Readings in Chinese Classical Philosophy, Essay Example

Books 1-7 of Confucius’ “The Analects” commences with an argument for why it is worth studying philosophy, or, in other words, why there exists an intrinsic value to the contemplative life. Hence, in the opening lines of the work, there are numerous references to youth, to the extent that the beginning of the text can be considered to be something of a “call to arms” as to why the philosophical life is a life worth living. In essence, this argument advanced by Confucius is centered on the ethics of contemplative living. For example, Confucius in 1.4 states a series of questions which he asks himself on a daily basis in relation to the subject of his own conduct – “in my dealings with others, have I in any way failed to be dutiful? In my interaction with friends and associates, have I in any way failed to be trustworthy? Finally, have I in any way failed to put into practice what I teach?” Arguably, in so far as these opening books may be understood as a rational justification of the value of a philosophical and contemplative life, the manner in which Confucius provides this justification is by eliminating the putative difference between everyday life and philosophical life. Hence, in this key passage, he reflects from an ethical perspective on precisely his everyday conduct. Accordingly, the philosophical life does not become something other to the everyday life, but the former rather clarifies the latter. In these books, therefore, Confucius provides a compelling argument for why philosophy should be studied by showing that it is not different to everyday life, but rather is fundamental to the latter’s true meaning.

Showing the depth and complexity of Confucius’ thoguht, this section arguably takes the opposite approach of the previous section, yet so as to reach the same goal. Namely, in so far as in the previous books Confucius endeavors to show how the philosophical life and everyday life are the same, in these books, he draws a distinction between them. For example, in 9.18, he states “I have yet to meet a man who loves Virtue as much as he loves sex.” The virtuous or ethical life, in this sense, is absent from the overwhelming majority of human beings, it is something that is not found in quotidian everyday life. The ethical man, the one who loves virtue above the material possessions of the world, to take Confucius literally, is someone that does not even exist. Nevertheless, this lack of existence does not mean that Virtue is impossible to attain. This is what Confucius terms “self-cultivation” and is arguably one of the most crucial concepts in his thought. In 9.19, for example, he uses the analogy of a construction of a mountain to the process of self-cultivation. To construct a mountain is to construct the highest possible landmass. There is thus no incompletion admissible to the act of self-cultivation — either one is virtuous or not. Nevertheless, the task of constructing the mountain itself once it has begun, by “dumping a single basketful of earth”, is nevertheless a beginning point in this journey. Confucius is thus encouraging a process of self-cultivation as the fulfillment of virtue and the ethical life, a journey, which, in this sense, requires a departure from everyday life, where this same virtue and ethics are clearly lacking.

In these pages, Confucius more clearly outlines the primary questions and concerns which motivate the philosophical and contemplative life. For example, in 15.16, Confucius states that “I have never been able to do anything for a person who is not himself constantly asking, ‘What should I do? What should I do?’” In this sense, the philosophical life or the quest for virtue begins with a question of profound doubt. This follows from the premises of the previous books, whereby the virtuous life is placed in juxtaposition to everyday life. In other terms, the individual who is entirely caught up in worldly, everyday affairs, never experiences the phenomenon of doubt: he or she never asks himself “what is this that I am doing everyday and why I am doing it?” For Confucius it is with this moment of self-questioning that becomes the decisive precondition to the desired goal of a virtuous life. Furthermore, it is precisely this type of self-questioning which allows one to distinguish true virtue from its falsified forms. Hence, in 17.23, Confucius is asked if courage is a virtue, and he responds that rightness is the highest virtue of all, providing a type of guide for courage, which needs virtue so as to be properly channeled. This passage mirrors the self-reflection required in the previously cited passage. Courage simply applied in life without any type of direction is equivalent to living without the necessary condition of doubt. One must not only act, but also reflect on why one acts and be motivated by the correct virtues, so as to act correctly. Action in itself is not valuable, even if it conditioned by an apparently noble character trait such as courage: rather, the ethical validity of action must be determined so as to evaluate the virtuousness of the action itself.

Arguably, the key argument of these passages from Mo Zi relate to the sense in which virtue and righteousness are entirely objective as subjective. Hence, in a mythological narrative, Mozi describes a period of pre-history, where every human being lived according to his or her own set of “norms.” This plurality of norms created a situation where conflict arose between different world-views: in so far as there was no objective “norm”, which was universal to all, what instead existed was a constant antagonism between positions. Mozi’s key lesson in these passages accordingly appears to be an argument for the necessity of an entirely objective concept of virtue, so as to guide all human beings despite their differences. Hence, Mozi states that the entire root of worldly conflict is what he terms “partiality”: if people will not be objective in their conduct, what is being encouraged is particular interests, as opposed to “what is beneficial to the world.” (Mozi, 69) Accordingly, the fundamental conflict in human life is that there is a tension between impartiality and partiality. People are inclined to accept positions and promote viewpoints that are in their own benefit. However, this overlooks the greater concept of “world”, which is the shared living space of all. Impartiality is the sacrifice of one’s own immediate personal interests for a higher concept, which is not based on division, but inclusive in a radical manner. Namely, this “world”, since it belongs to all, is impartial by definition: it is not a “part”, such as in “partiality”, but a whole. The task of the philosophical life is therefore to move from partiality, as Mozi recounts in his myth of the primordiality of partial norms, to the perspective of the entire world, which is objective and impartial.