Platos Theory of the Five Main Types of Souls, Essay Example

Introduction

If it is usual for people, and for some philosophers, to consider the soul as an inherently undefinable thing, Plato consistently rejects such a perception.  Perhaps more than any other philosopher, he insists on as precise a determination of the human soul as may be devised.  To that end, Plato equates the soul with the essentials of human character; he derives definition by viewing the soul as the core of human character, as he believes virtue and vice, as within human nature, emanate from the soul and consequently shape men and women as they are known to the world. This process in place, Plato neatly assigns political meaning to souls, or generates five types of souls through connecting them to the more overt political ideologies of humanity.  This permits a hierarchy of value in which the aristocratic, or the soul based on goodness and wisdom, is intrinsically superior, and thus better able to govern humanity in actual life.  The Platonic formula here is compelling and organized, yet it can only have worth when the human soul is so narrowly conceived.  It ignores dimensions of the soul widely embraced and by no means in keeping with such pragmatic manifestations, just as Plato relies unjustifiably on an idealized ideology as the superlative “soul.” This being the case, Plato’s theory of five types of soul fails because he essentially confines the element least able to be confined – the human soul – and attaches to it parameters that are removed from it.

Discussion

On the face of it, there is an attractive logic to Plato’s breakdown of five soul types. In essence, he inverts the usual means of exploring the soul and goes from “the outside in.” That is to say, he observes human conduct as it is so powerfully represented by political ideology, and he then reasonably concludes that such intensity of belief must reflect core being, or the soul.  From there is is a simple matter to create a basic equation of sorts: “It seems likely that there are as many types of soul as there are types of political constitution of a certain kind” (Plato  135). Plato then categorizes soul by political philosophy, assured that each instance of the latter fully reflects the essence of the former.

Of the types, Plato views the timocracy as a kind of devolved aristocracy, wherein the acquisition of property of the true aristocrats, or philosopher/kings, translates to an incorrect esteem of external forms.  The timocrats are less high-minded than the aristocrats, even if their natures are fundamentally good.  It is then a short distance to the oligarchy, wherein wealth alone determines standing and fitness for governing.  It is: “A constitution filled with a host of evils” (242), as it so radically departs from aristocratic concerns.  Further degrading for :Plato are democracy and tyranny, and it is interesting how he despises these seemingly contrary constitutions as similarly base. What becomes apparent, in fact, is Plato’s elitist stance as an aristocrat, as he condemns both from aristocratic perspectives. Tyranny is abhorrent to him on principle; even as the tyrant for Plato is a consequence of democratic regimes, he is horrified by the imbalance of soul, and appetite as virtually ruling the tyrant who seizes power and rules others.  As for democracy, the Platonic condemnation is more dismissive.  He has no patience for democracy because it is inherently absurd to him to rely on reason from the multitudes.  He has all the disgust of the traditional aristocrat, in the social sense, for the common people or mob, as he casually waves away democratic processes as “noise”: “Its fiercest part does all the talking and acting…it buzzes and does not tolerate any dissent” (235).

Not unexpectedly, then , it is the aristocracy Plato exalts as the finest representation of soul translating to government.  The sole outstanding man is the just king; the collective of outstanding men is the aristocracy (135), and there is no better state in Plato’s thinking.  Here, those with souls dedicated to virtue and justice are naturally entitled to exert authority over the population.  The implication is clear; other forms of government are flawed because the souls of those involved, from the fiercely materialistic oligarchs to the frenzied and irrational democrats, are flawed.  The aristocracy, in asserting the right to rule by virtue of superiority, is then the most desirable – and efficient – authority.  Moreover, the further implication is that the philosopher/king’s soul is the most perfectly ordered because it generates these behaviors reflecting good and wisdom.  As the soul and the human interactions in these spheres are indistinguishable, Plato clearly argues that one soul of the types is innately superior.

It is then tempting to challenge Plato simply on the grounds of his implacable elitism.  Even when modern thinking dismissive of elitism is set aside, there is something disturbing about any system of thought which categorically assigns degrees of quality to human beings in this way.  This is thinking which, as noted, is valid only when the exact parameters of the Platonic constructions are accepted as absolutes, and this in itself generates a philosophy that is suspiciously narrow.  More exactly, there is no room in Plato’s thinking for questioning regarding the ultimate determinations of good because that prerogative belongs solely to the aristocrat, and the charge of a dangerous elitism is enabled because Plato does not accept that the aristocratic state is corruptible.  The issue is important, as it reveals basic weakness in the theory.  That is, on one level Plato acknowledges that aristocracy may lapse into timocracy because the rulers neglect emphasis on just practices and allow an unbalance giving power and wealth undue influence.

What is missing, however, is how such a process may occur when the aristocratic government is in place and the aristocrats, as they must, reflect their intrinsically sound qualities.  If Plato’s construction is taken as he presents it, such degeneration cannot take place.  At the same time, he asserts that it may.  Consequently, his upholding of the superiority of the aristocracy is elitist because he refuses to recognize the weaknesses going to any devolving of the government.  How, it must be asked, may the timocracy, ruled by spirit and also by appetite (243) emerge from a state ruled by the wisest, who must be able to anticipate and forestall such a development? The only answer in Plato is a kind of guiltless negligence on the part of the aristocrats.  It is hollow and elitist because it does not hold the aristocrat to the standards initially exalting him.

This in turn leads to more fundamental issues in Plato’s theory, which reflect potential dilemmas with his concept of the tripartite or ordered soul itself.  Essentially, Plato’s insistence on definition of the soul, expanded in his theory of the five types, is further weakened by the expansion because the limits of the definition are then all the more amplified.  For example, and beginning with his most esteemed soul, the philosopher/king exists as such because his soul is most directed toward good and wisdom.  In this aristocrat, reason tempers spirit and appetite, and the pinnacle of balance is achieved.  Similarly, spirit and appetite dominate too greatly in the souls of timocrats, oligarchs, and democrats, while tyranny represents a nadir of base desire as paramount.  What this structure fails to account for is a guiding basis for the soul itself, and in any manifestation of it.  The aristocrat is wise and just, but Plato too easily relies on this composition of the soul as inflexibly creating itself in this way, when virtue may often be practiced by those not necessarily “well-ordered,” or badness may emerge from those with the most virtuous intentions.  It is not enough for Plato to assign character to souls because he actually translates soul from character, and human character varies on fundamental levels.  Put another way, if there is any reasonable view of the soul, it must incorporate the sense of its being absolutely foundational and consequently immune to significant change.  Plato’s thinking notwithstanding, there is no more basic component to human being itself than the soul, yet he employs it more as an instrument or determinant of general outlook and behavior.  The flaw in this is evident because, as noted, good and bad are generated by all types of people, which presents the soul as far too ineffable to be so neatly employed.

Plato’s entire construction here goes to emphasizing the need for superior humans to govern.  This is arguable in itself, but it is further reduced as theory when it is observed that human superiority is a vastly mutable matter.  As with his tripartite soul, Plato makes no allowances for degree and shifts in human perception which may radically alter behavior.  He insists on defined souls, but he refuses to accept that such definition then goes to character, and that character is static.  The potential gradations, in fact, are inestimable, and it is too bad that Plato refrains from discussing these potentials.  A philosopher/king may be essentially virtuous and wise, but conflict within an aristocracy may easily generate an excess of spirit in that sole aristocrat, and his focus on virtue may be distorted.  Similarly, the “buzzing” democracy so dismissed by Plato may well contain members guided, not by appetite, but by a commitment to the welfare of all, which is an appetite in itself.  To rely on a framework in which the well-ordered soul is the best and most entitled to rule, then, both reinforces a too narrow conception of the soul and also dismisses the nature of human character, even as the concept depends upon character as defining the soul.

Conclusion

In reflecting on Plato’s theory of the five types of souls, a strange element emerges; that is, it seems that Plato, in seeking to validate his thinking on government, calls into play a component not easily used to accomplish this end: the human soul.  This is not to say that no philosopher may identify the essence of the soul. Nonetheless, there is something inherently suspect when this entity, so universally held as defying precise definition, is given one essentially equating it with nothing more than human character.  Then, as human character undergoes change and is also inconsistent in fundamental ways, the theory equating the soul to how human beings interact and behave in political terms is all the more weak.  In the final analysis, Plato’s theory of five types of soul does not succeed because he essentially limits the element least able to be confined – the human soul – and attaches to it parameters that are not relevant to it.

Plato.  Republic.  Trans. C. D. C.  Reeve.  Cambridge: Hackett Publishing Company, 2004.  Print.