Technological Risks, Essay Example
A technology risk may be defined as one that exposes a business to a potential loss resulting from failure in an area the business. That is reliant upon technology, IP design, engineering, and the factory, computer technology processing etc. . In April 2007, the Japanese government appointed the firm of Mitsubishi heavy industry to develop and install the technology for fast breeder reactors. [FB] in order to provide nuclear power facilities in Japan. This was highly controversial in Japan, given the FDR that was operated by non-Jew and closed in 1994, owing to a sodium leak and fire in the second recording circuit. The restart was planned for 2008 and subsequently deferred until May 2010.
The risks from the technology in the fast breeder reactors span a number of different areas. Essentially, contamination from the neutron absorbing fission products. The concern of lots of weapons grade plutonium from the reprocessing technologies. This is considered to be less of a potential risk with Japan. More than that associated with belligerent nations, like you ran in the Middle East. There is also the dangers associated with the extraction and subsequent reprocessing of nuclear waste. It is estimated that waste disposed underground takes the name of 100,000 years in order to neutralize the point of safety. Dispose of nuclear waste has always been a controversial matter, given recent ecological disasters like that of the oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico, technology will need to demonstrate that it can deal with nuclear waste disposal and keep the potential risk to a minimum.
It is now reported by Japan today that the non-Jew fast breeder reactor has resumed operation. After 14 years and five months of suspension.” The reactor, operated by the Japan Atomic Energy Agency, is expected to reach criticality, or the point when a nuclear chain reaction becomes self-sustaining, on Saturday. The reactor is then to gradually raise its power output and begin full-fledged operations in the spring of 2013.” (Kyodo News).
” The construction of the Monju reactor started in the mid-1980s as a key part of the nation’s nuclear fuel recycling program. The reactor first achieved criticality in April 1994, but was shut down after a serious accident involving a leak of sodium, used as a coolant, and a fire in December 1995.” (Japan Times).
Japan hopes to commercialize FBR technology by 2050. The people argue that the early technology of the power plant, as operated by Monju, has become out of date and in need of important upgrading. They also believe that the sight of the plant is unsafe and as such, puts people at risk. This is owing to its proximity to a seismic fault lines and the potential of earthquakes. “For a CNIC stated that the Japanese government has spent $9.6 billion to date on maintaining the site”(Tunnicliffe).
The costs of building and maintaining the so called ‘dream reactors’, are extremely high. The technology risks are not insignificant and need to be embedded into a critical safety program in order to support the technological development of the nuclear power plants ” However, the economics of fast-breeder reactors are still questionable and in Japan, figures of as much as ¥2.8 trillion (€20 billion) have been reported as expenditure on the project. Even so, the government is expected to state that operations of fast-breeder reactors on a commercial basis will not start until 2050 or even later. ” (Nuclear Engineering International).
The International Panel on Fissile Properties produced a report on the international dimensions of Fast Breeder Reactor technology and in summary stated: ” The report notes that “fast breeder” reactors already have been the focus of more than $50 billion in development spending, including more than $10 billion each by the U.S., Japan and Russia. Yet, the report further notes, none of these efforts has produced a reactor that is anywhere near economically competitive with light-water reactors” (Podvig).
The risks associated with the FBR technology were summarized as early as 1956 by Adm. Hyman Rickover of the U.S. Navy. He recalled a nuclear submarine program whereby such reactors were expensive to build, extremely complex to operate and had considerable maintenance problems as they were prone to prolonged shutdowns, as a result of minor malfunctions. He went on to say that this interrupted Navel operations as the repairs were both time-consuming and expensive.
Japan has experienced similar problems with its FBR technology programs. One of the advantages of FBR is the ability to re-process the nuclear waste as opposed to long term storage issues. This concept is what makes it attractive to both the USA and Japan. The danger being that it exposes the risk of loss of huge amounts of weapons grade plutonium to potential terrorist groups. As such, the governments that use FBR technology programs have the responsibility to maintain a high degree of security over both the technology and the by-products that this produces. The Problems with FBR Fission have been described as follows” Under appropriate operating conditions, the neutrons given off by fission reactions can “breed” more fuel from otherwise non-fissionable isotopes. The most common breeding reaction is that of plutonium-239 from non-fissionable uranium-238. The term “fast breeder” refers to the types of configurations which can actually produce more fissionable fuel than they use, such as the LMFBR. This scenario is possible because the non-fissionable uranium-238 is 140 times more abundant than the fissionable U-235 and can be efficiently converted into Pu-239 by the neutrons from a fission chain reaction. ” (Fromm).
Japan, China, Russia and Korea seem the most committed countries to the applied use of FBR technology ” Japan, China, Korea, and Russia are all committing substantial research funds to further development based on existing LMFBR designs, anticipating that rising uranium prices will change this in the long term. ” (Fromm). The concept of Korea having this technology is particularly disturbing given the ongoing instability in that region. There is in addition little control over North Korea in terms of what it does with weapons grade plutonium and it has long been a concern of the west that this might fall into the hands of terrorist groups.
Fig 1 illustrates the type of Fast Breeder Nuclear Reactors being built in India for Nuclear power production. Other countries are taking a less than favourable stance on the use of Fast Breeder Technology and the concerns applicable to cost and safety are causing most longer term programs to be scrapped. France has gone further abandoning it all together ” Most breeder reactors are being shut down. “Germany, the United Kingdom and the United States have abandoned their breeder reactor development programs. Despite the arguments by France’s nuclear conglomerate Areva, that fast-neutron reactors will ultimately fission all the plutonium building up in France’s light-water reactor spent fuel, France’s only operating fast-neutron reactor, Phénix, was disconnected from the grid in March 2009 and scheduled for permanent shutdown by the end of that year. The Superphénix, the world’s first commercial-sized breeder reactor, was abandoned in 1998 and is being decommissioned. There is no follow-on breeder reactor planned in France for at least a decade.”(Salem-News).
The rationale for building FBR reactors is no longer a sound policy as both the costs and risks are considered to be too great ” “The rationale for pursuing breeder reactors — sometimes explicit and sometimes implicit — was based on the following key assumptions: 1. Uranium is scarce and high-grade deposits would quickly become depleted if fission power were deployed on a large scale; 2. Breeder reactors would quickly become economically competitive with the light-water reactors that dominate nuclear power today; 3. Breeder reactors could be as safe and reliable as light-water reactors; and, 4. The proliferation risks posed by breeders and their ‘closed’ fuel cycle, in which plutonium would be recycled, could be managed. Each of these assumptions has proven to be wrong.” (Kraft)
The core of the BR also imposes a world health risk in the event that a meltdown should happen. In Japan where these all built in areas of high seismic risk this becomes a dangerous possibility. To put this into proper perspective, the core contains roughly a ton of plutonium. The poison is so toxic that if it was released into the atmosphere, there would be enough toxic material generated to give lung cancer to everyone on the planet. The plutonium in an FBR core is highly concentrated constituting several hundred times the critical mass of the core reactor. In addition, it is predicted that by 2020 there will be hundreds of rail wagons loaded with liquid metal cooled casks with spent fuel on the way to or from nuclear reprocessing plants. Despite the sophistication and technology to control such shipments, there remains the risk of natural disasters. e.g fire, flood, earthquakes etc. that potentially could create an ecological disaster. Unlike oil spillage or chemical spillage it would be virtually impossible to build a contingency plan to deal with the outcome of the radiological disaster that might follow.
The engineering contractors within the nuclear construction industry claim to have devoted more efforts to safety issues than any of the other technologists. The emphasis is based upon adherence to engineering workers following the technical blueprint in the construction process. This has two main issues associated with it: [1] the blueprints are 100% correct in the first place. As there is no real margin for error here and [2] There is some allowance tolerance built in for human frailty, particularly in the more high risk technology areas. The main issues being sufficient safeguards back up systems, the ability to impose a critical shutdown and adequate recovery procedures in the event of a disaster scenario.
In addition to the technological risks associated with the FBR reactors in Japan, they also have to factor in the Nuclear Reprocessing plants that they have to build. These impose yet an additional cost and risk burden to the Japanese economy. In the prefecture of Fukui, where Japan has constructed a major nuclear reprocessing plant, they conducted a local survey amongst the people and determined that 81.6% of the population were uneasy about the proximity of the plant to their district. The town of Aomen in the prefecture is an agricultural and marine town. In 2006 they announced that the levels of radiation in the region writes will rise to twice that of the present background level in the levels in edible seaweed would increase by a factor of 2000 times. ” The major supermarkets in Japan said that they will not purchase the products even if the radiation levels on minute.” (Green Action). ” Japan’s nuclear fuel-cycle program has made significant progress, but technical and political hurdles remain. The program has been hampered by an accident with a prototype fast-breeder reactor and the lingering anxiety of residents near the site. Yet, Tokyo appears determined to pursue a full-scale independent nuclear fuel cycle, believing it will enhance Japan’s energy security, enable efficient use of energy resources, and contribute to Japan’s overall efforts to reduce emissions of greenhouse gases.” (Schiffer)
So as we examine risks in technology in Japan it is equally important to consider how similar risks translate to the other areas within S.E. Asia. As Japan struggles with issues at home it seeks to export its engineering and technological knowledge to other areas. One such concern being the construction of a nuclear power plant in the seismically active region of Indonesia ” Japanese civil society has repeatedly exposed bungles, cover-ups, and just plain corruption associated with nuclear power and big dam projects, sometimes derailing them. But what of Indonesia, a polity hardly known for its technocratic prowess, where professional bureaucratic decision-making is often questionable, and where the level of transparency and accountability is frequently questioned..” (Richard Tanter).
In Indonesia they are building one such plant in close proximity to a Volcano (See Fig 2 Aerial shot). Hence not only is the reason seismically active but there is the added risk of volcanic disruption. There are plans to build 4 such atomic plants on the muria peninsula seismically active region. Essentially the entire region is moving towards nuclear technology and this seems somewhat insane given the record of earthquakes, tsunamis, and volcanic activity. We all remember the volcanic eruption of Krakatoa which blew apart the entire Island. ” Southeast Asia looms large in talk of a “global nuclear renaissance.” Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand and Vietnam have all notified the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) of their interest in developing nuclear electric power generation, and the IAEA has collaborated with the Philippines in a study of the possibility of finally turning on the scandal-ridden Bataan Nuclear Power Plant, which was completed in 1984″ (Richard Tanter)
Perhaps the magnitude of global risk is more closely explained when looking at the map contained within Fig 3 that illustrates the proposed build of Nuclear power plants in the Java peninsula. If we start to add nuclear reprocessing plants into this equation, then we have an alarming recipe for a future ecological disaster with potential global dimensions. Although the engineers state they have the technology in order to make these plants safe. It is highly debatable whether this would be the case if a tsunami flooded the plant or an earthquake or volcano created significant seismic destruction. The plant in the Phillipines is also in a high risk area and already has a troubled history. ” that the operation of the power plant poses grave danger to life and environment, and is unacceptable to the people of Central Luzon. Noting that the plant sits right on an active volcano, Polintan warned that any seismic activity might cause it to explode.” (OLEA)
The FBR systems undoubtedly make weapons grade plutonium and some have argued that Japan should use this to make weapons of self-defence, particularly given the threatening nature of countries like North Korea. Japan has resisted this prefering to stay under the nuclear umbrella of the United States. More recent activities, have however questioned whether this is in fact both a true and realistic lines of defence. The recent firing of missiles into Japanese air space and the sinking of a South Korean warship has antagonized the Japanese government.. ” Some have said the Japanese reactor-grade plutonium would not be fully usable, but the US detonated a reactor-grade plutonium device in 1962, and in order to discourage other countries from using plutonium as a fuel, President Carter declassified data on the feasibility of a reactor-grade plutonium for nuclear weapons in 1976. A nuclear bomb similar to the one exploded in Nagasaki can be made with seven to eight kg of plutonium” (Global Security Org).
In conclusion, the use of technology and application of atomic energy and nuclear reprocessing will remain at the forefront of controversial issues in Japan. Despite this. Japan is determined to have an atomic energy policy that looks as far ahead as 2050. The entire world will be looking at sources of clean energy and reducing reliance upon fossil fuels like oil. Whilst science and technology go hand-in-hand. Nevertheless, we will continue to face risks that challenge how we apply this technology. Good risk management looks at potential scenarios and tries to address different risk mitigation strategies. However, as we have seen more recently in the Gulf of Mexico, where BP had an offshore oil facility that was extracting oil from a mile below the surface. Despite the advanced technology there was no immediate solution that enabled a burst pipeline to be immediately repaired. The end result was an ecological disaster that may take the region a decade to recover from. Similarly, building nuclear power stations in seismically active regions may be considered as an irresponsible behavior by both the governments and the corporations that allow this to go ahead. Despite the need for clean energy, there is also a responsibility to the people to ensure that they live in a safe environment free from potential threat and contamination of food sources.
Works Cited
Fromm, James R. The Breeder Reactor. 1997. 26 5 2010 <http://www.3rd1000.com/nuclear/nuke101g.htm>.
Global Security Org. Global Security Org. 2010. 26 5 2010 <http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/world/japan/nuke.htm>.
Green Action. Green Action. 7 5 2007. 26 5 2010 <http://docs.google.com/viewer?a=v&q=cache:495gY6hHz2cJ:www.citizen.org/documents/JapaneseReprocessing.pdf+Risks+Of+Fast+Breeder+Reactor+Technology&hl=en&gl=uk&pid=bl&srcid=ADGEESg6_1GlOOdPWX5lcJccKADLrWl626t6QVnSmILNIUBWbSeGG8kQbtVf7V-HqRG9uB30f8pBtzpX97J>.
Japan Times. Monju fast-breeder reaches criticality. 9 5 2010. 26 5 2010 <http://search.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-bin/nn20100509a4.html>.
Kraft, David A. Nuclear Energy Information Service . 2010. 26 5 2010 <http://www.schaferforcongress.info/2010/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=181&Itemid=68>.
Kyodo News. Japan Today. 6 5 2010. 26 5 2010 <http://www.japantoday.com/category/technology/view/monju-fast-breeder-reactor-restarts-after-over-14-years-of-suspension>.
Nuclear Engineering International. Nuclear Engineering International. 1 6 2005. 26 5 2010 <Japanese ruling boosts fast breeder technology>.
OLEA, BY RONALYN V. Revival of Bataan Nuclear Power Plant a Source of Corruption? 5 2 2009. 26 5 2010 <http://www.pinoypress.net/2009/02/05/revival-of-bataan-nuclear-power-plant-a-source-of-corruption/>.
Podvig, Pavel. History and status of fast breeder reactor programs worldwide. research report. Princeton University NJ: The International Panel on Fissile Materials, 2010.
Richard Tanter, Arabella Imhoff and David Von Hippel. “Nuclear Power, Risk Management and Democratic Accountability in Indonesia: Volcanic, regulatory and financial risk in the Muria peninsula nuclear power proposal.” Asia Pacific Journal (2009).
Salem-News. Nuclear Waste/’Fast Breeder’ Reactor – Study: Problem-Plagued Reactor No Solution to Long-Term Nuclear Waste Problem. 17 2 2010. 26 5 2010 <http://www.salem-news.com/articles/february172010/fast_reactors.php>.
Schiffer, Shinichi Ogawa and Michael. Japan’s Plutonium Reprocessing Dilemma. 10 2005. 26 5 2010 <http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2005_10/Oct-Japan>.
Tunnicliffe, Helen. TCE Today : Japan’s Monju fast-breeder reactor restarts. 6 5 2010. 26 5 2010 <http://www.tcetoday.com/tcetoday/NewsDetail.aspx?nid=12747>.
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