The Most Important External Influences (i.e. States or Events) on the Development of Canada’s Military and Defense Policies Since Confederation, Essay Example

Since the times of Confederation (1867 and onward) the issues of military system’s formation and the creation of a comprehensive defence policy have been one of the most critical and conflict-bringing questions set before the Canadian governments and officials. Even though Canada has grown to be one of the most stable, resources-rich and economically developed countries in the world, still in terms of its defence policy and participation in various military actions the country has always been somewhat dependent on other nations and external factors. For instance, the two states that had a tremendous impact on the military evolution of Canada and that still continue to exercise their influence are the United Kingdom and the USA. And if to talk about the events that helped to shape Canadian military and defence systems then the most influential among them were certainly the two World Wars and the Cold War. Nonetheless, there was a number of other states and military cases, the direct or indirect connection to and participation in which had changed (in one way or another) the Canadian defence policy, military structure and the country’s attitudes toward them. Those events include the Boer War, the Suez and Somalia crisis; and those states are the members of the NATO bloc and the Soviet Union.

Thesis statement: Despite an international image of an unmilitary country, Canada has actively participated in all the major military actions and wars of the 19^th and 20^th centuries and it is now one of the leading peacekeeping nations of the world as it is involved in various UN and non-UN tasks. As the country had only several brief periods of military and diplomatic isolation, hence the development of its armed forces and martial policy has always been dependent upon other states and external events. At this point it seems to me that being a ‘middle power’ actually means for a country to exist on the international arena as a non-aggressor, but at the same time for it not to remain reluctant in responding to the aggression of other states. And this is in my opinion what Canada has proven to be.

Introduction

It can be stated that the acknowledgement made by many historians and commentators about Canada being an unmilitary country seems to be at the same time quite true and untrue. It appears to be true due to the fact that through the course of Canada’s history, before and after the Confederation, the development and establishment of the professional army was somewhat set aside as primary attention and funding have always been given to other spheres. In addition Canadians have never viewed themselves as warlike people[1]. During the colonial era Canada was dependent upon the Mother Country for all issues dealing with defence and by the late 1850s it became pretty obvious that British government and politicians were interested in cutting colonial expenditures, especially those related to military affairs and defence[2]. In the immediate period following the independence of Canada (1867-1885) the country’s reliance on other states concerning determination and establishment of its own defence system can still be observed. As Morton argues the two primary ideas of the Canadian defence policy during that period were that of maintaining peace with the United States and dealing with the consequences of British withdrawal of its garrisons from Canada[3]. Thus from the very origin of the Canadian independence the country came under the influence of its southern neighbor and the Mother Country regarding the setting of military priorities. Moreover, despite the fact that eventually the spheres of influence over Canada between the USA and the UK had changed as the United States have turned from the major threat to the most reliable partner, nonetheless these two countries remain the ones that operate the greatest influence over Canada, both in terms of its military and economic development.

But the statement about Canada’s unmilitarism can be refuted by the fact that the country had participated in all major warfare conflicts of the 20^th century and it is now perceived as one of the most active peacekeeping nations in the world. Many historians argue that it was the Great War that had actually marked the beginning in the development of Canadian professional army as before that the primary source of defence was coming from the volunteers or civilian soldiers who were organized into militia units when needed. The use of such defence system was promoted partly by Canadians’ conviction that they were protected by the supremacy of the British Royal Navy and partly by the idea that flourished among Canadian politicians and officials that Canada was too small and young a nation to take independent steps regarding military actions. In addition there existed a strong persuasion that the country could absolutely rely on its citizen soldiers. Nonetheless, it seems to me that the first external event that to some extend revealed the disastrous position of Canada regarding its defence system and that showed the necessity for the professional army was the Boer War of 1899. Furthermore, Canada’s participation in this war once again demonstrated its commitment and tight connection to the British Empire. Basically Canada itself, as an independent state, was unrelated to the South Africa and therefore it wasn’t necessary for the country to participate in this conflict, but due to the fact that Canada still had obligations as a former colony it had no other choice, but to take part in the war. At this stage Morton notes that Canada’s inner disputes about the country’s military organization and its relationship to Great Britain were soon challenged and reinforced by the new external event – the First World War or as Canadians came to call it The Great War[4].

Canada entered the WWI simultaneously with the British Empire and in the beginning there was a great deal of disorganization and unpreparedness among Canadian troops. In overall historians view Canada’s participation in the Great War as consisting of two phases[5]. The first one was between 1914 and 1916 when little had been achieved by the Canadian military forces; and the second one, from 1916 till the end of the war, was characterized by military successes of Canadian troops. One of the most significant consequences of the war for the development of Canadian military structure and defence policy was the emergence of top-quality officers who now knew not only the strategic aspects of war-leading, but also its tactical and operational details. Among such officers Sir Arthur Currie’s career should be emphasized as he was the first Canadian to obtain the rank of full general. Canadian troops participated in a number of crucial battles (especially during the Hundred Days Offensive), most notable and prominent among which is the Battle of Vimy Ridge. Eventually, Canadian Corps have emerged to be much stronger and well-prepared by the end of the war than they were in its beginning. According to Morton the two most notable factors that contributed to Canada’s successes during the war were: 1) Canadian Corps’ structure as “semiautonomous national army” which allowed it to maintain stability and to develop an integrated doctrine, organization and procedures; 2) presence of a commander who was both competent himself and able to use innovations and observations proposed by his subordinates[6]. In overall Miller concludes that The Hundred Days are probably the highest and the bloodiest achievement of the Canadian troops in the 20^th century as it was the period when CF was playing a decisive role.[7] Another significant aspect and result of Canada’s participation in the WWI was that even though Canadian Corps were subordinate to the British Army, still in the course of the war they had transformed into a much more independent and integrated military force.

Although the Great War had prompted Canada’s military development and its successes in the war had brought a great deal of pride, still in the period between 1919 and 1939 the creation of the professional army was once again set aside as major funding and attention were concentrated on the economic aspects of country’s life. Furthermore, as Eayrs notes in this period Canada pursued an isolationist approached as its politicians were convinced that the country would stay away from all future conflicts in Europe[8]. Another significant feature of this period is that during it Canada had developed much closer relationships with the USA as it was trying to dissociate itself from the British control and influence. Nonetheless, as Harris states, in terms of military development Canadian forces continued to use organizational structures and doctrine applied by the British Army[9].

Once again, as it was in 1914, when the WWII started Canada found itself absolutely unprepared to answer British call for military aid. However, as Francis et al observe this time Canada didn’t declare war on Germany simultaneously with Great Britain, an action which signified Canada’s growing dissociation from its Mother Country[10]. In the beginning of the war Canada followed a “limited liability” policy as its government didn’t see a necessity for a total war effort[11]. Dexter notes that Prime Minister King struggled for the minimization of Canadian support of the British Army in order to avoid the necessity for conscription[12]. However, this attitude was changed in June 1940 with the fall of France which challenged the security of both Great Britain and North America.

According to Donald Creighton one of the most significant achievements of the World War II for Canadian military and diplomatic developments was the strengthening of Canadian-American relations prompted by a number of bilateral agreements (Ogdensburg Agreement which promoted continental defence cooperation; and Hyde Park Declaration which had positive consequences for Canadian military production)[13]. However, Granatstein, while acknowledging that in this period Canada did “move from the British military sphere to the American”, still argues that the country’s government had no other choice as the USA was much stronger at that period than Great Britain[14].

Another important accomplishment of the Second World War for Canada was that the country came out of it with the world’s third largest navy, fourth largest air force and a significant field army. All this made it possible for Canada to incur a sense of international obligation which forced it to join NATO, United Nations and NORAD blocs. Nonetheless, after the end of the WWII (in the same way as it was after the WWI) Canadian government once again set aside all military developments and reduced the defence budget. But this time an international event that forced it to re-consider the above policy was the onset of the Cold War and the deployment of an armament drive between the USA and the Soviet Union.

There were several aspects regarding the Cold War and the Soviet Union’s growing warfare and nuclear capabilities that showed Canadian politicians the necessity for an implementation of a solid defence policy and system. Firstly, it was the fact that Soviet military developments made it possible for the country to attack its enemies regardless the distance; and secondly, Canada’s geographical neighborhood to the USA (Soviet primary foe) made the country vulnerable to possible assaults. These conclusions once again enhanced Canadian-American cooperation in terms of continental defence. In addition, in the period between 1950 and 1965 Canada had greatly increased its defence budget and military size[15]. With the end of the Cold War in 1989 Canada started a process of defence policy’s reexamination. One of its major aspects was the adoption in 1994 of the White Paper on Defence that identified future roles for the Canadian Forces. Even though there occurred cuts in defence budget and severe reductions in forces’ composition (from 90,000 to 60,000), still the government declared that the CF won’t be restructured solely for the conduction of peace operations[16].

Starting from 1945 and onward Canada became one of the world’s most active states in terms of its commitment to peacekeeping. This can be proved by the fact that after the end of the WWII Canadian troops participated in almost all of the UN and some non-UN peacekeeping tasks[17]. But I think that in terms of their importance for the development of Canadian military and defence policies the most significant among all overseas missions were the Suez Crisis and Somalia. In general it can be concluded that the Suez Crisis gave birth to the peacekeeping as we know it today and it is the Canadian Prime Minister Lester Pearson who is considered to be the father of the modern concept of peacekeeping[18]. More importantly, some historians (Sean Maloney for instance) consider Canadian dedication to peacekeeping to be its distinctive feature as a ‘middle power”[19]. Morton also remarks that due to the fact that Canada was an emergent nation it had no tradition of long-term strategic defence and therefore was basically committed to deterrence which is demonstrated by its participation in peacekeeping missions[20].

The Somalia crisis was the one that revealed the disastrously unethical attitude and culture that flourished inside of the Canadian Forces. It also showed that CF was quite uncontrolled in terms of its accountabilities and reporting. As David Bercuson puts in his report to the defence minister:

Canadian officers today are weak in history, theory and the practical application of military strategy. Moreover, there is a death of both strategic thinking and forward planning generally. Almost all Canadian military intellectual activity concentrates either on the practicalities of doctrine, on tactical matters or on administration[21].

As a result a process of CF’s transformation was initiated targeted to improve leadership and leadership development through a more advanced military education and training (some of its programs were united under the title of Officership 2020). In overall these reforms, which are still in motion, aim to make CF’s operating more transparent and to make its inner culture healthier.

Thus a conclusion may be drawn that there were two major states that had a tremendous impact on the development of the Canadian military and defence policies – the USA and Great Britain. It may also be stated that Canadian Forces, as we know them today, basically were shaped under the influence of these two nations. Furthermore, the participation of Canada in the main warfare conflicts of the 20^th century was as well defined by the country’s connection and obligations to these two states.

In overall I may conclude that despite being an emergent nation, still Canada has quite a long and affluent history of military development and involvement. Furthermore, it seems to me that external events had greater influence on the evolution of Canada’s military and defence policies than the internal ones. Even though Canadian governments often acted quite reluctantly and hesitatingly towards the establishment of a professional army, still the country managed not simply to participate in all major warfare conflicts of the 20^th century, but more importantly to achieve some significant results (Battle of Vimy Ridge, settlement of Suez Crisis, capture of Rimini, etc.). In the long run Canada has come to be one of the world’s leading “middle powers” dealing with conflicts’ resolution and promotion of the world’s stability and peace.

References

Creighton, D. The Forked Road: Canada 1939-1957. Toronto: McClelland & Steward, 1976.

Dexter, Grant. “Canada and the Building of Peace”, in Keshen and Durflinger, eds. War and Society in Post-Confederation Canada. Toronto: Thomson Nelson, 2007.

Granatstein, J. L. “The American Influence on the Canadian Military, 1939-1963”, in J. Keshen and S. Durflinger, eds. War and Society in Post-Confederation Canada. Toronto: Thomson Nelson, 2007.

Granatstein, J. L. Who Killed the Canadian Military? Toronto: HarperCollins, 2004.

Eayrs, J. In Defence of Canada: Growing Up Allied. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1980.

Francis, D.R., et al. Destinies: Canadian History Since Confederation, 6^th Canadian ed. Toronto: Nelson, 2008.

Kennedy, G. C. Military Education: Past, Present and Future. London: Praeger, 2002.

Maloney, S. M. Canada and UN-peacekeeping – Cold War by Other Means, 1945-1970. St. Catharines: Vanwell Publishing Ltd., 2002.

McAndrew, W., “Operational Art and the Canadian Army’s Way of War”, in McKercher and Hennessy, eds., The Operational Art: Development in the Theories of War. London: Preager, 1996.

McKercher, B. J. C., & Hennessy, M. A., eds. The Operational Art: Developments in the Theories of War. Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 1996.

Miller, Ian H. M. “Our Glory and Our Grief – Torontonians and the Great War”, in Keshen and Durflinger, eds. War and Society in Post-Confederation Canada. Toronto: Thomson Nelson, 2007.

Morton, D. A Military History of Canada: From Champlain to Kosovo., 5^th Ed. Toronto: McClelland & Steward, 2007.

O’Brien, M. “Manhood and the Militia Myth: Masculinity, Class and Militarism in Ontario, 1902-1914”, in Keshen and Durflinger, eds. War and Society in Post-Confederation Canada. Toronto: Thomson Nelson, 2007.

Endnotes

[1] Mike O’Brien. “Manhood and the Militia Myth: Masculinity, Class and Militarism in Ontario, 1902-1914”, in Keshen and Durflinger, eds. War and Society in Post-Confederation Canada. (Toronto: Thomson Nelson, 2007), module 2, iii.

[2]R. Douglas Francis, et al. Destinies: Canadian History Since Confederation, 6^th Canadian ed.. (Toronto: Nelson, 2008), ch.2.

[3] D. Morton. A Military History of Canada: From Champlain to Kosovo., 5^th Ed. (Toronto: McClelland & Steward, 2007), 87.

[4] D. Morton. A Military History of Canada: From Champlain to Kosovo., 5^th Ed. (Toronto: McClelland & Steward, 2007), 110.

[5] D. Morton. A Military History of Canada: From Champlain to Kosovo., 5^th Ed. (Toronto: McClelland & Steward, 2007), 130-165.

[6] D. Morton. A Military History of Canada: From Champlain to Kosovo., 5^th Ed. (Toronto: McClelland & Steward, 2007).

[7] Ian H.M. Miller. “Our Glory and Our Grief – Torontonians and the Great War”, in Keshen and Durflinger, eds. War and Society in Post-Confederation Canada. (Toronto: Thomson Nelson, 2007), module 3, iv.

[8] James Eayrs. In Defence of Canada: Growing Up Allied. (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1980), 240.

[9] Steve Harris, quoted in McAndrew, William, “Operational Art and the Canadian Army’s Way of War”, in McKercher and Hennessy, eds., The Operational Art: Development in the Theories of War. (London: Preager, 1996), 89.

[10] R. Douglas Francis, et al. Destinies: Canadian History Since Confederation, 6^th Canadian ed.. (Toronto: Nelson, 2008), 265.

[11] D. Morton. A Military History of Canada: From Champlain to Kosovo., 5^th Ed. (Toronto: McClelland & Steward, 2007), 170.

[12] Grant Dexter. “Canada and the Building of Peace”, in Keshen and Durflinger, eds. War and Society in Post-Confederation Canada. (Toronto: Thomson Nelson, 2007), module 6, ii.

[13] D. Creighton. The Forked Road: Canada 1939-1957. (Toronto: McClelland & Steward, 1976).

[14] J. L. Granatstein. “The American Influence on the Canadian Military, 1939-1963”, in Keshen and Durflinger, eds. War and Society in Post-Confederation Canada. (Toronto: Thomson Nelson, 2007), 305.

[15] D. Morton. A Military History of Canada: From Champlain to Kosovo., 5^th Ed. (Toronto: McClelland & Steward, 2007), 232.

[16] R. Douglas Francis, et al. Destinies: Canadian History Since Confederation, 6^th Canadian ed.. (Toronto: Nelson, 2008), ch.20.

[17] R. Douglas Francis, et al. Destinies: Canadian History Since Confederation, 6^th Canadian ed.. (Toronto: Nelson, 2008), ch.14.

[18] J. L. Granatstein. Who Killed the Canadian Military? (Toronto: HarperCollins, 2004), 33.

[19] Sean M. Maloney. Canada and UN-peacekeeping – Cold War by Other Means, 1945-1970. (St. Catharines: Vanwell Publishing Ltd., 2002).

[20] D. Morton. A Military History of Canada: From Champlain to Kosovo., 5^th Ed. (Toronto: McClelland & Steward, 2007), 274.

[21] D. J. Bercuson. “A Paper Prepared for the Minister of National Defence”, quoted in G. C. Kennedy Military Education: Past, Present and Future. (London: Praeger, 2002), 170.