The Political Importance of the Space Race, Research Paper Example

Strategy is a plan of action that enables a body of people a planned order of attack. Strategy is necessary in war in order to properly implement, organize, and execute a successful attack. There have been many strategists in the centuries, whose contributions to war has changed the face of it. Frederick the Great, Guibert, Louis XIV, and Bulow have each contributed something to modern day war strategy. This paper will present the chronology of war strategy according to the aforementioned list and focus on how each contributor revolutionized the way that war is handled by changing troop dynamic from foreigners to patriots, lines of defense, a fortified front, shift in marching patterns, and an armies strategic mobility.

Machiavelli had changed war from a moral or ethical dilemma into one of social import while Vauben had brought strategy in the form of “natural science and technology.”[1]It was with Frederick the Great that the world witnessed a shift in war strategy. Frederick the Great introduced the world to blitzkrieg; not so much a planned strategy as it was a massive bombing. Frederick the Great was a general for over forty years and “who cannot be interpreted as anything other than a determined general seeking decisive victory.”[2]Frederick the Great changed his tactical maneuvers from mobile to stationary.[3]War, or rather, Frederick the Great’s army, was so important to him that he came up with an entirely new economic system in order to support his troops. Prussia was a great country because of its army. Prussia had such a great army because the country fused all of its important elements such as politics, economy and military science into a “science of statecraft”.[4]It is obvious that planning was Frederick the Great’s trademark when it came to his country (Prussia) and it’s strong army. Frederick the Great made strategy almost a philosophy, “a brave colonel…makes a brave battalion; and a colonel’s decision in a moment of crisis may sway the destiny of the kingdom.”[5]Thus, strategy hinges on leadership and the philosophy of a great leader dictates the kingdom’s future.

This idea of leadership instills in the troops a cohesive ideal: the ideal of fighting for a kingdom. This bonds them in a unity of purpose. Frederick the Great’s purpose was to build a great kingdom: Prussia. He succeeded because of his stalwart leadership skills. While Frederick the Great placed great emphasis on patriotism, he still fought under the antiquated belief that the common soldier was not imbibed with such loyalty and that the use of foreign troops was acceptable. Frederick the Great also relied on a battle scheme in which he reserved the onslaught of his forces until he was assured victory, “Frederick never committed his full force until he was certain of success, and it was axiomatic—as Napoleon told Joubert in 1797—that for an inferior army the art of war was not to come to battle.”[6]Thus, Frederick the Great brought patience into war strategy and the idea that troops are not expendable.

Guibert brought new light on warfare strategy by building on Frederick the Great’s ideas. Guibert believed in the idea of movement instead of positions because he believed that position should be a last resort in battle and that wars should be brought to the opposing side, “when an army knows how to maneuver, and wants to fight, there are few positions that it cannot attack from the rear or cause to be evacuated by the enemy.”[7]Guibert also believed that wars should not be fought by countrymen (and cited America’s successful revolution as British incompetence). Guibert argued that military technique from a good leader matched with “training discipline and resources,”[8] was what won battles. The French Revolution disagreed with a lot of Guibert’s points. The French Revolution in fact contributed a lot to modern battle strategy.

Louis XIV took war a step further by expanding the number of troops in an army to an unprecedented amount. He also emphasized control, discipline, and administration, which in turn made tactical units answerable to a specific hierarchy. The shift in strategy dynamic occurred most notably during the French Revolution. The Old Regime fostered an idea of armies made up of motley crews of foreigners, the poor, and criminals, but the New Regime was made up of men who came together to fight for a cause regardless of hierarchical stance.

During the 17^th century further changes on strategy were also being utilized in Germany. Germany and France began to fortify their troops. Previous to this troops had been more like marauders than organized units but the French Revolution’s organizational prerogatives proved handy and useful “Armies and fragments of armies were immobilized, near their bases, from which they were not supposed to depart by more than five days’ march.”[9] The shift in strategy at this time can best be described as a shift from random movements in a battlefield to one of strategized maneuvers in which it was more prized to hold a position.[10]

The shift in strategy was ultimately a shift in political organization. Freiherr Dietrich von Bulowwas the “founder of modern military science.”[11]In his treatise, he said that small states were antiquated, “he held that state power tended to fill a certain area, and beyond that area to be ineffective; hence each power had natural frontiers; the attainment of these frontiers would produce a political balance and lasting peace, since each power would then have reached the natural limits of its action.”[12]He designated certain areas in Europe to reigning powers based on “infantry tactics.”[13]

Bulow stated that there must be a base of organization (in which ammo was stored), and “two lines of operations”[14] that would eventually converge at 90 degrees and that in order to maintain a strong front, the attacking army must not exceed a distance more than three days march away from their base of operations. This “service of supply”[15] must be the foremost tactical advantage by a general, even above attacking an enemy; for, without a line of defense with adequate ammo and supplies, the advantage becomes lost to the enemy.[16]

Movement however, is the key to winning a war. Guibert and Bulow agreed that a solid army should have “skillful manipulation of the division.”[17]Organizing troops into a firing line required marching columns and organized marching patterns. When Marlborough marched in Britain, he “encouraged the development of platoon fire, whereby a battalion was divided into eighteen platoons, broken into three ‘firings’ of six platoons each. Every third platoon fired together, thus giving continuous fire along the whole length of the line, while at the same time maintaining a reserve and ensuring reasonable control.”[18]This strategy also required skill in speed, ability of a large group of soldiers to cover large ground and still be able to fight without losing men (to death or abandonment) and “simultaneous reconcentration [sic]at the objective with adoption of battle positions in the light of concrete local conditions.”[19]This put strategy above tactics. Thus, the emphasis on a great commander began to take shape and therefore we come full circle to Frederick the Great who emphasized a great general as having the sway of his kingdom’s destiny in his decisions on the battlefield.

In conclusion, without a great general there will be fragmentation in the troops.[20]A general is in charge of “artillery fire, military medicine, [and] logistics”[21]and being able to defend a country, or to conquer depends on the proper and efficient utilization of all of these things. The shift from stationary to mobile army units, the inclusion of lines of defense and marching distances from fresh ammo and supplies, all influenced today’s strategic approach to battle.

Bibliography

Palmer, R.R. (1986). “Guibert, Bulow: From Dynastic to National War.” Peter Paret (ed.) Makers of Modern Strategy from Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 92-119.

Strachen, H. (1983). “European Armies and the Conduct of War.” New York, New York: Routledge.

[1] R.R. Palmer, “Guibert, Bulow: From Dynastic to National War,” Peter Paret (ed.) Makers of Modern Strategy from Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1986), 92.

[2] Hew Strachen, “European Armies and the Conduct of War,” (New York, New York: Routledge 1983), 12.

[3]Palmer, “From Dynastic to National War,” 53.

[4]Palmer, “From Dynastic to National War,” 54.

[5] Ibid.

[6]Strachen, “European Armies and the Conduct of War,” 16.

[7]Palmer, “From Dynastic to National War,” 66.

[8] Ibid, 67.

[9]Palmer, “From Dynastic to National War,” 49.

[10] Ibid.

[11] Ibid, 69.

[12] Ibid.

[13] Ibid.

[14] Ibid.

[15] Ibid.

[16] Ibid.

[17] Ibid, 72.

[18]Strachen, “European Armies and the Conduct of War,” 17.

[19] Ibid.

[20] Ibid.

[21] Ibid.