What Is Computer Ethics? Research Paper Example

Introduction

With the possible exception of the introduction of the modern printing press in the fifteenth century, no technology has more powerfully affected life as has the computer. The analogy does not apply only in terms of global impact; both technologies completely altered the way information was both stored and transmitted. The computer, however, has completely revolutionized the way the world operates, and in every arena, in a manner nothing else has even approached.   The impact is also exponential; as more and more people rely on computers and  Internet communication, more must comply in order to function in any mainstream society.

Given how quickly the computer age has evolved, it is inevitable that certain issues arising from it present great challenges.  A few decades ago, daily access to the Internet was an unusual thing; today, it is virtually within every home, and this factor of so many people being connected has introduced ethical and social dilemmas from the start, many of which remain unresolved. Children need to be protected from predators who employ the Internet, as adults need safeguarding from sophisticated “hackers” who tap into financial and private records stored online. There is also the enormous issue of national security following the terrorist attacks of 2001, in a world where vital protection or operational systems may be breached by criminals who are merely one step ahead of those maintaining them. The computer era, which seems to be in no danger of disappearing soon, has generated many arms races, and isolating a standard of ethical practices within computer use remains a substantial challenge.

Many specific actions have marked the ongoing presence of computers in daily life, from laws enacted to prosecute the new breeds of criminal created by the Internet, to increasingly rapid evolutions in sophisticated equipment and transmission capabilities.  John Moor’s 1985 groundbreaking article, “What Is Computer Ethics?”, however,  is surely an example of an event that vastly influenced how computers would be perceived in years to come.  Moor’s article was among the first to actually bring to light considerations not yet widely acknowledged, and to foresee the ethical dilemmas the new technology would most certainly bring into prominence. While not an advancement in the technology itself, a law pertaining to it, or a societal response, Moor’s article was undoubtedly a major occurrence in a field which, before it, was only barely recognized. As Moor predicted, ethics regarding computer use would be an ongoing and complex arena on a global level, and his identifying this helped encourage the investigations into the subject going on today.

Moor’s Contribution

As is well established, computer usage is a fixture of ordinary life, and one ingrained within every sphere of it. If businesses absolutely depend on computer systems to store and transfer information and finances, private citizens rely on it equally to conduct personal relationships, as well as further careers and their educations. There is, in fact, no aspect of living which is removed from computers, because these tools enable communication and information exchange to a virtually unlimited degree.

This being the case, the matter of ethics must be seen as similarly expansive. To discuss the ethics of computer use is, fundamentally, to discuss the ethics of living. There are, however, unique distinctions which arise from the technology, and which Moor identified in 1985 as being of supreme importance. No small part of the potential issues was the unforeseeable impact computers would have, although Moor does very well in painting an accurate picture of what has since transpired: “The ubiquitous use of electronic mail, electronic funds transfer, reservations systems, the World Wide Web, etc., places millions of the inhabitants of the planet in a global electronic village” (Moor, 1985,   p. 267). The situation was, even as Moor observed it in 1985, unprecedented. This was, and was going to be, a circumstance wherein quantity would be inextricably tied to quality, and whole new approaches to ethics would be required. The sheer universality of application more than established ethics in computer use as a field unto itself, and one which had not been sufficiently examined.

This was the force of Moor’s work. As he documents, two dominant schools of thought emerged from the rise of the computer age.  The first – what Moor refers to as “routine ethics” –  held that the technology did not create a need for an entirely new set of ethics, but only an adaptation of existing ethical practices and beliefs. The other maintained a stance of cultural relativism, which dictates that, as ethics shift from place to place, the worldwide use of the computer renders strictly ethical considerations moot. That is to say, the prevailing ethics of local or national cultures must dictate the ethics regarding computer use. What makes Moor’s work so influential an event is that he rejects both viewpoints as insubstantial.

Computers were already becoming so enormously influential that known ethics could not keep pace with the activity, and an “ethical vacuum” was being generated which neither theory properly addressed. Moor believes that “routine ethics” underestimates the range of the computer, and relativism ignores that core values permeate humanity, regardless of locale.  In rejecting  these definitions, Moor does not precisely replace them.  Rather, his article serves as something of an alert, correctly informing the world in 1985 that the continuing evolution and use of computers would present exponential dilemmas in ethics. He does not present an answer, but he does a great service by emphasizing the need to view computer ethics as a monumental issue deserving of consistent attention.

Specific Ethical Considerations

In addressing his view of the factors contributing to “policy vacuums” in computer ethics, Moor touches upon the increasingly inflammatory issue of privacy. Privacy is unquestionably linked to civil liberties and individual rights, for it is merely an extension of personal space; as people have the right to express themselves in acceptable ways, they have as well the right to not reveal information about themselves. Unfortunately, and historically, privacy generates suspicion. Just as innocent citizens fiercely guard their rights to privacy, so too do computer criminals and terrorist organizations (Stamatellos, 2007,  p. 28). Moor’s article precedes the 9/11 reactions of the Patriot Act, and the other, governmental allowances for accessing personal information, but he does then see, and note, the potential. He does not draw an illustration of how international violence may generate loss of privacy.  It is enough that the computers permit the process, for any reason: violating privacy through computer use is termed by him an aspect of the “invisible abuse” possibilities of computers.

Moor unintentionally sets up questions that have great repercussions in today’s world. For example, it could be ethically argued that anyone who elects to place personal information on an Internet social network is waiving a right to privacy.   That is to say, that information willingly displayed is inherently no longer “private”, since the object of the network is for it to generate interest. This of itself creates an ethical dilemma, however, in that there may be an implied audience and/or purpose which can then be ethically violated.  If, for instance, X joins Facebook and posts an extensive amount of personal information on a public page there, one which may be accessed by anyone, there are no restrictions based upon merely the social aspect of the site. X may desire that only those interested in seeking out someone of like ideas socially should view the page, but the Internet itself makes no such distinctions, and X may be dismayed to find that their preferences and habits have been used in a study by a research group (McKee, Porter, 2009,  p. 2).  As Moor queries in 1985, access from “invisible” parties may or may not constitute a violation of privacy.  What is pivotal is that he foresaw this eventuality.

Interestingly,  based on very little history, Moor also accurately predicts another ethical dilemma arising from technology, that of computer surveillance: “Computers can be programmed to monitor phone calls and electronic mail without giving any evidence of tampering” (p. 273).

As is well known, the workplace has become a battlefield in regard to computer ethics. A survey conducted in 2003 established that nearly seventy-five percent of all American companies practice some form of electronic surveillance on their employees, most typically in the forms of video cameras in the workplace and the monitoring of email and computer storage of individuals (Floridi, 2010,  p. 235). What is truly surprising about this, in fact, is how the initial outrage once created by this practice has lessened. People, it seems, are simply accepting of the fact that employers may access their private information, as many companies today have clauses in employment contracts reflecting this prerogative.

Towards the close of his article, Moor touches upon an issue strangely not viewed with great interest in the modern world, that of another kind of “invisibility”. He notes, more precisely, that  an ethical concern is raised by the very fact that computers do their work in a way unfathomable to most human beings. He is not speaking here of actual programming or technology skills, but rather the many and diverse tasks assigned to computers.  For example, he refers to a 1976 program wherein computers were asked to substantiate four-color conjecture, the long-held principle that a map can never have more than four colors without confusing the colors of adjacent areas shown within the map. A thousand or more hours of computer time went into this problem at the University of Illinois; it was, after all, 1976, and it is interesting to surmise how quickly the operation could be done today. The computer validated the theory.  However – and this truly does reflect a vastly important ethical point – there was no one able to validate the computer’s findings.  As the process was conducted on such a multifaceted and sophisticated level, no human being could begin to crosscheck it.  It is an extraordinary irony, that the technology is so advanced – and was so, even in 1976 – that it defies human supervision. Moor is not an alarmist, and he does not indicate an Orwellian nightmare waiting to unfold in his article.  He does, however, sanely address this as the important aspect of computer dependency it is. Moreover, it is strongly tied to ethics. That is to say, societies must ask themselves how much responsibility they are willing to place on what is essentially a tool, or implement.

An example of this is the 1984 presidential election.  As Moor notes, computer predictions established the results in California and New York long before the polls closed, and this goes to information as potentially swaying voters: “The problem is that computers not only tabulate the votes for each candidate but likely influence the number and distribution of these votes” (Moor,  p. 269). Then, as certainly today, an ethical determination must be made as to this process. Then, as today, and as Moor emphasizes, it is crucial to maintain an eye on what the machines are permitted to do.

Conclusion

Admittedly, John Moor’s 1985 article, “What Is Computer Ethics?”, does not fall under the category of a specifically influential event.  It is likely, in fact, that the release of the next, more streamlined laptop computer will create far more interest. Nonetheless, it is vital to recognize the importance of what he put forth. If he did not neatly summarize and address all the ethical issues arising from computers, a virtually impossible task in the 1980s as well as today,  he made an enormous contribution in giving the subject the serious consideration it merits, and in drawing academic and popular attention to it.

Before Moor, ethics regarding computers was discussed, but no theory took into account the vast power and impact of the technologies, which would inherently generate unique ethical dilemmas. Moor predicted this tide. In 1985, he understood that ethics regarding computer use would be an ongoing and complex arena on a global level, and his identifying this helped encourage the investigations into the subject going on today.

References

Floridi, L. (2010.)  The Cambridge Handbook of Information and Computer Ethics. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.

McKee, H. A., and Porter, J. E.  (2009.)  The Ethics of Internet Research: A Rhetorical, Case-Based Process.  New York, NY: Peter Lang Publishing.

Moor, J. H.  “What Is Computer Ethics?”  Metaphilosophy, Vol. 16, No. 4. (1985.) pp. 266-275.

Stamatellos, G. (2007.)  Computer Ethics: A Global Perspective.  Sudbury, MA: Jones and Bartlett Learning.