Physical Security for Olympics, Essay Example

Structural and Procedural Components of Terrorist Risk at the Vancouver Olympic Games

Joseph Demkin himself said, “Building security is about protecting people, property, and information located in and around buildings”. The security organization of the Olympic Games is charged with a much loftier responsibility: protect the international ideal of brotherhood and friendly competition.

Question 1: Hardening Requirements

In his book Demkin stresses the importance of developing security procedures which provide a cohesive combination of nature, organization, and mechanical know-how. The end goal should always be in the forefront of security considerations- above cost, vanity, and the initial set-up of the structure. After a brief initial review of the complex’s strong and weak points, a threat assessment, risk assessment, and vulnerability assessment should be completed and distributed to select personnel in an effort to address the structure’s shortcomings of security. However, some limitations to security upgrades may be encountered in an effort to maintain a level of safety in the case of a natural disaster, such as an earthquake or flood. All nationwide standards must be met before and after the security changes are complete.

Water and open fields provide a good basis for a clear line of sight, but open viewing are  out of the question in the vicinity of Vancouver’s Olympic stadium. While this does not help the security personnel, it also obscures the line of sight of potential ballistic terrorists. Still, to compensate for this security shortcoming, the simple security measures of building fences and adding bars to the windows will go a long way. The walls in areas at high risk for terrorist attack can be reinforced with blast-mitigating structural materials which help maintain the oneness of the glass and masonry in the event of an attack and/or explosion. The windows can also be paired with blast curtains and more concrete nearby.

The standard hardening requirements for any building housing the Olympic Games consist of the hire of patrolling guards, careful screening, the formation of procedures for sending and receiving shipments and reporting suspicious packages, the formation of a central security location, intrusion detection and surveillance, the inclusion of accessible panic alarms viewable (through camera feed) from the central security location, monitoring utility weak points, and additional training for employees. Early estimates put the cost of these security measures between one and six billion dollars. After set-up, sweeps, and employee training have been completed, every piece of equipment must be checked and checked again, and (just as you would at a wedding rehearsal) a mock event set-up should be coordinated to test the cooperative abilities of all of the security assets. This ensures that any errors in employee procedure, software compatibility, or unsecured locations are at the very least identified and secured.

Because the hockey players will be going to and from a nearby location, the General Motors Place, they are the celebrity targets who will be most vulnerable to a personal attack. While travelling between these two main buildings, the hockey players should be escorted by security personnel whenever possible.

We have yet to address one of the single most vulnerable locations in most large, public sites: the parking garage. Parking garages often allow self-parking that is within a convenient walking distance of the event. Even when secure personnel are told to park all of the cars, some people are inevitably going to park their own car. Sadly, this convenience afforded to the spectators also presents a security dilemma of proximity and accessibility to the site. While getting into the stadium with weapons may seem like mission impossible, ballistic terrorism from the vantage point of the parking garage is mission too easy. Were the garage to be used as the access point, replacing nearby public parking with shuttle bus lines would most likely create more casualties and might even make it possible for a terrorist to go farther undetected. Every available member of the security and emergency response teams who is not needed elsewhere should be near the parking garages.

Question 2: Security for Medal Ceremonies

Detection, deterrence, and response are the three main considerations for security professionals. Several measures should be undertaken to establish security during the games. Obviously security would be most stringent in the areas reserved for diplomats, celebrities, and other public figures. Personnel background checks should be equally stringent. While Botox is frequently used by public figures, its originator, the botulism toxin, is actually used to induce a long-term paralysis of the muscles. It can be lethal even in small doses. In the event of an attack, each security employee will have a zone of security to report to, secure, and evacuate.

Despite housing seats for sixty thousand people, the security screening at the entrance will create crowding outside and immediately on the other side of the entrances. While providing a unique challenge to visually screening the entrants, the density of people in one area will certainly discourage a forced entry where so many people will be present to witness, report, and block hostile intent or actions.

The threat is not limited to the inside of the stadium; the structure is surrounded on all sides by tall businesses and high-rise residences. Because the top is soft and filled with air by many fans, it is also extremely vulnerable to aerial or sniper attacks- however limited the visibility may be. Security proves to be doubly difficult, as it has all of the challenges to the security of any other stadium and the additional challenges of such a large, open, and soft top. Hijacking airplanes has recently become a favorite tactic of terrorists, so any flights passing near the city should be diverted to other airports or landing strips until the conclusion of the ceremonies.

Nearby there is also the Plaza of Nations complex, an internationally-utilized structure which provides an accessible point of entry for citizens of any country; should there be an attack meaning to make a very public statement, the complex would provide the most likely point of origin for a long-distance terrorist attack. Ballistic attacks are those which are accomplished through the use of weaponry, usually guns. Ballistic-resistant reinforcing is the most effective preventative measure against structure penetration by gunfire.

Question 3: Threats and Countermeasures

Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, or Explosive [CBRNE] incidents are of increasing concern in recent years. For its part, the United States Homeland Security and Counterterrorism Program has refocused its efforts on “homegrown” terrorism. It is no longer enough to monitor your enemies; it must also be done with one’s own countrymen. These threats produce an even larger effect with time. When chemical weapons are unleashed, their effects are not contained to the area in which they were unleashed. Some persons who bear residual contamination will escape detection; it is inevitable. Eventually they will return to their places of work and residence and the chemical exposure will continue to adversely affect both themselves and the people around them. In the damage to the structure, it is also likely that both emergency respondents and innocent bystanders will be exposed to large quantities of asbestos in the fallen pipes, walls, ceilings, etc.

That is precisely the reason that preparations in case of CBNRE devote as much time to their prevention as to the response due were such an emergency to occur. Firemen, policemen, EMS, and volunteers are all on stand-by throughout the events who are willing to risk their own safety and possible contamination to abate the effects of a CBNRE crisis. All of them should be wearing the appropriate attire to shield their eyes, nose, and mouth from contamination by asbestos or chemical reactant.

The most likely threat of CBNRE comes from an unlikely source: fuel, oil, and fertilizer. These materials were the main components used in the destructive Oklahoma City bombing. Because such materials seem innocuous, they present a viable threat as the primary explosion or to initiate diversionary tactics and cause structural collapse and widespread panic within the stadium. It can further be assumed that if one such explosive device were to breach the secure perimeter, then there will likely be at least one more similar explosive within the stadium.

One recommended countermeasure to the above scenario is the strict monitoring of both the employees involved in the construction, security, and upkeep of the stadium and of any outside liquids. The spectators should not bring in or leave with food or drink. It has often been said that one must fight fire with fire. Flights now have undercover air marshals, so some security personnel should discretely patrol in civilian attire.

If a terrorist were to penetrate the structure’s security with a small nuclear device and any explosive device, then the results would be even more unimaginable. The propulsion of the explosive device would spread the nuclear contamination rapidly and affect thousands more people. Emergency respondents are advised to use protective masks and to carry radiation detectors and detergent to remove radioactive dust. However, while preparing for these worst-case scenarios, it is crucial that the facilitators and emergency team members remember that the run-off is also extremely hazardous and must be contained.

Possible chemical agents include nerve agents, vesicants, blood agents, choking agents, and incapacitating agents. Nerve agents are often found in regular materials, too, like pesticides, because they are paralytic in nature. Blood agents, such as cyanide gas, attack the blood’s oxygenation and cause the victim to suffocate. On the other hand, anthrax has been used frequently in the last ten years. It is an example of a pathogen, as are smallpox, the plague, and the hemorrhagic fever.

We live in the real world. In the real world, people will make mistakes. If two unknown people can manage to slip into a presidential soiree, then there does not seem to be much hope of properly ensuring the safety of some 60,000 people in one building at one time. All of the money in the world could not make it completely impervious to attack. There are tough choices to be made: which entry points are most likely to allow a CBNRE to pass through, exactly how many security members should rove or guard a certain area, which procedures would minimize the further risk and panic and encourage safe evacuation in the event of an emergency, etc.