Parameters of “Free” in Free Will, Essay Example

The thrust of Stace’s reasoning in “Free Will and Morality” is that, contrary to much thinking, the concepts of free will and determinism are not in strict opposition to one another. Through careful delineation of the processes of both concepts, Stace presents that the two are not mutually exclusive, and that what is typically perceived as deterministic may often be a case of free will mistaken, or not sufficiently viewed as the complex agent it itself is. More exactly, issues of definition in Stace’s thinking obscure the two main components unjustifiably, and there are inherent aspects of free will in much that is deemed determinism. Incalculable influences must go to the process of free will and, as philosophers tend to interpret the term more narrowly, Stace concludes that they create false and intrinsically contrasting ideas of the actual essences of the two forces.

While Stace is thorough in his breakdown and analysis, there remains a sense that he refrains from going as far as his own reasoning would, if pursued fully, take him. As will be shown, the author is actually presenting a platform upon which free will and determinism are not compatible, so much as they may be identical, or at least inextricably linked. He discusses, for example, how multiple elements affect free will, and this is done in order to support his claim of compatibilism. He refers to a police suspect as having confessed because the police beat him, which is clearly an agent “coercing” free will, if such a term may be used, as it inescapably restricts the free will (410). Consequently, and as Stace eagerly supplies, an external agent is blatantly blurring the line between determinism, which would be the inevitability of the suspect’s confession, with free will as the actual, individual choice to confess being made. This is a borderline case, as Stace intreprets Aristotle’s own assessment of the dilemma (412). In such cases, external compulsion obviates, or lessens so greatly as to render it moot, free will.

It is then all the more interesting that Stace’s choice of Gandhi’s fasting is employed to further illustrate how causal factors simultaneously dictate the direction of free will and support determinism. It is in this case of Gandhi, in fact, that an important question resides: namely, to what extent do internal forces as developed from external agents compel behavior and choices? Moreover, on what basis may such forces be discounted as less deterministic than the most blatantly external ones? In discussing Gandhi’s “choice” to fast, Stace seems to deviate from his own assurance to a degree. He acknowledges that causes must have been in place beyond the identified ones of political commitment, but he is content to leave the actual nature of these cause speculative, or perhaps related to biological conditions not known. In doing this, Stace is both affirming the power of internal agents and negating their true, potential impact. More exactly, if free will is compatible with determinism, is is likely that internal forces are equally influenced, if not created, by processes of external factors. Returning to Gandhi, there is reason to believe that his actual choice was directed by personal and internal influences set in place through a succession of external agents, as in his conviction to freeing India as derived from witnessing its subjugation. Moreover, such a scenario may easily exist whether the individual is cognitively aware of the processes; what matters is that internal compulsion is generated through the translation of external forces, and to such an extent that determinism and free will are rendered essentially interchangeable concepts.

It is acknowledged here that multiple instances abound wherein free will and determinism are distinct from one another, even if compatible. This distinction, however, is ultimately topical, simply because the nature of free will is so subject to influences beyond external matters shaping determinism. Put another way, to assert that free will may exist in an unalloyed form is to ignore the fundamental manner in which individual character is shaped, which then goes to the choices made by the individual. This is where Stace retreats from his own rationales. He is glad to bring free will and determinism nearer to one another, but he is reluctant to address the fact that free will, so inescapably shaped by external forces generating the internal, is then not precisely compatible with determinism, but virtually synonymous to it.

Works Cited

Stace, W. T. “Compatibilism: Free Will Is Consistent with Determinism” From Religion and the