The Conceptual Accuracy of Race in Biological Anthropology, Essay Example

The issue of the rigorousness of the concept of race in physical anthropology remains a contested issue. Within the field, such rigorousness entails the accuracy of race to accurately delineate various observed differences within Homo sapiens. Accordingly, the legitimacy of the conceptualization of race is primarily based on some type of biological or empirical evidence: for the concept to remain germane, there must be a physical basis and conceptual value to its continued utilization.

Such an issue is especially pertinent because of the social and political impact that the concept of race carries. In the introduction to the terms of this debate in Taking Sides: Clashing Views on Contested Issues in Physical Anthropology, Mary Courtis underscores this point in reference to the discovery of the Kennewick man, which placed into doubt various historical narratives about Native Americans and when Europeans appeared in North America. Accordingly, this incident demonstrated that racial classification is a politically tense issue, one capable of causing division; the issue of race does not only possess a scientific dimension, but is furthermore a social and political problematic. Issues of technical classification in physical anthropology can quickly degenerate into divisive political debate.

As Courtis notes in her postcript, the fact that no one in the anthropological community “disagrees that biological differences do exist among human populations” (284) suggests that the debate within anthropology over the validity of race is a question as to whether race is sufficient to explain biological difference. Insofar as biological variation “may reflect a combination of genetic drift adaptation and different regional and cultural conditions” (Courtis, 284), the specific issue is whether race accurately reflects such combinations.  For example, that differences in skin color are prominent in those living closer to the Equator, and that this trait is thus the result of the geographic location inhabited by a group, suggests that such biological difference is mostly environmental: in this sense, race is inadequate to the extent that it does not carry a meaning of environment. Accordingly, it would be more accurate to view such biological differences in terms of these combinatory factors. Yet proponents of the category race point to clear instances of biological differences, and therefore maintain that race accurately reflects these differences. In this sense, both sides of the debate are essentially arguing about terminology, as opposed to empirical evidence. In other words, what should the empirical evidence of biological difference be termed?

In the respective texts of C. Loring Brace and George Gill, the former opposes the concept, while the latter maintains its continued relevance. Brace’s argument takes a sociological approach to race, suggesting that race is “a cultural and political category” (277): this definition follows from the absence of strict biological merits for race. In contrast, Gill opposes this viewpoint, by citing clear examples of biological difference that are accurately reflected in the notion of race: insofar as such biological evidence exists, the concept of race sustains its relevance as a rigorous explanatory tool that is consistent with the basic framework of anthropological classification.

In Brace’s text, the author contends that, “it is perfectly true that the long-term residents of the various parts of the world have patterns of features that we can easily identify as characteristic of the areas from which they come.” (277) For the author, however, understanding such “patterns of features” in terms of race is a mistake in empirical observation, equivalent to the earth-centered cosmological models that were replaced by Copernican and Galilean revisions of empirical observation in terms of a heliocentric model (277): such observation of race is the product of a lack of proper perspective. The appearance of race is caused by a perspective that is informed by the social and political prominence of race, in which one is taught through these various forms of discourse to identify race: race is, in this regard, a symptom of the workings of political ideology. As the author notes, this is especially pertinent in the case of America and is consistent with the ideological framework of American history: the notion of race is derivative of slavery and the history of both theoretical racial classification and practical segregation that was crucial to the formation of American society itself.

The author does not deny physical differences, but rather opposes the explanatory potency of race to explain such differences: “Yes, we can recognize people from a  given area. What we are seeing, however, is a pattern of features derived from common ancestry in the area of question…this can be regarded as ‘family resemblance’ writ large.” (279) Accordingly, apparent racial difference is rather indicative of the geographic delineation of certain groups, some who are more closely related than others. As such, the author concedes that, “there is nothing wrong with using geographic labels to designate people.” (279) Such geographical classifications are misappropriated, however, if they are replaced by racial classifications: “terms such as ‘Negroid,’ ‘Caucasoid,’ and ‘Mongoloid’ create much more problems than they solve.” (279) This is because there is no underlying physical reason for these differences other than the aforementioned family resemblance: such racial classification possesses as much scientific value as the statement that someone looks like their mother, i.e., it is a weak thesis. Thus, that such terms continue to remain in use despite their conceptual weakness is symptomatic of the influence of social norms. A term such as race, therefore, may have value within a sociological discourse, which attempts to explain norms and the treatment of different members of society, but are insufficient within the discourse fo physical anthropology. The perception of race is a social phenomenon, as opposed to scientific phenomenon.

In contrast, Gill’s adherence to the concept of race rests on what he claims is its scientific relevance. This account is based on the fairly straightforward thesis that there is “nothing wrong in defining and naming the different populations of Homo sapiens.” (280) Accordingly, race is largely a classificatory tool used by anthropologists to delineate specific parts of the Homo sapiens family.

Gill’s argument relies primarily on forensic anthropology and empirical analysis. Multiple methodologies allow for a clear discernment of particular races according to physical features. Accordingly, the “biological reality” of race points to the notion that race exists on a biological level, and thus is a valid concept. The issue as to whether “the particular ‘social construct’ that defines its limits might be imperfect” (281) is a sociological issue, not a biological issue: That race is an overloaded term with potentially divisive meanings does not discount its value to the task of anthropological classification and investigation. If physical anthropology includes “racial taxomony” as its subject matter, than this taxonomy, for the author, remains irrefutable: Gill states “I am more accurate at assessing race from skeletal remains than from looking at living people standing before me.” (281) Race, therefore, is not only attached to a notion of skin color: it is apparent in all the manifestations of the human form.

Gill furthermore notes that those who oppose race as concept nevertheless accept clinal differentiation as a form of biological classification, a cline defined as “a gradient of change, such as from people with a high frequency of blue eyes, as in Scandinavia, to people with a high frequency of brown eyes as in Africa.” (281-282) Accordingly, because of such acknowledged difference, it is those opposed to race who find their views tainted by the social and the political, adopting a “politically correct position” (281) that maintains that race is not real: their acceptance of clinal differentiation clearly contradicts their opposition to race.

When examining these arguments, one of the clear features is that both sides tend to reduce the opposing position to a political or social ground. Accordingly, the reasons against using race are because of the historical danger of this category as demonstrated in American history: race leads to inequality and the violation of fundamental human rights; race as concept has negative effects in politics and society. This is not to deny the existence of biological difference; however, such biological difference is essentially used on the political and social levels to create general systems of inequality. From this perspective, race, in essence, can be defined as the political and ideological utilization of the phenomenon of biological difference. It is thus an inadequate and non-scientific understanding of biological difference.

Nevertheless, those opposed to race as a concept also concede that biological difference does exist. There cannot be an elimination of the obvious empirical data that there are differences between members of Homo sapiens. Accordingly, the opposition to race, as Gill notes, is a claim that is also politically motivated, and is largely informed by current so-called “politically correct” discourses. These discourses are especially sensitive to historical misappropriations of biological difference, and in essence, attempt to socially intervene in biological anthropology in order to re-interpret scientific and empirical conclusions that are construed as potentially damaging for a particular vision of society.

In essence, both sides of the debate play the same strategic game: to claim the higher scientific ground, while reducing the position of the other to a non-scientific, politically motivated postulate. Nonetheless, there is no denying the obviously historically divisive connotations of the term race. In this regard, there should not be a denial of biological differences, but rather the introduction of both a new terminology and new discourse that attempts to understand and classify these differences, one that is not so politically charged. The point is not that one side of the debate remains political while the other is not, as both Gill and Brace maintain, but that physical anthropology should maintain a social responsibility and understand the divisiveness of its terminology.

At the same time, however, this is not merely a socially motivated notion: the debate concerning the nature of how to properly understand biological difference within Homo sapiens clearly shows that this understanding is an unfinished project: for example, debates concerning clines and the impact of environment. Accordingly, the uncertainty regarding how to define such biological variation should be not be viewed as an impasse, but rather as an opportunity to develop a more rigorous terminology to understand such differences. Accordingly, race, as an older form of terminology, is not only insufficient on a social level, but also on a scientific and anthropological level, insofar as the reasons for biological variation remain contestable.

One of the key current themes in the academic literature that is omitted in both these arguments is that of DNA. Whereas DNA at first glance seem to repeat familiar motifs of race, DNA studies demonstrate a certain inadequacy of this category, as Gracia notes: “Studies of DNA suggest, for example, that all human beings descend from the same mother and that the number of common characteristics to humans is extraordinary.” (79-80) Accordingly, when thinking about the clear empirical phenomena of biological variation through the various conceptual lenses of clines, environment, culture, DNA, etc., what becomes apparent is that our ever-expanding knowledge requires a more sophisticated conceptual terminology in order to sufficiently treat its thematic. DNA, for example, is both the sign of a difference and the sign of a common origin. In this case, strict delineations between races are inadequate to fully express the simultaneously shared unity and diversity that constitutes biological and physical anthropology.

The abandonment of the terminology of race, therefore, is not only indicative of the sensitivity to historical injustice and political concerns, but is also reflective of the more dynamic picture of biological variation within Homo sapiens that science is discovering. In order to accurately describe this picture, what is required is a radical revision of traditional modes of classification and categorization. These revisions are appropriate according to both this dynamism and the currently unknown elements that constitute physical and biological anthropology. Continual new findings and innovations coupled with a re-thinking of traditional categories become reflective of positive advancements in science: these should be viewed as opportunities to create new forms of discourse – both social and scientific – that more accurately reflect human existence. Race therefore resembles an archaic category that is unable to account for the simultaneous unity and diversity that biological anthropologists are uncovering in contemporary research.

Works Cited

Brace, C. Loring, Courties, M. and Gill, George W. “Is ‘Race’ and Outdated Concept?” in Mary Courtis, ed. Taking Sides: Clashing Views on Controversial Issues in Physical Anthropology. Dubuque, IA: McGraw Hill, 2006, pp. 275-285.

Gracia, Jorge J.E. Surviving Race, Ethnicity, and Nationality: A Challenge for the Twenty-First Century. Oxford, UK: Rowman & Littlefield, 2005.