Will of Human Beings, Essay Example

According to Rowe and Wainwright, if it were determined that human beings do not have free will, for example through the conclusions of a materialistic neuroscience, which reduces what we previously thought was free will to a form of automaton cause and effect relationship between particles in the brain, this would result in the following: “the structure of human affairs would collapse.” (p. 26) The logic behind of this link between a “debunking” of free will and social collapse is based on the notion that so many of our social relationships are based upon what may be a presupposition that we are agents of free will. In other words, our existential choices are precisely that: choices.

The collapse of human free will would thus be a total collapse according to Rowe and Wainwright. And this seems like an entirely legitimate argument. For it is difficult to conceive of a particular area of human existence, where the presupposition that we possess free will and thus are autonomous in our decision making processes is not in effect.

A brief summary of the diverse forms of social relationship and human existence itself justifies this point. That is to say, from a purely social perspective, the entire social structure is perhaps a result of a certain conception of autonomous agency imparted to the human subject. To consider, for example, the legal realm, this tension is explicit: human beings, for example, charged for violating the law could no longer be brought before this same law, as though this supposed criminal act were of their own volition.

Furthermore, any of our personal interrelationships would collapse: concepts such as trust between individuals and even some of our most profound sentiments such as love would be radically challenged, in so far as these sentiments would no longer be the result of autonomous decision: nor would they be the result of sudden and contingent encounters.

This is a crucial point in the sense that we would have to radically alter how we discuss ourselves on the most basic levels. Random everyday sentiments, such as “I am happy” or “I am sad” would no longer have the same meaning: they would no longer be viewed as the products of particular existential circumstances, or an inner-subjective view on the world, but rather something radically foreign. This foreign quality of our deepest personal sentiments would therefore deconstruct our own personhood: without a sense of freedom in our choices, how can we conceive of ourselves as a human person?

This last point shows that not only is the loss of free will devastating for the social structure, but, moreover, to the extent that we separate the theological and metaphysical dimensions from the social realm, then here we lose our very relationship to the Divine. Certainly, in terms of various conceptions of our personal relationships to God, namely, in line with particular theological and metaphysical constructs, there may exist a certain element of fate, which would resemble an absence of free will: nevertheless, from a Christian perspective, this is incompatible with the gift to the human being which is our free will and thus the deepest seat of our personhood. The gift of God according to God’s love that is our existence would now be questioned, in so far as our own personhood would now be in doubt: how can we have a personal relationship with God if the free will that characterizes individual persons as persons is now lost?

Accordingly, despite the radicality of Rowe and Wainwright’s claim, perhaps upon further reflection the conclusion reached is that this claim is, in fact, not radical enough. For not only are all social institutions voided, our very sense of selfhood would be voided without a concept of free will. And moreover, any possible relationships to God would also seem to be destroyed by this potential neuroscientific discovery.