The Why of the Extraordinary: Hume, Ward, and Miracles, Research Paper Example

Introduction

The subject of miracles has long concerned those removed from theology, and inevitably so; miracles as such defy the most widely held assumptions regarding the natural courses of events, so scientist and philosophers are inevitably drawn to investigating miracles. In the following, the contrasting views of David Hume and Keith Ward will be summarized, and the primary arguments of each presented. As Ward essentially rebukes Hume, Hume’s argument will be revealed first. Then there will be a statement and explanation of which argument has the greater claim to validity.

David Hume: Belief in Disbelief

David Hume’s “Of Miracles” may be said to be an approach based on a resolute pragmatism. Hume essentially begins by asserting his most dramatic conclusion, which is that the thoughts of Dr. Tillotson, refuting any possibility of there having been a real, divine presence as expressed by the Apostles, is truth. He paraphrases Tillotson and seizes upon the pivotal argument that, as the testimony of the Apostles constitutes the only known evidence of recorded Christian miracles, there is no basis of understanding to allow acceptance of these miracles as fact. In this beginning, then, Hume is offering his primary point that, in the long history of miracles as identified as having occurred by humanity, more than testimony is required for genuine belief to be in place. No matter the degree of certainty as expressed by believers and “witnesses,” only just reasoning may determine the reality. With Hume, then, that reality takes the form of miracles as not being possible.

As Hume comprehends that his argument rests on how experience creates parameters of authentic understanding, he then acknowledges that there are variations regarding how far experience may be trusted. Experience, he suggests, may delude, as when an unusual outbreak of weather contradicts normal patterns. The unusual, however, nonetheless conforms to some experience, even if not in a readily apparent way: “All effects follow not with like certainty from their supposed causes” (Hume), and there are innumerable variations of consequences which seem unlikely. Consequently, Hume holds that the man of sense must always weigh occurrences with an awareness of the range of probabilities. When experience dictates unchanging consequences, the assurance of the same is more firmly rooted; when variation in consequences is more seen, there is then the greater need to determine the most likely explanations.

Hume then goes on to assert that experience of humanity in its entirety is the most trusted and rational means available of ascertaining reality. He argues that the inherently noble pursuit of truth in men, along with tides of observations and testimonies concurring over time, reaffirm this position. He acknowledges that falsehood is committed, but he discards this as as inevitably lacking in authority. More importantly, it is the process of weighing evidence that Hume feels is the true arbiter of reality: “We balance the opposite circumstances, which cause any doubt or uncertainty; and when we discover a superiority on any side, we incline to it.” Reason, Hume suggests, which must be the guiding force here, is an evolving thing itself, proving itself through its own processes of examination.

The author then proceeds to the thrust of his argument and addresses the possibility of miracles. Given his position as stated, he is unable to reconcile a reality of them with what is absolutely known of the world, and he makes this assertion in a clinical way: A miracle is a violation of the laws of nature; and as….experience has established these laws, the proof against a miracle…is as entire as any argument from experience can possibly be imagined” (Hume). This is supported by a corollary formula; for a miracle to be determined as real, then the likelihood of its being presented falsely must be less real, or more “miraculous.” Hume does address reasons for belief in miracles, certainly. He discusses how eagerly stories of miraculous events are seized upon, indicating the human impulse to favor the extraordinary. Hume cites scenarios ranging from Alexander’s conquests to a hypothetical resurrection of Elizabeth I to illustrate how mankind’s attraction to the marvelous obfuscates sense. There is also discussion of how “miracles” of one culture may only be believed when those of contrasting cultures are viewed as fraudulent. Moving into examples of miracles tied to faith, Hume proceeds to apply the same standards of examination, finds them wanting, and ultimately affirms that: “no testimony for any kind of miracle has ever amounted to a probability, much less to a proof.”

Only in regard to faith does Hume relax his judgment, in that faith, as removed from reason, renders miracles possible. The Bible is literally fabulous in Hume’s estimation, cataloging untold unrealities, but prophecies are by their very nature miraculous and, as held to by faith, necessary for the Christian religion of which Hume speaks with some respect. Even so, Hume also emphasizes that any such adherence to faith is an admission of a failure in reason alone, for even belief in prophecies intrinsically defies basic principles of understanding.

Ward: God as Proof

Keith Ward has a single agenda in his “Believing in Miracles,” and that is to refute Fume’s pragmatic, non-spiritual denial of miracles. It is Fume’s process of relying on rational forms of evidence that prompts Ward’s dissent: “David Fume’s arguments against believing reports of miracles are shown to be very weak” (741). Ward’s argument relies in its entirety on a supposition Hume avoids, that of a divine presence as able to create miracles, and he begins by logically, and ironically, siding with Hume. Miracles as such do indeed contradict the established laws of nature. If they occur, then, and following the precept that there must be a cause behind any occurrence, God’s will must be responsible, for only such a power could transcend the laws governing existence. Ward then refutes Hume by virtue of Fume’s acknowledged agnosticism. If Hume is, as an agnostic, open to the possibility of God, then he cannot assert that miracles are impossible, as he does.

Ward then goes on to break down Fume’s stance in degrees, beginning with what the author perceives as Fume’s incorrect concept of a miracle itself. For Ward, Fume’s idea of a miracle as impossible is actually substantiated by Fume’s own, “hyper-inflated” idea of natural laws as absolutely fixed and immutable. Citing Aquinas, Ward offers that it is reasonable to hold that natural laws dominate most of the time, and that the order of things proceeds in typically recognizable ways. To see such order as inviolable, however, is all that Hume may rely upon to dismiss miracles as impossible, and consequently the creations of misguided belief or expectation. Then, and as Ward somewhat eagerly moves on to, there is the inestimable matter of God’s presence in any such determinations, a presence which Hume, as an agnostic, must in some way allow for. That Hume does not seems to be the crux of Ward’s dissent, for it is unfathomable to Ward that humanity should hold a divine power to restrictions applicable to human beings: “Why should a personal God confine divine action to a set of absolute laws?” (743).

For Ward, if there is a God, then there can be no accounting for events and natural laws

without some admission of divine action as proceeding apart from them. The nature of divine action itself renders this acceptance necessary, as that nature is not obligated in any way to reflects established ideas of humanity. This being the case, divine acts do not contradict natural laws, but are part of a larger sense of them. Consequently: “The question of miracles is the question of whether a God who is constantly causally active in the cosmos sometimes acts in

ways that wholly transcend the regular operations of nature” (Ward 744). If the divine reasoning is unknown to humanity, it is nonetheless reasoning and within the realm of the natural world known to mankind.

This view established, Ward then proceeds to directly counter Hume. Fume’s claim that the evidence supporting natural laws must outweigh the validity of observation to the contrary is unsound, simply because it presupposes a degree of integrity to established events not justified. Hume discounts miracles because vast custom or experience presents them as so unlikely as to be unfounded, yet Ward counters that this view is intrinsically weak; merely because observation of an event is unusual does not eviscerate its validity, and Hume is, again, attaching far too much weight to accumulated experience. Ward then challenges Fume’s assumption that testimony regarding miracles must be unreliable, and the corollary that the greater likelihood of falseness must lie with the testimony than with the miracle, for a miracle to have occurred. For Ward, the reasoning is flawed because Hume does not at all allow for any probability of miracles and, if the existence of God is entertained as reasonable, the probability must exist. Ward also takes issue with Fume’s reliance on rarity as evidence of the improbability of miracles, which further invalidates testimony: “There is no correlation between the unusual of an occurrence and the unreliability of a report” (745).

The argument goes on to assess Carl Hempen accounts of the laws of nature, and here Ward delineates between God’s actions within natural laws and miracles. God may act in Hempen, but only within parameters following – interestingly – Fume’s own insistence on natural laws as fixed and governable. Ward’s primary point is raised here, in that God’s actions may be utterly improbable, More exactly: “There is no way that sense observation and experiment can detect

such particular intentions of a spiritual being” (747). While acknowledging that science is essential in helping to determine miracles, if only by establishing the patterns revealing such extraordinary occurrences, Ward ultimately concludes by maintaining that any willingness to believe in God must reflect a willingness to comprehend miracles as real.

Assessment

David Hume makes a fascinating case for miracles as being inherently false, a point of view enhanced by his willingness to accept the human attraction to them. Moreover, and to his credit, he does not make his argument based on disparagement of human interests or perceptions; he does not, more exactly, refute miracles because belief is foolish, but because there is non actual reason to believe beyond the desire to do so. It is also persuasively presented that, in weighing the likelihood of miracles, it is essential to also weigh the credibility or validity of the testimony in terms of its own probability of accuracy.

Nonetheless, Ward’s argument is more coherent and more trustworthy, and for reasons ironically as based in pragmatism as Fume’s. Ward does not insist that Hume is wrong because there is a God, and therefore Hume must be wrong; rather, he simply relies on a rational acceptance of possibility. This is what Hume does not entertain, and what weakens Fume’s stance. Ward does admit to the scope of natural laws as certainly rendering doubt of miracles reasonable, but he also – and sensibly – refuses to allow predominance to dictate as an absolute. Given the possibility of a divine force capable of moving in directions utterly unknown to humanity, and prompted by similarly arcane reasons, to assert that miracles cannot be is a gross assumption. As Ward illustrates, it is the nature of a miracle to confound and perplex, and to violate the established order of things. This order, however, is a man-made construct, and must be appreciated as such. Put another way, and extrapolating from Ward, humanity has attached the label of miracles to events later identified as having natural and explicable causes. Humanity may only proceed based upon what it holds to be true and valid and, ideas of God apart, this is itself necessarily a subjective arena. When, as Ward points out, God is admitted as possible, the enormity of that admission demands a willingness to conceive of the miraculous as real.

Works Cited

Hume, D. “Of Miracles.” An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding. Harvard Classics Volume 37. New York: Collier & Son, 1910. Web.

Ward, K. “Believing in Miracles.” Zygon, 37.3 (2002): 741-750. Web.