Plato and Aristotle, Essay Example

I

Socrates’ discussion with Meno concerning virtue in the last third of the dialogue centers on the question of whether virtue is teachable. This will contribute to a possible understanding of what virtue itself means. Hence, Socrates begins with a hypothesis that states, if virtue were in fact something that is relatable to the soul, could it be taught or not? If someone could be taught virtue, then this would imply that it is a type of knowledge. This is significant for Socrates, as it means that virtue becomes bound to an idea of wisdom: something is virtuous if it is good, but to understand what is good and what is not, this requires wisdom. But Socrates nevertheless hypothesizes that virtue is knowledge itself. This follows from the notion that no teachers of virtue themselves exist. This is proven with historical examples of so-called virtuous men, whose children do not exhibit this same virtue. It would make sense that the descendents of the virtuous would themselves be virtuous, since they have been taught, by the virtuous, but Socrates’ hypothesis states this is not the case. This means therefore that no one can learn what virtue is, since there are no teachers. Virtue becomes something ambiguous in this case, something that, as Socrates states, possibly comes from a divine power. The absence of the teaching and learning of virtue at the same time does not mean that virtue itself does not exist. If virtue is separated from the teacher-student relationship, if it becomes something that, in a sense, is always already there, it means that virtue is an entirely different form of knowledge. It can, in this regard, tie into Socrates’ remarks about knowledge and memory: knowledge is possibly the act of remembrance from a previous state – in the case of virtue, our understanding of it comes from our pre-understanding of what this knowledge is. This non-empirical and non-pragmatic acquisition of virtue once again suggests that it comes from a divine source.

II

For Aristotle, the best human life is one of theoretical study according to his understanding of what virtue entails. Any assessment of the best life is, for Aristotle, equivalent to this same virtue. Hence, a happy life is one that is virtuous. Yet this is not the same as mere amusement, since such happiness is an end, for Aristotle, not a means. Happiness becomes a goal to be attained. As Aristotle notes, amusement certainly seems to fit with this conception, as one amuses oneself for the sake of the amusement itself. The problem is that if all that one does in life is aimed at reaching the end of amusement, for Aristotle, this is absurd: it would make work and activity merely something to be finished as quickly as possible, so that one can amuse themselves. This is an incomplete life, or a life constituted by a fundamental tension.

If the best life is the theoretical life, life, as consisting of both means and ends, entails that virtue must be reflected in both the means and ends of the action. Without this constant presence of virtue in all actions, one does not live a full life, but a fragmented one. In the case of the theoretical life, this life is dedicated in all its aspects to the contemplation of the highest virtue, that which is virtuous without exception: it is, as Aristotle argues, that which is best in us. The theoretical life precisely captures all the best in us because it is a life dedicated to virtue and essentially a harmonious life, whereby the exertion of means corresponds to the ends and is thus part of the process of reflection. This entails, as Aristotle notes, that we can continually lead the contemplative and theoretical life: the exertion of reflection still is consistent with the highest virtue, unlike in the case of amusement. The contemplative life has no end other than itself, it is not done for something else (for example, as Aristotle notes, military actions to acquire wealth) and therefore it is a full life, a completely closed system that functions in all its aspects for its own well being.