WMD Commission Report, Essay Example

An Analysis of the WMD Commission Report in Light of the Elder and Paul Model of Critical Thinking

In October 2002, the National Intelligence Council presented before Congress a National Intelligence Estimate regarding Iraqi’s arsenal capability. The information, which turned out to be unreliable, was the basis of the decision-making process that culminated in the Iraqi invasion in early 2003. Following the sorry aftermath of the Iraqi invasion, Congress formed an independent body- the Weapons of Mass Destruction Commission (WMD Commission) to investigate the causes of the NIC’s errors. The Commission’s report casts serious doubts on the capability of America’s intelligence community to conduct effective spy operations, and provide reliable intelligence information for policy makers. This essay analyses the commission’s report in light of the Elder and Paul model of critical thinking, in light of the eight key elements of analysis. The essay examines the author’s purpose and point of view, the report’s assumptions, implications, evidence, key questions, basic concepts conclusions.

The WMD Commission’s purpose was to investigate the intelligence community’s errors in its recommendations about Iraqi’s military capability, and recommend necessary changes to avoid such errors in the future. However, below the presentation of facts and case studies reports, the Commission’s point of view is skeptical of the intelligence community’s efficiency. It portrays the intelligence agencies as inept, inadequate, ineffective and unsuited for the contemporary external and terrorism threats facing the US. In its report, the commission emphasize that the Iraqi invasion resulted solely from the assessment of the Intelligence Community, and the aftermath of the war revealed its weaknesses and unreliability (WMD Commission 2005, p. 3). It draws its evidence from the Iraqi Survey Group, which found out that the intelligence community’s reports did not reflect the reality on the ground regarding Saddam’s secret military projects. It reference to the NSA’s spy agents as ‘eavesdroppers’ it lacks cutting-edge information gathering technology, and instead relies on amateurish techniques and rumor-mongering. In such cases, the agencies could only collect “little intelligence, which is either worthless or misleading” (p. 11). This assertion portrays the inefficiency of the spy agency and by extension, highlights the misuse of taxpayers’ money.

The commission’s report implies that the US intelligence community is guilty of previous intelligence plunders, but points out that it hid such mistakes from the public eye. It states that while the intelligence services of other countries were suspicious of Iraqi, the US intelligence compromised its credibility with its public assertion, and the result was very damaging- “one of the intelligence’s failures in recent American history” (p. 3). It also charges that the report is not the first one to implicate the intelligence service, as previous commissions have identified the same fundamental shortcomings in the working of the intelligence community.

The commission’s assertion that it was not asked to determine whether Saddam had weapons of mass destruction points to the fact that the concerned authorities wished to keep any truth from surfacing. Similarly, the commission claims that it lacked the mandate to investigate the how policy makers handled assessment reports from the intelligence community. It raises questions as to why the government would limit the commission’s scope of investigation, which further raises doubts on the commission’s autonomy. These revelations, implicitly suggest that were it not for the limitations on its investigation, the commission would have opened a can of worms that displayed the unreliability of the intelligence community and its inability to predict outcomes of foreign military expeditions.

During the Gulf War, the intelligence community underestimated Iraqi’s arsenal capability to the detriment of US’s military policy makers. It is possible, therefore, that the National Intelligence Council exaggerated the NIE report for cautionary reasons. However, now that this intelligence tactic has backfired, it throws the spy agencies at a loss on how to handle the Iran threat. Psychological analysis of the enemy’s intentions is a central feature of intelligence gathering (Arbel & Edelist, 2007, p. 293). On its part, Tehran would most likely capitalize on the suspicions the Iraqi mess casts on the CIA, and pursue its nuclear ambitions with some degree of courage. As a matter of fact, in the event Washington thinks of going east again, it will be more cautious than the reckless Bush-Pushing into Baghdad.

Some of the basic concepts that the report examines includes the nature of intelligence analysis, which it attributes to the mess in Iraqi. It states that the intelligence community made assumptions in their assessment of the military situation in Iraqi, saying that “analysts were too preoccupied with their assumptions about Saddam’s motives” (p. 7). Nonetheless, the commission exonerates the intelligence community from part of their mistakes, by pointing out that regardless the validity or otherwise of the intelligence assessment reports, some rather difficult decisions had to be made about Iraqi’s weapons programs. Consequently, it implies that no definite solution was available to policy makers, and any other intelligence service, given the situation, would have made similar assumptions. Additionally, the commission recognizes the complex management and technical challenges that the intelligence community faces in the modern world. This confession seems to imply that intelligence professionals operate in an environment where they to err is part of their job.

Moreover, the report recognizes the intelligence community’s successes elsewhere, as evidence that it is not totally inept. It points to the Libyan operation in which the spy agency’s revelations forced President Muammar Gaddafi to renounce his weapons of mass destruction programs. Similarly, it uncovered the A.K Khan nuclear armament network. In most recent times, the CIA and FBI have been effective in countering terrorist threats, especially after 9/11. In this light, then, the Iraqi error was an isolated case of occasional failure, which is a normal occurrence in the intelligence service (p. 8). In any case, the report points out that regardless the level of intelligence, weapons of mass destruction will continue to be a major threat in the 21^st century. Accordingly, the intelligence service will always appear to be imperfect, given that some incidences, like the 9/11 attacks, are surprises that even the best intelligence service will not foresee and avert.

The commission’s soft stance towards the intelligence community is, however, a tactical diversion to attack the political establishment. It notes that ‘we cannot expect the intelligence service, with their satellites, spies and analysts to guarantee absolute security” (p. 8). Instead, a collaborative national security system, including the use of diplomacy and an adequate military outfit are necessary to enhance a nation’s security capabilities. Loch Johnson notes that it is by sheer lack that the intelligence community’s weaknesses have revealed themselves to the American public, without having to suffer a biological or nuclear attack (Johnson, 2003, p. 329). This assertion reveals a major aspect of the intelligence profession, which compromises its efficiency significantly. The commission reports that bureaucracy runs deep within the intelligence community, which has a record of outside opinion.  It reports that the intelligence community has got many talented and dedicated people, but the bureaucratic system limits their professional practice. As a result, they work hard to maintain a status quo that is becoming increasingly irrelevant to challenge of containing the proliferation of nuclear weapons. With the charge of bureaucracy, it raises suspicions whether the Bush administration had prior plans to push its way into Iraqi, and the NIC exaggerated its National Intelligence Estimate report to support a government agenda.

In its conclusion, the commission’s report declares the intelligence community irrelevant to the contemporary military and terrorism threats facing the US. In response, they recommend a complete restructuring of the intelligence service. The present bureaucracy should be rooted out to afford the agencies a degree of autonomy in their operations. There is a need to strengthen the analytic “tradecraft”- which is the ways in which intelligence analysts think, collect, assess and communicate intelligence information to match the demands of the 21^st century in intelligence gathering. The commission points out that the Soviet Union is no longer the US’s top-list target, as more nations have emerged that pose a serious threat to her interests. Finally, the intelligence community is fragmentary, which hinders cohesive and harmonious intelligence reportage. In this regard, inter-agency coordination is necessary to ensure efficiency.

References

Arbel, D., & Edelist, R. (2003). Western intelligence and the collapse of the Soviet Union, 1980-1990: ten years that did not shake the world. New York: Routledge.

Johnson, L. (2007). Strategic Intelligence, Volume 1. New York: Greenwood Publishing Group.

WMD Commission. (March 31, 2005). Overview of the Report. Retrieved November 14, 2010 <http://www.gpoaccess.gov/wmd/pdf/overview_fm.pdf>