The Atomic Bomb, Essay Example

The debate over the cold war and America’s actions against Japan have been a long-term debate over necessity and extreme. The lives lost were excessive and what was once highly acceptable has grown into a series of studies and justifications. The controversy and alternate reasons have surfaced leading many to wonder if the atomic bomb was used for bigger reasons than ending the war with Japan. Whereas we may never know the true details behind the decision to use the atomic bomb, there are many controversial beliefs as far as its use. The determination to launch such a devastating attack was based on far more than the desire to end the war with Japan, whereas the speculations are numerous, the United States utilized this option to take back the control that Japan had refused them.

During the time of the war, Truman’s decision to bomb Hiroshima and Nagasaki was not questioned. However, long after the dust had settled, the purpose and necessity has been reviewed and debated for the true need of such extensive force. The atomic bomb resulted in 70,000-80,000 Hiroshima citizens losing their lives.[1] This was not necessarily an instant casualty count, this occurred over days as the radiation set in, many suffered for days before dying. Truman’s decision to launch the bombs was not done carelessly or void of deep consideration. However, there has been a debate for decades as far as the legitimacy or even need for nuclear attacks. Studying the details and determining the premise that the U.S. based their decision on judgment instead of facts creates the need to rethink the nuclear weapons policies.[2] It really does dictate individuals to study the details of the war to determine whether it was the best course of action or whether it was avoidable. At this point in the war, it was believed that taking such force was the best way to force Japan to relinquish their powers that they were misusing.

The bombing of Japan was not based solely on the war, it was an economic consideration as well. Japan refused to back down, fighting the United States demands. There are some who felt that as détente deepened on an economic levelthe Soviet alliance would shift away from planning towards the market, and from a location of isolation into a fully integrated world economy.[3]The concern was that the necessary resources for economic success was been smothered by the Soviet’s involvement. Because the United States wanted to restore stability, it was necessary for them to learn an important historical lesson that only when the United States was resilient could there be world order. [4]On an economic level, the United States had to take back what they classified as theirs in hopes of remaining dominate in economic, political, and social standing worldwide. This was one of the many reasons that the bombing was felt to be necessary. The entire nation was dependent upon the resources that Japan was denying them. Years of fighting a back and forth battle void of bombing would have withheld the necessary resources from Americans for too long.

In a study done on the Cold War and dropping the bomb on Japan, many students were asked their opinion as to whether this action was justified and necessary. They were presented the facts and thenallowed to discuss the details in order to work through some of the controversies that linger around the dropping of the Atomic bomb. One group supported Truman’s decision basing as the probably the most difficult decision that he ever had to make and he did it based solely upon the well-being of his country. He also carried the guilt of the lives lost as a result of this bomb. [5] Another group was not as open to the idea of this action as the first group. They were not certain on their standing of right or wrong because they felt that the facts were not presented correctly and they still held a certain amount of controversy. The details of the war in general were still in question and the casualties for both sides were not laid out. But in the end they majority determined, “The bomb was a good thing because now all the world knows how much desolation and destruction it causes and hopefully we will have enough sense not to drop it ever again.”[6] The decision was supported for the well-being of America and the prevention of future attacks based on the worldwide knowledge of their powers. Meaning that Truman’s decision to utilize the atomic bomb was for the overall well-being of Americans as well as a means to take back the economic power from Japan while ending the cold war.

Many scholars have spent decades studying the events and relevance of the cold war. The division as far as relevance, avoidance, or alternate solutions have created heavy debates. John Lukas determined that “This symbolic event, marks the supreme condition of contemporary history …. That supreme condition is not the Atomic Bomb and not Communism; it is the division of Germany and of most of Europe not American and Russian spheres of influence. The so-called cold war grew out of this division.”[7] There is still a significant amount of evidence missing with both the American and Russian actions, the final judgment of the Cold War origins will remain elusive.[8] However, there are many different publications that have shown that the Soviet’s behavior was the opposition, being both inflexible and an illusion that the Soviet could have been dissolved without the extensive cost of the war. This is clearly speculation because there is no way to know if the other methods or resolution would have been effective or merely prolonged the war unnecessarily.

The cold war was referred to as an overkill. A Washington legislative assistant, Alperovitz, has examined the role of the atomic bomb in the forming America’s position for the Soviet Union. His findings, tentative and equally frightening, is that the United States used the atomic bomb on Hiroshima in order show that their weapon capability to the Russians in order to scare them into disgorging part of their Eastern European conquests.[9] Clearly this adds additional dimensions as to the need for the atomic bomb. The previous approach in history to the Cold War is laid out in a systematic and trivialize manner in order to dictate necessity. However, the event from the Potsdam to the Doctrine of Truman has been extremely underplayed. Textbooks support Truman’s actions to being a great president and handling the crises of NATO, the Marshal Plan, and the Doctrine. The attention rarely has been centered on Truman’ actual participation in these situations.[10]This leads individuals to question if other approaches would have led to an early détente as well.

From the American point of view, the initiation of nuclear weapons gave us an alternative to creating European peace in assistance with the Soviet Union. This also was a ploy to neutralize Germany and any potential Nazi aftermath. Having an atomic monopoly permitted that a small fear of German resurgence and void of concern of the interest of Soviet security.[11]The Soviet foreign policy after the World War II occasionally supported the security of American interest. Therefore it is determined that the monolithic true enemy of the Cold War was largely in the imagination of America’s ardent anticommunist cold fighters.[12] The events even suggest that Stalin was willing to cut a deal during the postwar years. There is not a significant amount of evidence showing how the American-Soviet relations was in terms of cooperation, but there was potential.

Contrary to popular belief, based on the historical presentations, Truman knew that the atomic bomb was no longer needed in order to avoid an invasion. The manuscripts and records presented to scholars over the past few years has led them to a better understanding of the events of the cold war. The overall consensus of the war was that the bomb was not necessary nor needed to avoid Japanese invasion, it is clear that there were alternatives to such drastic measures and Truman knew it.[13]Due to the devastation of the bomb, it raised the question of why it was utilized. The end result of analyzing the 1945 attack, it is questioned how American leaders could willingly kill over 100,000 innocent Japanese people if it was avoidable. The American leaders of this time have opened the doors for their values and scruples to be questioned. [14] The evolution of attitude and America in general are under attack as a result.  However this attack is not valid or necessary. The act of bombing Japan took back all necessary controls in Japan and outside of Japan, ensuring America’s safety and economic security. If this action did not occur, it is highly unlikely that the same favorable outcomes would have occurred.

Beyond Truman, the question of the Henry L. Stimson, secretary of war, had his motives in the line of fire as well. He was a deeply religious man with strong moral convictions, who grieved the passing the comforting traditions of the nineteenth century.[15] He is referred to, at best, as being confused morally, and at worst a hypocrite. The Japanese concessions were not significant enough and Stimson stated: The whole situation is beginning to shake me up and get me back to a little bit nearer my old view that we haven’t yet reached the stage where we can dispense with police force; and the only police force I have got to depend on today is the American Navy. Pretty soon I am going to tell the President to so.[16] It believed that his moral stand was bypassed in order to support the attack on Japan. Knowing the casualties and ultimate demise, he supported and encouraged the process, despite the visible surfacing alternative routes.

Barton argued that the former governmental officials willing and knowingly constructed the history of the atomic bomb. He found that James B Co-nant, in effort to chase off the growing criticism encouraged the secretary of state, Henry l. Stimson to create an article to justify and explain the bomb.[17]In this publication he defended the actions by saying that it saved millions of American’s lives. Truman utilized his publication by proceeding to add validity to it by saying the bomb had saved a half a million lives of Americans. This presentation of lives saved, increased the support of Truman actions and influenced the memories that individual’s had for his decision to proceed with the bombings.[18] This laid to rest the initial speculations and allowed Americans to believe their claims for a while. The best interest of America was carried out by utilizing the power encompassed in that bomb. Regardless of the true purpose behind the bombing, it still provided the safety that we know today. It was not an easy decision, and it was not done in vain.

When asking a collection of journalist the top one-hundred stories of the twentieth century, the 1945 atomic bombing of Japan was the top.[19] This is based on the controversy that has been raised over the past decades from scholars who have delved deeper into the details of the bombing. The acrimony and polarization over Truman’s choice to drop the bomb disrupted the efforts to determine the weaknesses and strengths of the competing positions and to elevate to a defensible middle ground.[20] With the debate over the atomic bomb and the new surfacing documentations, there are very strong arguments on both sides of the spectrum that provides strong evidence that there is more to the bombing than saving the American lives as originally believed. This allows individuals to question the motives behind the decision, but not the true reason. There is no question that the actions of Truman were in the best interest of Americans, past and present.

The determination to launch such a devastating attack was based on far more than the desire to end the war with Japan, whereas the speculations are numerous, the United States utilized this option to take back the control that Japan had refused them. Perhaps we may never know the true details behind this attack, it is important to realize that there are alternative beliefs based on the scholarly findings. The loss of life was excessive and it is hard to imagine that was in vain. However, for history sake it is a significant turning point for the stability and strength of America. Unleashing the potential power left America a country not to be messed with and allowed them to take the opportunity to establish themselves economically. Regardless of the side one takes on the atomic bomb, it was a significant factor for America being where it is today. Had the bomb not been utilized, it is inevitable that America would have been challenged at some point, and as Truman believed, the millions of lives could have been lost.

Bibliography

Alperovitz, Gar; Robert L. Messer; & Barton J. Bernstien. Marshall, Truman, and the Decision to Drop the Bomb. International Security, Vol. 16 Number 3 (1992) pp. 204-221.

Barton J Bernstein, Understanding the Atomic Bomb and the Japanese Surrender: Missed          Opportunities, Little- Known Near Disasters, and Modern Memory. Diplomatic History (1995) 19 (2): 227-273

Bonnett, John. Jekyll and Hyde:Henry L. Stimson, Mentalite and the Decision to Use the Atomic Bomb on Japan. War in History (1997) 4: 174.

Cox, Michael. From the Truman Doctrine to the Second Superpower Détente: The Rise and Fall of the Cold War. Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 27, No.1 (1990) p. 25-41.

Doppen, Frans H. Teaching and Learning Multiple Perspectives: The Atomic Bomb. The Social Studies: ProQuest Central. (2000) p.159-168.

Graebner, Norman A. Cold War Origins and the Continuing Debate: A Review of Recent Literature. Journal of Conflict Resolution. (1969) 12: 123.

Miles, Rufus E. Jr. Hiroshima: The Strange Myth of Half a Million American Lives Saved. International Security Vol. 10 Number 2, (1985) pp. 121-140.

Nuclear Weapons. ProQuest Central. (1994) pp.2-10.

Smalls, Melvin. Discussion and Reviews: Reexamining the Classic Cold War: A Review. Journal of Conflict Resolution. (1966) 10:516.

Walker, Samuel J. Historiographical Essay: Recent Literature on Truman’s Atomic Bomb Decision: A Search for Middle Ground. Diplomatic History (2005) 29 (2): 311-334

[1]Miles, Rufus E. Jr. Hiroshima: The Strange Myth of Half a Million American Lives Saved. International Security Vol. 10 Number 2, (1985) pp. 121-140.

[2]Miles, Rufus E. Jr. Hiroshima: The Strange Myth of Half a Million American Lives Saved. International Security Vol. 10 Number 2, (1985) pp. 121-140.

[3]Cox, Michael. From the Truman Doctrine to the Second Superpower Détente: The Rise and Fall of the Cold War. Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 27, No.1 (1990) p. 25-41.

[4]Cox, Michael. From the Truman Doctrine to the Second Superpower Détente: The Rise and Fall of the Cold War. Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 27, No.1 (1990) p. 25-41.

[5]Doppen, Frans H. Teaching and Learning Multiple Perspectives: The Atomic Bomb. The Social Studies: ProQuest Central. (2000) p.159-168.

[6]Doppen, Frans H. Teaching and Learning Multiple Perspectives: The Atomic Bomb. The Social Studies: ProQuest Central. (2000) p.159-168.

[7]Graebner, Norman A. Cold War Origins and the Continuing Debate: A Review of Recent  Literature. Journal of Conflict Resolution. (1969) 12: 123.

[8]Graebner, Norman A. Cold War Origins and the Continuing Debate: A Review of Recent  Literature. Journal of Conflict Resolution. (1969) 12: 123.

[9]Alperovitz, Gar; Robert L. Messer; & Barton J. Bernstien. Marshall, Truman, and the Decision to Drop the Bomb. International Security, Vol. 16 Number 3 (1992) pp. 204-221.

[10]Smalls, Melvin. Discussion and Reviews: Reexamining the Classic Cold War: A Review. Journal  of Conflict Resolution. (1966) 10:516

[11]Nuclear Weapons. ProQuest Central. (1994) pp.2-10.

[12]Nuclear Weapons. ProQuest Central. (1994) pp.2-10.

[13]Alperovitz, Gar; Robert L. Messer; & Barton J. Bernstien. Marshall, Truman, and the Decision to Drop the Bomb. International Security, Vol. 16 Number 3 (1992) pp. 204-221.

[14]Alperovitz, Gar; Robert L. Messer; & Barton J. Bernstien. Marshall, Truman, and the Decision to Drop the Bomb. International Security, Vol. 16 Number 3 (1992) pp. 204-221.

[15]Bonnett, John. Jekyll and Hyde: Henry L. Stimson, Mentalite and the Decision to Use the Atomic Bomb on Japan. War in History (1997) 4: 174.

[16]Bonnett, John. Jekyll and Hyde: Henry L. Stimson, Mentalite and the Decision to Use the Atomic Bomb on Japan. War in History (1997) 4: 174.

[17]Barton J Bernstein, Understanding the Atomic Bomb and the Japanese Surrender: Missed Opportunities, Little- Known Near Disasters, and Modern Memory, Diplomatic History (1995) 19 (2): 227-273.

[18]Barton J Bernstein, Understanding the Atomic Bomb and the Japanese Surrender: Missed Opportunities, Little- Known Near Disasters, and Modern Memory, Diplomatic History (1995) 19 (2): 227-273.

[19]Walker, Samuel J. Historiographical Essay: Recent Literature on Truman’s Atomic Bomb Decision: A Search for Middle Ground. Diplomatic History (2005) 29 (2): 311-334

[20]Walker, Samuel J. Historiographical Essay: Recent Literature on Truman’s Atomic Bomb Decision: A Search for Middle Ground. Diplomatic History (2005) 29 (2): 311-334