Rousseau, Essay Example

Arguments concerning ideal forms of governance are the central speculative problematic of any discourse on politics. This can certainly be considered a justification for contemporary democracy: democracy is often conceived as a system that obstructs the misuse of power, as the people are free to select their leaders. This particular justification for democracy thus suggests that democracy is a preventative measure against the necessary evil that is the inevitable abuse of power. It is thus a concession that the ideal is impossible to achieve. Prima facie, it would appear that my own theory of the general will supports such an approach: consider, for example, my notion of “the general will is always right.” (Rousseau, 17) However, this would be a misreading of my views. My notion of the general will can only be developed in relation to the particular will, that is, according to its difference from the particular will. I would argue that current forms of parliamentary democracy are merely a sum of particular wills, as opposed to a general will in the radical sense that I have attempted to give the term. In essence, the notion of general will can be understood as a self-negation of any principle of difference or of individuality. In the following correspondence, I shall make a case for this argument.

It is crucial to note that in my “On the Social Contract” I develop the notion of a general will first through a critique of what I term “force” and “the right of the strongest.” Essentially, I attempt to differentiate a certain organization of society from what I consider to be a higher organization of society. Consider the following: “Force is a physical power, and I fail to see what moral effect it can have. To yield to force is an act of necessity, not of will.” (Rousseau, 3-4) Here, I do not discount the existence of force. Rather, I contrast it to the category of the moral and the notion of the will. By arguing against force as a political principle, I am arguing in favour of the moral as something that is beyond force. Accordingly, it is something that is beyond necessity. Force is necessity because force is a reaction. One responds in a forceful manner according to a threat. If my notion of the general will is not an act of necessity, which would only make it similar to force, this means that to a certain extent the general will is unnecessary. But unnecessary to what? It is unnecessary to the right of the strongest, of the brute physical world. To this world, the general will is always regarded as an impossibility, because it is unnecessary for a world of force and violence.

Let us consider democracy. I write as follows: “If we take the term in the strict sense, there never has been a real democracy, and there never will be. It is against the natural order for the many to govern and the few to be governed.” (Rousseau, 69) It is clear for me that real democracy is impossible, as a real democracy would be the rule of the many: it would be a rule of the general will. Contemporary forms of democracy, insofar as they rely on elected representatives who make political decisions, are not a rule of the many, but rather a governing of the few. In the last instance, it is inconsequential how they received their power, for they have been chosen to rule. This is an example of what I term “the particular will.” A particular will is individuality: “in fact, each individual, as a man, may have a particular will.” (Rousseau, 26) Democracy in its representative form is essentially the sacrifice of the general will to a particular will: to the representative. Accordingly, democracy is impossible, to the extent that it would require an absolute general will.

It will be clear therefore that democracy as it is practiced in these times is closer to what I name the rule of the strongest. For the rule of the strongest is one of necessity and it is one of particularity. Democracy is viewed as a necessary response to the threat of an abuse of power. Hence, it repeats the logic of force because it operates according to necessity. What is rather required is a radically novel political dimension: a politics not founded on what is necessary, but a politics founded on a moral and ethical principle that is the general will. But if the general will is not a response to a question of political necessity, which would only make it another form of force, what is it? The general will is precisely what is impossible for our current political situation to think, since this situation operates according to the logic of force and necessity. The general will is an entirely new political space that lies beyond any necessity. It is a collective decision regarding the break from a political rule that maintains the rule of force, a force that is always linked to the particular will. It is an event that attempts to posit the political space not in terms of necessity, but rather as a resolution of the problem of necessity: the creation of a political space in which necessity is not needed, because the wishes of the general will are made manifest. This is the meaning of my statement that “the general will is always right”: it is always right because it is against the rule of force and the particular will, which are always informed by necessity and self-preservation. The general will is always right because only the general will has a concept of what is right, as opposed to the particular will which only has an idea of what is necessary. Only the general will possesses the what I have termed the “moral.” This is because what is right must not be right for the particular but for everyone: that is the only true example of righteousness.

Works Cited

Rousseau, Jean-Jacques. On the Social Contract. New York: Everyman, 2007.