The Russia-Georgia Crisis, Research Paper Example

The Russia-Georgia crisis can be considered as a pertinent case of extant tensions within international politics, insofar as the crisis entailed a fundamental policy and military conflict between a pro-Western Georgia and a Russia that is attempting to maintain its sphere of influence in the Eurasia region after the break-up of the Soviet Union. The recent key event in these strained relations, the Russian and Georgian war in South Ossetia in 2008, can be viewed as a boiling-over of these geopolitical tensions. The conflict is thus particularly germane to the study of international relations, to the extent that it underscores some of the key concepts of international relations, such as neorealism and neoliberalism, while also recalling traditional geopolitical conflicts both on the territory of the former Soviet Union and cold war tensions between Russia and the United States. In the following essay, we shall examine the background of the conflict; international responses to the conflict; a summary of the relevant states involved; a conceptual analysis of the crisis based on theories of international relations; an account of future implications; and a conclusion that recapitulates the political and theoretical significance of the conflict between Russia and Georgia.

The tensions between Russia and Georgia can be traced back to the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991. Georgia gained sovereignty and disputes with neighbors began, particularly Abkhazia and South Ossetia, revolving around issues of the territorial integrity of Georgia contra the desired autonomy of these respective regions. Russia has traditionally expressed a policy position that supports the independence of these areas, thus creating diplomatic problems between Moscow and Tbilisi in the early nineties.  With the seizure of power by Mikhail Saakashvili in the so-called “Rose revolution”, there was a heightening of bellicose rhetoric from Tbilisi. The government of Saakashvili, an American-educated lawyer, is, “strongly pro-Western and pro-American.” (Mitchell, 7) Moreover, Mitchell notes that, “the Rose Revolution was unusual among political transitions in that demonstrators waved American flags – and even a few Israeli flags.” (Mitchell, 7) Georgia, under Saakashvili has sought to be a member of EU, and more significantly for the geopolitical situation in the region, a member of NATO. The South Ossetian War of 2008, which marked the first full-scale armed conflict between Russia and Georgia, can be interpreted as the culmination of Saakashvili’s pro-Western policies. Georgia launched a full-scale military operation to claim South Ossetia as Georgian territory. According to both the Georgian aggression and the presence of Russian peacekeepers in Georgia, the Russian military responded with a defence of South Ossetia, and routed the Georgian military in a nine-day war. Complicating the matter was the aforementioned geopolitical and policy forces behind the decision. Georgian military had consistently been strengthened over the proceeding years by America and Israel; it is also relevant to note that Georgia was the third most represented nation, following the U.S. and the United Kingdom, in the coalition in Iraq. (Huq) Russian analysts have also been clear in noting “the U.S. role in initiating the war.” (Buzgalin & Kolganov, 122) During the conflict, the Russian army was extremely efficient, removing the Georgians from South Ossetia and also advancing into Georgia, kilometers from Tbilisi. The Russians nevertheless eventually withdrew back to South Ossetia, and Saakashvili’s government in Georgia remains in power. Two of the key consequences of the conflict can be viewed as Russia’s recognition of the independence of South Ossetia and Abkhazia, something they had refrained from doing since 1991, and the straining of relations between Russia and the Tbilisi-Washington axis.

The presence of IGOs was a decisive aspect of the Russia-Georgia crisis. In the previous conflicts between South Ossetia and Georgia, particularly, the 1991-92 war, South Ossetia had a de facto autonomous status, however it was neither recognized by the United Nations, nor, as noted, by Russia. This indecisiveness on the part of the international community could be interpreted as contributing to the ongoing disputes between Georgia and South Ossetia. Another one of the key corollaries of the 1991-92 war was the introduction of the Joint Control Commission for Georgian-Ossetian Conflict Resolution, essentially a peacekeeping IGO made-up of Russia, Georgia, North and South Ossetia. A key precursor to the August 2008 war can be identified as Georgia’s pulling out of the JCC in spring of 2008, which would indicate their dissatisfaction with the IGO. The aforementioned continued support of the Georgian military by Israel and the United States also can be speculated as a reason for Georgia’s refusal to co-operate in the JCC peacekeeping organ. After the Georgian army’s defeat, the European Union played a key role in mediating peace between the two sides. These actions of the EU suggest a conscious political decision to provide diplomacy between the Russia and the United States-Israel-Georgia axis, a role that reveals the significance of this conflict, as the EU itself noted: “This is the first time in its history that the European Union has decided to intervene actively in a serious armed conflict.” (EU, 3) Moreover, the EU was important in investigating the reasons for the war. The Union’s independent fact-finding commission to determine the causes of the South Ossetian war concluded that the conflict began with a “massive Georgian military artillery attack.” (EU, 20) The mediating role of IGOs in the conflict thus revealed a traditional geopolitical split between two axes of influence: to the extent that the EU made unprecedented steps to de-escalate the geopolitical tension, this suggests that the conflict was not only a Russian-Georgia conflict, but was a conflict in which American foreign policy had encouraged Georgian military action.

From this analysis, we can gather that the key relevant states in the conflict did not only include Russia, Georgia and South Ossetia, but also the United States. For example, the U.S. military conducted training exercises in Georgia, less than one month before the Georgian invasion of South Ossetia. (Woods) This, as has been suggested by Russian analysts is indicative of: “the degree of the Saakashvili’s regime dependence on U.S. support” and that Georgia “could not undertake any military actions not [sic] without direct instructions from its U.S. sponsors.” (Buzgalin & Kulganov, 124) The close-connections between Tbilisi and Washington, as observed by the above American and Russian sources, would certainly indicate that U.S. support for Saakashvili was symptomatic of a greater foreign policy that was hostile to Russia. This perspective is also evident in other examples of U.S. foreign policy, such as the overwhelming support for other “colored revolutions”, such as the Orange revolution in Ukraine, and the desired construction of a missile shield in Czech Republic and Poland. While these acts could be viewed as the propagation of an “idealist” foreign policy that supports “democracy”, judging by America’s selective support of “democracies” across the world (i.e., no encouragement of a prospective Saudi Arabian democracy, insofar as Saudi Arabia is an American ally), America’s disproportionate support for Georgia would rather indicate a conscious foreign policy decision to diminish Russia’s influence in the region. The prima facie relevant states involved in the conflict – Russia, Georgia, and South Ossetia – are therefore joined by America, which speaks to the complexity of the Russia-Georgia crisis.

The policy decisions of Russia, South Ossetia, Georgia and America clearly reflect some of the key concepts in theories of international relations. Realist, neorealist and neoliberalist perspectives may be used to interpret the unfolding of the Russia-Georgia crisis. From the horizon of neoliberalism, it is crucial to analyze the crisis in terms of “the relationship between neoliberalism, the exercise of state power, and the institutions and practice of global governance.” (Lee and McBride, 1) Firstly, the Georgian position, insofar as one accepts the premise that there was a pronounced American influence on Georgia’s actions, is indicative of the cooperation of state powers in issues of global governance. More precisely, the Georgian attack on South Ossetia can be viewed as the utilization of state power for the aim of global governance, according to a desired aim to limit Russian influence in the Caucasus. As neo-liberalism stresses the balance between the self-interest of individual states and the possibility of coalitions between states, the American role in the crisis certainly points to a neo-liberalist position par excellence. It can also, however, be interpreted from a realist perspective, to the extent that one accepts the notion that America utilized Georgia to fight its own proxy war for realist interests against Russia. Russia could also be construed as operating from a neo-liberalist perspective, to the extent that it sided with South Ossetia. However, South Ossetia’s lack of status as an independent nation, and the absent of the global aspect significant to neo-liberalist ideology would seem to suggest that Russia did not employ a neo-liberalist policy during the crisis. Rather, Russia’s policy would appear to be more consistent with a classical realist perspective that intends to support Russia’s regional aims as opposed to global aims. Thus, from a realist perspective, Russia’s suspicion of Tbilisi’s aggressive alliances with Washington, certainly suggests that Russia acted in their own self-interest against what it perceived to be a neo-liberal co-ordinated threat amongst various nations operating under a globalist, neo-liberal slogan of “democracy.” The realist actions of Russia would thus be interpreted as the attempt for Russia to maintain state sovereignty against what was viewed as Georgian threat, while the defense of South Ossetia was in essence consistent with Russia’s own realist aims. From a neorealist perspective, the fact that the Russian actions were condemned by many in the Western world indicates that Russia failed to meet the structural requirements set by the American dominated West. However, the criticism of Russia was not universal, as evidenced by the aforementioned conclusion of the EU that Georgia was responsible for starting the war. The conflict essentially realized the limit of neorealist theory in order to explain conflict, as there was no international consensual structure that clearly judged the actions of Russia or Georgia: the conflict fitted more along the lines of a traditional realist conflict, however, with the added element of Georgia’s support from America. As opposed to these theories, perhaps the most accurate description of the crisis would be a geopolitical description that emphasizes Georgia, South Ossetia and Abkhazia’s roles within a greater conflict between America and Russia that came to the forefront during the South Ossetian war.

As to the future of the conflict, the tensions between Russia and Georgia remain significant. The key event we may interpret here is the recognition of South Ossetian and Abkhazian independence by Moscow, after the war took place. This can be interpreted as a message sent from Russia to Tbilisi that military aggression from Georgia in the area will not be tolerated, and that any such actions will have consequences that clearly affect the Georgian territory. Moreover, the decisive victory of Russian forces over American and Israeli trained Georgian forces demonstrates that the Russian armed forces are thoroughly capable of defeating a Western trained army in decisive fashion. From an American perspective, the war can only be viewed as a disaster, as Georgia realized none of her objectives and America did not limit the Russian sphere of influence. While the independence of South Ossetia and Abkhazia is not recognized internationally, the conflict demonstrates that Russia has sufficiently rebuilt to not allow incursions into its sphere of influence. The absence of a resolution is also significant here, as it demonstrates the ongoing tensions between a Washington-backed Tbilisi and Moscow. Moreover, the conflict remains significant not only because it recalls a Tbilisi-Moscow tension, but also is a crucial symptom of ongoing tensions between Moscow and Washington.

The conflict between Moscow and Georgia is thus exemplary in its demonstration of the conflicts that can arise after a state such as the Soviet Union dissolves and unresolved geopolitical disputes remain pertinent. Moreover, it demonstrates how these geopolitical disputes, such as between Georgia and South Ossetia, can be influenced by greater states such as Russia and America. It particularly recalls that Russia and America are not allies, despite the end of the Cold War. However, the Russia-Georgia crisis also indicates that after the cold war America has pursued an aggressive foreign policy in areas of the former Soviet Union under the neoliberalist slogan of democracy. The presence of various IGOs presence as mediators in the Russian-Georgian crisis can be interpreted as a symptom of the recognition on the part of the international community of the severity of the geopolitical scope of this conflict, as opposed to it merely being a local “small war” between Georgia and South Ossetia. The unresolved nature of this crisis also fails to support the neo-realist or neo-liberalist approaches to international relations, as the clear global connotations of these two theories are absent: the Russian victory against Georgia demonstrated that an American dominated world is not a geopolitical reality.

Works Cited

Buzgalin, Alexander and Andre Kolganov. “The Caucasian War and Public Interest:

Peaceful Democratic Alternatives to Replace Imperial Ambitions.” In Russia In Global Affairs, Moscow, Vol. 6 No. 4. December, 2008.

European Union. International Independent Fact Finding Commission on the Conflict in Georgia. Volume I, September, 2008.

Huq, Aziz. “American Dispatches: How To Manage an Imperial Decline.” In Asia Times, October, 18 2008.

Lee, Simon and Stephen McBride. Neo-Liberalism, State Power and Global Governance. New York: Springer, 2007.

Mitchell, Lincoln Abraham. Uncertain Democracy: U.S. Foreign Policy and Georgia’s Rose Revolution. University of Pennsylvania Press, 2008.

Woods, Bryan. “Security Cooperation Exercise Immediate Response 2008 Begins with Official Ceremony in Republic of Georgia.” U.S. Army News, July, 17, 2008. accessed at: http://www.army.mil/-news/2008/07/17/10953-security-cooperation-exercise-immediate-response-2008-begins-with-official-ceremony-in-republic-of-georgia/