The Arab Uprisings, Essay Example

The book, “Arab Uprisings” by James Gelvin is a well-organized account of the eventual unfolding of events in the Middle East, to result into what it is today. One of the most confusing and rather difficult questions to answer regards the reasons as to why so many rebellions and revolutions had to take place. The book gives a clear encounter if the various socio-cultural, political and historical contexts of all countries in relation to those of other countries such as Egypt, Yemen, Syria and Liberia among others[1]. The book employs a question and answer format, which provides an easy substantive reading experience. Gelvin employs his mastery of history to give an accurate report of the contemporary matters happening in the Middle East. The author elaborately gives the impacts of the revolts in the latter part of the book. One realizes that the uprisings have dire effects on both America and Iran while at the same time fueling the Israel-Palestine conflict and al-Qaeda by extension. Indeed, as per the subtitle of the book, everyone needs to know what is written within the pages of the book[2].

Gelvin notes that four major factors led to the Arab uprisings, despite the fact that each one of them has a unique historical background. One of these factors was the unsuccessful neoliberal policies by the United States government. The international food system as well as the benefits of compliance also contributed generously to these uprisings[3].

According to Gelvin, the “human element” was the major contributor to the social unrest that followed the Eve of the Arab Spring. The author is convinced that neither demographic challenges nor food crisis was the cause to this problem, and as such, he criticizes the social scientist theories, whose opinions regarding the causes of revolutions differ from his. He does not agree with the idea that the uprisings result from disruption of a period characterized by improving economic conditions by abrupt reversals. According to him, such theories fail to offer an explanation about the numerous instances when there are sufficient conditions for uprisings, yet no such uprisings occur. Gelvin goes further to explain that some factors emerge out of the blues, and these include the departing of heads of state in Egypt and Tunisia. Others include the unfair arrest and treatment of school going children in Syria as well as the incident in Bahrain where troops fired at peaceful protestors. Such instances according to him are the factors that led to the uprisings, which no individual had foreseen[4].

Considering these characteristics, society in Tunisia and Egypt seemed to be similar in nature, one of them being that there was a clear demarcation between the poor and the rich from the various neoliberal policies. As a result, tension came up, evident at the time of the uprisings. In addition, both countries have a similar history relating to the autocratic form of leadership that has brought up identities with a significant feel of solidarity[5]. The ensuing regimes from uprisings in these uprisings contributed to these social factors by a large extent. A good example is that of the Tunisian uprising, which led to an indelible mark on others, who followed suit in suicide-by-fire kinds of revolts[6]. Social media such as Facebook also became a significant platform where these revolts were exercised. The author also sheds light on the similarity of the Egyptian uprising with that of Tunisia, detailing the way it was disseminated from the state of having no leaders and its non-religious and non-violent nature[7].

One thing that the author brings out is the implication of the previous protest movements that occurred in Egypt during the uprising in 2011. He claims that these protests were characterized by both political and economic demands, giving those who organized them adequate experience and tact, leading to organizations that would eventually take part in the uprisings.

In his analysis, he considers three groups of protests, one being composed of two events outside Egypt. The first group that he considers is that of the year 2000, a time when citizens went to the streets and expressed their support for the intifada uprising which involved Palestinians against the line of work of the Israeli within the West Bank. The other incident that he recounts is that of the year 2003, a time when the United States government took up arms against Iraq and occupied it[8]. The second group that he looks at is that of the year 2004, characterized by the founding of the Kefaya group, which was later to diminish. Despite the dying of the group, one of the youths from its youth movement ended up being the founder of the 6 April movement, a substantial figure in the organization of the 2011 protest. The third group was in 2005, characterized by the judges refusing to certify the results of the parliamentary elections in the year 2005[9].

Looking at the Bush and Obama administration approach to the Middle East Policies, a sharp contrast is very evident. During the times of President Bush, the initiative of the Roadmap to Peace was instrumental in attempting to come up with a two-state solution by the year 2005. This was to be characterized by giving pressure to the Palestinians in a bid for them to accept reforms as a way to go as far as shunning violence is concerned. In addition, they were to pressurize Israel into doing away with military penetrations into the Palestinian areas and limiting them from coming up with settlement areas[10]. The Obama government did not have such measures, and did not provide for any direct negotiations between the two countries apart from the recent Jordanian initiative that did not bear significant fruits.

In Egypt, for two consecutive years since the uprisings, the economic problems in the country kept multiplying. The poverty level pummeled by over 20 percent between the years 2010 and 2011, with the employment levels shooting drastically to 10 year heights. The only option available at the time was for the government to minimize what it spent on subsidies so as to combat the problem affecting the budget. At the same time, it was inevitable that taxes would go up on several goods and services[11]. The country’s currency began depreciating at an alarming rate leading to a massive surge in the prices of basic commodities, especially imports[12].

In the quest of realizing revolutionary goals, one post-revolution cabinet after another tried to come up with various policies with the key intention of reducing the burden of the country’s income imbalances. Unfortunately, these attempts have not been very successful as they have been in one way or another overshadowed by the vast realities on the ground as appertains to the economy.

A perfect example is that of the new national wage minimum, which aimed to shield the working-class citizens form poverty. This scheme involved the granting of public servants a minimum wage of LE700, as opposed to the initial value of LE1200 which had been proposed. The government did this for the mere reason that it was not in a position to pay them more, given to the fact that public wages made up for over 25 percent of the country’s budget[13].

The LE700 per day, or better still LE23.3 per day was not able to sustain an individual, considering the upward trend of the daily expenses. The new minimum wedge was inadequate that it prompted the escalation of labor actions in different places of work all over the country.

Individuals in the private sectors benefited very much from a related plan by the end of the year 2012. At the same time, the average wages could not grow because there was no proper enforcement strategies put in place by the government. This was also backed by the abnormally high rates of joblessness[14].

The informal workers in Egypt, who cumulatively made up about 75% of the entire employment in the private sector at the national level, were not beneficiaries in the new rates on wages (Brown 2012). However, as noted by some individuals, the contentions on the minimum wage rate were not helpful as far as the improvement of the living conditions of the Egyptians was concerned. The idea of taxation although proposed was not adopted by the country for more than two years. The top income tax bracket went up from 20% to about 25% for those earning above LE10 million, and this was eventually changed by the President Mohamed Morsi to include those with LE1 million. At the same time, he announced the imposition of tax on real estates, IPOs as well as corporate mergers and acquisitions.

Two years after the famous uprising that saw the removal of Hosni Mubarak from power, other clashes still ensued in Egypt with police engaging protestors in running battles. The protests were characterized by rallies in different cities in the country, whose organizers claimed that none of the pro-democracy goals was achieved. They also went ahead to show public disapproval of their President Mohammed Morsi[15].

In other areas, such as Ismailia, near the Suez Canal, the protests involved breaking into government offices and massive looting while the police sprayed teargas from outside. Back at Cairo, several people from different districts came together to protest at the Tahrir square. The protest was so intense that the Egyptian Prime minister, Hesham Kandil had to appeal to the protestors to resume work[16].

The country has experienced several instances of struggles dividing them on grounds of those that are Islamists and their liberal counterparts ever since the removal of Mubarak from power. This has been so much to the extent that the economy has been on a steady downward trend, which is likely to lead to discontent from the public. The tourism industry is also one under severe threat and is at the moment slumped while the foreign currency reserves continue to collapse as prices continue to hike[17].

Bibliography

Brown, Nathan J. Can Egypt’s Democratic Uprising Be Redeemed? December 24, 2012. http://carnegieendowment.org/2012/12/24/can-egypt-s-democratic-uprising-be- redeemed/ewbv (accessed April 8 2013).

Gelvin, James. The Arab Uprisings: What Everyone Needs to Know. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012.

Lynch, Marc. The Arab Uprising: The Unfinished Revolutions of the New Middle East. New York: PublicAffairs, 2013.

Yangyang. Egypt’s Opposition Demonstrates 2 Years after Uprising. January 26, 2013. http://english.cri.cn/6966/2013/01/26/2982s745411.htm (accessed April 8 2013).

Mary Casey. Arab Uprisings: The Syria Crisis. February 27, 2012. POMEPS Briefings. Retrieved April 8 2013 from http://pomeps.org/2012/02/arab-uprisings-the-syria-crisis/

Almond Mark. Egypt unrest. BBC News Middle East. Retrieved April 8 2013 from http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-12431231

Reedy, Kathleen. Why Syria Is Different From All of the Other Arab Spring Uprisings. Business Insider. Retrieved April 8 2013 from http://www.businessinsider.com/bone-deep-fear-and-paranoia-are-now-the-only-things-that-rule-syria-2013-1

[1] Gelvin, James. The Arab Uprisings: What Everyone Needs to Know. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012.

[2] Lynch, Marc. The Arab Uprising: The Unfinished Revolutions of the New Middle East. New York: PublicAffairs, 2013.

[3] Mary Casey. Arab Uprisings: The Syria Crisis. February 27, 2012. POMEPS Briefings. Retrieved April 8 2013 from http://pomeps.org/2012/02/arab-uprisings-the-syria-crisis/

[4] Almond Mark. Egypt unrest. BBC News Middle East. Retrieved April 8 2013 from http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-12431231

[5] Lynch, Marc. The Arab Uprising: The Unfinished Revolutions of the New Middle East. New York: PublicAffairs, 2013.

[6] Gelvin, James. The Arab Uprisings: What Everyone Needs to Know. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012.

[7] Reedy, Kathleen. Why Syria Is Different From All of the Other Arab Spring Uprisings. Business Insider. Retrieved April 8 2013 from http://www.businessinsider.com/bone-deep-fear-and-paranoia-are-now-the-only-things-that-rule-syria-2013-1

[8] Lynch, Marc. The Arab Uprising: The Unfinished Revolutions of the New Middle East. New York: PublicAffairs, 2013.

[9] Gelvin, James. The Arab Uprisings: What Everyone Needs to Know. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012.

[10] Yangyang. Egypt’s Opposition Demonstrates 2 Years after Uprising. January 26, 2013. http://english.cri.cn/6966/2013/01/26/2982s745411.htm (accessed April 8 2013).

[11] Mary Casey. Arab Uprisings: The Syria Crisis. February 27, 2012. POMEPS Briefings. Retrieved April 8 2013 from http://pomeps.org/2012/02/arab-uprisings-the-syria-crisis/

[12] Reedy, Kathleen. Why Syria Is Different From All of the Other Arab Spring Uprisings. Business Insider. Retrieved April 8 2013 from http://www.businessinsider.com/bone-deep-fear-and-paranoia-are-now-the-only-things-that-rule-syria-2013-1

[13] Brown, Nathan J. Can Egypt’s Democratic Uprising Be Redeemed? December 24, 2012. http://carnegieendowment.org/2012/12/24/can-egypt-s-democratic-uprising-be-redeemed/ewbv (accessed April 8 2013).

[14] Gelvin, James. The Arab Uprisings: What Everyone Needs to Know. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012.

[15] Yangyang. Egypt’s Opposition Demonstrates 2 Years after Uprising. January 26, 2013. http://english.cri.cn/6966/2013/01/26/2982s745411.htm (accessed April 8 2013).

[16] Almond Mark. Egypt unrest. BBC News Middle East. Retrieved April 8 2013 from http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-12431231

[17] Gelvin, James. The Arab Uprisings: What Everyone Needs to Know. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012.