Safety Assessment of Foreign Aircraft, Thesis Paper Example

Executive Summary

On the 21st of April 2004, the European Union implemented Directive 2004/36/EG, a new regulation regarding the Safety Assessment of Foreign Aircraft, also known recognized as the SAFA Program. Since then this program has developed into a well-established ramp checking program throughout Europe and the European Civil Aviation Conference Members. For all airlines and high complex aircraft operators in Europe the SAFA Program has become an issue they have to deal with and asses their procedures and attitude towards it. The number of ramp checks alone e.g. in Austria have exceeded 400 in 2013 (Austro Control GmbH, 2013) and the numbers continue to rise. This project determines the economic impact of this Ramp Check Program on the operators and airlines flying to and within Europe, and assess what kind of impact from an economic view do these ramp checks have on airlines and operators through delays, extra work with findings during such checks, possible changes to handbooks, ops procedures etc. It also evaluates how do compliant and non-compliant approaches of different operators towards this program affect their business cases. Some operators try to trick their way around the checks, in the form of early boarding of passengers, crew leaving the airplane, or they try to subvert the system by “complying” only on the surface through establishing shady dealings with inspection authorities. This project identifies how operators who end up on the banned community list and how this has impacted their economic future. The author explains the current program and the underlying developments in the past which have led to the current status of the European Union Directive and how for example, the national Civil Aviation Authority of Austria has implemented it. Further he will show the implemented procedures and mechanism which accompany the ramp check program, the methods used and the extensiveness of such a spot check. He explains the possible impact and volume of the SAFA Program and analyze the possible effects on operators and airlines on their respective operation. Through research of the available data on performed Ramp Checks, the banned Community list, questionnaires sent to operators and pilots, the author will try to evaluate and analyze the possible economic impact of the program. Through research of the validated findings through the SAFA Program the different approach types used by operators in respect to the SAFA Program will be analyzed. Findings reveal that the economic limitations that arise out of this legislation have a substantial impact of airline carriers and their ability to operate.

Introduction

Air transport is recognize as a driving force for social and economic progress through its ability to keep people connected and expand the reach of business operations. In many ways, the aviation industry serves as a vital part of economic growth. EU standards are based on protocols established by the ICAO and then interpreted by member states. Enforcing air safety standards entails the use of the List of Air Carriers subject to an operating ban, which dictates which entities are barred from entering EU airspace. The Safety Assessment of Foreign Aircraft Program (SAFA) is a system designed to make uniform regulatory protocols regarding civil aviation ramp inspections to be applied across European airlines. The program was drafted and implemented by the European Civil Aviation Conference (ECAC).  The number of ramp checks alone e.g. in Austria have exceeded 400 in 2013 (Austro Control GmbH, 2013) and the numbers continue to rise. Civil Aviation Authorities are relative across a wide range of bodies but they are all regulated within the parameters of European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) policy when they enter European air space. Due to the fact that there are a variety of Non-EU countries that must be regulated when entering Europe’s air space, blanket bans serve as a potential method to prevent violations. While the EC doesn’t take any formal action against air carriers, technical missions are put in place to single out specific concerns related to groups of air carriers that have questionable activities that might trigger an inspection that are registered with the CAA.

Enforcing parameters that can best enhance the safety of transportation for both the trade process as well as the passenger is much more complicated in a region like Europe, than say the United States, due primarily to the fact that each respective Member State and non-member state tends to be its own country. The European Organization for the Safety of Air Navigation (EUROCONTROL) in collaboration with the Central Flow Movement unit (CFMU) breakdown the importance of the blacklist and how it’s used to enforce SAFA. The CFMU is responsible for delivering the SAFA/Blacklist to relevant SAFA participating States. This service is known as the alarming process. Part of the function of the CFMU is to dispatch flight plans and to manage a centralized flight plan processing system utilizing what’s known as the IFPS, or Integrated Flight Plan Processing System. All data reports are issued by Member State authorities are kept in a central database managed by the JAA.  It’s standard protocol within the SAFA program for the JAA to assess all data and to report its findings to the Member States regularly. All possible safety hazards are reported and data such as standards of operation or action reports that occurred during, and after, the incident are also stored within the database for the JAA’s review.   This creates a uniform standard of safety policy that allows operators to measure their performance against their peers and effectively optimize efficiency and travel standards. However there are some negative aspects of the system spanning across all Member States. For example, involving many institutions and organizations in daily procedures of a carrier creates more bureaucracy which can slow down effective operations.

The European Civil Aviation Authorities has handled the ramp inspection process since 1996 regarding all aircraft visiting their country. The program is structured specifically to ensure the safety and security of both travellers and the EU air space. For this purpose standards of compliance are put in place to reduce error in the inspection procedure. Based on the European Parliament’s legal Directive 2004/36/CE, as well as the standards set by the Council on the safety of third-country aircraft using Community airports, Member States are given the authority to inspect aircraft that enter their airspace that are from a third party, third country air craft, and that are suspected of not complying with international safety standards. Regardless of the obligation to check aircraft suspected of non-compliance, the legislation specifically states that if spot check procedures are implemented, random aircraft can be checked including nonparticipating non-EU operators. The SAFA Ramp Checks are conducted through inspecting a list of 54 specific times. It’s noted that, the inspection checklist is composed of four primary parts. The main criteria for what is checked during one of the inspections are those factors that would most reduce safety and not comply with the SAFA regulations. Due to this fact, it is most irresponsible of a flight carrier to assume that an aircraft is flight worthy just because it passes one of these inspections. During the inspection the inspectors identify what is known as compliant and non-compliant factors. Non-compliant factors during an inspection are referred to as findings. When findings are identified, it means there are non-compliance issues that need to be handled. This involves stakeholders of the SAFE program. The stakeholder of the SAFE program included the State of Registry, the State of Operator, as well as the state in which the inspection was executed. These are the organisations recognize as the key players involved in the follow-up process once there has been an inspection. Ultimately, all participating States are held solely responsible for the performance of aircraft and passing inspections. The European Aviation Safety Agency holds are information related to the SAFA program including database material and analysis procedures.

The Safety Assessment of Foreign Aircraft Program

The Safety Assessment of Foreign Aircraft Program (SAFA) is a system designed to make uniform regulatory protocols regarding civil aviation ramp inspections to be applied across European airlines. The program was drafted and implemented by the European Civil Aviation Conference (ECAC). The primary protocol put in place by ECAC, stated by the Joint Aviation Authorities (JAA), is that upon identifying irregularities in ramps, an operator must be alerted and the “Member State” can enforce oversight authority to keep the aircraft from taking-off if there is a perceived immediate risk. All data reports are issued by Member State authorities are kept in a central database managed by the JAA.  It’s standard protocol within the SAFA program for the JAA to assess all data and to report its findings to the Member States regularly. All possible safety hazards are reported and data such as standards of operation or action reports that occurred during, and after, the incident are also stored within the database for the JAA’s review.

It should be noted that SAFA inspections are recognized as surface assessments of immediate incidents and they are not expected to replace standard regulatory oversight or protocols to dictate whether or not an aircraft is flight worthy. The ECAC classifies 42 regions as Member States, which include: Turkey, Lithuania, Romania, F.Y.R.O.M,  Armenia, Switzerland, Albania, Azerbaijan, Ireland, Estonia, Italy, Belgium, Slovakia, Bosnia Austria, Sweden, Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Poland, Cyprus, France, Moldova, Denmark, Finland, Monaco, Germany, Spain, Greece, Hungary, Czech Republic, Iceland, Latvia, Luxembourg, Malta, the Netherlands, Serbia, Ukraine, Norway, Portugal, Republic of Georgia, Slovenia, and the United Kingdom.

It should be noted that SAFA is a successful program, specifically in regards to “the black list.” Linda Werfelman (2010) notes, that “the list has been so effective that it should be used as part of a system of expanded international cooperation to enforce safety standards” (Werfelman, 2010, pp.29). She largely attributes the success of the black list to the fact that it has been updated over twelve times since 20006, and to the level of strictness associated with the program. The high standard laid down by the program ensures that admittance is not a simple accomplishment. The author states that, “according to the November list, all air carriers from 15 non-EU countries, as well as five individual carriers, were banned from operating within the EU. In addition, eight carriers were permitted to operate only under specific conditions” (Werfelman, 2010, pp.29). From the perspective of the EU, SAFA and the black list is enhancing security. These measures can easily be identified as actions that lead to safer conditions and quality of travel. The problem is the same cannot be said for all stakeholders involved. If you ask Werelman (2010) however, she will state that the program is a “success from every angle,” further adding that, there are numerous carriers who once faced with being black listed acknowledge that their safety precautions are not up to standard and are willing to adapt and make the necessary changes towards improvement. The author sates that, “there have been a number of cases where air carriers subject to a ban have acknowledged that their safety performance fell below the internationally accepted standard and embarked upon, and demonstrated the successful completion of, remedial and corrective actions. As a result, these carriers have been removed from the list” (Werfelman, 2010, pp.29). Essentially the author is saying, the very presence of the list resulted in reform of non-compliant violators on their path back towards acceptance. Many of the changes that have been implemented throughout the aviation sector can be attributed to policy changes made by the European Union. They have involved a wide range of institutional developments that would be nearly impossible without uniform policy application and strategic thinking. Authors note that, “in the last 20 years, the aviation sector in Europe has undergone a revolution that would have been unthinkable without key measures taken at EU level. Up to the late 1980s, air transport was fully controlled by State governments and overregulated by rather rigid bilateral agreements and obsolete international conventions”(Žabokrtský, 2011, pp. 161). The issue largely centers on the need for uniform policy that can be applied across multiple EU regions which by cultural standard have their own set of unique legislative and operational practices. Enforcing parameters that can best enhance the safety of transportation for both the trade process as well as the passenger is much more complicated in a region like Europe, than say the United States, due primarily to the fact that each respective Member State and non-member state tends to be its own country. The European Union’s authority enables these regions to have uniform policy, but even after making the policy uniform and applying it across EU and non-EU carrier registries, the laws must be enforced. As Žabokrtský points out prior to legislative changes like SAFA, Europe’s aviation sector was regulated b rigid regulations based on outdated conventions that had no real baring or relevance in the modern world. He states, since those years the European Union has now become, “a leading force and a respected policy maker in the field of air transport. Being highly successful in liberalizing the aviation sector in Member States, the EU took the opportunity to pursue its action further “(Žabokrtský, 2011, pp. 161). Extending policy beyond the traditional fader that once regulated the aviation sector across Europe made the system more secure and effective at sustaining security. The new system also allows for uniform policy to be applied across all member states. The Safety Assessment of Foreign Aircraft Program (SAFA) is a system designed to make uniform regulatory protocols regarding civil aviation ramp inspections to be applied across European airlines. The program was drafted and implemented by the European Civil Aviation Conference (ECAC). The primary protocol put in place by ECAC, stated by the Joint Aviation Authorities (JAA), is that upon identifying irregularities in ramps, an operator must be alerted and the “Member State” must make the necessary chanced to repair the feature for compliance.

Air transport is recognize as a driving force for social and economic progress through its ability to keep people connected and expand the reach of business operations. In many ways, the aviation industry serves as a vital part of economic growth.  As Žabokrtský (2011), adequately points out, “even if there are significant discrepancies among the evaluations of economic impact of aviation obtained by different studies, they seem to indicate that the benefits of air transport clearly outweigh its costs” (Žabokrtský, 2011, pp. 161). While it took, 25 years for EU Air Transport Policy procedures to set measures that fully encompass all aspects of safety operations, many of the current policies put in place are now applicable across all EU Member States. This creates a uniform standard of safety policy that allows operators to measure their performance against their peers and effectively optimize efficiency and travel standards. However there are some negative aspects of the system spanning across all Member States. For example, involving many institutions and organizations in daily procedures of a carrier creates more bureaucracy which can slow down effective operations. It’s noted that, “in areas based on Directives the progress was less significant, as these acts, to be valid, have to be incorporated into the legal system of each Member State, which is often a slow and painful process” (Žabokrtský, 2011, pp. 180). Here the author acknowledges that there can be some conflict with the procedure of exchanging information.

The European Organization for the Safety of Air Navigation (EUROCONTROL) in collaboration with the Central Flow Movement unit (CFMU) breakdown the importance of the blacklist and how it’s used to enforce SAFA. The organizations note that, acting on the advice of an Air Safety Committee composed of technical experts drawn from all the “EU Member States, Iceland, Norway and Switzerland, the European Commission regularly updates this list whereby operators are included in, or withdrawn from the EC blacklist on the basis of various criteria established by the ‘Blacklist Regulation’ (2111/2005/EC)” (EUROCONTROL, 2011). The black list and getting listed on the black list entails a carrier recognizing their violation of set protocols and then going through the process of addressing the deficiencies or factors of non-compliance before being delisted.

The CFMU is responsible for delivering the SAFA/Blacklist to relevant SAFA participating States. This service is known as the alarming process. The above map displays the 44 ECAC States, which also includes 27 EU Member as well as the 17 non-EU States. Following each successive update of the EC blacklist, the European Commission transmits to EUROCONTROL’s CFMU the data of air carriers/aircraft that are subject to an operating ban. Likewise, the Commission informs the CFMU each time it issues an updated list for the prioritization of SAFA ramp inspections by Member States.

It is noted that part of the function of the CFMU is to dispatch flight plans and to manage a centralized flight plan processing system utilizing what’s known as the IFPS, or Integrated Flight Plan Processing System.  When providing the SAFA with a black list, the CFMU utilizes a Flight Assessment and Alerting System (FAAS). This system split tests, or compares, real time flight data with the information given to the CFMU by the European Commission. If the CFMU makes a connection between the data in the SAFA/Blacklist and the data within the IFPS flight plan, it triggers the alarm system and an alarm delivered to the European Commission, EASA, as well as the National Aviation Authorities (NAA).  The procedure can be seen in the diagram below:

The role of partners involved in the above process are as follows:

EU Member States/ European Commission: These two groups represent the collective of stakeholders responsible for regularly updating the EC blacklist. All updates are made three times a year through a Committee on Air Safety. The Member States are held responsible for enforcing the policies made by the European Commission. Regulations implemented by the European Commission across the European Community are enforceable  among all EU member states and incredibly strict, it means the measures hold significant weight for virtually all international carriers seeking to do business within Europe or even surrounding flight paths. In addition to being enforceable within the European Union, the regulations are also enforceable in Switzerland, Iceland, Lichtenstein, and Norway.

SAFA Competent National Aviation Authorities (CNAAs): At the national level, the SAFA CNAAs are in charge of managing and monitoring all factors related to responsibilities under the SAFA program. This includes ensuring carriers adhere to EU blacklist regulations.

EUROCONTROL CFMU: The European Organization for the Safety of Air Navigation (EUROCONTROL) in collaboration with the Central Flow Movement unit (CFMU) breakdown the importance of the blacklist and how it’s used to enforce SAFA. It’s noted that, “by allowing the timely distribution of alerts/warnings, the CFMU provides assistance to the European Commission and to the Member States in managing the effective adherence to air safety regulations (namely ‘blacklist’ and SAFA) and helps them to take expeditious actions as appropriate” (EUROCONTROL, 2011, pp.3). Eurocontrol is the primary source of the alarming function as it utilizes blacklist data to file reports.

“In 2008, EC blacklist alerts were in the range of 50 per month with regard to EU Member States (80% of these alerts were ‘not relevant’ as a result of some airlines failing to indicate that the flight concerned was being operated under “wet lease”*). The average for all ECAC States in 2008 was 200 Alerts per month” (EUROCONTROL, 2011, pp.3).

When the EC blacklist started to pick up steam as a force within air safety regulations, it was around 2005. This happened through the organization first establishing the blacklist, on December 14^th. The initial list of blacklisted carriers was published. In 2006, The Permanent Commission put forth measurements for EUROCONTROL to provide support to the Community SAFA Program. The cooperation agreement necessary to get the ball rolling on what would eventually be the EC SAFA warning system happened in 2006 when EUROCONTROL signed an agreement with EC DG-TREN. The program became the EC SAFA program in 2007 when it was transferred. In 2009, the first warning message to carriers with flight plans in breach of EC bans was sent out. On the importance of how these organizations ultimately formed the departments and policies related to aviation safety and security, Griffiths and Bromely (2008) note that, DG Tren is the Directorate-General for transport, the relationship position would eventually have in regards to forming the blacklist is noted when the authors state that, “the blacklist is compiled by the Directorate-General for Transport and Energy of the European Commission (DG Tren) in consultation with the Air Safety Committee (ASC) comprised of experts from EU member states” (Griffiths and Bromley, 2008, pp.11).These are the primary departments in charge of compiling the black list and drafting it. The Member States still play as substantial role in the compiling process due to the fact that experts are selected from these regions. The main source DG Tren and ASC use to gather information form the black list is the Universal Safety Oversight Audit Program (USOAP) of the ICAO. This is due to the fact that the program issues mandatory safety audits of member states which provides for ample information on each state (Griffiths and Bromley, 2008, pp.11).

EC SAFA warnings were established originally carriers that were being observed by the EC. This was usually in regards to an investigation that could potentially result in a black listing, but the companies being observed at the time were not banned. The warnings were in their own way would lead to the culmination of the ramp inspection. It’s noted that,

“at that time, EUROCONTROL/CFMU issued approximately 500 such warnings per month. With the introduction of dedicated legislation on the prioritization of ramp inspections and a related streamlining of the CFMU alarming function, the number of EC-SAFA warnings issued by EUROCONTROL/CFMU has grown to 50,000 per month. Around 33% of these warnings were generated for flights departing/arriving at EU airports, whilst some 67% concern flights departing/arriving at non-EU airports” (EUROCONTROL, 2011, pp.3).

Following these regulatory procedures, the EC Regulation on prioritization of SAFA ramp inspections was issued and adopted in April 2008 by the Member States. Through this program ramp inspections would be carried out within the Member States on each respective carrier and then the Member State would take responsibility for reporting necessary progress, data, outcomes etc… It was the summer of 2008, when the EC SAFA waring system was installed as a part of the CFMU system.

Airline & Operators

EU standards are based on protocols established by the ICAO and then interpreted by member states. Enforcing air safety standards entails the use of the List of Air Carriers subject to an operating ban, which dictates which entities are barred from entering EU airspace. Another name for this list is “the black list” (The European Commission, 2013). This list was drafted within, and enacted through, Commission Regulation (EC) No. 2111/2005 a policy put proposed during the Council of December 14, 2005 by the European Parliament. This action repealed Article 9 which was originally published as an amendment in Directive 2004/36/EC (The European Commission, 2013). It was during the December 2005 council meeting that the European Parliament authorized the Commission to compose the blacklist as well as the relevant standards and rules, which was legislation drafted to support enforcement of the list and published in 2006 (Commission Regulation EC No. 474, 2006). The black list can be applied to an entire state’s flight registry of air carriers, a particular air craft carrier’s fleet, or one individual carrier. It’s further noted that, “in other cases, the carrier may be issued with a warning that may precede being entered in the blacklist at a later date. Carriers and civil aviation authorities may make representations prior to a ban being imposed. There is also an appeal process following a ban’s imposition although, contrary to some media reports, no air carrier has overturned a ban” (Commission Regulation EC No. 474, 2006). The practical application, and implementation, of these precautions are viewed as being issues of national, as well as international security. Many needed precautions are enacted and implemented by these agencies such as the Wassenaar Arrangement, the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), and the European Union (EU) because these institutions have established a shared understanding of “the central role played by air cargo operators in destabilizing arms transfers, particularly of small arms and light weapons (SALW). Such transfers have proved especially detrimental in Africa, where they have helped to fuel the continent’s various conflicts and threatened fragile states and societies”(SIPRI, 2015, pp.1). Civil Aviation Authorities are relative across a wide range of bodies but they are all regulated within the parameters of European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) policy when they enter European air space. Due to the fact that there are a variety of Non-EU countries that must be regulated when entering Europe’s air space, blanket bans serve as a potential method to prevent violations. As noted in the SIPRI (2015) report, “‘Blanket bans’ refer to situations in which all the air carriers registered with a particular CAA are barred from EU air space because of unreliable air carrier numbers and fleet data. Blanket bans have been imposed on the DRC, Equatorial Guinea, Indonesia, Kyrgyzstan, Liberia, Sierra Leone and Swaziland” (SIPRI, 2015, pp.1). The reason these particular carriers are identified within a blanket banned list is due to the fact that they have had, or are believed to have had, an AOC given to them by the banned CAA (SIPRI, 2015, pp.1). It should be further noted that the bans are applicable to all air carriers that hold an AOC which was issued by any of these states, and this holds true even when the carrier was not mentioned within the EU regulations. By setting forth this specific stipulation the EU is able to strictly regulate its air space across boundaries of EU and Non-EU nationalism, which can have a significant impact on commercial carriers. For example, there are a significant number of carriers implicated within this legislation. Griffiths and Bromley (2008) note that, “of the 172 carriers included in this CIT-MAP study, 134 can be categorized as subject to a blanket ban. Of those carriers subject to a blanket ban, 53 (40 per cent) have been named in a UN or other arms trafficking-related reports” (Griffiths and Bromley, 2008). The authors point out that when these carriers are cited as being subject to a blanket ban, they are urged to self-regulate. The authors offer a definition of self-regulation noting that, “self-regulation refers to situations in which the CAA of a non-EU member state places restrictions on an air carrier following a visit by an EC technical mission” (Griffiths and Bromley, 2008). The primary challenge blacklisted carriers face is in trying to maintain operations once they have been singled out by national authorities for AOC revocations is that assets transferred to or from other named companies is documented and kept on file with the JAA. This limits the carrier’s operational ability to carry out business as usual.

While the EC doesn’t take any formal action against air carriers, technical missions are put in place to single out specific concerns related to groups of air carriers that have questionable activities that might trigger an inspection that are registered with the CAA. These air carriers are the ones that have in the past been subject to inspections, carriers that operate specific aircraft types, or carriers that have drawn the attention of the Commission due to air safety-related violations they may have committed prior to the systems launch. As Griffiths and Bromley (2008) notes, “the restrictions imposed by the national CAAs can include partial or complete bans on flights to the EU or the withdrawal of the air carriers’ AOC. Of the 172 carriers included in this CIT-MAP study, 25 fall into the self-regulation category” (Griffiths and Bromley, 2008, pp.11). It is further noted that out of the those 25 carriers, 14 have been identified in an arms trafficking or UN related safety report between 1998 and 2008. This accounts for 56 percent of the total carriers.  It is also noted that 19 of the carriers have leased aircraft associated with arms trafficking reports or UN safety violations. This accounts for 76 percent of the total aircraft reviewed by the CAA during this period.

This data is very telling in regards to the financial impact SAFA has had on carriers as it delves into the assets sharing practices of airlines. Many airlines do not own their aircraft, and even those that do own their aircraft are in the habit of leasing out aircraft to carriers that may not follow proper ramp procedures that would classify them as compliant with SAFA. At its core SAFA is a data collection process that leads to collecting data based on ramp inspections but these inspections open up managers to a new world of data which they access utilizing performance grids. On the surface it appears as though the primary focus of the SAFE system is to keep travellers and air space safe, but legislation does serve to improve the quality of services and performance certain carriers provide, who can afford rising to the challenge. Authors note that, “from performance grids and annual performance statistics are all important for the sake of establishing a much stronger foundation through which a carrier can grow and expand. The data retrieved through this process assists carriers in drawing the line between inefficiency and efficiency” (Laszewski, et al., 3). SAFA in addition to offering metrics to monitor security are essentially providing performance metrics as well to carriers, as they can benchmark the amount of times they are reviewed for inspection and how well they perform against other carriers across different member states and within the same state. The authors further point out that, “this is an essential aspect of expanding and improving on their performance within the competitive airline industry, as well as having more insight on the needs of their clients” (Laszewski, et al., 3). Through implementing new strict regulations, the EU forces carriers to invest in new forms of airline supply that are counter to traditional asset sharing procedures, but that could essentially make them more independent in the long run.

Financial Impact

The consequences that accompany a carrier being placed on the EU blacklist can be substantial. Polivnick, Suthaporn, and Woodend (2015) point out the primary impact is that the carrier will nolonger be able to operate transports between their state airports and those located in the EU. Blacklisting individual carriers can have much greater consequences that extend beyond their ability to operate in the EU, even if other civil aviation authorities refrain from also blacklisting the carrier. This is primarily due to the negative publicity associated with being blacklisted. It creates speculation in the public eye regarding the perceived safety standards of the carrier, which could lead to consumers, or companies, reducing the nature of their commercial relationship with the carrier or even ending their business with the carrier altogether. This is especially true of carriers that are a part of regional global alliances, as it creates a very difficult circumstance for other carriers or companies doing business with the black listed carrier as they are forced to choose between risking their own reputation and a potential black listing or maintaining business operations with the black listed carrier. Currently the state of the airline industry is one of many global alliances where airlines exchange services and resources. The authors note that, “in an age of global airline alliances and networks which integrate the services of multiple carriers, each member airline plays a significant and critical role in the alliance and its network” (Polivnick, Suthaporn, Woodend, 2015, pp.3). If the EU downgrades and blacklists a major carrier it can global repercussions in respect to how it impacts the entire network of other carriers. It is not completely known how global airline networks might respond to the blacklisting of one of the respective carriers within their alliance but it can be assumed that actions to improve non-compliant factors would be provided with resources to get the carrier off the blacklist. This theory is supported by authors who note that, “it remains to be seen how any of the three global aviation alliances would react to such a downgrading. It is likely that the other member airlines will offer assistance to ensure that all corrective actions are taken as quickly as possible” (Polivnick, Suthaporn, Woodend, 2015, pp.3). The problem with this theory is that SAFA protocols and the subsequent blacklisting of a carrier essentially makes it a pariah among other member airlines. All involvement other airlines have with a blacklisted carrier could potentially draw the negative attention of the EU. Even if the EU does not subject these supporting airlines to unwarranted review, speculation within the market about safety integrity could cause many doubts in the market and diminish the brand of a carrier. There are a wide range of factors that must be taken into consideration when one attempts to assess how a global network will respond. The authors touch on this concept as well when they note that, “although each member of an alliance plays a critical role, it is important to consider traffic and passenger flows when considering how an alliance would respond to a downgrading and/or blacklisting” (Polivnick, Suthaporn, Woodend, 2015, pp.3). In addition to the challenge blacklisted carriers face at maintaining their business relationships with non-blacklisted carriers and relevant affiliates, there are also some financial factors that come into play such as higher operating costs. These costs can be attributed to factors like increased insurance premiums that come as a byproduct of insurance companies viewing the blacklisted carrier as a greater flight risk. Higher operating costs due to these carriers being viewed as insurance liabilities creates a major economic hurdle for the black listed carrier that is a very time sensitive endeavor. From the moment a carrier is blacklisted by the EU, every day that passes until the carrier’s status is reinstated results in significant loss in revenue and limited operational reach. Carriers might also find it more challenging to lease or acquire aircraft or resources due to the intangible restrictions on operations. Depending on the nature of the carrier’s operations, for example carriers that function primarily outside the US or EU, they may be able to survive the setback.

Burden Placed on Airlines

The burden placed on airlines attempting to prepare for a blacklisting is that they must evaluate their code share flights to see how they might be affected (Havel & Sanchez, 2014). They must identify route destination schedules that might be impacted and then change them in a way that doesn’t impact their revenue. In many cases this can be very difficult, especially when a carrier is heavily reliant on providing travel to EU locations. Carriers must keep in mind there might be additional inspections or safety checks which they may not foresee, and then prepare for those as they could result in a longer turnaround times and more time needed for connections (Havel & Sanchez, 2014). Carriers also need to anticipate how their leasers may view a black listing or potential black listing and confirm with insurance companies and the companies through which they access aircraft how such instances will financially impact business. For example, a carrier can consider wet leasing aircraft for affected and important routes. In regards to airlines facing a potential blacklisting, authors note that they should, “notify your lessors of the position. Check your leases for any requirement as to the licensing and registration authority and whether this is impacted by the downgrading” (Polivnick, Suthaporn, Woodend, 2015, pp.3). It’s clear that there are many factors that must be considered in response to SAFA regulations. The fact alone that it’s possible for carriers to be subject to inspections keeps carriers on their toes in overseeing operations. In a survey done executed for this very study asked 83 respondents whether their airline/ commercial air operation experienced SAFA Ramp checks in Europe, of the 75 that answered, 85.7 percent of respondents (65) stated yes. The table and chart can be seen below:

This reveals that SAFA Ramp checks play a significant role in overall operations within the European Airline industry.

One of the most challenging financial hurdles that arises for carriers that may be suffering from an EU blacklisting is that they are viewed differently by the banks. Researcher on this issue advise that “banks and lessors should consider the impact on the permitted uses of an aircraft, including permitted sub-lessees. Consider the impact on maintenance and safety oversight requirements” (Polivnick, Suthaporn, Woodend, 2015, pp.3). The company must truly assess how changes in their corporate structure will ultimately impact how they do operations. This is true in regards to labor and management as well as many other factors. Authors note, “that depend primarily on reductions in wages or union power will at best bring only short-term relief from immediate financial pressures. Sustained improvement in service quality and financial performance will require more fundamental improvements in the quality of labor relations” (Gittell, Von Nordenflycht, Kochan, 2004). This fundamental understanding of the labor force can play a major role in whether or not a company survives a blacklisting or can avoid being listed altogether when their operations have come under scrutiny in the form of numerous Ramp Checks.

Data reveals that the financial impact EU air safety bans and SAFA protocols has had on carriers and their operations is undeniable. Reports reveal that, “the various UN asset freezes implemented sporadically in support of certain UN embargoes, EC air safety regulation enforcement and technical inspection missions have resulted in the closure of many more air cargo carriers. Some of the reasons for this are more obvious than others” (Griffiths and Bromley, 2008, pp.16). Furthermore, due to the fact that regulations implemented by the European Commission across the European Community are enforceable  among all EU member states and incredibly strict, it means the measures hold significant weight for virtually all international carriers seeking to do business within Europe or even surrounding flight paths. In addition to being enforceable within the European Union, the regulations are also enforceable in Switzerland, Iceland, Lichtenstein, and Norway.  Authors note this is primarily why the legislation, “ensures that bans are implemented across the EU as well as being applicable in EC legislation can also have an indirect impact beyond the borders of the EU” (Griffiths and Bromley, 2008, pp.16). While the implied meaning behind the regulations extends beyond the borders of Europe heightens the power of the regulations, it also further limits the capabilities of carriers, even those with minimal operations within Europe. This reduces entry into the market, and prevents many carriers that could potentially operate in Europe right now from having viable flight services. Analyst suggest that, “one factor is the process of EU enlargement, whereby states in Eastern and South-Eastern Europe have to meet certain criteria for membership, including those related to civil aviation and air safety. For states such as Moldova and Serbia, EU membership may be some years off” (Griffiths and Bromley, 2008, pp.16). Despite this, the need to standardized safety controls and secure operating procedures in this space is important and it enables the EU to recognize those carriers outside EU borders that have operations that meet safety standards the opportunity to function within the EU. Such carriers include Serbian Airlines and Moldovan airlines like JAT Airways.

Despite the fact that EU blacklisted carriers struggle financially to operate, DIRECTIVE 2004 implies that uniform legislation shared across Member States will enhance economic power and reduce monopolization within the aviation industry for the Member States. The directive cites Article 80(2) of the Treaty of the European Community, and the proposal from the Commission formed by the Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee, and mandates the regulations based on the authority granted under Article 251 “approved by the Conciliation Committee on 26 February 2004” (EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND COUNCIL, 2004, pp.2) Within the legislation, specifically Article 251, the European Parliament and The Council of the European Union state that, “in order to establish and maintain a high uniform level of civil aviation safety in Europe, a harmonised approach to the effective enforcement of international safety standards within the Community should be introduced” ( EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND COUNCIL,2004,pp.2). The legislation justifies ramp inspections as the necessary method to need to maintain uniform level of security across member states. It’s further noted that, “to that end, it is necessary to harmonise the rules and procedures for ramp inspections of third-country aircraft landing at airports located in the Member States” (EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF COUNCIL, 2004,pp.2). The law identifies that through this uniform method, there will be economic benefits for member states, specifically the advantage of having uniform competition. It’s believed that if there is a uniform standard of operations shared between all member states, and those that do not comply with these standards are rejected, then it will prevent those carriers from being able to unfairly manipulate the market. This perspective is stated within the legislation when it states that, “(5) A harmonised approach to the effective enforcement of international safety standards by the Member States will avoid distortions of competition. A common stance on third-country aircraft that fail to comply with international safety standards will be of benefit to the position of the Member States” ( EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND COUNCIL, 2004,pp.2). The problem with this aspect of the law is that, as previously has been shown, with the Russian Federation example, the EU is able to apply priority preference to who should be inspected more frequently or excessively and which carrier get a pass. In a way, while preventing non-member states and non-compliant carriers from monopolizing the system, the regulation itself serves as a regulatory monopoly mandating which carriers can and which ones can’t do business in the European Union. It has been further demonstrated that companies which are blacklisted from the system suffer severe consequences, especially when their infrastructure is such that is relies heavily on the U.S. and U.K. systems.

The uniform standards is not the only barrier that reinforces the authority of SAFA, it’s also the procedures through which information is exchanged that prevents blacklisted carriers from doing business with Member States. It’s noted that all inspection information is shared mutually across all Member States and it’s mandatory for them to participate. The legislation states:

“the competent authorities of the Member States shall participate in a mutual exchange of information. Such information shall, at the request of a competent authority, include a list of airports of the Member State concerned that are open to international air traffic with an indication, for each calendar year, of the number of ramp inspections performed and the number of movements of third-country aircraft at each airport on that list”.

This means that there is a transparent documentation of operations and inspections and a record of compliance or non-compliance with SAFA and the information is exchange frequently and efficiently, making is virtually impossible for any carrier flagged for category 1, 2, or 3 safety risk, or for any carrier who is about to have their AOC expire to continue operations at the same level of proficiency, without having some negative stigma within the market. The procedure through which this information is exchange is highly efficient because it’s written into the law for it be timely. This can be seen in the legislation where it states, “all standard reports referred to in Article 3 and the ramp inspection reports referred to in Article 4(4) shall be made available without delay to the Commission and, at their request, to the competent authorities of the Member States and to the European Aviation Safety Agency. This makes it very clear why SAFA is a very power piece of legislation regarding operating in the airline industry within the EU. While standards of safety appear to be the primary focus of the legislation, the economic benefit of complying with the regulations is undeniable. What is also undeniable is the substantially negative economic impact imposed on a carrier that fails to comply with these standards.

The most tragic aspect of the law really is the combination of its policies regarding information and how it should be exchange in collaboration with written stipulations which place distinct priority preference on certain carriers. This can be seen in the Russian Federation example. These two aspects of the program in tandem can easily create a downward spiral effect for carriers; one where, news of minor standards violations quickly spread resulting in a higher priority of ramp inspections targeting a particular carrier, which could potential put that carrier in a greater risk of being black listed. In the legislation it states, “whenever a standard report shows the existence of a potential safety threat, or a ramp inspection report shows that an aircraft does not comply with international safety standards and may pose a potential safety threat, the report will be communicated without delay to each competent authority of the Member States and the Commission” .  When the report is given to each competent authority across all Member States, for major problems, it could serve as the perfect alternative to safety risk, but it could also turn minor risks into more prominent issues.

European Union Air Carriers

The European Commission notes in regulation (10) that the EASA analysis of SAFA ramp check information on Union Air carriers is the by-product of standardization inspections executed by EASA.  In addition the regulation points out that these inspections are also executed by national aviation authorities causing several Member States to take certain enforcement measures and in turn inform the Air Safety Committee and the Commission about these measures (The European Commission, 2013, pp.8). Whether an airline carrier is considered to be compliant with SAFA is dictate by the governing authority. For example, when findings call for it and a carrier is found to be non-compliant, and the carrier fails to make the necessary changes, the carrier’s Air Operator Certificate (AOC) is revoked. An example of this can be seen in the legislation when it’s noted that the European Commission informed Romania that the Air Operator Certificate (‘AOC’) of their jet carrier Jetran Air was revoked. Another example of the legislation being enforced can be seen when the AOC of the popular carrier in Spain IMD Airways expired and then is put through the revocation process (The European Commission, 2013, pp.8). To justify these incidents, the legislation states that “(11) Should any relevant safety information indicate that there are imminent safety risks as a consequence of a lack of compliance by Union air carriers with the appropriate safety standards, Member States reiterated their readiness to act as necessary” (The European Commission, 2013, pp.8). This means when the Member States fail to act, their AOCs are revoked.

Some of the carriers banned from operating with the European Union include, Ariana Afghan Airlines of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, Air Jet of the Republic of Angola, Africa Airways of the Republic of Benin, Equaflight Service of the Republic of Congo, Puto Azul of Equatorial Guinea, Sky Gabon of the Republic of Gabon, Batik Air of the Republic of Indonesia, Air Almaty of the Republic of Kazakhstan, Air Manas of the Kyrgyz Republic, Petro Air of Libya, Emilio Air Charter LDA of the Republic of Mozambique and the list goes on. Within the community list legislation, the European Commission notes that, “where an airline which is currently included in the Community list deems itself to be in conformity with the necessary technical elements and requirements prescribed by the applicable international safety standards, it may request the Commission to commence the procedure for its removal from the list”. While they provide an avenue out of being black listed, it is still challenging to overcome the operational limitations both tangible and un-tangible that are imposed on carriers listed as well as those that warrant a review. For example within the legislation under the title “Air carriers from the Russian Federation (82”), the authors note that, “aircraft operated by some air carriers certified in the Russian Federation and flying into airports in the Union are being subjected to prioritised SAFA ramp inspections to verify their compliance with the international safety standards”. This is a prime example of how being on the EC’s radar, even when a carrier is not officially listed, can subject them to unnecessary review. This is how non-member states are handled by the EASA, specifically those regions that have questionable compliance operations in respect SAFA regulations. Ultimately the Russian Federation is an outside jurisdiction to that of the EU Member States, making their interaction with the EASA an inter-agency correspondence. The stipulations of this interaction between agencies can be seen within the legislation when it’s noted that, “the competent authorities of the Member States and EASA continue to inform their counterparts in the Russian Federation about the identified concerns and invite them to take action to address any non-compliance with ICAO standards” . The fact that the Russian carriers are subject to “prioritized SAFA ramp inspections,” demonstrates the enhanced level of scrutiny the EASA gives to non-member states, but it can also be viewed as effective international security policy.

Impact on Businesses: Case Examples

This case study assists in demonstrating how SAFA has economically impacted companies involved in the regulatory enforcement of destabilizing arms transfers. The very first case predates the EU air safety enforcement ban list as it occurred in 2004. More recently, other companies, not specifically named in EC air safety regulations but targeted as a result of EU technical inspection missions have also been banned. These cases, together with other control experiments performed on air safety inspection databases, independently confirm the correlations between air safety violations and air cargo carriers named in arms trafficking-related reports.

Between the year 2001 and the year 2004, Aerocom, a carrier registered in Moldova, found to be engaging in commodity smuggling. During this period the carrier executed over a dozens arms transfers to the Middle East and Africa and the Middle East. This information was uncovered during an interview with an air cargo industry executive in the Ukraine in 2007.  In 2003, the United Nations enlisted an expert panel to investigate Aerocom’s operations. During this period there were sanctions on Liberia and it was uncovered that the airline played a role in shipping arms to Charles Taylor’s regime (United Nations, 2003).  Despite the report, Aerocom continued its illegal operations through the Moldovan registry. During this time, staffers affiliated with the carrier, operated from a United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Kieve, Ukraine addresses. In 2004, EU member states formally expressed concerns regarding the security and safety issue violations carried by Aerocom with the Moldovan CAA, specifically Valeriu Ceban, the flight operations specialist certification and authorization inspector of Moldova (Ceban, 2005).  These actions eventually resulted in the EU member states requesting that the Moldovan inspector take actions to withdraw Aerocom’s air operations certificate (AOC). Ultimately the certificate was not renewed and then it expired on the first of August 2004. Despite Aerocom having it AOC revoked, the company continued to do business. The authors note, “in August 2004, an Ilyushin TD, operated by Aerocom and using the Aerocom call sign carried out four flights from the US-controlled Eagle Base, close to Tuzla in Bosnia and Herzegovina” (SIPRI, 2015, pp.1). The flight left Turkish airspace headed for Baghdad, Iraq carrying military equipment and ammunition as part of an arrangement setup by German and British arms brokers. This trip was executed for Taos Industries Inc., a US company.

Aerocom represents the first known case of a carrier registered in an Eastern or Central European country that was identified in an arms trafficking-related report and then had an AOC withdrawn based on air safety regulations. This is how it happened. Tuzla airport has an information database that covers all flights. The authors note however that, “one flight was not reported to the Bosnia and Herzegovina Directorate of Civil Aviation. As a result, the European Organisation for the Safety or Air Navigation (Eurocontrol) did not receive all the flight plans” (SIPRI, 2015, pp.1). What triggered many suspicions was the fact that Iraq’s Regional Air Movement Control Centre established no documented recording for landings by the Aerocom aircraft Ilyushin 76, which was said to have flown to and landed in Baghdad in the month of August 2004. Later on during that year, in November, the same Aerocom aircraft Ilyushin 76, was reportedly owned by a company called Artic, and it was registered under the AOC of a company called Jet Line International. The reason this raised even more attention was that outside of the flaws in documenting the flight plans, Jet Line International had previously been named in arms trafficking reports concerning national security. The aircraft Ilyushin 76 flew under Jet Line International’s AOC until Moldovan authorities withdrew the AOC for violations of international air safety regulations (SIPRI, 2015, pp.1). This AOC withdrawal represented one of many that year for carriers registered in Moldova, that occurred as the result of a technical inspection. There were specifically six AOC withdrawals that happened in total and they all resulted from a visit of an EC team of EU member state experts. The reports were published in the EC regulation of July 2007 (SIPRI, 2015, pp.1).

There are some additional cases of companies that have been black listed due to arms trafficking-related reports uncovered during ramp checks. These states are Georgia, Herzegovina, Armenia, Albania, Azerbaijan, Bosnia Norway, Croatia, Switzerland, Iceland, the Former Yugoslav Monaco, Republic of Macedonia, Moldova, Montenegro, Serbia, Turkey and Ukraine. All of these states had their licensing revoked due to non-compliance with EC safety standards. Serbia, together with Aerocom, and these cases are not mentioned in EC Regulations. Despite the fact that a holder of an Air Operator’s Certificate (AOC) when it’s issued by the Republic of Moldova, has their primary business location in the Republic of Moldova is entitled to be placed on this list, it was not done so in contradiction of Annex 6 in the Chicago Convention.’ Commission Regulation (EC) No 787/2007. It’s noted that a Serbian air carrier had its AOC suspended due to the fact on June 2007 Air Tomisko was inspected by EC led EU officials and the Serbian air cargo carrier was discovered to be functioning without having Third Party Liability Insurance. This resulted in a very fast suspension of the company’s AOC.  It was later revealed in a UN-funded report as well as an article published in the New York Times that the owner of the Serbian based company had actually been smuggling SALWs, small arms and light weapons for more than ten years across Africa (Cosgrove, 2013). The company was also known to smuggle a wide range of commodities.  This is a prime case of how SAFA’s safety protocols are able to isolate certain behaviour that on many occasions turn out to be violations of more than just safety but national security violations as well.

In another case, the EU performed inspections in 2008. This came after the EU issued a concern that Serbia was not following EASA standards or adhering to the necessary safety levels. The inspection resulted in the Serbian Civil Aviation Department withdrawing the AOCs of two prominent Serbian carriers Kosmas Air and United International Airlines (UIA). The case notes that, “UIA were established in Serbia following the closure of Air Sofia, an air cargo company registered in Bulgaria which had lost its Bulgarian AOC following an EU technical inspection mission to Sofia”(SIPRI, 2015, pp.1).  This fact suggests behaviour of juggling AOCs from one company to the next through fraudulent behaviour. In fact, the equipment and aircraft that was being transferred from one region to another had already been flagged. The case further notes, that, “Air Sofia transferred its aircraft to Serbia where the company was registered as UIA. Air Sofia has been named in multiple arms trafficking-related reports. Kosmas Air has been named in a UN sanction committee report which alleged that their aircraft was ‘mentioned in the context of the illicit transfer of arms to Liberia’ as well as the supply of arms to Rwanda”(SIPRI, 2015, pp.1). This is an example of how carriers share and exchange resources, and how the SAFE Program through the work of global network efficiency, has the ability to keep track of aircraft that might previously have been the cause of AOC suspensions at other companies that went through inspections or perhaps the same company by a different name.

Compliant and Non-Compliant Behaviour

The European Civil Aviation Authorities has handled the ramp inspection process since 1996 regarding all aircraft visiting their country. As noted within current policy, “during such an inspection, the compliance with the applicable International safety standards (issued by the International Civil Aviation Organisation [ICAO]) is checked. These inspections became mandatory for all Member States of the European Union as of April 2006. This leaflet is to explain the setup of the program” (Austro Control GmbH, 2013, pp.1). The program is structured specifically to ensure the safety and security of both travellers and the EU air space. For this purpose standards of compliance are put in place to reduce error in the inspection procedure. There is specific legislation that empowers inspectors to carry out their duties efficiently and in a way that makes the policy effective. Linda Werfelman (2010), has described the EU black list formed from those considered non-compliant with these regulations as “an efficient dissuasive measure.” She made this claim in part due to what is seen as the success of the program.

Legal basis

Based on the European Parliament’s legal Directive 2004/36/CE, as well as the standards set by the Council on the safety of third-country aircraft using Community airports, Member States are given the authority to inspect aircraft that enter their airspace that are from a third party, third country air craft, and that are suspected of not complying with international safety standards. Under the terms of this law third party aircraft are defined as those “aircraft not used or operated under the control of a competent authority of a Member State” (Austro Control GmbH, 2013, pp.2). It is also essential that the aircraft must be suspected of not complying with international legislation unless a specific procedure is implemented known as “spot check”. The legislation further breaks down the standards for the inspection procedure explain the used of spot check when it’s noted that in addition to being obligated to inspect when an aircraft is suspected of being non-compliant, “Member States may also inspect EU aircraft and may inspect aircraft according to a spot-check procedure without having any suspicion of noncompliance. The Annex to this directive has been amended by the Commission Directive 2008/49/EC. The obligations set out in the above mentioned Directive are for the 27 EU States only” (Austro Control GmbH, 2013, pp.2). Here it’s made clear that the legislation applies to distinct EU States and it is not applicable to all EU states but it’s further recognized that the European Aviation Safety Agency has signed working arrangements with 19 non-EU ECAC States. Through these arrangements the states are also included in the SAFA programme. Through this method the EU Member States and the Non-EU ECAC States referred to as the SAFA Participating States, which extends the regulatory authority of the policy to assess whether a state is compliant or non-compliant.

Which aircraft are checked?

Regardless of the obligation to check aircraft suspected of non-compliance, the legislation specifically states that if spot check procedures are implemented, random aircraft can be checked including nonparticipating non-EU operators. It’s noted that, “the Participating States choose which aircraft to inspect. Besides the obligation that aircraft being suspected of non-compliance with the international safety standards shall be inspected, most participating States carry out random inspections. Both aircraft used by EU operators and non-EU operators may be inspected” (Austro Control GmbH, 2013, pp.2). This means so long as official random checks are orchestrated the procedure can be enforced and applied to those existing outside the region of the council. While this does allow for enhanced security and the authority of the legislation to extend beyond what’s perceived as its intended purpose, it could be questionable as to whether or this has a positive or negative impact on private carries from non-EU regions and whether the policy can be used as a form of monopoly control on the market.

What is checked?

The SAFA Ramp Checks are conducted through inspecting a list of 54 specific times. It’s noted that, the inspection checklist is composed of four primary parts: “Part A concerns items to be inspected in the flight deck of the aircraft. Part B of the checklist concerns items to be checked in the (passenger) cabin, and mainly consists of safety equipment. Part C relates to the general technical condition of the aircraft which needs to be verified during a walk around check” (European Civil Aviation’s Conference, 2005, pp.19). Part D checklist items concern the cargo compartment of the aircraft and the cargo carried. It is SAFA policy to avoid flight delays unless there are specific safety reasons. This is primarily due to the fact that the time between flight arrival and departure might be too limited to go over the entire 54 item checklist. For example, checks could include: ­“licences of the pilots; ­ procedures and manuals that should be carried in the cockpit; ­ compliance with these procedures by flight and cabin crew; ­ safety equipment in cockpit and cabin; ­ cargo carried in the aircraft; and ­ the technical condition of the aircraft” (Austro Control GmbH, 2013, pp.2). Here it’s clear that the primary concern as to whether a specific carrier is compliant or non-compliant focuses on safety. If a carrier is suspected of being unsafe, and violating parameters mentioned within the checklist, then they can be obligated to go through an inspection. The benefit of this process is that it enhances safety and reduces the likelihood of non-compliant carriers from traveling, but there is also an aspect of national security that alleviates concerns in regards to transport of illegal goods. As these are thorough inspections, the likelihood of uncovering illegal materials or those detrimental to the security of citizens of the Member State, become more probable through an inspection. The factors checked through these inspections are uniform and standard across all carriers and state entities. This is further emphasized by Austro Control (2013) when it’s stated that, “the inspections carried out by the Participating States follow a common procedure and are then reported by entering them into the centralised SAFA database of the European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA). It has to be stressed that SAFA inspections are limited to on-the-spot assessments and cannot substitute for proper regulatory oversight and therefore they cannot guarantee the airworthiness of a particular aircraft” (Austro Control GmbH, 2013, pp.2). The main criteria for what is checked during one of the inspections are those factors that would most reduce safety and not comply with the SAFA regulations. Due to this fact, it is most irresponsible of a flight carrier to assume that an aircraft is flight worthy just because it passes one of these inspections.

Findings and follow-up actions

During the inspection the inspectors identify what is known as compliant and non-compliant factors. Non-compliant factors during an inspection are referred to as findings. The authors note that factors that are compliant are those that are checked off and that done’ deviate from the required standards of safety. When the deviations are identified, but classified as being minor, then they are reported to the commanding captain, but as noted within Austro control (2013), “a non-compliance found during an inspection is called a finding. Such findings are categorised according to the magnitude of the deviation of the requirements and to the influence on safety of the non-compliance. Minor deviations (category 1) are reported to the Pilot in Command” (Austro Control GmbH, 2013, pp.2). In this respect it depends on the severity of Non-compliance to determine whether an inspection calls for being forwarded to the operating authority.  For example, while category 1 deviations from safety protocol are just reported to the pilot, category 2 deviations are reported to the person in charge of the operations. Finally category three deviations may require keeping the light from taking off, or at the very least applying strict limitation to the flight’s operations. Conditions note that, “where non-compliances have a major impact on safety (category 3), the flight crew is in addition expected to correct such non-compliances before the aircraft departs by either correcting the deficiency or by imposing restrictions on the aircraft operations” (Austro Control GmbH, 2013, pp.2). An example of a category three safety risk would be a defective seat that needs to be blocked to prevent a passenger from using it.

Follow-up process

When findings are identified, it means there are non-compliance issues that need to be handled. This involves stakeholders of the SAFE program. The stakeholder of the SAFE program included the State of Registry, the State of Operator, as well as the state in which the inspection was executed. These are the organisations recognize as the key players involved in the follow-up process once there has been an inspection. The procedures involved in the follow up process are as follows:

• Step 1: This step entails the SAFA inspector debriefing the Pilot in command and then handing over the Proof of Inspection material (Cederholm,2014).
• Step 2: Once the Pilot in command has been debriefed, there is a formal request for the pilot to sign the Proof of Inspection material to confirm awareness of the non-compliance violations (Cederholm,2014).
• Step 3: If it’s found that the violations are category 2 and/or 3, then a written communication is required and sent to the operator as well as the competent authority responsible for overseeing the operator’s work.
• Step 4: The operator is then formally requested draft a written reply communicating with an action plan that will address deficiencies and deviations.
• Step 5: The competent authority may be requested to provide a written confirmation as well regarding their knowledge of the action plan. This step is put in place to incorporate the oversight of the competent authority in case their expertise may identify weaknesses within the action plan.
• Step 6: Findings, proof of non-compliance, is considered resolved once they have been addressed by all stakeholders involved.
• Step 7: A follow up inspection may occur to ensure that all findings have been addressed. This step is carried out by the state.

Database analysis

All data reports are issued by Member State authorities are kept in a central database managed by the JAA.  It’s standard protocol within the SAFA program for the JAA to assess all data and to report its findings to the Member States regularly. All possible safety hazards are reported and data such as standards of operation or action reports that occurred during, and after, the incident are also stored within the database for the JAA’s review.

It should be noted that SAFA inspections are recognized as surface assessments of immediate incidents and they are not expected to replace standard regulatory oversight or protocols to dictate whether or not an aircraft is flight worthy. When data is stored, it’s for reporting purposes to be reviewed by the JAA. Austro notes, that, “all reported data is stored centrally in a computerised database set up and managed by EASA. The database also holds supplementary information, such as lists of actions carried out following inspections which revealed non-compliances” (Austro Control GmbH, 2013, pp.2). All non-compliance information is reviewed and then the carrier is assessed for their performance and risk measure to identify whether they should be placed on the black list. The final review is made by the JAA, when the risk category is viewed as being extensive beyond a regular deviation from the basic criteria for a safe air craft. Despite this procedure being set for exceptional cases, on a daily basis the EASA reviews the database. This criteria is set to ensure that the system is comprehensive and efficient. It’s further noted that, “the European Commission and Member States are informed about the results of the analysis and are advised on any identified potentially safety hazards” (Austro Control GmbH, 2013, pp.2). Ultimately, all participating States are held solely responsible for the performance of aircraft and passing inspections. of the inspections. The European Aviation Safety Agency holds are information related to the SAFA program including database material and analysis procedures.

Analysis of Findings

Through research of the available Data on performed Ramp Checks, the banned Community list, questionnaires sent to operators and pilots, the author will try to evaluate and analyse the possible economic impact of the program. Through research of the validated findings through the SAFA Program the different approach types used by operators in respect to the SAFA Program responses were analysed utilizing a survey tool. For the purpose of acquiring a clearer understanding of how SAFE has impacted the EU airline industry, initially 83 respondents were surveyed within the industry. The table below is breakdown of their age groups.

The respective age groups of respondents ranged from 21years of to 60 years or older. A few declined to provide their age.

When asked for their age, out of 83 respondants, 81 answered the questions provide. An estimaed 12.3 percent of respondents (10) confirmed they were between the age of 21 and 29, 38.3% (31) marked that they were between the ages 31 and 39, 29.6 percent  checked that they (24) were between the ages of 40 and 49, 16 percent (13) claimed that they were between the ages of 50 and 59 and 3.7 percent (3) identified with being 60 years or older.

When asked to identify their position in the company, of the 83 respondents, 81 answered. An estimated 53.1 percent (43) were pilots, 25.9 percent (21) represented management, 12.3 percent (10) were CAA Staff and 8.6 percent (7) identified with the classification of other. The seven respondents that identified themselves as ‘other’ represented titles such as Senior Engineer – MRO, Fleet Manager, Inspector, Airworthiness, Engineer, or Passenger Service.

All positions of respondents listed in the survey indicate the survey serves as a thorough assessment of the issue at hand, as respondents reflect the full scope of the industry as a whole, crossing all department. Staff, management, and pitlots are represented as well as other relative positons within the industry that might impact how SAFA impacts performance.

When asked whether their airline/ commercial air operation expericned SAFA Ramp checks in Europe, 85.7 percent of respondents (65) stated yes. The table and chart can be seen below:

This reveals that SAFA Ramp checks play a significant role in overall operations within the European Airline industry.

With an undeniable majority of carriers traveling throughout EU airspace experiencing these types of inspections, it becomes very clear that research into how this inspections and the relative legislation is impacting carriers and the industry may provide significant insight into improvements for all stakeholders inolved going forward. This can especially be said in regards to details related to procedures of inspections and how they impact efficiency or ROI.

When asked whether they saw any flaws and gaps in the flight procedures, handbooks and organisational structures before the implementation of the Ramp Check Program, some respondents noted that they recognized many, while others stated that identified none. One respondent stated that the airline was “missing common lowest standards on which you can assess foreign airlines,” another stated the airline had, “no structure and common standard” while another cited their airline as having “massive errors in standards, no minimum oversight by some CAA s. A recurring complaint was issues with CAAs lacking standards and supervision practices as well as issues with procedures, fuel planning, duty time, and loading instructions. Another respondent states that they were unable to answer the question as their airline had not been subject to the SAFA program for the first 17 years of his employment. This was a common complaint and resulted in respondent attributing a lack of SAFA knowledge to staffers such as pilots, who they claimed had a vague understanding of the policies and standards. For example, one respondent stated their company spent 11 years flying in Africa, and they only experienced SAFA in the last 10 years of operations; such exposure to the program results in pilots only having a vague understanding of compliant and non-compliant practices. While many airline staffers have since become more certain regarding SAFA protocols, there were occasions when crews “believed” “that if it’s not covered by the MEL it must be OK.”  Some respondents claimed their companies had poor procedures and poor quality manuals that needed to be updated, and they cited a lack of resources within the organisation. Discrepancies between DOM/DOI tables in OM-B and actual figures used on load sheets, and operators paying less attention to unapproved installations, placards and emergency lights are examples of the types of manual issues and issues with lack of oversight cited in the survey. Compliance with requirements and out of date approvals was cited as a major issue, but also identified by many as being a standard aspect of operations in the growth and development process. Many respondents recognized there is always room for developing with every organization, and that SAFA checks have very little to do with the procedures and organization structure. It concentrates to status of aircraft, and aircrafts’ and operators documentation. One respondent pointed out that despite the airline having deficiencies in procedures, few of the deficiencies were identified through the SAFA checks.

As there are minor findings in updating manuals, much the same as what is being found by SAFA (e.g location and numbers of safety equipment), it is recommended that handbooks and procedures being continuously developed and readapted to daily operations for relevance and effectiveness. The need for continuous improvement was viewed overall as an aspect of operations that is standard and that would never change. The chart below represents the number of respondents that identified SAFA as responsible for improving flaws and gaps in their company systems:

When asked if the implementation of SAFA Ramp Check Program mproved the flaws and gaps in procedures, 52.2 percent (35) of respondents said ‘yes’, while 47.8 percent stated ‘no.’ Popular concensus among all respondents was that there is still substantial room for improvement. One respondent claimed that, “SAFA does not dig deep enough to really uncover unsafe airlines like Ryanair, China and Eastblock carriers, they simply have their papers nice and shiny and dont pop up then.” Responses revealed that in addition to there being substantial need for operators to better understand SAFA standards, there could also be room for improvements within the program itself to better confront contemporary risks and procedures.

It’s important to mention that when asked if the ramp checks caused delays, 71.2 percent (52) respondents stated yes. The average time given for these delays was about 44 minutes, but some respondents cited times as long as 300 minutes. When asked what the reason was for these delays, 25.4 percent (15) of respondents cited technical findings; an estiamted 15.3 percent (9) attributed the delay to operational (flightPlan, W/B, Pilot Licenses, or non-compliance issues related to flight procedures, and 13.6 percent (8) attributed the cause to Certification issues such as AOC or other CAA documents. An overwhelming majority, specifically 45 percent (27) identified with other reasons as being the cause of the delay. When these respondents chose the other category is almost always was to claim their delay was the results of all of the options. This suggests that SAFA is working in providing improvement, but it also could be a sign that the process is incredibily strict. The idea that SAFA causes delays ties into to the argument previosuly mentioned by Žabokrtský (2011). The author pointed out how a uniform standard of safety policy allows operators to measure their performance against their peers and effectively optimize efficiency and travel standards. However there are some negative aspects of the system spanning across all Member States, where the constant obligation to exchange information and to update all Member Sates of safety status cuts into operating times. Proof of this can be seen with respondent responses some attributing ramp inspections to 300 minute delays. For example, involving many institutions and organizations in daily procedures of a carrier creates more bureaucracy which can slow down effective operations. It’s noted that, “in areas based on Directives the progress was less significant, as these acts, to be valid, have to be incorporated into the legal system of each Member State, which is often a slow and painful process” (Žabokrtský, 2011, pp. 180). Here the author acknowledges that there can be some conflict with the procedure of exchanging information. The advantage of having carriers work independently to form their own business relationships is that it results in more time efficient operations. In the defense of the program, it could also be argued thatt many of the delays that occurred due to ramp inspections happened because the carriers were not following proper safety procedures.

One final value worth mentioning is in regards to the caliber of insight provided by the respondents. When asked were you working in the field of aviation prior to the development of the Safety Assesment of Foreign Aircraft (SAFA ) Ramp Check Program, 76.8 percent of respondents (53) states yes, with 23.2 percent (16) of respondents stating no.

The reason the above data is imoortant is due to the fact that it reveals the credibility of respondents both as individuals who experienced procedures prior to the implementation of SAFA.

The importance of whether or not SAFA has really provided improvements in policies and operatons, can be found within the answers of these respondents. The experience to know what performance of the airlines was like both before and after SAFA implementation is envaluable to this study as it adds a distinct credibility to the report.

Overall data from the survey suggests that the SAFA program is less effective than previous research on the topic might suggest. Many of the respondents had worked with airlines for more than ten years and had adequate exposure to airline procedures, allowing for ample criteria from which to extract qualitative data on the program. While the fact that slightly more than 50 percent of respondants did agree that the program resulted in improvements, the metric is far too low to identify the program as a success. The fact that SAFa has many negative economic affects on carriers, by limiting their capacity for operations across the EU calls for the program to, at the very least, satisfy its goal for heightened security, an area where its impact is questionable at best. More research may be necessary to identify the true efficacy of the program as a supplement for keeping airlines more secure. Developments within the EU airline indistry must also be taken into account, as many respondents claimed continuous improvement as an essntial factor in whether or not their companies met safety standards. This means the SAFA program might have to live up to the same expectation of contintuous improvement, which could be difficult if amendments are limited by a prolonged bureaucratic process.

Conclusion

In sum, air transport is recognize as a driving force for social and economic progress through its ability to keep people connected and expand the reach of business operations. In many ways, the aviation industry serves as a vital part of economic growth. Many of the changes that have been implemented throughout the aviation sector can be attributed to policy changes made by the European Union. They have involved a wide range of institutional developments that would be nearly impossible without uniform policy application and strategic thinking. On the 21st of April 2004, the European Union implemented Directive 2004/36/EG, a new regulation regarding the Safety Assessment of Foreign Aircraft, also known recognized as the SAFA Program. SAFA inspections are recognized as surface assessments of immediate incidents and they are not expected to replace standard regulatory oversight or protocols to dictate whether or not an aircraft is flight worthy. There are some negative aspects of the system spanning across all Member States. For example, involving many institutions and organizations in daily procedures of a carrier creates more bureaucracy which can slow down effective operations. Data reveals that the financial impact EU air safety bans and SAFA protocols has had on carriers and their operations is undeniable. EU standards are based on protocols established by the ICAO and then interpreted by member states. Enforcing air safety standards entails the use of the List of Air Carriers subject to an operating ban, which dictates which entities are barred from entering EU airspace. This project determined the economic impact of this Ramp Check Program on the operators and airlines flying to and within Europe, and assessed what kind of impact from an economic view do these ramp checks have on airlines and operators through delays, extra work with findings during SAFA checks, possible changes to handbooks, and ops procedures. It also evaluated how do compliant and non-compliant approaches of different operators towards this program affect their business cases.

Findings reveal that the economic limitations that arise out of this legislation have a substantial impact of airline carriers and their ability to operate. This data is very telling in regards to the financial impact SAFA has had on carriers as it delves into the assets sharing practices of airlines. The primary concern as to whether a specific carrier is compliant or non-compliant focuses on safety. If a carrier is suspected of being unsafe, and violating parameters mentioned within the checklist, then they can be obligated to go through an inspection. The benefit of this process is that it enhances safety and reduces the likelihood of non-compliant carriers from traveling, but there is also an aspect of national security that alleviates concerns in regards to transport of illegal goods. Blacklisting individual carriers can have much greater consequences that extend beyond their ability to operate in the EU, even if other civil aviation authorities refrain from also blacklisting the carrier. Aerocom represents the first known case of a carrier registered in an Eastern or Central European country that was identified in an arms trafficking-related report and then had an AOC withdrawn based on air safety regulations. The burden placed on airlines attempting to prepare for a blacklisting is that they must evaluate their code share flights to see how they might be affected. They must identify route destination schedules that might be impacted and then change them in a way that doesn’t impact their revenue. In many cases this can be very difficult, especially when a carrier is heavily reliant on providing travel to EU locations. Carriers must keep in mind there might be additional inspections or safety checks which they may not foresee, and then prepare for those as they could result in a longer turnaround times and more time needed for connections. Carriers also need to anticipate how their leasers may view a black listing or potential black listing and confirm with insurance companies and the companies through which they access aircraft how such instances will financially impact business. Many airlines do not own their aircraft, and even those that do own their aircraft are in the habit of leasing out aircraft to carriers that may not follow proper ramp procedures that would classify them as compliant with SAFA. In addition to the challenge blacklisted carriers face at maintaining their business relationships with non-blacklisted carriers and relevant affiliates, there are also some financial factors that come into play such as higher operating costs. These costs can be attributed to factors like increased insurance premiums that come as a byproduct of insurance companies viewing the blacklisted carrier as a greater flight risk. Higher operating costs due to these carriers being viewed as insurance liabilities creates a major economic hurdle for the black listed carrier that is a very time sensitive endeavour.

Through implementing new strict regulations, the EU forces carriers to invest in new forms of airline supply that are counter to traditional asset sharing procedures (Cappelli, 1985). Overall data suggests that the SAFA program is less effective than previous research on the topic might suggest. Many of the respondents had worked with airlines for more than ten years and had adequate exposure to airline procedures, allowing for ample criteria from which to extract qualitative data on the program. A recurring complaint was issues with CAAs lacking standards and supervision as well as issues with procedures, fuel planning, duty time, and loading instructions. While standards of safety appear to be the primary focus of the legislation, the economic benefit of complying with the regulations is undeniable. What is also undeniable is the substantially negative economic impact imposed on a carrier that fails to comply with these standards. The most tragic aspect of the law really is the combination of its policies regarding information and how it should be exchange in collaboration with written stipulations which place distinct priority preference on certain carriers. This can be seen in the Russian Federation example. While there are clearly many benefits to SAFA as method for security control, it’s impact on the free market development of the airline industry within the European Union could be a hindrance.

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