The Question of Free Will in a World of Determinism, Research Paper Example

Questions about the concept of “free will” have been asked by philosophers, theologians, and other thinkers for all of human history. At the core of the argument for and against the existence of free will is the philosophical concept of determinism, with free will existing on one side of the argument and determinism on the other. Simply put, “determinism” means that everything that happens, including the individual actions of human beings, is determined by factors and causes unrelated to and outside of human will. A common philosophical position, then, is that in a world of determinism free will simply does not exist, or that determinism and free will are incompatible. This position been challenged by philosophers who have developed what is known as the compatibilist view; this view holds that the desires and motives of agents can exist apart from determinism, and that determinism does not disprove the existence of free will. The arguments made by various philosophers about determinism and free will can and do get very complicated, and reading how these various philosophers address issues related to free will makes it clear that the very definition of what constitutes free will is not universal. In order to even consider whether free will is possible within a context where determinism is taken as a given, it is first necessary to define free will. The fact that no widely-held agreement has been reached among philosophers over the nature of free will demonstrates just how elusive it is.

Frankfurt (1971) makes a layered and complicated argument in favor of the existence of free will. His essay “Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person” considers a definition of free will that Frankfurt claims can exist regardless of whether determinism is true or not. As Frankfurt puts it, his “conception of freedom of the will appears to be neutral with regard to the problem of determinism” (p 20). It is immediately clear in Frankfurt’s words here just how complex an issue free will really is. Frankfurt goes on to assert that “it seems conceivable that it should be causally determined that a person (has free will)” (p 20). To be fair, this statement comes only after Frankfurt has devoted multiple pages to defining and explaining what free will means in his view; it does bear out the core compatibilist argument that free will and determinism are not mutually exclusive. In fact, Frankfurt develops and argument that simply avoids the issue of determinism entirely by simply asserting that determinism could determine whether or not an individual agent has free will.

Looking deeper into Frankfurt’s argument, however, reveals that he seems to be creating very specific definitions about both free will and determinism (or the lack of either) in order to argue that the two are not just compatible, but are perhaps entirely irrelevant to each other. Frankfurt’s general thesis is based on the notion that the concept of “personhood” is predicated on the existence or presence of free will in an individual. In other words, argues Frankfurt, free will can and does exist, but not every member of the human race has free will; those that do have free will are “persons,” and those who do not are (as he labels them) “wantons.” According to Frankfurt, both animals and “all very young children” (p 11) are wantons; a wanton, he argues, “does not care about his will.” Frankfurt claims that wantons are motivated by their desires, but lack the capacity for critical reflection, or the ability to understand, analyze, or choose between their own motives and volitions in the way that someone with free will can do.

This is an interesting argument, as Frankfurt is flatly proclaiming that some human beings do have free will and that some human beings do not have free will. Moreover, Frankfurt claims, it is the difference between these types of human beings that determine whether or not they qualify for personhood. Therefore, in Frankfurt’s view, the existence of free will is not something that is universal to all human beings. It would seem at first glance that Frankfurt is simply redefining what the concept of “free will” means. For many philosophers, theologians, and others who consider the issue of free will, it is something that exists apart from consciousness, and is in effect a supernatural phenomenon that is universal among all people (Dennett, 2008). From this perspective on free will, every individual has free will, and every individual is both morally and causally responsible for his or her actions. It is this notion of free will that is most polarized with determinism, and Frankfurt sets out to explore a definition of free will that is not constrained by, or obviated by, determinism.

In describing his ideas about free will, Frankfurt delves into a complicated and sometimes even confusing analysis of what he labels “desires” and “volitions.” These desires and volitions are further broken down into categories of “first order” and “second order” (with the capacity for acknowledging and considering those that exist as “second order” desires serving to fill the function of the critical self reflection Frankfurt claims separates persons from non-persons). “Human beings are not alone in making choices,” writes Frankfurt (p 6), noting that animals too make choices. What is “peculiarly characteristic of humans,” however, is their ability to form –and consider- these “second order desires” (p 6). In short, second order desires are reflective of a person’s ability to choose between different desires, and to want to choose between them; as Frankfurt puts it, persons “are capable of wanting to be different, in their preferences and purposes, than they actually are” (p 7). This capacity is, according to Frankfurt, both indicative of the existence of free will and the fundamental component of personhood.

This also explains why Frankfurt’s conception of free will is not a universal trait among human beings. The argument goes that some individuals act entirely on their first order desires, and give little or no consideration to analysis or reflection of those desires, while others question their own desires, and make choices about whether or not to act on them. In this context, an individual may have a strong desire to act in a particular manner, but may also have a strong desire not to want to act in this manner. This second-order desire can override the first one; this capacity alone would seem to qualify the individual for Frankfurt’s conception of personhood. The question that arises when considering Frankfurt’s views and arguments on this subject, then, pertains to whether the capacity to develop and choose between conflicting desires –or the lack of such capacity- is enough to support the philosophical notion of free will.

Franklin’s position is difficult to reconcile with the most basic conception of free will, as he seems to be playing a semantics game in order to redefine “free will” to fit his argument. If anything, his position seems to be that some people have a greater capacity than others to overcome their basest urges, and those that have such capacities have free will while those that cannot do not have free will. Assuming that Frankfurt considers himself to have free will, then who is to say that those “wantons” who give in to their base urges are not simply exercising their free will to indulge those urges? The arguments Frankfurt makes, and the questions his arguments raise, demonstrate how difficult it is not just to consider the existence of free will, but even to define it.

While Frankfurt makes a case for free will that is compatible with determinism (and that he claims exists regardless of the veracity of determinism) other compatibilist philosophers address determinism head on when making their case for the existence of free will. One well-known contemporary philosopher and author, Daniel Dennett, goes so far as to acknowledge a significant measure of determinism while arguing that free will can and does exist and is entirely compatible with such determinism. Dennett’s argument in favor of such a compatible version of free will is, like Frankfurt’s, first based on the need to define (or, depending on one’s perspective, redefine) what “free will” means. Also like Frankfurt, Dennett frames “free will” largely within the context of an individual’s ability to choose between desires or options. In order to make his argument, Dennett takes a scientific approach, using the process of evolutionary biological and physiological development as evidence of his views on free will.

Dennett begins by examining the development of the earliest life forms, the most basic proteins and other cells that form the building blocks of later, more complex creatures. These microscopic organisms function in particular ways that are, in essence, mechanistic, and there is no agent within them that chooses to function in such particular ways. Although they are as alive, in a biological sense, as are human beings, there is unquestionably a different set of operational imperatives at work in prokaryote cells than there is in human beings (or, for that matter, in many “higher” life forms). The line from the earliest single-cell organisms to contemporary humans spans 3.5 billion years, with the existence of human beings taking up the tiniest fraction at the very recent end of this timeline.

Moreover, notes Dennett, it has only been a few million years since the human species branched off of the same evolutionary common ancestor we share with chimpanzees and other non-human primates. Finally, at the very tip of the timeline, is the period of only ten thousand or so years that human beings have developed civilizations and begun to reshape the Earth’s environment to suit our needs and desires. According to Dennett, free will is an inherent component of what it means to be human, but it is not something that has always existed, or that is or was granted by some outside force (Dennett, 2013). In short, asserts Dennett, free will is something that evolved within human beings in the same way that any and all of our capacities as living things evolved (2013). Crucial to Dennett’s view on free will and its compatibility with determinism is the question of “inevitability;” Dennett holds that because the decisions that human beings make are not, in his view, inevitable, that free will is by definition a component of human nature (Dennett, 2013).

Dennett discusses “inevitability” by defining it as “unavoidable” (2008). Either things are “evitable” (avoidable) or they are “inevitable” (unavoidable). Dennett describes the evolutionary process in humans as largely being exemplified in our capacity to avoid certain situations or circumstances (Dennett, 2008). Further, he argues, we are able to make long-term and far-reaching plans based on our interests and desires to avoid things such as physical harm, disease, starvation, and other threats and dangers. The simple cells with which he begins his discussion on the evolution of free will do not, of course, possess these same capacities to plan for the future, to understand and avoid threats, or to otherwise choose between options based on “evitability” (Dennett, 2008) Free will, then, does not have to be something that exists in the supernatural realm; in fact, it can only be a part of the natural world. It is, according to Dennett, simply a capacity that human beings have developed as a result of millions and even billions of evolutionary history.

As noted, Dennett’s argument that free will is compatible with determinism seems to be based on his own personal definition of free will. As conscious beings, humans have an awareness that they have the capacity to choose between different options, and Dennett posits that this awareness and capacity for making choices is a product of our evolutionary development. By framing it is a biological and physiological construct, Dennett seems to be arguing that free will is practically synonymous with self-awareness. Dennett’s argument is fairly effective; by defining free will as an outgrowth of biological processes, he can posit on one hand that these biological process are deterministic, but what they have “determined” is the existence of free will.

There are, of course, many philosophers who disagree with Dennett, Frankfurt, and others about the existence of free will or its possible compatibility with determinism. Philosopher and author Sam Harris addresses the issue in his book on the subject, simply titled “Free Will.” In this book, Harris argues against the notion of compatibility, and even against the notion of free will itself. In order to make his case in favor of his views, Harris first attempts to knock down the claims about free will held by philosophers such as Dennett and Frankfurt. Harris readily acknowledges that human beings can and do make decisions and choices in a manner that is quite different from the way non-human creatures make decisions and choices (Harris, 201, p3). Harris’ views on free will do not in any way discount the idea that human beings are capable of weighing options, or of having conflicting and competing desires that provide the context in which decisions or choices are made. What Harris does argue against, however, is that such capacities are, in themselves, proof of the existence of free will.

While Harris acknowledges the existence of consciousness and of the capacity people have for making decisions and choices, he argues that this does not support the existence of free will; further, he asserts, “free will is an illusion” (Harris, 2012, p 5). If we have wills, or if we define how we make decisions as being the function of the will, these wills “are simply not of our own making” (p 5). Harris believes that the thoughts and desires and impulses that drive us and motivate us to action arise from “background causes of which we are unaware and over which we exert no conscious control” (p 5). Although we are conscious creatures, in Harris’ view we are, in essence, mistaking an awareness of self for a sense of self-agency that simply does not exist.

To bolster his argument, Harris points to the example of two men who were convicted of engaging in the brutal rape, torture, and murder of a woman and her two daughters. Harris postulates that if he were to completely trade places with either of these two men, if he were to become either of them, to have their exact neurological makeup, life experiences, and other characteristics, then he would be unable to act in their circumstances any differently than either of them acted. As Harris writes, “there is no extra part of me that could decide to see the world differently or to resist the impulse to victimize other people. Even if you believe (in) an immortal soul, the problem of responsibility remains: I cannot take credit for the fact that I do not have the soul of a psychopath” (p 4). Harris, who has studies both philosophy and neuroscience is firm in his belief that we are not the conscious agents of our decisions, that no matter how much we believe that we have free will, our conscious and subconscious minds are shaped and programmed by events and circumstances that are out of our control and beyond our awareness.

At the core of the debate over determinism and free will is the matter of defining what, exactly, “free will” means. Throughout human history philosophers and theologians have debated the issue of free will, and developed many compelling arguments on each side of the free will/determinism debate. As I see it, arguing over the existence –or simply the definition- of free will has changed and evolved as our scientific understanding of the universe has grown. In its earliest iterations, free will was conceived as something that was supernatural, a capacity granted to human beings by a spiritual creator. As scientific developments and have supplanted many of humanity’s superstitions, it appears that the very definition of free will has evolved to keep pace with them. Contemporary philosophers and writers such as Frankfurt, Dennett, and Harris all seem to frame free will to fit their own positions, but all share a common understanding that whatever the limits of human capacity are, they are not supernatural. In this sense, then, such models of free will are inherently different from the notion that free will is a spiritual function that exists apart from consciousness. If that is the case, and free will –if it exists at all- is just a function of biology, then the only argument for or against it would seem to be whether our awareness of our own decision-making processes does or does not fulfill the definition of free will. In my view, free will is simply the illusion we experience that our consciousness is something that exists as a separate entity from our biology, and that the existence of that illusion is a function of determinism.

Works Cited

Dennett, Daniel. “Dennett on Free Will and Evolution.” YouTube. N.p., 29 Jan. 2013. Web. 22 Nov. 2013.

Dennett, Daniel. “Dennett on free will and determinism.” YouTube. N.p., 30 Aug. 2008. Web. 22 Nov. 2013.

Frankfurt, Harry G. “Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person.” Journal of Philosophy 68.1 (1971): 5-20. Web. 22 Nov. 2013.

Harris, Sam. Free Will. New York, NY: Free Press, 2012. Print.