An Ethical Dilemma from Aristotelian and Kantian Perpsectives, Reaction Paper Example

The ethical scenario “The Case of the Inquiring Murderer” presents a dilemma, in which a friend seeks a place of hiding in the home of whom the dilemma is being presented, because he or she is being sought by a murderer. This hiding place is granted: nevertheless, the murderer that the friend identifies now comes to your door, asking for the location of the friend in question. The ethical question is as follows: what should be done in this case, in other words, how should one answer the requests of the murderer? From an Aristotelian perspective, it can be said that this dilemma is essentially a non-dilemma, although this response depends upon the precise interpretation of Aristotle’s concept of eudaimonia. Aristotle’s concept of eudaimonia is founded upon a concept of common virtue, whereby the ethical ends of an act are determined by the extent to which they contribute to this common virtue. In the case of the murderer, two desires oppose each other: on the one hand, the desire of the friend to hide, and, on the other hand, the desire of the murderer to seek out the friend, presumably to take their life. From an Aristotelian perspective, however, it seems difficult to relegate the concept of eudaimonia to either the wishes of the one hiding from the murderer or the one who seeks to murder. Namely, Aristotle’s concept of eudaimonia refers to the best possible virtues of human beings as a whole, and not merely the subjective wishes of one individual or another. In this case, however, the Aristotelian ethical principle sides with common sense intuition: for here it is difficult to understand how disclosing the whereabouts of the friend in question could possibly serve some notion of common good. Certainly, disclosing these whereabouts of the person in hiding would satisfy the desires and wishes of the murderer; yet the Aristotelian concept is not about satisfying individual desires, but rather suggests a concept that evokes a common good. In this sense, therefore, the common good would be to maintain the safety of the individual against aggression, irregardless of the case in question: there is no ethical point that is serviced by conveying the murderer the information that he (or she) requests.

From a Kantian perspective, in so far as Kant defines his ethics according to the Categorical Imperative, which in short means that one should act on the level of particular relationships in an ultimately universal sense, i.e., that one should direct one’s actions towards a universal ethical principle, it would appear that disclosing the location of the murderer is also flawed. For what kind of categorical imperative is being satisfied by disclosing these whereabouts? Certainly, it can be argued that in the Kantian framework there is a general commitment to not lying, and thus one should tell the murderer where the individual is hiding. However, this would be a simplification of the Kantian principle: all actions should be considered in terms of their universal effect. What would be the universally ethical effect of disclosing there whereabouts of the individual to the murderer? It could be said that one here commits to a principle of honesty. However, does honesty mean the end or be all of ethics? From the Kantian perspective, honesty can certainly be considered a part of the Categorical Imperative, but all instances of acting according to a universal principle does not mean that honesty is always definitive. Defending someone against losing their life may require lying, but this is still ethical, in so far as the universal maxim of a common good and conduct is being served.

Accordingly, both the Kantian and Aristotelian perspectives satisfy what seems to be our common sense responses to this dilemma. One should not reveal the whereabouts of the desired victim of the murderer, since this means a violation of their existence and a greater ethical violation. Lying, in both cases, is nevertheless sufficient according to the universal character of both the Aristotelian and Kantian requirements for ethics.