Cold War and the American Covert Action Plan of Afghanistan, Thesis Paper Example

Introduction

Several authors have been searching for the answer to the question: which international political conditions contributed towards the end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Bloc?  One of the theories that have been drawn up by historians states that the Covert American assistance of the Mujahedeen during the Soviet-Afghan War led to the Soviet loss in Afghanistan, and consequently the weakening of the Soviet Union. The below essay will investigate the above stated thesis, and attempt to reveal the real impact of the American intervention in Afghanistan. The author of the current study would like to prove that the Afghanistan conflict was a crucial turning point, and clearly reflected the Soviet Union’s intent to increase its military presence and power worldwide. Therefore, the decision made by the United States of America to intervene was crucial in order to stop the Cold War and end the expansion of the Soviet military power.

The below paper will examine how the American assistance of the Mujahedeen during the Soviet-Afghan War and will prove that the Soviet loss in Afghanistan was a contributing factor in ending the Cold War.  Called the American Covert Action Plan, or the Reagan Doctrine, (source-dependent) The US Central Intelligence Agency supplied the Mujahedeen with training, intelligence, logistical support, and weapons. -Most notably the shoulder-fired anti-aircraft Stinger missile.

Regarding the question how the Soviet loss in Afghanistan contributed to the end of the Cold War, the thesis paper will provide the reader a total picture of the conflict between the Capitalist and Communist societies as they both sought to gain global superiority following WWII.

In the 1980’s, American President Reagan fully intended to force the stagnation of Soviet expansion, end the Cold War, and used the Soviet-Afghan War to do it.

As Alexiev[1] states, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan had a great impact on the Soviet relations with the West, in particular the United States. The international behavior of the Soviet Union was considered unacceptable, and America finally decided to intervene. However, throughout the paper, the author would also like to prove that the defeat of the Soviet Army in Afghanistan had a significance beyond showcasing military power. Billard[2] concludes that “the growing Soviet influence in the Persian Gulf served to foreshadow the war that would be the downfall of the Soviet Union”. Schweizer[3] states that for the United States, the main threat that the Soviet military expansion presented was the spreading of Communism.  Reagan saw communism, according to Schweizer, as a totalitarianism, similar to Hitler’s political ideology.  At the same time, the President also believed that Communism appealed to the Weak, therefore, Russia’s expansion in the Persian Gulf did not only present military threat, but also ideological.

Based on the above situational analysis surrounding the Afghanistan conflict, the author would like to examine the below thesis statement:

Thesis Statement: The American Covert Action Plan in Afghanistan contributed to the stagnation of Soviet global expansion and eventually became one of the causes that led to the end of the Cold War.

Planning for the Fall of the Soviet Union: The Aid for Mujahedeen

The CIA’s Involvement and the Collaboration between Freedom Fighters and the USA

East[4] reviewed the covert operations’ main facets during the Afghanistan conflict, and found that by establishing the Radio Free Kabul, the West found a way to coordinate Mujahideen efforts, and the Afghanistan Relief Committee (established in 1980) was also designed to aid the  Mujahideen fighters financially and through providing essential intelligence. The Committee for Free Afghanistan was also established in 1981, to support the opposition in Afghanistan.

It is also important to highlight that the United States was keeping an eye on the political situation in Afghanistan. While Moscow regarded their political and military intervention as a sign of “friendship and cooperation”[5], in 1979 the US intelligence agencies received worrying reports about a Soviet military presence in the country. The CIA describes the early military and political actions of the USSR as an attempt to shape politico-military topography[6]. In other words, the Soviet Union was planning to expand its international presence and influence. At the time of the conflict, a military and intelligence alliance existed between Pakistan and the United States. In 1977, the Afghan leader,  Daoud was invited to Moscow, and Brezhnev stated during the discussions that the NATO advisors present in Afghanistan were indeed “spies”. Daoud considered this statement as an interference in internal affairs of his country, therefore, it was time for the Soviet Union to replace him. The Soviet Union’s response was to form a Communist coup in the country, and working on replacing the government. Even though Moscow had strong motivations to increase its presence and power in Afghanistan, “US intelligence assessments, however, said there was no evidence the Soviets had been involved in launching the coup, although Moscow had moved quickly to exploit the situation once it began”[7]. By 1979, an Interagency Intelligence Memorandum, analyzing the situation in Afghanistan reported that there were around 2500 Soviet military advisors in Afghanistan,  attached to the country’s army. The intelligence services of the United States concluded that military intervention was not necessary, and would potentially cause chaos in the war-struck country.

While there were major differences between intelligence expectations and the reality, and the Afghan situation was not successfully assessed by the CIA, the agency already considered intervention. According to a CIA report[8], the Soviet military intervention in the end of 1979 came as a surprise for intelligence agencies. While information about the military preparations of Moscow were received, the agencies assumed that the Soviet Union would decide not to intervene. Therefore, the Western intelligence agencies were completely aware of the threat, but did not take it seriously, and made the wrong judgments.

There is an interesting remark made by Billard[9], regarding the situation between the Soviet Bloc and the West. According to the author, there was a detente (release of tension), which was suddenly affected by the military intervention in Afghanistan. It is possible that the CIA and other international intelligence agencies did not take the threat of Soviet military expansion and aggression seriously because of this detente, providing the West with a false sense of security during this period of the Cold War. The Presidential Directive NSC-63, only declassified in 2001, issued by President Carter highlights the importance of taking a regional approach and collaborating with other countries neighboring Afghanistan. Another feature of the document is that it confirms that the West looked at the conflict from a strategic point of view, and President Carter emphasized the need for the United States to “retain a credible force in Central Asia”[10]. This confirms the previous assumption that the Afghanistan conflict was a part of the Cold War power struggle, and the influence of the two superpowers was multi-layered, therefore, military intervention alone without the support of intelligence agencies and diplomacy would not have solved America’s problem.

The US Central Intelligence Agency supplied the Mujahedeen with training, intelligence, logistical support, and weapons. According to the former CIA director, Robert Gates,[11], the CIA started collaborating with the Mujahedeen fighters approximately six months before the Soviet Army intervened. While the official version of the CIA stated that the agency started aiding the rebels only in 1980, Brzezinski[12] stated back in 1998 that President Carter signed the directive on the 24^th of December, 1979. Revealing one of the main motivations of the United States in aiding the rebels, in the interview Brezinski states: “That secret operation was an excellent idea. It had the effect of drawing the Russians into the Afghan trap”[13]. The United States was planning to give the Soviet Union their “Vietnam war”, and the intervention cost the superpower endless amount of money and resources. As Brezinski further confirms, the CIA created“ a conflict that brought about the demoralization and finally the breakup of the Soviet empire”[14].

Further, it is important to highlight the importance of military technology delivered by the United States to the Mujahedeen fighters. The shoulder-fired anti-aircraft Stinger missile provided to the Mujahedeen proved deadly to the Soviet Army, capable of eliminating the Russian Hind helicopters[15]. Westermann[16] confirms that the war in Afghanistan proved to be costly for Russia, and they were struggling to gain territory. In 1986, the government of the United States decided to supply Stinger surface-to-air missiles to the freedom fighters, which had a technological advantage over the equipment used by the Soviet army. These missiles were heat-seeking devices, and their psychological and physical impact on the Soviet military was great. Apart from the Stinger, the fighters also received Blowpipes, manufactured in the United Kingdom, and the two weapons together weakened the advantage of Soviets in Afghanistan. 200 Stinger missiles were delivered in 1986 to the Mujahideen fighters, and they had a speed of 2.2 Mach and a range of 5.5 kilometers[17]. The kill ratio of the Stinger was around 50 percent[18]. An additional 270 Soviet aircraft were destroyed a year, costing around $2.2 million. As  Westermann[19] confirms, one of the main factors contributing towards the failure of the Soviet military in Afghanistan was the inability to utilize manportable SAM technology, and the small size of the forces not prepared for the Stinger missiles.

Conflict between the Capitalist and Communist Societies

Phillips[20] states that Communism, developed by Lenin was opposing the individualism that gained ground in the West. Communism downgraded private property, and increased community responsibility. Later, Communism was turned into a totalitarian political ideology, assigning governments with absolute power and influence. As Phillips confirms, Communism imposed a threat to the Western society and political system. According to Communism, the West was responsible for dividing the society into different classes. The Communist State did not have multiple parties, and the society was made to be “classless”. In liberal democracies, such as the United States, the freedom of individuals and the choice of governments was maintained. The main struggles of the Cold War were fought on the ideological level, and both sides feared the other spreading. As Phillips[21] confirms: “if communism was to succeed it had to be a worldwide revolution and this meant the collapse of capitalism”. Likewise, if liberal democratic states gained influence, the influence of Communism would have been weakened.

Carpenter[22] created an overview of the situation in Afghanistan during the late 70-s. According to the author’s report, the political system of the country was ruled by Soviet officials, and this made the problem even greater. The Soviet Union controlled the politics, military, policies, and the public opinion, while the puppet regime of Babrak Karmal had no real power. Further, the Soviet Union had the tools and power to spread the ideology of Marxism-Leninism to increase its influence on the country’s politics. While back in 1978 the U.S. administration (President Carter) refused to admit that the newly formed government of Afghanistan was a communist one[23], assuming that the political situation in the country was stable, the process of transformation and the spreading of Soviet influence already started. By 1986, the Soviet propaganda made the military intervention in Afghanistan appear to be an “international duty”[24], and the war did not exist officially. The war  in Afghanistan, however, was not only fought on the military level. As Alexiev[25] states, the Soviets started a war on the traditional Afghan society and political system. Replacing the flag, sending special “advisers”, and creating a new order in the country called for an intervention from the West that was not plainly reliant on armed forces. This is the main reason why the United States decided with Covert assistance of the Mujahedeen, and an operation that relied on political and military intelligence, as well as close collaboration with freedom fighters.

Fighting the Soviet Imperialism

The Soviet Union believed that once a state has been transformed and took on the Soviet model, it will always remain a communist state. At the same time, the Soviet Union made a strategic choice when invading Afghanistan, often explained by the “contemporary perception of US weakness and the possibility that Moscow’s international ambitions”[26]. Therefore, it is evident that Moscow had a higher motive than showing power: it wanted to gain influence for Communism, and potentially acquire new markets for its produce. Adding further countries to the Communist bloc would have increased production, and potentially solved some of the financial problems the Soviet Union was facing at the time. According to Reuveny and Prakash[27], there were “increased economic and technological gaps between the Soviet Union and the capitalist West”. Further, the economy of the Soviet Union stopped growing in the 1980-s[28], and it was seeking new gains of markets and sources to survive.

One of the mistakes highlighted by several authors that the Soviet Union made was that they believed once they captured a territory it remained under their influence. Brown indicates that the Soviet leadership was confident in the superiority of their power, due to the temporary weakness of the United States, and was overly-optimistic about the venture in Afghanistan. The author[29] also quotes Ustinov, who believed that “Soviet troops need only show up in Afghanistan and some rebels would drop their weapons right there and the others would simply flee”. Previously the Soviet Union never experienced “being thrown out of a country”. The United States used the strategy of containment, therefore, the risk for the West’s intervention was extremely low. According to President Reagan, the main tasks ahead of the United States were: containing the expansion of the USSR, exploiting the opposing superpower’s weaknesses, and put maximum pressure on the Soviet military in Afghanistan[30]. None of the above strategies involved military action, and the Soviet Union did not expect the West to intervene indirectly by aiding the Mujahedeen fighters with military supplies.

The Power Struggle Between the Soviet and Western World

Both the Soviet Union and the US sought dominance after WWll leading up to the end of the Cold War/post WWll politics up to Reagan administration. The power struggle was present in every area of politics, and was motivated by each superpower’s need for stability and growth. Power struggles, however, hurt and weaken countries, and cost a large amount of money spent on military presence, operations, and intelligence services. As “major wars among great powers reorient the domestic politics of the warring parties by weakening powerful groups and enfranchising less powerful groups”[31], it is evident that the struggle for dominance contributed towards the fall of the Soviet Union. While Anti-communist uprisings during the Cold War were common, the Soviet army managed to overpower each army, and maintain its great influence in the Eastern Bloc. While the West decided not to interfere in Eastern and Central Europe (Hungary, 1956, East Germany, 1953, Czeckoslovakia, 1968).

Another thought related to the intervention’s impact on the position of the Soviet Union is the United States withdrew from military intervention and their international politics were at a standstill. Reviewing the impact of the Cuban missile crisis, it is evident that the United States was aiming to avoid war at any cost. Indeed, in the above mentioned conflict, the two superpowers both aimed at a solutions that was reciprocal, and reduced the threat for their own country. While covert operations did not end in Cuba, and the two superpowers continued to monitor each other’s activities. The CIA’s report in 1962 confirmed Moscow’s account about the nuclear missiles’ number and withdrawal process. The United States was also vary of starting direct military conflict and an offensive in Afghanistan, after the Vietnam War, which achieved no results, and cost the country too much money. Brown[32] states that the Vietnam War weakened the position of the United States, and the country was feeling more cautious. As Brown confirms: “the United States was chastened by failure in Vietnam and in the process of losing its principal ally in the Gulf as a result of the Iranian Revolution”[33].

The Cuban Missile Crisis greatly increased the risk of a Nuclear War, and after the standstill, both parties became more aware of the dangers, and acted with more consideration. The United States avoided direct military intervention, as it did not want to repeat the failures of previous conflicts, and partly because it was planning to avoid conflict. The reason why the United States decided to intervene was that Russia manifested and invasive and aggressive behavior, however, deploying U.S. forces was out of question. Alexiev [34] explains the lack of direct intervention with the fact that the United States considered the Soviet Army’s withdrawal as the only acceptable solution.

The instability of the Middle East made the international landscape ripe for insurgency movements. Indeed, the fighting in Afghanistan did not start in the 1980-s, and did not end there. The political situation, social conditions, and lack of infrastructure posed a great challenge for both parties. Without local knowledge, no war in Afghanistan could be won. The Mujahideen fighters had local political connections and geographical knowledge, unlike an outsider army.  While the Soviet forces were embedded in every level of the government and military, they still lacked experience fighting in the ragged terrain, and did not have the right weapons for the military operation. By the United States supplying the freedom fighters with the “more accessible anti-aircraft weapon in mountainous terrain[35]”, the Stinger, the rebels who were fighting against the Soviet invasion gained a technological and strategic advantage. Back in 1979, President Carter authorized support for insurgents’ propaganda, as well as basic aid. However, the Reagan era brought forward more drastic support, and resulted in the full intelligence and military collaboration between the Mujahedeen fighters and the CIA.

The United States realized that the West can gain advantage from collaborating with the rebels in Afghanistan. The Radio Free Kabul was established, and international agencies (mostly British and American) forged existing alliances further. The Sikh independence movement in Afghanistan, for example, was allied with the Mujahedeen fighters, and both groups had the same goal: driving the Soviets out of the country[36]. Billard[37] states that when Ronald Reagan took over the presidency, he “turned up the heat”. In the first year of his presidency, he doubled the budget of the CIA allocated for the Afghanistan operations. Further, the agency and the U.S. government built a strong collaboration with intelligence services and government agencies outside of Afghanistan, as well as the Mujahedeen fighters. The Saudi government matched the U.S. budget, and Pakistan became involved in the operations[38]. In that first year of Reagan’s presidency, the freedom fighters launched 500 attacks on the average each month, and destroyed more than 500 Soviet vehicles, killing over 4500 security troops. Reagan’s foreign policy did not involve respecting the “detente”, and the public no longer supported the policies focusing on maintaining peace. Further, as Billard quotes Don Barlett’s memoirs[39], “Administration officials insisted that the Soviet Union’s interest in Afghanistan was a prelude to a communist takeover of the Middle East oil fields”. Given the recent oil price crisis, and the assumption that the Soviet Union would soon run out of fuel, and lack sustainability, becoming one of the main importers of fuel[40], making sure that the Soviets do not gain influence and control in Afghanistan had a strategic importance. While Carter simply wanted to reduce the impact of the Soviet invasion in Afghanistan, Reagan’s clear goal (and the CIA’s) was to drive out the Soviets from Afghanistan by all means. The CIA started to directly smuggle weapons to Mujahedeen fighters, while previously this was done through the Pakistani agency, ISI[41]. The defeat of the Soviet army, therefore, was necessary for the decline of the empire. The Soviet Union lost its ability to deal with Saudi Arabia, and lose influence in the Middle East.

President Reagan and the Anti-Communist Movement of America

Carpenter’s review about the Reagan doctrine[42] provides some interesting aspects related to the government and intelligence policies. While insurgency movements in Angola, Cambodia, and Mozambique were less supported by the United States, Reagan’s foreign policy was certainly more aggressive than his predecessor’s. The main aim for the policies and directives introduced was to ensure that political stability of the region is maintained, and the Soviet Union’s influence (political, military, and economic) is weakened. The Reagan administration did not only approve the anti-communist insurgence movements on the diplomatic level, but also managed to form a collaboration with the Mujahedeen group and the political opposition. First of all, according to Carpenter’s account[43], the problem that the guerilla freedom fighters faced was that they had outdated equipment. The weapons used by the Mujahedeen groups were British rifles from WW I. The Soviets, on the other hand, had the AK-47 and had a great advantage on land. The United States realized that the war could not be won simply on ground, and missiles had to be introduced. This also reduced the need for U.S. military involvement, and still support the anti-Soviet movement.

Schweizer[44]  talks about Reagan’s  decision to intervene in Afghanistan after the several discussions with Gorbachev  was influenced by the motivation that America simply  did not want to allow the Soviet Union to leave in a way that it would not damage their prestige and reputation. Therefore, he instructed the government to move fast and do anything necessary to help the Mujahedeen[45]. The new goal was to defeat the Soviets on the battlefield, in order to reduce the “communist threat”. As Schweizer[46] confirms, President Reagan often delivered speeches at anti-communist rallies, and opposed not only the political system, but also the idelology, as well. Shortly after being elected,  the president expressed his belief in freedom opposing the totalitarian communist state.

According to Reagan, the threat of communist expansion was so great that the budget of the Afghanistan covert aid program increased to $300 million a year[47], and it became the most expensive of that kind in U.S. history. His war against communism was a war for world liberty, fought not only in Afghanistan, but also Nicaragua and other parts of the world, apart from Eastern Europe, which was considered to be rightfully belonging to the Soviet Union.

As a summary, the Reagan doctrine was responsible for the fighting of the West against the Communist state of the Soviet Union on the ideological level. Viret[48] describes the Reagan doctrine as “Reagan’s policy of offering open military assistance to anti-communist rebels”, with the focus on anti-communist motives. The author also states that the doctrine itself was not responsible for America’s de facto actions in Afghanistan, but the change in foreign policy had more connection with the decisions. Indeed, America saw an opportunity to weaken the Soviet Union, and knew how the Vietnam war affected the economy of the U.S. Learning from experience, and assuming that the economy of the Soviet Union was no longer sustainable, the West decided to strike down hard, and invest hundreds of millions of dollars in covert aid operations in Afghanistan. The main focus of Reagan as a new president was to scale back communist expansion and increase the world dominance of the United States on the ideological, military, and political level. This aim could not have been achieved without stopping the Soviets in Afghanistan. By making the intervention of the Soviet Union in Afghanistan no longer cost-effective[49], and revolting communism. According to the Reagan doctrine, however, the Mujahedeen  groups were indeed freedom fighters, and they were fighting for the same democratic values that Americans fought for hundreds of years before. Through this idealistic message, Reagan managed to secure public approval for the covert aid operation in Afghanistan, and secured the intelligence budget necessary to overthrow the Soviet power.

The Vietnam of the Soviet Union

The Red Army was defeated in Afghanistan because it was their “Vietnam. According to Ozzy[50], the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan resembled America’s war at Vietnam. It was brutal, killing more than a million people, and no real breakthrough was visible in the first few years. While the United States in the early 1980-s still suffered from the Vietnam Syndrome[51], and did not want to directly become involved in the military operations. At the same time, it is also possible that the presence of the U.S. Army in Pakistan and the Indian Ocean resulted in the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan[52]. While the ten year struggle in Afghanistan resulted in great financial and military losses of the Soviet Union, it is crucial to remember that the conflict initially started as an internal uprising against the Soviet communist influence, and later escalated into an issue that called for the United States to intervene indirectly. The question is why did the United States not intervene until 1979? As it has been revealed before, there are several potential explanations for the above dilemma. First, it is possible that the Vietnam Syndrome had an impact on President Carter’s international politics, and the United States remained an outsider. Secondly,  the CIA could have simply underestimated the chance of military invasion, and failed to act in time. The third explaination is that America was aware of the threat, however, the West patiently waited for the Soviet Union to spend endless amount of money on military equipment, propaganda, and logistics before intervening and simply destroying the majority of the Soviet military equipment. As it has been confirmed, Reagan did not want to provide the Soviets an easy way out. He wanted to destroy  and humiliate the army[53].

Billard[54] clearly states that  “In many respects, we begin to see a comparison to the U.S. involvement in Vietnam. Certainly the result of the Vietnam War, in conjunction with the regional situation, made the decision for the United States to bleed the Soviet Union much easier”. The similarities in the mistakes made by the United States in Vietnam and by the Soviet Union in Afghanistan are clearly visible. The only difference was that while the United States clearly declared war against Vietnam, and ideologized the intervention, the Soviet-Afghan war simply did not exist officially. The Soviet Union’s diplomats maintained that the country was simply supporting communist governments in “friendly” countries. The invasion and the military operation was kept secret by Moscow.

Regarding the guerilla fighting in Afghanistan, it is important to note that there was no clear military strategy on either side. The Afghan Army, supported by Moscow simply needed to carry out operations, and the guerilla Mujahedeen fighters lacked strategy, despite their training received from U.S. intelligence operatives. Afghanistan at the time was far from being an organized and homogenous country. Indeed, as recent analysis confirms[55], the country consisted of tribes loosely connected. The lack of cohesion within the country were reflected on the tactics of the Mujahedeen fighters. The tactics were not standard, and differed from one valley to the next[56]. Further, a maximum of 15 percent of guerilla fighters were trained at the military, and the majority of the group members were volunteers. Likewise, the lack of organization within the Soviet-controlled Afghan army, there was a lack of cohesion. The Red Army failed to defeat the Mujahedeen fighters, as it had ruthless but unorganized tactics, and a lack of discipline[57]. The Soviet campaign is described as “intensive but indecisive”[58], and in 1986, Gorbachev himself described Afghanistan as a “bleeding wound”. However, in the beginning of the conflict, the Mujahedeen were also equipped with little more than their bravery and determination, therefore, they simply needed covert assistance to overcome the difficulties and deal with the Soviet Army’s superiority. The tactics of the Soviet Army, were, however, also lacking organization, and resembled to genocide more than systematic destruction of the enemy. The main methods utilized by the Soviets were carpet-bombing from high altitude, and the destruction of entire villages, which also increased resistance among the population of the country, and increased the number of volunteers joining the Mujahideen fighters.

At the same time, it is clear that the Soviet military underestimated the Mujahedeen. Indeed, as Billard[59] states, the Mujahedeen group was supported by several ISI (Directorate for Inter-Services Intelligence in Pakistan) members, before being trained and aided by the United States. The ISI later had a great role in the conflict after the American involvement, as they helped transporting military equipment to the freedom fighters. It is possible that the Soviet Union was not aware of the size of America’s and Saudi Arabia’s (among other countries) backing of the Mujahedeen fighters, and was not prepared to be facing modern, state-of-the-art weapons. Without the military equipment received from the West, however, the Mujahedeen groups could have been destroyed by the Russian helicopters. Therefore, the intervention was necessary, and needed for defeating the Soviet Union, destroying a great number of ground and air equipment, and creating great enough losses for the USSR to leave the country (and ultimately weaken, leading to the collapse of the superpower). The Soviet Union further underestimated the support of the Mujahedeen fighters that came from Pakistan, in particular. The Mujahideen were trained to target the communication systems of the Soviets, and had the advantage of knowing the challenging terrain.

Assistance in Military Equipment and Intelligence Underestimated

The Soviet Union also underestimated the impact of the American and Saudi aid, and the military training’s impact on the fighting tactics of the Mujahedeen. The reason why the Soviet Army decided to withdraw, according to Billard[60] is that “the effects of U.S. intervention and aid to the Mujahedeen could no longer be reasonably faced by the Soviet military”. However, there are other reasons behind Moscow’s decision, as well, such as losing domestic support for the war, and the infrastructure of the country was no longer able to support the Soviets, without substantial investment made.  As Billard[61] states, the military and intelligence aid provided by the United States to the Mujahedeen  fighters did not only cost the USSR the war, but also their strong government. After the war, the support for the government’s ideology, international politics, and Cold War tactics weakened throughout the Eastern Bloc. The main aim of the CIA was to distract the strategy of the Soviet Union by aiding the Mujahedeen  fighters, and training them to successfully defeat the army. Without the powerful (and superior) weaponry supplied to the fighters, however, the West would not have succeeded. The United States also realized that international sanctions were not effective driving out the Soviet Army from the country, and there was a need for a military defeat.

The war, however, was not won plainly on military level. The support of the CIA provided for the Mujahedeen  group was essential for success. In collaboration with the ICI, the CIA planned the training of fighters, and taught the volunteers how to effectively utilize the weapons supplied by America. Without an extensive knowledge about the military equipment stationed in Afghanistan, America could not have selected the right military aid that would be suitable to defeat the land and air forces of the great Red Army. Previous to the American aid, the weapons used by Mujahedeen fighters were outdated and inferior to Soviet technology. As Alexiev[62] confirms, initially the United States did not supply the right weapons, and in the first five years of the war, only anti-aircraft machine guns were provided, ineffective against the gunship helicopters used by the Soviet Army. For ground fighting, the Mujahedeen only had 82 mm Soviet mortars, with limited range and accuracy rate[63]. Therefore, in the beginning of the war, the Soviet Army’s dominance was unchallenged. The turning point came when the United States became directly involved with Mujahedeen fighters, and the CIA started providing training for the volunteers necessary to achieve superiority. Still the modern equipment supplied made the greatest difference. The Stingers arrived  late, but just in time to drive the Russians out of the country. The Stingers clearly tipped the balance of military power, and decided the outcome of the war alone. Further, Billard[64] also emphasizes that the weapons also had a psychological effect, and deterred the Soviet Army from using military helicopters. Indeed, Billard[65] concludes that “The arming of Afghan rebels was inherently linked to the decline of the Soviet Union”. The aids of the Mujahedeen were not, however, restricted to Stingers and British made rifles: the Czechoslovakian government provided the Pakistanis with Soviet Army supplies, and weapons were delivered from Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and China as well. The Reagan administration took the training and aids to the next level, after introducing the National Security Decision Directive Number 75, highlighting the role of the United States in the Afghanistan conflict.

CIA did everything but physically fight with the rebels, and this involved training, gathering intelligence, bringing international groups together for collaboration (Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, Great Britain), and providing communication/ infrastructure. The establishment of the Radio Free Kabul[66] had a great importance coordinating operations and delivering information. Without the involvement of the CIA, the anti-communist rebels would not have known which type of weapons would be needed for defeating the Soviets. The U.S. intelligence service gathered information on the size of the troops and their location. Further, the Stingers were selected because they were the most suitable for the terrain of Afghanistan. The Stinger was a transportable weapon that was ready to be moved from one base to the next. As Billard[67]  puts it, with the training provided by the CIA and the superior weapons, there was nothing that the Soviet Union could do to stop the Mujahedeen fighters.

The financial support was also necessary for the Mujahedeen fighters, in order to gather intelligence, access crucial infrastructure, and survive in the hostile environment. It has already been confirmed that the CIA’s Afghanistan covert operation budget increased significantly from the date Reagan took over the U.S. administration. Reagan immediately doubled the budget, and through the Committee for a Free Afghanistan, the opposition received substantial funding. Schweizer[68] notes that the United States spent around $470 million to aid the Afghan resistance by 1986. In comparison, the Soviet Union was slowly running out of funds, and could not afford to spend any more on the Afghan intervention. Brown[69] reports that the Soviet Union indeed spent five  billion Roubles each year of the conflict on military and political operations in Afghanistan. The longer the war was going on the weaker the state was becoming. The USSR’s adventurism cost the country a great amount of money, plenty of weapons, and lives of military personnel. This itself reduced the acceptance rate of the actions within the Eastern bloc.

The retreat of the Red Army was a clear win for capitalism, and a  defeat of the communist expansion. Wounded and defeated, the Soviet Union lost more than a war: it lost support, trust, and a strategically important stronghold in the Middle East. Brown[70] describes the Soviet Union’s actions as self-defeating. The Red Army’s retreat and the “win” for Capitalism was not only the result of the well thought through strategy of the Reagan discipline, but also a consequence of the mistakes made by the Soviet Union: politically, strategically, and diplomatically. The country was already running out of energy sources, and was desperate to maintain the sustainability of the Eastern bloc. However, instead of revising its failing economic policies and strategy, Moscow decided to invest into a costly war. The United States, on the other hand, did the calculations. The CIA was happy to spend less than a billion yearly on Afghanistan, while the operations cost the Soviet Union over $8 billion each year[71]. The United States was planing on “draining” Moscow. The government also realized that funding guerilla freedom fighters was significantly cheaper than supporting a government. At the same time, America knew that by choosing not to deploy military forces directly, the war’s costs can be kept under control, while the Soviet Union would run out of money. As the Soviet Union truly believed in the superiority of their army, they became over-confident, and ended up stretching too far, eventually collapsing altogether. The invasion of Afghanistan cost the Soviet Union its international reputation, standing, and domestic support. Without the CIA’s support, the communist state could have expanded, and there was a need for the Reagan doctrine to come to effect to stop the USSR.

Conclusion

Going for the Greatest Damage

The American Covert Action Plan in Afghanistan contributed to the stagnation of Soviet global expansion and eventually became one of the causes that led to the end of the Cold War. America was doing the maths well, and knew – through its intelligence service – that the economy of the Soviet Union was no longer sustainable. Further, the CIA calculated the cost of the war for the Soviets, and was happy to invest into funding, training, and arming the Mujahideen rebels in Afghanistan in order to drive the Soviet Union out. The above essay has investigated the reasons why the United States delayed their intervention and covert operation. It is clear that the West was planning ahead, and wanted to avoid conflicts similar to the Cuban missile crisis, which resulted in a long term standoff of the two super-powers. The threat of nuclear war was too strong to allow the United States to directly intervene in the conflict. Another reason for the delay is the vivid memory of the Vietnam war that cost the United States endless amount of money and thousands of lives. The American public was not likely to support military action against the Soviet Union, that soon after what happened in Vietnam and Cuba.

The strategy of the United States to start covert operations in Afghanistan was well thought through and calculated. The cost associated with training, supporting, and arming thee Mujahedeen fighters were negotiable compared with the amount spent by the Soviet Union. The intelligence services of the United States, Great Britain, and Pakistan created a successful method of collaboration that was designed to gather information on the location, equipment, and position of the Soviet army. Based on that knowledge, the countries were able to support the rebels, and create communication, logistic channels that provided a steady supply of information and weapons. Without the intervention of the United States, the Mujahedeen fighters stood no chance against the superior Soviet army. The Soviet Union controlled the government, the army, and had a large number of equipment/troops deployed in Afghanistan.

The delivery of the Stinger missiles was a decision that was made based on the assumption that these weapons were the most suitable for the given terrain, and for fighting the military equipment of the Red Army. The Stingers had a high accuracy rate, and this meant that they managed to destroy a large number of expensive Soviet tanks and helicopters. Causing the greatest damage was the aim of the covert operation coordinated by the United States, and this aim was clearly achieved. The Americans managed to let the Soviet Union “bleed out”, and lose influence in a geographical spot that had a strategic importance. Covert operation was also needed because Soviet “advisors” controlled every area of the Afghan government, and using  traditional channels was too risky. The United States was supported by the Pakistani intelligence service from the beginning and obtained both information and logistics services that led to gaining an advantage.

In the midst of the Cold War, the battles  were not only fought on the military level, but also on the ideological one. The Reagan discipline concluded that Communism and the Soviet Union were evil, and the enemy of  liberal democracies, like the United States and the United Kingdom. Through this discipline, the U.S. administration managed to gain international approval for the covert operations. Knowing that the Soviet economy was in an unhealthy state, and Moscow could not support the war for too long, the American intelligence service decided to strike in a way that it caused the most damage for the superpower. The defeat in Afghanistan did not only destroy a large number of equipment, but also caused reputational damage for Moscow. The public in the Soviet Union was informed about the cost of the Afghanistan intervention, and the lack of success. While the Soviet officials maintained their version that the military presence of the Red Army was simply a friendly gesture, countries in the Eastern bloc had access to Western news channels, such as Free Europe[72]. While in the beginning of the Soviet-Afghan war Moscow believed the United States weakened by previous military actions and the lack of success in Vietnam, Cuba, soon they had to realize that the CIA had the winning hand, and the peace of  “detente” was no longer guaranteed. The Soviet Union emerged the Afghan war not only defeated, but also weakened politically, economically, and ideologically.

The Causes of Defeat: CIA Teamed up with Guerilla Fighters

The Red Army was not prepared to fight in Afghanistan,  especially when the rebel fighters were receiving vast amounts of intelligence and training from the CIA.  The Soviet Army retreated because of the success of the Reagan Doctrine or the American Covert Action Plan. This was the beginning of the end of the Cold War. The Red Army was notorious of being disorganized, and winning battles on technological or number advantage. The intelligence service of the Red Army, and their communication systems were attacked by the joint operations of the West through the Mujahedeen fighters. The lack of organization itself would not have caused the Soviets’ defeat alone, though. The covert operation of the United States, based on joining forces with the ISI, the Pakistani intelligence service provided the West with an upper hand. By knowing exactly which tactics and weapons the Soviets were using, the CIA was able to determine the right course of action: training provided for the – mainly inexperienced – Mujahedeen volunteers, the Stingers, and the British rifles. Without knowing about the size, location, and equipment of the Red Army, the CIA could not have selected the right weapon aids that would give the guerilla fighters an advantage on the battlefield. It is likely that the Soviet Union did not expect the United States to intervene indirectly and use support from the Mujahedeen group to overthrow the regime, damage the Soviet military, and force the Red Army to retreat. By building a successful international collaboration for aiding the rebels in Afghanistan, and supplying the right equipment, the United States selected the right strategy to weaken the Soviet Empire, weaken its influence, and eventually start up a process that led to the collapse of the Communist state and Eastern bloc.

Bibilography

Alexiev, Alexei. The United States and the War in Afghanistan. (1988) Rand Corporation

Billard Jr, Robert D. “Operation Cyclone: How the United States Defeated the Soviet Union.” URJ-UCCS: Undergraduate Research Journal at UCCS 3, no. 2 (2010): 25-41

Brown, J. D. (2013). Oil Fueled? The Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan. Post-Soviet Affairs, 29(1), 56-94.

Brzezinski, Zbigniew. “How Jimmy Carter and I Started the Mujahideen.” William Blum, trans., Counterpunch 15 (1998).

Carpenter, Ted Galen. “US Aid to Anti-Communist Rebels: The “Reagan Doctrine” and Its Pitfalls.” Cato Institute Policy Analysis 74 (1986).

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Gates, Robert M. From the Shadows: The Ultimate Insider’s Story of Five Presidents an. Simon and Schuster, 2011.

Jalali, Ali Ahmad, and Lester W. Grau. The other side of the mountain: Mujahideen tactics in the Soviet-Afghan war. Tales End Press, 2012.

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Westermann, Edward B. “The Limits of Soviet Airpower: The Failure of Military Coercion in Afghanistan, 1979-89.” Journal of Conflict Studies19, no. 2 (1999).

[1] Alexiev, Alexei. The United States and the War in Afghanistan. (1988) Rand Corporation.

[2] Billard Jr, Robert D. “Operation Cyclone: How the United States Defeated the Soviet Union.” URJ-UCCS: Undergraduate Research Journal at UCCS 3, no. 2 (2010): 25-41. p. 27.

[3] Schweizer, Peter.  Reagan’s War: The Epic Story of His Forty-Year Struggle and Final Triumph Over Communism.  Grove/Atlantic.  New York. 2002.

[4] East, K. E. “The Anglo-American Support Apparatus Behind the Afghani Mujahideen.” Executive Intelligence Review 22, no. 41 (1995): 13.

[5] MacEachin, Douglas J. Predicting the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan: the intelligence community’s record. Study of Intelligence Central Intelligence Agency, 2002.

[6] Ibid

[7] Ibid, p. 4

[8] MacEachin, Douglas J. Predicting the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan: the intelligence community’s record. Study of Intelligence Central Intelligence Agency, 2002.

[9] Billard Jr, Robert D. “Operation Cyclone: How the United States Defeated the Soviet Union.” URJ-UCCS: Undergraduate Research Journal at UCCS 3, no. 2 (2010): 25-41. p. 27.

[10] Ibid, 28.

[11] Gates, Robert M. From the Shadows: The Ultimate Insider’s Story of Five Presidents an. Simon and Schuster, 2011.

[12] Brzezinski, Zbigniew. “How Jimmy Carter and I Started the Mujahideen.” William Blum, trans., Counterpunch 15 (1998).

[13] Ibid.

[14] Ibid.

[15] Billard Jr, Robert D. “Operation Cyclone: How the United States Defeated the Soviet Union.” URJ-UCCS: Undergraduate Research Journal at UCCS 3, no. 2 (2010): 25-41

[16] Westermann, Edward B. “The Limits of Soviet Airpower: The Failure of Military Coercion in Afghanistan, 1979-89.” Journal of Conflict Studies19, no. 2 (1999).

[17] Westermann, Edward B. “The Limits of Soviet Airpower: The Failure of Military Coercion in Afghanistan, 1979-89.” Journal of Conflict Studies19, no. 2 (1999).

[18] Alexiev, Alexei. The United States and the War in Afghanistan. (1988) Rand Corporation

[19] Ibid

[20] Phillips, Steve. The Cold War: conflict in Europe and Asia. Vol. 52001. Heinemann, 2001.

[21] Ibid, 5

[22] Carpenter, Ted Galen. “US Aid to Anti-Communist Rebels: The “Reagan Doctrine” and Its Pitfalls.” Cato Institute Policy Analysis 74 (1986).

[23] Alexiev, Alexei. The United States and the War in Afghanistan. (1988) Rand Corporation.

[24] Reuveny, Rafael, and Aseem Prakash. “The Afghanistan war and the breakdown of the Soviet Union.” Review of International Studies 25, no. 4 (1999): 693-708.

[25] Alexiev, Alexei. The United States and the War in Afghanistan. (1988) Rand Corporation

[26] Brown, J. D. (2013). Oil Fueled? The Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan. Post-Soviet Affairs, 29(1), 56-94.

[27] Reuveny, Rafael, and Aseem Prakash. “The Afghanistan war and the breakdown of the Soviet Union.” Review of International Studies 25, no. 4 (1999): 693-708. 695.

[28] Ibid.

[29] Ibid. 84.

[30] Billard Jr, Robert D. “Operation Cyclone: How the United States Defeated the Soviet Union.” URJ-UCCS: Undergraduate Research Journal at UCCS 3, no. 2 (2010): 25-41. p. 27.

[31] Reuveny, Rafael, and Aseem Prakash. “The Afghanistan war and the breakdown of the Soviet Union.” Review of International Studies 25, no. 4 (1999): 693-708. 707.

[32] Brown, J. D. (2013). Oil Fueled? The Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan. Post-Soviet Affairs, 29(1), 56-94.

[33] Ibid, 64.

[34] Alexiev, Alexei. The United States and the War in Afghanistan. (1988) Rand Corporation.

[35] Billard Jr, Robert D. “Operation Cyclone: How the United States Defeated the Soviet Union.” URJ-UCCS: Undergraduate Research Journal at UCCS 3, no. 2 (2010): 25-41. p. 27. p. 33.

[36] East, K. E. “The Anglo-American Support Apparatus Behind the Afghani Mujahideen.” Executive Intelligence Review 22, no. 41 (1995): 13.

[37] Billard Jr, Robert D. “Operation Cyclone: How the United States Defeated the Soviet Union.” URJ-UCCS: Undergraduate Research Journal at UCCS 3, no. 2 (2010): 25-41. p. 27. p. 33.

[38] Ibid.

[39] Billard Jr, Robert D. “Operation Cyclone: How the United States Defeated the Soviet Union.” URJ-UCCS: Undergraduate Research Journal at UCCS 3, no. 2 (2010): 25-41.  p. 32

[40] Ibid.

[41] Ibid.

[42] Carpenter, Ted Galen. “US Aid to Anti-Communist Rebels: The “Reagan Doctrine” and Its Pitfalls.” Cato Institute Policy Analysis 74 (1986).

[43] Carpenter, Ted Galen. “US Aid to Anti-Communist Rebels: The “Reagan Doctrine” and Its Pitfalls.” Cato Institute Policy Analysis 74 (1986).

[44] Schweizer, Peter.  Reagan’s War: The Epic Story of His Forty-Year Struggle and Final Triumph Over Communism.

[45] Ibid.

[46] Ibid.

[47] Ibid

[48] Viret, Julian. “The Reagan Doctrine: No De Facto Effect on America’s Intervention in Afghanistan.”

[49] Ibid.

[50] Ozzy, Daniel. “Afghanistan War Without End” Lulu Books. Retrieved 13/10/2015 from Google Books.

[51] Brown, J. D. (2013). Oil Fueled? The Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan. Post-Soviet Affairs, 29(1), 56-94

[52] Ibid, 71.

[53] Schweizer, Peter.  Reagan’s War: The Epic Story of His Forty-Year Struggle and Final Triumph Over Communism.

[54] Billard Jr, Robert D. “Operation Cyclone: How the United States Defeated the Soviet Union.” URJ-UCCS: Undergraduate Research Journal at UCCS 3, no. 2 (2010): 25-41  p. 38.

[55] Jalali, Ali Ahmad, and Lester W. Grau. The other side of the mountain: Mujahideen tactics in the Soviet-Afghan war. Tales End Press, 2012.

[56] Ibid

[57] Brown, J. D. (2013). Oil Fueled? The Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan. Post-Soviet Affairs, 29(1), 56-94. p. 66.

[58] Alexiev, Alexei. The United States and the War in Afghanistan. (1988) Rand Corporation. 26.

[59] Billard Jr, Robert D. “Operation Cyclone: How the United States Defeated the Soviet Union.” URJ-UCCS: Undergraduate Research Journal at UCCS 3, no. 2 (2010): 25-41

[60] Billard Jr, Robert D. “Operation Cyclone: How the United States Defeated the Soviet Union.” URJ-UCCS: Undergraduate Research Journal at UCCS 3, no. 2 (2010): 25-41. p. 38.

[61] Ibid.

[62] Alexiev, Alexei. The United States and the War in Afghanistan. (1988) Rand Corporation. 11.

[63] Ibid.

[64] Billard Jr, Robert D. “Operation Cyclone: How the United States Defeated the Soviet Union.” URJ-UCCS: Undergraduate Research Journal at UCCS 3, no. 2 (2010): 25-41. p. 38.

[65] Ibid, 34.

[66] East, K. E. “The Anglo-American Support Apparatus Behind the Afghani Mujahideen.” Executive Intelligence Review 22, no. 41 (1995): 13.

[67] Billard Jr, Robert D. “Operation Cyclone: How the United States Defeated the Soviet Union.” URJ-UCCS: Undergraduate Research Journal at UCCS 3, no. 2 (2010): 25-41.

[68] Schweizer, Peter.  Reagan’s War: The Epic Story of His Forty-Year Struggle and Final Triumph Over Communism.  Grove/Atlantic.  New York. 2002.

[69] Brown, J. D. (2013). Oil Fueled? The Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan. Post-Soviet Affairs, 29(1), 56-94. p. 66.

[70] Ibid

[71] Schweizer, Peter.  Reagan’s War: The Epic Story of His Forty-Year Struggle and Final Triumph Over Communism.  Grove/Atlantic.  New York. 2002.

[72] Schweizer, Peter.  Reagan’s War: The Epic Story of His Forty-Year Struggle and Final Triumph Over Communism.  Grove/Atlantic.  New York. 2002.