing it to prosper as never before, all at the same time.

Barber’s point, however, is that these two scenarios, jihad and McWorld, are not as mutually exclusive as is often thought. Barber gives a number of examples of partisans of particular identities nevertheless participating in the broader culture of McWorld. “Serbian assassins wear Adidas sneakers and listen to Madonna on Walkman headphones as they take aim through their gunscopes at scurrying Sarajevo civilians looking to fill family watercans” (Barber 5). The interesting thing, for Barber, is the relationship between these two great world-historic forces. While it is true that it is quite often an antagonistic relationship, the relationship between Jihad and McWorld is also quite often a more mutualistic one.

In fact, Barber suggests that perhaps what Jihad and McWorld both have in common is anarchy (5). Neither one is directed from above, or even guided by one collective will. Despite their differences, Barber argues, both Jihad and McWorld can be viewed as the parts of a dialectic. Indeed, they have something quite important in common: they are both at odds with, and therefore antagonistic to, the nation-state. Because they both seek to undermine the nation-state, both Jihad and McWorld pose a threat to the democratic institutions of the nation-state. While McWorld does tend to breed a certain cosmopolitanism, its mass media can also be formidable tools in the hands of the partisans of Jihad. “Fascist pop and Hasid rock are not oxymorons; rather they manifest the dialectics of McWorld in particularly dramatic ways” (18). Far from McWorld leading to universal, unilateral homogeneity, then, it not only allows but can actively facilitate ongoing tribalism.

Overall, I think that the readings for this section underscore an important point: immigration touches on issues of identity that are far more complex than the pundits of either the left or the right argue. On the one hand, many immigrants have shown themselves to be very willing to become part of the national life of their adopted countries. Xenophobic, nationalist movements rely on fear, prejudice and stereotypes to arouse feelings against a clearly-defined out-group. That said, the evolution of xenophobic, nationalist groups demonstrates the flexibility of identity, and one of the important ways in which McWorld has infiltrated and worked upon something that is indelibly on the Jihad side of the aisle.

Immigration and globalization are not without lots of controversies, but the issues they raise are often very complex ones. It is true that McWorld will most likely not erase all distinctions between peoples, and if recent decades are anything to go by, consumerism will not usher in a utopian age of homogeneity. However, the flexibility of identity can be seen even in the constructions of states themselves, and the higher-order groupings of religions and civilizations, since these identities have had to be constructed and extended. In the final analysis, perhaps a multicultural society is not so radical a concept after all.

Works Cited

Barber, Benjamin R. Jihad vs. McWorld. The Atlantic 269(March 1995): 53-59.

Bissoondath, Neil. Selling Illusions: The Cult of Multiculturalism in Canada. Toronto, ON: Penguin Books, 1994.

Engelhart, Katie. “The Rise of the Far Right in Europe.” Maclean’s (November 30, 2013).

Huntington, Samuel P. “The Clash of Civilizations.” Foreign Affairs 72 (Summer 1993): 22-49.

Kymlicka, Will. Finding Our Way: Rethinking Ethnocultural Relations in Canada.Toronto, ON: Oxford University Press, 1998.