Aeronautical Science, Capstone Project Example

Abstract

The airline industry has been under increased scrutiny after an influx in aircraft accidents. Pilot error is recognized as the major contributor in these accidents; specifically pilot fatigue. This comprehensive exam will focus primarily on pilot fatigue. Additionally, the exam will address the vast array of other contributing factors in aircraft accidents. In order to offer a comprehensive understanding of the increase in aircraft accidents, five questions have been developed and answered to demonstrate a full understanding of all program outcomes belonging to Embry Riddle Aeronautical University’s Bachelor of Science in Professional Aeronautics. Extensive research was conducted to examine the following topics: (a) considerations about the effectiveness of modern advancements in aviation technology aimed at combatting pilot error; (b) considerations about the workloads of pilots; (c) clear communication of Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) regulations, and the importance of situational awareness; (d) the importance of pilot knowledge about flight environment; and (e) other causes of pilot error.

The comprehensive exam will adopt a positivist approach in conjunction with a deductive and quantitative methodology(Neill, 2007).This method of research was chosen because it effectively addresses the issue at hand by providing measurable outcomes so that a conclusion can be drawn(Miles & Huberman, 1994). The results are applicable, and there is sufficient evidence to enable a working hypothesis. Research information will be obtained from the Federal Aviation Regulations, FAA Fact Sheet, Air crash Statistics, and peer reviewed literature.

Statement of the Question

Are modern advancements in aviation technology effective in combating pilot error?

Research and Answering of the Question

Before exhibiting the specific findings of various authors, it is crucial to understand precisely what ‘innovation’ signifies in aviation, especially that of the term ‘cockpit innovation.’ BusinessDictionary.com (2009) defines innovation as the:

“Process by which an idea or invention is translated into a good or service for which people will pay. To be called an innovation, an idea must be replicable at an economical cost and must satisfy a specific need,” (www.BusinessDictionary.com, 2009).

One might find it conceited to settle with one definition, especially considering the many variations of the aforementioned definition. An additional supplement by Howard & Guile (1992) states that:

“This (innovation) life cycle is an S-shaped logistic curve consisting of three distinct phases: emergence (the development of the product or service, its manufacturing capabilities, and its place in the market), growth (where the product family pervades the market), and maturity (where the market is saturated and growth slows),” (Howard & Guile, 1992, p.12).

Both definitions focus on the theme of the development of a product that succeeds in the market place by satisfying a common need. However, in order to give a comprehensive answer to the stated question, the term ‘cockpit innovation’ must be made very clear by first knowing the function and description of the cockpit. A cockpit is defined the space in an airplane that houses the pilot, copilot, and sometimes the crew and passengers (Caldwell, 2008). Typically, cockpits are divided into two sections: smaller aircrafts have cockpits which are designed to accommodate the pilot as well as passengers, and commercial aircraft cockpits which are designed to accommodate crewmembers exclusively. With that said, it is reasonable to combine the former definitions and assume that ‘cockpit innovation’ is the development and creation of the space made available for pilots and passengers that satisfies their operational tasks efficiently and safely.

The basis of new cockpit advancements revolves around automation. Automation is defined as the mechanically controlled operation of a device, procedure, or system by electronic devices which replace human labor (Howard & Guile, 1992). Based on this definition, automation in the cockpit pertains to a reduction of complexity in the cockpit by incorporating fewer gauges and allowing for computers to control more functions of the aircraft. Older generation cockpits evolved from numerous switches, dials, and gauges to a less complex and simplified cockpit which is called the ‘glass cockpit.’ This cockpit consists of only a few color screens. When compared to older cockpits, the glass cockpit appears to provide the same information, but in a more compact area, along with a much clearer picture (displays). One advantage of glass cockpits is it delivers extensive safety and mechanical features which makes aircraft equipment more precise, more consistent, and less prone to maintenance. These advantages are attributed to the fact that glass cockpits maintain reliability and accuracy despite harsh operating environments, because it contains virtually no moving parts (Johnson, 2007). In addition, autopilot systems (a form of automation where the aircraft flies itself according to input), once prohibitively expensive for small aircraft (particularly helicopters), are also finding their way into the cockpit due to the efficiency and reduced cost when used in conjunction with glass displays. Providing enhancements in overall safety and particularly useful in easing fatigue, autopilots are affordable and sold with some glass displays as a complete package.

However, despite the implementation of automation and glass cockpits, research conducted by Wiener & Curry (1980) suggests that automation merely changes the nature of error, and possibly increases the severity of its consequences. The researchers included field studies of airlines which rely heavily on automation. By contrast, more recent research found that glass cockpits are beneficial to flight safety. Vice President of Sagem Avionics, Dan Johnson, states that the glass cockpit “reduces fatigue, increases situational awareness, can display a multitude of data in a smaller, more easily discernable area, and increases multitasking capability when needed most.” (Johnson, 2007).

Several full-time pilots have participated in a study designed to determine the primary cause for pilot error and to determine the most effective solutions to combatting pilot error. Based on the survey results, 90 percent of the pilots attribute pilot error to pilot fatigue. The same number of survey participants agrees that cockpit automation and the glass cockpit are effective tools to combat pilot error. Although technological advances in cockpit innovation play a role in reducing pilot error, other factors, such as pilot workload, must be taken into account to effectively and permanently eliminate pilot error.

Statement of the Question

What effect do pilot workloads have on pilot fatigue?

Research and Answering of the Question

The majority of all aircraft accidents are attributed to pilot error (Printup, 2000). Since the 1950s, data has been collected and analyzed on the actual causes of aircraft accidents. The causes include weather, mechanical failure, sabotage, and human error. Of all the causes studied pilot error, not related to weather or mechanical issues, has been, and remains the leading cause of aircraft accidents for more than 50 years (Printup, 2000).

The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB), an independent U.S. Federal Governmental agency responsible for analyzing and discovering the cause of aircraft related accidents compiles evidence suggesting the reasons for human error. According to the NTSB, unprofessional pilot attitude is the main contributing factor in human error. This unprofessionalism relates to mental and physical health, family life, and a pilot’s financial situation. Pilot fatigue is cited as the top cause for pilot error. According to Printup (2002), fatigue is proven to increase human errors as well as the risk associated with flying.

“The airlines need to recognize that the cost of fatigue and the errors that result are many times higher than the cost of ensuring adequate rest for their crews. Seventy percent of the accidents in aviation are due to pilot error, and fatigue is a major cause of those errors” (Printup, 2002).

In addition to Printup (2002), the NTSB has recorded numerous accidents with fatigue as the underlying factor. In 1993, a military DC-8 crashed while attempting to land at Guantanamo Bay in Cuba (Rosekind et al., 1996, p.1). Based on the crash investigation, the NTSB determined that “The probable cause of this accident included the impaired judgment, decision-making, and flying abilities of the captain and flight crew due to the effects of fatigue,” (Rosekind et al., 1996, p.2). This was the first time in a major U.S. aviation accident that the NTSB cited fatigue as the probable cause. Since then, the NTSB has found that fatigue has played a role in at least 250 airline accident deaths over the last 15 years (Cordes, 2009).

Pilot workloads are primarily responsible for pilot fatigue. A recent survey found that more than 70 percent of pilots with a commercial rating have more than 500 annual flight hours in visual meteorological conditions (VMC)(Borth, 2010). The survey further found that nearly 40 percent of survey participants have more than 50 hours of instrument meteorological conditions (IMC) and nearly 35 percent have between 100 and 300 flight hours in IMC. It is important to note that the pilots who took part in the survey all had a commercial rating. A pilot’s skill level could influence his or her decision-making tendencies, and in this situation it is acceptable to assume that their skill level may or may not give them the training or knowledge of the glass cockpit. Equally important is the fact that less skilled pilots often have not been exposed to all the elements of flying (e.g. fatigue, advanced avionics operation, adverse weather).

VMC refers to circumstances in which the current weather conditions are such as to which the pilot can operate the aircraft solely by visual references on the ground. The results from flying in VMC vary, because pilots who fly mostly in VMC use instruments (e.g. a glass cockpit) far less than pilots flying in IMC. On the other hand, the propensity for fatigue still remains the same. IMC refers to circumstances in which the weather conditions are such as to which the pilot operates the aircraft solely by references to instruments (e.g. a glass cockpit). Hours flown in IMC are significant to the research question because it correlates directly with operation of the instruments of the aircraft and often times the glass cockpit.

The survey also found that nearly 50 percent of all pilots who participated in the survey had individually accumulated, on average, 200 hours of annual nighttime flight hours and, on average, nearly 1,000annual daytime flight hours. Human physiology studies indicate that humans, in any profession, feel the effects of fatigue more during the nighttime. The author is hypothesizing that pilots who have flown more hours at night have experienced higher levels of fatigue, more often. Although most pilots both general aviation and commercial log a majority of their hours during the day, this factor cannot be ignored because of the importance to the research question. All of the survey participants have flown in or trained in a glass cockpit. Sixty-six percent of those pilots state that glass cockpits are safer than traditional cockpits. Nearly 90 percent of survey participants state that glass cockpits increased their ability to focus; however, only 21 percent stated that glass cockpits were effective in combatting pilot fatigue. In fact, 91 percent of survey participants attributed pilot fatigue to pilot workload(Borth, 2010).

Statement of the question: What impact do FAA regulations have on flight safety and how does that relate to situational awareness?

Research and Answering of the Question

In order to combat the issues related to pilot error, the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), whom acts as the governing body for aviation rules and regulations, mandated that airline companies, as well as other aviation institutional learning centers reform their training protocols. These protocols are known as the Airline Safety and Pilot Training Improvement Act (Costello, 2010). In addition, the FAAdevised a checklist that is utilized throughout the aviation industry. The IMSAFE checklist was designed to help pilots evaluate their current situation even before stepping foot inside the cockpit:

IMSAFE Checklist:

1. Illness—Am I sick? Illness is an obvious pilot risk.
2. Medication—Am I taking any medicines that might affect my judgment or make me drowsy?
3. Stress—Am I under psychological pressure from the job? Do I have money, health, or family problems? Stress causes concentration and performance problems. While the regulations list medical conditions that require grounding, stress is not among them. The pilot should consider the effects of stress on performance.
4. Alcohol—Have I been drinking within 8 hours? Within 24 hours? As little as one ounce of liquor, one bottle of beer, or four ounces of wine can impair flying skills. Alcohol also renders a pilot more susceptible to disorientation and hypoxia.
5. Fatigue—Am I tired and not adequately rested? Fatigue continues to be one of the most insidious hazards to flight safety, as it may not be apparent to a pilot until serious errors are made.
6. Eating—Have I eaten enough of the proper foods to keep adequately nourished during the entire flight?

(Federal Aviation Administration, 2009, p. 176).

Although the checklist items are all perceived hazards, pilot fatigue is cited as the top cause for pilot error.

Statement of the question: What is the importance of pilot knowledge as it relates to flight environment?

Research and Answering of the Question

Theories pertaining to measurement error have been in existence for decades, yet one theory is predominately used over time because of its universal structure and simple ease of use. Novick (1966) wrote The Axioms and Principal Results of Classical Test Theory, in which he describes the classical test theory, later modified and given the title True Score Theory, in order to predict outcomes of psychological testing, such as the ability of test-takers. According to Novick (1966) the True Score Theory assumes that each student generates a true score ‘T’ that is obtained if no measurement errors existed. A person’s true score is described as the probable number-correct score over a countless number of independent administrations of the test. Unfortunately, test users never observe a person’s true score, only an observed score, X. It is assumed that observed score = true score + some error.

The modified true score theory was formed to fill the absence of validity pertaining to error, and is broken into systematic error and random error: systematic error is instigated by any factors whichmethodically affect measurement of the variable across the sample, whereas random error is instigated by any factors that arbitrarily affect measurement of the variable across the sample (Trochim, 2006). Systematic error is an instance where the lights in a classroom suddenly go out; this would affect everyone taking the test in the same manner. Whereas, an example of random error is a situation where one student doesn’t eat breakfast before the exam, and another student doesn’t get a good night’s rest. These factors are considered random because the effects pertain only to a select few students instead of the entire classroom.

Although the true score theory is typically used in test taking, the theory can possibly relate to pilots’ abilities under given conditions in the same manner. It can therefore be assumed that ‘random error’ events felt by test takers are also felt by pilots very similar to those described in the IMSAFE checklist by FAA(2009). The events affect only the individual. On the contrary, ‘systematic error’ affects everyone in the cockpit at that time. Although it is possible to generate a true score for a pilot, the author feels the data does not translate into anything significant, as the scoring is based on quantitative data (numbers, as opposed to words). In other words, pilot errors, whether random or systematic, are only given a numerical value. In actuality, the ideal data needed is the exact cause of the error, not a numerical value distinguishing the severity of the error in order to find if innovation aimed to combat pilot error is, in fact, reducing the risk of flying.

It is only necessary to examine another theory in order to abstain for a biased approach. In 1931, H.W. Heinrich developed a theory on accident causation called the ‘domino theory’, which states that:

“Accidents result from a chain of sequential events, metaphorically like a line of dominoes falling over.  When one of the dominoes falls, it triggers the next one, and the next…but removing a key factor (such as an unsafe condition or an unsafe act) prevents the start of the chain reaction,” (Stewart et al., 2009, p. 1).

Heinrich’s domino theory argues that 88 percent of all accidents are caused by unsafe acts of people(Giddens, 1999). This correlates with the aforementioned data from Printup (2002) suggesting that around 70 to 80 percent of all accidents occur from the human element of pilot error. More importantly, addressed further in the author’s research question is the element of risk associated with flight, and how the elements of pilot error and fatigue influence that risk.

Statement of the question: What are the most common causes of pilot error?

Program outcomes addressed by this question.

By the definition, one could assume from an aviation standpoint that society is preoccupied with the future and safety of air travel, as well as a need for new technology and innovation. Giddens (1999) believes risk is divided into two types, external risk and manufactured risk (Giddens, 1999, p. 8).External risk can be attributed to external factors such as hurricanes, floods, and plagues, whereas a manufactured risk is assumed to be created by society in response to external risks i.e. pollution and climate. The basis behind Gidden’s theory is the belief that a shift is occurring in the way society is moderating risk:

“At a certain point, however – very recently in historical terms – we started worrying less about what nature can do to us, and more about what we have done to nature. This marks the transition from the predominance of external risk to that of manufactured risk. Our age is not more dangerous – not more risky – than those of earlier generations – but the balance of risks and dangers has shifted. We live in a world where hazards created by ourselves are as, or more, threatening than those that come from the outside. Some of these are genuinely catastrophic, such as global ecological risk, nuclear proliferation, or the meltdown of the world economy” (Giddens, 1999).

From Giddens’ standpoint, it is possible that society is focusing on risks mitigated by society alone. But how does this theory pertain to the risk of flying? First, it is important to distinguish between the possible external factors regarding flight. Weather is an obvious assumption, which can be considered the foremost external risk. When the author attempts to associate manufactured risk to flight, the most probable main factors lead to aircraft design and pilot training. When combining the external and manufactured risk to flight, an assumption is created that similarly matches Giddens’ theory, which pertains to the shift in risk he observes.

During the infancy of flight, the main risk was the element of weather. The first-generation cockpits weren’t advanced enough to decrease this risk. As cockpit innovation evolved, aerospace companies began to shift their focus on improving the manufactured risk by manufacturing sophisticated cockpits, recommending intense training regimens, and designing more aerodynamic and streamlined aircraft. This is not to say, however, that the external risk of weather is completely disregarded, as weather still creates a risk in flight every day. Forty-nine percent of all accidents are due to pilot error, with pilot fatigue as a major contributor, according to Printup (2000). Additionally, the second highest contributing factor was mechanical failure at 22 percent, Printup (2000). What supplements this assumed shift even further is the percentage of accidents due to weather, recorded at 12 percent. This data provides a possible reasoning for the shift by examining the areas responsible for the most accidents. Addressed next are the risk matrixes currently intended to be used as tools to aid the pilot in decision making, and thus reducing the risk of flying.

The FAA is solely responsible for creating and endorsing the following risk matrixes, which are accepted by law as the standard in aviation.According to the FAA, “The most basic tool is the risk matrix. It assesses two items: the likelihood of an event occurring and the consequence of that event” (FAA, 2009).

According to the FAA, the following are guidelines for determining the likelihood of the event:

• Probable—an event will occur several times.
• Occasional—an event will probably occur sometime.

The following are guidelines for making assignments:

• Probable—an event will occur several times.
• Occasional—an event will probably occur sometime.
• Remote—an event is unlikely to occur but is possible.
• Improbable—an event is highly unlikely to occur.

The following are guidelines for determining the severity of the event:

• Catastrophic—results in fatalities, total loss.
• Critical—severe injury, major damage.
• Marginal—minor injury, minor damage.
• Negligible—less than minor injury, less than minor system damage.

Connecting these factors indicates the perceived risk for the flight. The pilot must then decide whether or not to fly, after assessing ways to mitigate, eliminate, or control the risk (FAA, 2009, p. 17-6).Although it is assumed the risk matrix is rather effective at assessing a particular situation, it appears shallow in regards to its ability to assess other factors because the design of the matrix is such, that pilots’ under a given circumstance can generate differing risk scores, possibly leading to disparity among the pilots decision. According to FAA(2009):

“Although the [Risk] matrix provides a general viewpoint of a generic situation, a more comprehensive program can be made that is tailored to a pilot’s flying. [Enhanced Risk Matrix] Includes a wide array of aviation related activities specific to the pilot and assesses health, fatigue, weather, capabilities, etc. The scores are added and the overall score falls into various ranges, with the range representative of actions that a pilot imposes upon himself or herself,”(FAA, 2009, p. 17-6).

Summary

It is no mystery that modern day pilots are overwhelmed with rigorous work schedules. These pilots fly day and night, for hours on end, with little to no rest in between flights. In its most basic sense, pilot fatigue happens because pilots do not get enough rest. One survey participant explained how a mandatory eight hour rest for a pilot, could easily dwindle down to only about five hours of actual sleep. Once the aircraft has landed, many small obligatory routines eat away at a pilot’s allocated rest time. Passengers must get off the aircraft, the pilot must do a post flight, walk to baggage claim, wait for a hotel shuttle, check in etc. Once a pilot is finally ready for sleep, he or she gets only about five hours of actual sleep. When this becomes routine, fatigue increases to the point of impairing a pilot’s judgment in the cockpit. Pilot fatigue, therefore, must first be tackled at its most basic level. Pilots need more rest; thus, regulations must be put in place for that to happen. Until pilots receive adequate rest, and ‘life’ won’t interfere with their lack of sleep (such as family, pets etc.), other steps are put in place to combat the effects of fatigue. One such step is the glass cockpit. Of all the pilots interviewed, and those who participated in the survey, the consensus is unanimous that the glass cockpit has been effective in combating pilot fatigue. In comparison the older cockpits, the glass cockpit still provides pilots with the same information, just a more compact version of it. It also provides a clearer picture. While more than 50 percent of the survey respondents agree that the glass cockpit has little effect in combating actual fatigue – that is to say it does not reduce the feeling of fatigue, the majority agree that the glass cockpit greatly increases a pilot’s focus. Therefore, the pilot may, with the aid of modern innovation, have a better flying experience, fatigued or not, due to the glass cockpit. While fatigue may lead to errors in judgment, the glass cockpit significantly reduces those risks, by ‘simplifying’ distractions in the cockpit. Suffice it to say, a fatigued pilot may be at a smaller risk of error during flight, whilst in a glass cockpit, than a fatigued pilot in an older version cockpit. Although this innovation does not eliminate pilot fatigue, is greatly reduces the risks associated with it, and has therefore been successful in combating the risks involved with flying. Advances in innovation, such as automation and the glass cockpit, have been implemented to reduce the risks associated with pilot fatigue as pilots now have a plethora of tools to assist them in being safer. However, pilot skill is still vital, regardless of automation. Koonce (2002) states:

“Pilot training courses should not have to spend time teaching Morse code, NOTAM abbreviations, or weather symbology. With the availability of computers, these can be clearly presented in plain English, French, Russian, or any other language.The technological advancements in the airplane cockpits of the future are all predicated upon the assurance of complete reliability of the electronic system(s). In the event of an electrical emergency and the subsequent loss of the glass displays and automated systems, how will the pilot manage? This will be a challenge for the designers to consider the basic human capabilities and limitations in safely recovering the airplane at a suitable airport when the “lights go out” in the cockpit.” (Koonce, 2002).

So, despite new innovation such as automation, basic pilot skills are still required. Pilots are still required to make clear and prompt decisions in a time of crises. Regardless of the innovative advancements in any given cockpit, the final decision in ensuring a safe flight, still lies with the pilot. It is therefore pertinent that each pilot operating an aircraft be well rested and able to make clear decisions. Pilot fatigue, therefore, remains the culprit when flight risk is involved. The author concludes that in order for pilots to make better decisions in the cockpit, they need more sleep.

References

Caldwell, J. A. (2008). Fatigue in the aviation environment: An overview of the causes and effects as well as recommended counter measures. Aviation Space and Environmental Medicine Association, 68, 932-938.

Federal Aviation Administration. (2009). Aeronautical decision-making.InPilots handbook of aeronautical knowledge.(FAA-H 8083-25A, pp. 17-1-32) Oklahoma City, OK: U.S. Department of Transportation.

Giddens, A. (1999). Risk and responsibility. Modern Law Review, 62(1), 1-10.

Howard, W., & Guile, B. (1992). Profiting from innovation. New York, NY: The Free Press.

Johnson, D. (2007). The instrument six pack: Advantages to glass cockpit technology.New York, NY: Sagem Avionics Inc.

Miles, M., & Huberman, M. (1994). Qualitative data analysis: An expanded sourcebook. Beverly Hills, CA: Sage.

Neill, J. (2007, February 28). Qualitative versus quantitative research: Key points in a classic debate. Retrieved from http://wilderdom.com/research/QualitativeVersusQuantitativeResearch.html

Printup, M. B. (2000, September). The effects of fatigue on performance and safety. Retrieved from http://www.airlinesafety.com/editorials/PilotFatigue.htm

Ropeik, D. (2006, October 17). How risky is flying?NOVA. Retrieved from http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/nova/space/how-risky-is-flying.html