Plato’s Theory of the Forms, Essay Example

Introduction

Plato’s contribution of the Theory of Forms cannot be overstated in terms of enduring impact.  Through a careful analysis of the perceptible and the real, and with focus on discerning the latter from the more deceptive quality of the former, he essentially translated metaphysical concepts into pragmatic ideology, and provided the world with a foundation of absolute knowing.  It is, again, an astounding achievement, and its basis in reason is as compelling as its appeal to moral impulses.  That is, it satisfies both the objective and ethical drives of humanity.  At the same time, the Theory may be said to suffer from the self-defeating aspect Plato identified in relativism, in that he attaches to Forms qualities which can exist only when an idea of morality is accepted as an absolute.  The moral attachment to the Theory in effect reduces the integrity of it, because such an attachment equates to a distinctly human perception or value as an absolute as well. In the following, an alternative to Plato’s Theory will be proposed which, while incorporating the concept underlying it, removes it from the moral structure Plato feels is necessary. The alternative theory then ultimately reduces Plato’s Theory of Forms to a more absolutist concept removed from the inherently human ideas of virtue.

Discussion

There is a powerful attraction of the Theory of Forms in its inherent comprehension of reality beyond the perceptible, or the reality shaped by subjectivity.  It is, in plain terms, a kind of pure rationalism; for anything to be perceived or known, and no matter the qualities attached by the perception, there must first be a state of being not in flux or not susceptible to such subjectivity. Essentially, a thing must be in a fundamental sense before the human mind can undergo the processes of attaching meaning and significance to it.  In Plato, the visible world is of the utmost importance, of course, but equally important is that its shape is determined by how humanity interprets manifestations of the Forms.  The green of the grass, for example, provides a limitless basis for subjective definition and meaning, but the green is a property removed from the circumstance of the perceiving.  It may well be that humans go to war over disputes over the meanings of lines, as in national boundaries, but this in no way reduces the fact that a true line exists as a Form to be either recognized as such or interpreted in a variety of ways.  We then rely on Forms because we must; they are the unchanging realities behind the changing, and the fundamental properties beyond the power of human subjectivity to actually alter.

As noted, the Theory is powerful and compelling, and not a little because it simply affirms the existence of absolutes.  It seems that humans are consistently drawn to knowledge that it is held to be inviolable; era after era, and culture after culture, it is universally desired that some things be counted upon as fixed realities.  Plato’s Theory offers this, and in a way removed from attaching absolute reality to concepts of faith or religion.  This is important; that is, humanity is usually so driven to ascertain absolutes that it upholds divine forces as such, which renders any real determination of reality difficult at best for the non-believer. Plato’s Forms have nothing to do with faith, not because he is lacking in faith, but because Forms are independent of such belief.  To expand on his Theory in this regard, Forms may be the work of God or they may not, so the Theory accommodates any variation within human beings within the vast framework of that most dominant interpretation, religion.

A problem remains, however.  As mentioned earlier, it also reflects Plato’s issue with relativism as a self-defeating concept.  If all things are relative, according to Plato, there can be no absolute truth, so the truth of relativism is invalid.  The same type of inquiry, however,   exposes the weakness in Plato’s Theory.  That is, if good is the highest of all forms in his canon, then Plato is employing a human construct or idea to stand as the ultimate – and inviolable – Form.  He is essentially asserting that a virtue is a reality and, if this conforms neatly to his own and Western ideas of the human soul, it departs from the pure objectivity of his Theory.  Plato maintains that justice, for example, is intrinsically bound to good, as he believes real good, or the Form of good, is a property unto itself.  Moreover, this good is one he feels is recognized and embraced as such because the awareness of it provides the necessary basis for understanding (Plato 36).  This relates to the Platonic idea of the soul, in which the proper balance of reason, spirit, and appetite is necessary to conform to good, or the pursuit of good.  Humans are drawn to good in Plato because good is essentially the highest of forms, a thing or quality utterly intangible, yet imbued with properties of tangible effect.

This Platonic emphasis on good is crucial in comprehending an alternative to the Theory. Plato does not merely hold to good as one Form, again, but as the “best,” and he further adds to it the subjective quality of being more difficult to know: “In the knowable realm, the last thing to be seen is the form of the good, and it is seen only with toil and trouble” (211). With this Form comes a variety of conditions, in fact, all of which underscore the Form as strangely abstract and simultaneously absolute.  If the Forms of green and the straight line are there to be known and accepted, that of good seems to carry with Plato an array of moral dimensions irrelevant to other Forms.  For instance: “Unless someone can give an account of the form of the good, distinguishing it from everything else…he does not know the good itself” (229). It is interesting how elusive this Form is, given the innate accessibility of others, just as good demands efforts of the soul in order to be known and other Forms require only thought. In essence, Plato’s theory then relies completely on an “absolute” of virtue or morality as integral to a true understanding of the reality of Forms themselves.

This then presents the opportunity to construct an alternative theory, one both based on the concept of Forms and freeing them from this intrinsically human, or subjective, construction.  The question in fact arises: why must virtue be incorporated as essential to Forms? Plato himself relies on mathematical reasoning to support his Theory.  He holds that geometry, for example, is “knowledge of what always is” (222), and this unchanging quality renders the line and the circle Forms.  At the same time, Plato loses no times in noting that the innate truth of geometry may then direct the soul to pursuing truth, and this presupposes an ethical impulse as real within humanity as Forms themselves. It may be that Plato’s Theory then exists to conform, intentionally or otherwise, with his philosophy of the human soul as necessarily driven to seek good.  The crucial point is that it need not, and the alternative theory more basically affirms that Forms exist beyond the realms of perception and subjectivity, and which also serve as foundations of reality for all perception.  Put another way, the theory holds that the line, the circle, and the color green are Forms.  They are properties never in flux because they exist apart from the ways in which they are identified and constructed by human beings.  Moreover, and further supporting the basic of Plato’s Theory, we can know they exist as such because their presences are perpetually manifested in life and reality.

Then, in the alternative theory, other Forms demand recognition, as some do in Plato.  Dark and light are forms, certainly.  It is also reasonable to assert that awareness is a Form, as are motion and space.  These are things immensely subject to degree, interpretation, and perception, but they share the common property of universal being.  No matter how people view them, they exist to be perceived, so it is logical to accept that they exist in a pure and absolute state removed from subjectivity.  In this theory of Forms, the criterion most essential is a kind of omnipresence in no way dependent on the variables of human existence.  Forms in fact may be said to be identified as such because they are essences completely apart from human thought.  We recognize them because, as humans, we also exist and must encounter them, but their existence lies apart from the recognition.

What this theory of Forms does not encompass is any acknowledgment of a virtue as a Form, simply because virtue or good is not a known reality.  That Plato holds it to be is understood, yet good is nonetheless an essence actually determined by human feeling and response.  For Plato, and not unreasonably, good is a Form because the human is drawn to it, which affirms it as an absolute property.  The nature of good is nonetheless inherently variable, and Plato’s reliance upon it is question able because the status he accords it as a Form derives from a commonality of perception.  This in itself defies the idea of Forms because an absolute cannot be identified by even mass feeling or mass, shared recognition; the thing must exist apart from humanity, and it is unlikely that good may so exist.  To assert that it is a Form apart from human interests is specious because only human interest defines it.  In the alternative theory, then, no virtue – or vice – may stand as a form, for these are properties constructed by humans, or so subject to human interpretation, there is no essence part from it.  What remains is then a theory of Forms for the visible and unseen worlds which goes no farther than an identification of things and forces in places as universal essences.

Conclusion

As noted, Plato’s Theory is a marvel of analytical and philosophical reasoning, and it reflects an admirably classic focus on essences of being.  At the same time, there is an insistence on goodness as integral to the Theory which ultimately weakens the simplicity and purity of itself.  The idea of the Form is excellent and rational; it allows for universality of being and the influences of subjectivity.  What is necessary, then, is a reduction of the Theory, and one in which it is stripped of the Platonic identification of good as within the field of invisible absolutes.  Good may indeed be invisible, but it is also no fixed reality or property, just as its actual meaning must derive from the human creation of it.  The alternative theory then reduces Plato’s Theory of Forms to a more absolutist concept removed from the inherently human, and consequently inappropriate, ideas of virtue.

Plato.  Republic.  Trans. C. D. C.  Reeve.  Cambridge: Hackett Publishing Company, 2004.  Print.